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This thesis explores how people’s knowledge about sustainability affects 
participation in combined conservation and development initiatives. It focuses 
principally on two case studies that embody these dual objectives: the ‘conservancy 
programme’ in Namibia and the Alto Bermejo Project in Argentina. The concept of 
sustainability – of living in a way that meets both current and future needs – has led, 
on a global scale, to a re-casting of the relationship between conservation and 
development as one of necessary interdependence. Such is the credibility invested in 
the concept of sustainability that it is found underpinning policy and intervention in 
countries as distinct as Namibia and Argentina. 
 
These observations set up the two central questions of the thesis. First, what types of 
participation characterise decision-making processes within these two contexts? 
Second, how is having knowledge on sustainability one (though not the only) causal 
determinant of who participates, in what activities and on what basis?  
 
These questions pave the way for analysis of the types of participation found in two 
Namibian conservancies and specific components of the Alto Bermejo Project in 
Argentina. A key belief shaping policy and intervention in both contexts is that 
wider local involvement is a precondition of sustainable natural resource use. 
Consequently, strong efforts are made in both places to attempt to ensure that local 
people are key decision-makers. However, talk of local-level, grassroots 
participation in the Namibian or Argentine context, whilst by no means wholly 
misplaced, can obscure the high participation levels of NGO, government and 
specific private-sector actors. This is because both initiatives depend for the 
achievement of their objectives on a process of knowledge transfer from 
implementers to beneficiaries. Much of the knowledge deemed necessary for the 
realisation of these objectives lies with government, NGO and specific private sector 
actors. Having this knowledge, therefore, renders their participation indispensable. 
Indeed, the very access of these actors to the resources on which intervention 
depends is partly a function of the credibility invested in their knowledge. Access to 
resources is also a means through which the credibility of such knowledge is 
reinforced. This dynamic I call ‘circularity in intervention’.  
 
‘Circularity in intervention’ entails a variety of advantages and disadvantages 
relative to context and perspective, which this thesis neither condemns nor condones. 
It does, nonetheless, seek to clarify one important point. Our account of participation 
in the Namibian or Argentine examples is incomplete without looking at how having 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
1. Sustainability and participation in the conservancy 
programme and the Alto Bermejo Project  
 
The importance of the concept of sustainability  
Sustainability has become an extremely important concept in countless spheres of 
remarkably diverse human activity. The objective of the thesis is to trace the 
consequences for local participation, in both Namibia’s conservancy programme and 
Argentina’s Alto Bermejo Project, of having or not having knowledge deemed 
necessary to the achievement of sustainability goals.  
Finding a way of living sustainably is increasingly believed to be necessary for 
the avoidance of environmental catastrophe; and in particular the kind of 
environmental catastrophe that might compromise the future existence of human (and 
other) life on the planet. Sustainability has come to be viewed as the means through 
which to reconcile two tendencies that have often been seen as incompatible. One 
stresses the importance of conserving the environment, be it as a matter of urgent 
expedience or in lieu of the intrinsic worth of global biodiversity. The other celebrates 
human abilities to marshal and exploit myriad features of the natural world in the 
pursuit of continual, collective improvement, as measured (however reductively) in 
terms of economic growth. Precisely what form this reconciliation should take is a 
matter that continues to generate hotly-contested and politically-charged debate.  
Despite larger controversies over the appropriate global response to the potential 
dangers of current modes of growth and consumption, many have nonetheless arrived 
at the conclusion that it is possible to realise conservation and development objectives 
simultaneously. The very existence of the Namibian conservancy programme and the 
Argentine Alto Bermejo Project confirms this to be the case. Both posit the 
sustainable management of common-pool resources as the solution and both 
constitute a set of arrangements formulated for the purpose of setting common-pool 
resource use on a sustainable footing. That initiatives in such markedly distinct 
contexts as Namibia and Argentina should do so is a powerful indication of the global 
reach of the concept of sustainability. Put differently, the privileged character of 
 1
knowledge related to the concept of sustainability is evident in the fact that it 
underpins policy and intervention in these specific initiatives (and others) in both 
Namibia and Argentina. Viewing sustainability in terms of privileged knowledge is a 
useful exercise, because it raises the questions of how this status was acquired and 
how it is maintained. Answering these questions, I contend, is necessary if we are to 
gain a fuller understanding of who participates and on what basis in either enterprise.  
In the literature on achieving conservation and development objectives 
simultaneously, local participation is commonly taken to be a precondition of 
sustainable common-pool resource management. Indeed, thinking in conservation and 
development arenas has led, over the last four decades, to a flattering re-evaluation of 
the role and capacity of local people, one which has lamented their exclusion from the 
most important decision-making processes that frame intervention (Chambers 1983, 
1997, Freire 1974, Pimbert and Pretty 1995, Richards 1985). Both the conservancy 
programme and the Alto Bermejo Project profess strong commitment to the 
importance of local participation, and claim that local people are central to the 
decision-making processes through which their interventions are governed. In the 
Namibian context, for instance, it has been asserted by a longstanding practitioner 
that the conservancy programme is “the most popular grass-roots movement in the 
country”1. Although no comparably grand claim is made for the Alto Bermejo 
Project, the policy documents which frame it do make clear that the participation of 
grass-roots organisations (organizaciones de base) is considered fundamental to the 
success of their combined conservation and development objectives (i.e. Fundación 
Pro Yungas 2003:25).  
There are numerous grounds in both contexts for accepting the argument that 
provision is made for local people to participate in the most central of decision-
making processes. Taking the specific example of Tsiseb conservancy in Northwest 
Namibia, for instance, we find that it draws upon the tradition of representative 
democratic decision-making that was established in Namibia following independence 
in 1990. The agroforestry initiatives of the Alto Bermejo Project in Los Toldos, 
Northwest Argentina, on which part three of the thesis focuses, are characterised by 
‘direct’ participation. That is, the people of Los Toldos themselves – as opposed to 
representatives – decide what activities they will pursue and how they will be 
                                                 
1 Interview with Margaret Jacobsohn co-director of Integrated Rural Development and Nature 
Conservation (IRDNC), 22.1.2004, Windhoek. 
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pursued, albeit jointly with an employee of the Pro Yungas Foundation, the ‘lead 
organisation’ in the Alto Bermejo Project, who has the knowledge, skills and access 
to resources necessary for the pursuance of those activities.  
Nonetheless, viewing either the conservancy programme or the Alto Bermejo 
Project in the light of grass-roots participation leaves our account incomplete. The 
link between knowing and deciding, and the consequences for local participation of 
that link, remain unexplored. It is only once these initiatives are seen as exercises in 
knowledge transfer that a fuller picture can be developed. Essentially, although both 
stress the importance of local knowledge and skills, objectives are defined more in 
terms of bodies of knowledge that local people in both places do not have, than they 
are in terms of the knowledge that people do have. Such is the centrality of the 
concept of sustainability to both initiatives that they are in fact unintelligible without 
prior knowledge of it. There are, to be sure, local ways of using or not using 
common-pool resources that may be translated into the vocabulary of sustainability, 
but the term itself is not locally employed in the areas in which fieldwork was 
conducted. 
Moreover, the means through which sustainability objectives are to be achieved 
are not always locally available. From determining the institutional arrangements for 
sustainable common-pool resource management, to the logistics of bringing people 
together to make decisions jointly, considerable external assistance is necessary in 
both contexts. For this reason, in both initiatives, a transfer of knowledge and skills 
sets is required; indeed, it is the existing consensus that such a transfer is necessary – 
the identification of a knowledge gap – that justifies intervention in the first place. 
Because the knowledge transfer is seen as justified – in the interests of sustainability 
objectives, from which positive conservation and development outcomes can be 
achieved – the participation of actors with those sets of knowledge and skills is 
rendered indispensable.  
 
Circularity in intervention  
Identifying this existing consensus about the need to transfer knowledge and skills 
related to achieving sustainable conservation and development outcomes is important 
and fruitful. It leads on to the questions of how it is that consensus on the need for the 
knowledge transfer was brought about, and how it is that sustainability has come to 
be such an important goal even in places as different as Namibia and Argentina. By 
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tracing the process through which the concept of sustainability has acquired its 
privileged status, it is possible to understand how and why actors who have 
knowledge relating to it become and remain indispensable participants. That such 
participants are involved in justifying the knowledge transfer, thereby partially 
defining in the first place what there is to participate in, and are subsequently 
involved in the implementation that follows, is a dynamic which I hope to have 
captured with the notion of ‘circularity in intervention’. There are two senses to the 
notion of circularity as I employ it in the thesis. Both derive from work by Barry 
Barnes on the problem of reference (Barnes 1983, 1988). His ideas and their 
relevance to my research are explored at greater length in chapter two; here a 
synopsis is offered. 
In the first sense, knowledge about sustainability has a circular quality, in the 
sense that it has a self-referential component (Barnes 1988, chapter 3). That is to say, 
references to sustainability refer partly to other references to sustainability, and not 
just to a thing or occurrence independent of that reference. To put it another way, 
people may come to refer to a thing or occurrence as sustainable because other people 
already refer to that thing or occurrence as sustainable, and not because, on inspection 
of that thing or occurrence, they have discovered within it the inherent, empirically 
verifiable property of ‘sustainability’. What the reference actually specifies is not the 
thing or occurrence itself, but rather the relationship in which it stands to a context of 
human activity (ibid:49). The source of their reference is another reference. The 
subject and the object of the reference are thereby collapsed, and this, as Hume would 
have had it, is to reason in a circle. In this first sense, then, I take ‘circular’ to be 
synonymous with ‘self-referential’. 
To give an example, when a person refers to strictly-controlled trophy hunting as 
a form of ‘sustainable wildlife management’, s/he is not referring to an empirically 
verifiable property of trophy hunting, nor directly to the animals which are hunted. 
‘Sustainable wildlife management’ here refers to killing only certain quantities and 
kinds of animals (i.e. older males, not pregnant females). This action can only be said 
to be sustainable in relation to a context of human activity, namely one of trying to 
ensure the continual availability of those animals. Following Barnes, crucially, we are 
the context in which designating some ways of killing sustainable and others 
unsustainable becomes intelligible. An individual will designate an activity 
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sustainable in a context in which others commonly make the same designation, 
indeed partly because others commonly make the same designation.  
If designating a thing or occurrence as sustainable refers not only to a specific 
empirical attribute, but partly also to other references to it as sustainable, then its 
status as sustainable or otherwise is, consequently, a matter for negotiation and 
agreement (cf. Barnes 1983). Accordingly, if agreement on what is and is not 
sustainable cannot be reached merely by reference to empirical properties, room is 
left for two individuals to designate the same thing or occurrence as sustainable or 
unsustainable. How is agreement secured on whether a thing or occurrence is or is not 
sustainable when there is so much scope for negotiation? The answer is frequently 
that there is no agreement on what is sustainable and what is not: to illustrate the 
point, one need only compare the opposite conclusions reached about the same 
phenomena by the Global 2000 Report to the President (1980) on the one hand and 
the contributors to The Resourceful Earth on the other (Simon and Kahn 1984). Yet 
there are still occasions when agreement is reached. On these occasions, such 
agreement rests partly on what Barnes terms ‘cognitive authority’, that is, on the 
propensity of people to accept a designation that is already assigned by an individual 
or a group precisely because it is so designated by that individual or group (Barnes 
1983:525-30). In other words, the source of authority for the designation – the reason 
why others will make the same designation – rests in an individual or a group. 
Extrapolating from Barnes, I draw the distinction between ‘limited’ (individual) and 
‘general’ (group) cognitive authority. The more general the source of cognitive 
authority, the greater the number of people who can designate a term and have it 
accepted by other users of that term. The more limited the source of cognitive 
authority, the fewer are the users who can designate a term and have that designation 
accepted by others. Whether the source of cognitive authority is limited or general, if 
it makes others accept the designation of a particular thing or phenomenon as 
sustainable, a ‘coordination of beliefs’ (Barnes, Bloor, and Henry 1996), or a 
consensus, is the end product. To reiterate once more, then, one significant reason 
why a reference to a thing as sustainable comes to be accepted cannot wholly be 
explained without recourse to the idea of cognitive authority.    
Now I have made the points necessary to explain what I mean by the second sense 
in which I use the term ‘circular’ in this thesis. I contend that the cognitive authority 
for the designation of something as sustainable is more likely to be of the limited than 
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of the general kind. This is because knowledge relating to sustainability is a 
specialised affair. It requires its holders to acquire proficiency in diffuse bodies of 
knowledge, ranging from the science of soil conservation, silvi- or aquaculture to 
theories of collective action, institution-building and governance, to name but a few 
aspects of sustainability. Because of the sheer amount that it is deemed necessary to 
know in any attempt to formulate a thoroughgoing definition of sustainability, it is the 
few rather than the many who will possess sufficient cognitive authority to be able 
credibly to separate the sustainable ‘wheat’ from the unsustainable ‘chaff’.  
In terms of participation in initiatives which presuppose the importance of 
sustainability, then, people with knowledge of this concept are rendered indispensable 
when their cognitive authority is accepted by the actors with the resources necessary 
to finance intervention. Whatever sort of intervention follows has to be measured 
against the yardstick of sustainability. The presence and established acceptance of this 
criterion is important to recognise because, as noted, it helps us to realise that what 
there is to participate in is already partially predetermined. Any analysis of 
participation needs must be aware of this factor. Furthermore, it leads to circular 
forms of involvement: the same actors are involved in all stages of the project cycle. 
The people whose cognitive authority was instrumental to ensuring that knowledge 
about sustainability is accepted as a basis for conservation and development policy, 
the people who implement conservancy programme or Alto Bermejo Project activities 
and the people who judge whether such activities are sustainable are often one and the 
same; and precisely because they were successful in getting their knowledge accepted 
in the first place.  
This type of circular involvement has, then, been self-reinforcing. Involvement in 
the early stages of policy change has led to securing the financial, human and other 
resources required for involvement in implementation. The outcomes of intervention 
feed back into what is known about sustainability. This in turn influences the policy 
in terms of which implementation is to be shaped; which in turn serves as the basis on 
which further funding is secured. Indeed, further funding has been secured more than 
once for both the conservancy programme and the Alto Bermejo Project. This circular 
dynamic is illustrated below in figure 1.1.  
Two points of clarification. First, the notion of ‘circularity in intervention’ might 
be conflated with the suggestion that people with knowledge about sustainability in 
the Namibian and Argentine contexts strive to gain acceptance for their knowledge, 
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merely with a view to securing the funding that is necessary for the survival of their 
own institutions, and/or that will give them greater control over the direction of these 
initiatives. Such thinking chimes with the concerns about and critiques of expert 
knowledge that were central in paving the way for more participatory approaches to 
development policy and practice. The work of Robert Chambers has long sought to 
problematise the privileged character of knowledge which for him underpinned the 
“professional realities” of international development practitioners who had failed to 
come to terms with the validity of utility of local knowledge (i.e. Chambers 1983, 
1997). In their work, scholars such as Emery Roe (1991, 1995), Melissa Leach and 
Robin Mearns (1996) have similarly sought to demonstrate that the perpetuation of 
expert knowledge, be it a claim for an orthodox view or a counter claim against it, 
serves the interests of the experts who seek to perpetuate it.  
This is not quite what I mean to suggest in relation to my own fieldwork in 
Namibia or Argentina. I do not think that project actors in either context who have 
knowledge about sustainability render themselves indispensable solely as part of a 
ploy to sustain ‘NGO livelihoods’. To be sure, self-interest plays a role, but the roles 
and motivations which explain the involvement of people with knowledge about 
sustainability need to be explored in terms of a broader, richer tapestry of goals and 
interests (cf. Barnes, Bloor, and Henry 1996). Furthermore, it is my intention with 
this thesis to demonstrate that, even in initiatives such as the conservancy programme 
and the Alto Bermejo Project which can make plausible claims to featuring high 
levels of local participation, such participation is still shaped in fundamental ways by 
the link between knowing and deciding. If the participatory rhetoric used to describe 
these initiatives does not take as its starting point their essential character as exercises 
in knowledge transfer, then it will obscure as much about their participatory dynamics 
as it reveals.  
Second, the focus on knowledge about sustainability may at first glance appear to 
render NGO, government, donor or academic actors as ‘omnipotent’ powers in the 
situation, casting local people in the role of passive bystanders, or simple recipients of 
knowledge about sustainability in a one-way transfer process. This is not the case. 
Both the Conservancy Programme and the Alto Bermejo Project, in different ways, 
view local participation as a precondition of sustainability and see local knowledge as 
an important part of setting resource use on a sustainable footing. Partly for this 
reason, local knowledge about common-pool resource use finds its way into policy. 
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Local people in both contexts are also free to reinterpret, reject or remain ignorant of 
‘external’ knowledge deemed necessary for the achievement of sustainability 
objectives. The transfer works both ways, so to speak, with NGO, donor government 
and academic actors often extending the cognitive authority of the knowledge of the 
local people they work with by accepting such knowledge and emphasising its use as 
necessary to the achievement of sustainability in natural resource use. And yet it 
remains the case that the definition and achievement of sustainability relies more on 
what local people do not know, than on what they do know.  
 
 

























2. The thesis structure 
 
The main body of the thesis is divided into three parts, bracketed by this introductory 
and one concluding chapter. The structure devised has been shaped by two principal 
factors:  
 
1. As a comparative study, it was necessary to identify the basis for comparison 
between Namibia and Argentina: namely, the profound influence of the concept 
of sustainability on conservation and development policy and intervention in 
Namibia and Argentina.  
2. Having identified the concept of sustainability as the basis of the comparison, the 
thesis then had to trace the consequences of having or not having knowledge 
about sustainability for participatory dynamics in the Alto Bermejo Project and 
the conservancy programme, using this approach first in Namibia and then 
repeating it in Argentina.  
 
The reasons for choosing a comparative study are taken up in more depth in section 
three. The rationale for a three part structure should now be clear: part one deals with 
the basis for comparison; whilst parts two and three explore how this influence 
manifests itself in two distinct empirical contexts – especially in respect of the 
consequences for local participation. Both parts two and three also feature chapters 
which give historical backgrounds on Namibia and Argentina respectively. These 
serve to provide an idea of the broader contexts in which to situate the conservancy 
programme and the Alto Bermejo Project. This thesis is not principally about 
Namibia or Argentina; it is about the concept of sustainability, and it is for this reason 
that it is given extensive treatment in the three chapters which comprise part one.  
 
Part one – studying sustainability in historical context (and how to go about it) 
In order to establish how it has acquired the status of an imperative that we ignore at 
our peril, it is necessary to explore the history of the concept of sustainability. In 
terms of policy and intervention related to conservation and development, 
‘sustainability’ is so important that no credible policy, proposal, project or 
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programme could fail to mention it. It was not always this way: how did it become so, 
and how did ideas regarding the relationship between conservation and development 
change as a consequence? Finding answers to these questions is the central task of 
part one.  
In order to achieve this objective, I employ insights from the sociology of 
knowledge (scientific or otherwise) partly from the work of Barry Barnes on 
reference, as already mentioned, but also from the approach elaborated by Barry 
Barnes, David Bloor and John Henry in Scientific knowledge: a sociological analysis 
(1996). These are elaborated in chapter two. Although work on the self-referential 
components of knowledge is clearly important in understanding how we come to 
accept certain activity as sustainable, it is not the whole story. Rather, it has to be set 
within the ‘finitist’ account of knowledge. The finitist account holds that our current 
ways of knowing are insufficient to determine the truth of one belief or the falsity of 
another. In essence, finitism requires that the causes of all beliefs – regardless of how 
true or false they are considered to be, must be investigated symmetrically (Bloor 
1991 [1976]). That is, they must be investigated by the same method, i.e. with 
reference to the goals and interests which cause them to be held in preference to 
others (Barnes 1982b, Barnes, Bloor, and Henry 1996). This line of argument sets 
itself up in opposition to the proposition that the cause of some beliefs being held is 
that they are demonstrably true, whilst the cause of other (false) beliefs is to be found 
in the realm of social, cultural or psychological explanations. In the case of all beliefs, 
the goals and interests of those who hold them are to be stated, and the consequences 
of holding such beliefs traced.  
Chapter three proceeds, then, to document the history of the concept of 
sustainability. As already noted, the term cannot be understood in isolation from 
concerns, dating back at least as far the nineteenth century, about the potentially 
adverse environmental effects of ‘progress’ through industrialisation and a global 
expansion in consumption rates. The emergence and increase in the influence of the 
concept through the staging of certain events – such as the earth summits – and the 
creation of certain institutions – such as the World Commission on Environment and 
Development – is elaborated.  
The definition of sustainability that receives most attention here derives from that 
given in the Brundtland Report for sustainable development: “development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
 10
meet their own needs” (WCED 1987 43). But, of course, there is not just one 
interpretation of this definition, let alone one single definition of sustainability. Just as 
multiple definitions exist, so too do approaches to achieving sustainability: a brief list 
of the best-known ‘perspectives’ includes techno-, anthro- or eco-centric, blue-, red- 
or deep-green varieties. As a result, there is much consensus on the need for 
sustainability, but rather less on what that might entail. It remains a broad and perhaps 
necessarily vague notion, around which gather an unlikely and often mutually 
antagonistic set of interest groups (Duffy 2000a).  
The use of common-pool resources is central to any attempt to realise a 
sustainable way of living. Within the study of common-pool resources, sustainability 
has undergone a reappraisal, in terms of how to make common-pool resource use 
sustainable and indeed whether this aim can actually be achieved through careful 
management. This re-evaluation has brought about change in ideas about what 
constitutes necessary knowledge in order for sustainable common-pool resource 
management to be realised, as well as who holds such knowledge. The value of local 
knowledge and common-pool resource management regimes has received much more 
attention, whilst conventional western approaches to common-pool resource 
management as well as scientific knowledge about common-pool resources, have 
come under fire (Fairhead and Leach 1998, Holling, Berkes, and Folke 1998, Ostrom 
1990, Pottier 2003, Richards 1985). Local knowledge holders have sometimes 
become cognitive authorities regarding sustainable common-pool resource use. 
Crucially, this change in attitude has led local participation in common-pool resource 
management to be viewed as a precondition of sustainability.  
These debates prefigure thinking at the core of ‘community conservation’, of 
which both the Conservancy Programme and the Alto Bermejo Project are examples. 
‘Community conservation’, which redefines conservation in terms of the sustainable 
use of common-pool resources, can be seen as a counter-narrative which has 
challenged the standard narrative of ‘fortress’ conservation (Adams and Hulme 2001, 
Roe 1991, Roe 1995). Chapter four deals with thinking on the relationship between 
the two narratives, changes in ideas about how to go about achieving conservation 
and development objectives, and the possibility of reconciling conservation and 
development processes. This exercise paves the way for introducing the six 
‘principles of sustainability’ which underpin policy and implementation in both the 
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Conservancy Programme and the Alto Bermejo Project. These six principles in turn 




Part two – Namibia’s conservancy programme  
The second part of the thesis examines how the concept of sustainability has found its 
way into policy and implementation in Namibia’s conservancy programme. Chapter 
five gives historical background on Namibia, the broader context within which to 
understand how the conservancy programme emerged. Namibia’s history, for a 
majority of its inhabitants, has been one of vast structural disadvantage and inequity. 
From German annexation in 1884 until independence in 1990, government policy was 
skewed in favour of the white settler minority. We can read Namibian history as one 
excluded the majority from the processes through which the territory was governed. 
We can also read much twentieth century Namibian history as one of resistance to 
such exclusion, as embodied in the quest for self-determination and independence. 
Independence created an urgent demand for more inclusive policies that would 
better serve the black majority. The representative democratic structures established  
 




through the political settlement provided models for decision-making which, in view 
of the struggle to achieve independence, resonated with the legitimacy of a long-
denied but just cause. The conservancy programme, which recast poor, black 
communal area inhabitants in the light of capable protagonists fitted perfectly in the 
new ‘policy space’ that had opened up.  
Chapter six charts the emergence of the conservancy programme, a nationwide 
initiative which allows communal land inhabitants to apply to central government for 
limited rights to manage wildlife and benefit from tourism operations. A standard 
bearer for the ‘community conservation counter-narrative’, it is a manifestation of the 
changes that conservation and development thinking have undergone as a result of the 
increasing importance of the concept of sustainability. Conservation is to be taken 
outside the protected area, squared with local livelihood imperatives and, crucially, 
must involve local people in decisions about common-pool resource use – especially 
wildlife – if sustainability objectives are to be achieved. The chapter shows how 
conservancy policy and legislation can be read in terms of the ‘six principles of 
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sustainability’. The acceptance of this different way of thinking about conservation 
would have been unlikely to find any purchase had it not been for the opportunities 
for change in beliefs about conservation and development opened up by 
independence. 
The actors central to redefining the conservation agenda during policy 
formulation also led the charge for implementation of the conservancy programme. 
Their access to considerable financial resources also made them perhaps even more 
central to implementation than the Ministry of Environment and Tourism.  
Chapter seven concentrates on Tsiseb conservancy, in the Erongo region. Tsiseb 
is plays host to a number of tourism ventures which endeavour to generate revenue 
from consumptive and non-consumptive forms of wildlife use. Principally, these are 
the Brandberg White Lady Lodge and African Hunting Safaris trophy hunting 
excursions and the Daureb Mountain Guides.  
Like other Namibian conservancies established on (state owned) communal land, 
Tsiseb is governed through an elected committee system, and decision-making is an 
extension of the principles of representative democracy which prefigure Namibia’s 
national system of governance. Decision-making is largely carried out not by 
conservancy residents directly but by the (elected) conservancy executive committee 
and the conservancy manager, with considerable input and advice from the support 
organisations which are also involved in the running of Tsiseb. It is important to 
clarify this link to a wider precedent which, for all its flaws, enjoys broad legitimacy, 
and is especially pertinent given that the conservancy programme has been criticised 
on the grounds that conservancy residents lack sufficient opportunities to participate 
in important decisions (eg. Long 2004, Vaughan pers. com.). How, in an area as large 
as Tsiseb, participation could be more direct, is hard to fathom, so it is as well to 
clarify the expectations we can or should hold of representative participation. Do we 
justify ‘committee- (rather than community-) based natural resource management’ by 
endorsing representative participation? Or are we imposing a ‘tyranny of 
participation’ (cf. Cooke and Kothari 2001, Mosse 2001) by arguing for more direct 
decision making in Tsiseb? These are vital questions for people involved in the 
conservancy programme to tackle, but it is necessary to set them within the wider 
context of representative democracy in Namibia.  
The discussion of representative participation leads into the consideration of 
circularity in intervention in Tsiseb conservancy through which people with 
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knowledge about sustainability are rendered indispensable to decision making. Talk 
of the indispensability of support organisation actors speaks to fractiously 
controversial issues of power and control within the conservancy programme; but it is 
not my intention to determine how it should speak to these issues. It could be enlisted 
to support the concern that non-governmental support organisations have too much 
control over the conservancy agenda and the power to exclude other agendas therein. 
But it could also support those who feel that the conservancy model is essentially 
sound, and that flaws in the implementation of conservancy policy notwithstanding, 
support organisations, either governmental or non-governmental, are offering poor 
communal land inhabitants necessary, beneficial, welcome knowledge and skills. My 
reluctance to ‘take sides’ reflects a wish not to exacerbate with my own research the 
sometimes acrimonious character of the relationship between ‘external’ researchers 
and some of the conservancy programme’s practitioners. In the interests of frank and 
comprehensive debate, in this work I take the position that leaving space open for all 
viewpoints is more important than seeking to adjudicate between them.  
 
Part three – Argentina’s Alto Bermejo Project  
The third part of the thesis examines how the concept of sustainability has found its 
way into policy and implementation in Argentina’s Alto Bermejo Project. Chapter 
eight serves the same purpose as chapter five, that of giving historical background, 
and background which is indeed thematically linked to twentieth-century Namibian 
history through the concept of exclusion, albeit manifest in an empirically very 
different set of circumstances. When the Argentine-Bolivian border was re-drawn in  
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Map 1.2 – Argentina   
 
Source: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas 
 
1938, the Valley of Los Toldos, in which sits the present day municipality of Los 
Toldos, became part the province of Salta, Northwest Argentina. Historically, the 
villages of the modern municipality of Los Toldos are the result of settlement patterns 
in the Tarija Valley in modern Bolivia. 
The municipality’s current situation was forged through the interplay of many 
factors, including colonisation, migration, war, trade, and the patchy industrialisation 
of the Argentine Northwest. When taken together, these interwoven processes 
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constitute a history of geographical isolation, marginalisation and concomitant 
poverty. This history, in combination with a dependency on the resources of the state, 
is a disadvantage for toldeños (inhabitants of Los Toldos), when it comes to making 
decisions about local conservation and development issues. These hinge often on 
knowledge and skills that toldeños, due largely to their history of isolation and 
poverty, do not have. It is against this background that toldeño participation in the 
Alto Bermejo Project is to be understood. 
Chapter nine traces the broad outline of the Alto Bermejo Project, an initiative 
which proposes taking the conservation agenda outside Northwest Argentina’s 
protected areas and squaring it with ongoing natural resource use activities, in the 
interests of sustainability. The Project operates within the framework of the ‘Yungas’ 
Biosphere Reserve, which was created in order to conserve the subtropical mountain 
forests, or Yungas, which stretch down the eastern slopes of the Andes from 
Venezuela to Northwest Argentina in discontinuous strips covering 4.5-4.8 million 
hectares (Brown et al. 2001). The Yungas spread across too large a terrain to be 
incorporated into a protected area, and it is for this reason that it is deemed necessary 
to undertake conservation activities across a wider landscape.  
In large measure, the Alto Bermejo Project clusters, coordinates and funds a series 
of pre-established activities and actors. It groups these activities and actors under the 
four constituent components, which are posited as the means through which to 
achieve its objectives:  
 
1. The institutionalisation of the Biosphere Reserve and its area of influence 
2. The management of protected areas 
3. The sustainable management of natural resource utilisation for commercial 
and farming purposes 
4. Environmental monitoring of activities in the Project area (Pro Yungas 
Foundation 2003:25-29, my translation). 
 
At various points throughout the chapter, which essentially explores Alto Bermejo 
Project policy documents, the influence of the six ‘principles of sustainability’ is 
traced.   
Chapter ten focuses more specifically on agroforestry and related activities 
undertaken by the Pro Yungas Foundation, the lead organisation in the Alto Bermejo 
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Project, in the municipality of Los Toldos. Once again the influence of the ‘six 
principles’ of sustainability on policy and implementation is rendered explicit. It 
looks also at the type of participation that characterises these initiatives. I designate 
this ‘direct’ participation because, in contrast with the conservancy programme, most 
decisions concerning the activities to pursue, what resources, financial and natural, to 
utilise and how are taken directly by the people of Los Toldos, in conjunction with 
the Pro Yungas Foundation extension worker. It is therefore understandable that some 
may conclude that participation in the agroforestry initiatives can be designated as 
‘grass-roots’.  
However, to make this designation, no matter how understandable, does not lead 
to a fuller understanding of one of the crucial dynamics affecting who participates 




The concluding chapter briefly reiterates points made about circularity in 
intervention, before proceeding to outline my own thinking on how we might 
approach this phenomenon. I argue that whilst there is cause for concern about some 
of the consequences for local participation of circularity in intervention, there is a 
danger of missing the benefits that are offered by both the conservancy programme 
and the Alto Bermejo Project if it is viewed solely as a negative phenomenon. This is 
an especially likely scenario if the continuing centrality of having knowledge about 
sustainability is construed purely in terms of the self-interest of government, non-
government, research or private sector actors.  
The conclusion also outlines directions for further research, in which I call for a 
clearer understanding of the ‘mechanics’ of knowledge transfer in both the 
conservancy programme and the Alto Bermejo Project. What and how do local 
people come to know about the conservation and development processes in which 
they participate, how do they incorporate, square or contrast it with what they already 
know (presuming they understand it or do not choose to ignore it altogether)? These 
are questions which have fallen outside the scope of this work, with its focus more on 
what local people do not know, as opposed to what they do know. Gaining a fuller 
understanding of how knowledge about sustainability is changed – or recreated 
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(Cummings 2003) – by the encounter between local and ‘external’ knowledge may 
help in the formulation of policy on participation and in its implementation. 
The chapter concludes with an attempt to situate the thesis within thinking on the 
relationship between development policy and intervention. This is done with 
reference to David Mosse’s recent book, Cultivating Development, which challenges 
the view that policy causes practice in simple and unproblematic fashion (2005). I 
argue that a better understanding of the factors which affect the outcome of 
knowledge transfer processes can make a helpful contribution to our understanding of 
the relationship between policy and practice.   
  
3.  Methodology  
 
Why a comparison, and why Namibia and Argentina?   
Comparison is often said to enjoin theory and method (i.e. Barnard 1992); and so it is 
with this research. It is as well, then, to say a little more on what is being compared, 
even though the basis for the comparison is laid out at the start of section two. This is 
not a comparison of Namibia and Argentina per se; it would be problematic to take 
these two very different places as the basic unit of comparison. Rather, the thesis 
offers a comparison of the consequences for local participation, in a Namibian and an 
Argentine initiative, stemming from the fact that the concept of sustainability has 
acquired such privileged status in both contexts that it underpins and justifies policy 
and intervention. Policy and intervention in both the conservancy programme and the 
Alto Bermejo Project is likely to be enriched by a fuller understanding of 
participatory dynamics. Demonstrating that this approach yields useful insights even 
in contexts as distinct as Namibia and Argentina, as I hope this thesis does, serves to 
underline its analytical utility. The comparative angle also provides an indicator of 
the sheer scope of the influence of the concept: the inroads made by a ‘global value’ 
(cf. Quarles van Ufford and Giri 2003) in two very different local contexts. In this 
light, the ostensible lack of commonality between the two countries becomes an asset 
to the study, not a problem to be explained away. Of course, I did not select Namibia 
and Argentina solely on the basis of their dissimilarity, but the other reasons for 
selection are discussed in the section on fieldwork (below).  
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What should be spelled out from the start is that my comparison leans more 
towards exploring the striking similarity of the way in which the link between 
knowing and deciding affects participation in the Alto Bermejo Project and the 
conservancy programme. It was this eventuality which most excited my curiosity, and 
which is most significant in terms of its contribution to debates around the 
relationship between policy and practice in development (and conservation) arenas. 
However, whilst this methodological strategy suits my purposes, it has been 
necessary to temper it with an awareness of how the vast differences between 
Namibia and Argentina, as the wider contexts in which research was conducted, 
shaped the initiatives that formed the focus of fieldwork. Notwithstanding the 
correspondence in underlying ideas and in overall objectives of the Alto Bermejo 
Project and the conservancy programme, they differ from each other in fundamental 
ways which cannot be explained without recourse to contextual factors, be they 
historical, geographical, social, political, ecological or otherwise. At various points 
throughout chapters 8-10, therefore, such differences – and in particular their impact 
on local participation – are explored in some detail. Moreover, I do not compare the 
whole of the Alto Bermejo Project with the whole of the conservancy programme. 
Instead, I compare arrangements for local participation in one component of the Alto 
Bermejo Project with those for an established conservancy (Tsiseb), with a view to 
establishing the impact upon local participation of the link between knowing and 
deciding.  
As already mentioned, the sociology of knowledge provides a very useful 
framework for investigating processes of knowledge transfer, and the consequences 
that derive therein. What has not yet been mentioned, however, is that there have 
been, to the best of my knowledge, few attempts to use the sociology of knowledge as 
a set of analytical tools in the literature on conservation and development. This is in 
one sense quite bizarre, given that much development can easily be read as an 
exercise in knowledge transfer. It is my hope that this thesis can therefore serve as an 
example of how the sociology of knowledge can be a useful framework for analysts 
of development – and conservation – processes.  
 
Fieldwork 
Early on in the research, events beyond my control prompted a change in the choice 
of one of the countries I would research. Originally, I had hoped to conduct the 
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Southern African fieldwork in Zimbabwe, and to return to work on Campfire (the 
Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources), which I had 
studied for my MSc thesis (Newsham 2002). But 2003, the year I started research, 
was not a good time to be doing rural research in that country. Famine was 
widespread, petrol shortages were becoming chronic; people had more important 
things to worry about than another muzungu coming along asking questions about 
illegal hunting. I was being advised by established Zimbabwe researchers such as 
JoAnn McGregor and Marshall Murphree that I might get myself and anyone 
associated with my research into trouble with paranoid local elements of the ruling 
party, ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front). My 
supervisors dutifully echoed all these points, and the search for another country 
commenced. Namibia was the obvious choice, as the conservancy programme in 
many ways has its roots in Campfire, and indeed is a modified version of it. It was 
easy to obtain a research permit and offered a stable, welcoming environment in 
which to conduct rural (and urban) fieldwork. 
In all, I spent a total of nine months in Namibia and six months in Argentina, 
between September 2003 and January 2005. It made sense to devote more time to 
Namibia than Argentina. I had never before been to Namibia: what I knew of it came 
almost exclusively from background reading and talks with Alan Barnard, my 
principal supervisor. By contrast, I speak fluent Spanish and I had lived and worked 
in Argentina for a year, between 1997-98. Moreover, I had conducted two months of 
preliminary research in Argentina in 2002, prior to starting the thesis, with a view to 
establishing the feasibility of a comparative study with a Southern African country, 
making contacts and scoping out potential fieldsites. It was in this year that I 
discovered that, although few and far between, there were initiatives being conducted 
in Argentina, by organisations such as the Pro Yungas Foundation, which had 
reconfigured conservation in terms of the sustainable use of natural resources. I could 
see, even then, a surprising parallel with the Campfire programme and with what I 
had read about the conservancy programme. 
In both countries I employed a number of research methods: 
 
• Interviews – semi-structured and informal 
• Focus groups with local people, government and NGO actors 
 21
• Participant observation in gatherings, meetings, workshops and conferences  
• Policy analysis  
 
I also gleaned much vital information, especially in terms of how to interpret some of 
the events I witnessed or formed part of, from research assistants and key 
informants/friends. The relative lack of acknowledgment of the contribution research 
assistants make to the work of social scientists is surprising and remiss, as Molony 
and Hammett persuasively illustrate (forthcoming). Let my debt to my own research 
assistants, then, be clear. In Namibia, the logistics of focus group work would have 
been simply overwhelming without the assistance of my two translators/key 
informants (and friends), David ‘USA’ Aiseb and Iyambo Naruseb. Getting to some 
of the further-flung settlements in Tsiseb conservancy involved coming off well-
graded gravel roads and following narrow dirt tracks with endless forks and other turn 
offs. I mostly saw these as opportunities for getting lost; Iyambo and David 
thankfully proved far more discerning. Once we arrived and gathered people for the 
focus groups, they had to be conducted in two or more languages (English, Damara-
Nama, Afrikaans and Otjiherero in one case) in order that all participants could 
contribute; as is the way with most group discussions in Namibia. With so many 
languages in play and with restrictions on what participants felt free to say in public, 
it was necessary to triangulate the data provided by focus groups with interviews, 
policy statements, participant observation; not to mention long analytical discussions 
with David, Iyambo and others, which would often give the lie to the conclusions that 
focus groups generated, revealing significant and fascinating differences between 
public and private knowledge.  
In Argentina, language was not so much of an issue. The difference between the 
Buenos Aires (porteño) Spanish I was accustomed to and the dialect spoken in Los 
Toldos at first seemed akin to the difference between the Queen’s English and the 
Doric; but necessity is the mother of invention, and I needed to listen and talk. It was, 
in short, possible to do all of my research in Spanish, and to manage logistics without 
recourse to paid assistants. Nonetheless, triangulation between focus group work and 
private interviews proved as necessary as it had in Namibia, and my interpretation of 
data was greatly enriched by the local knowledge and impressive analytical skills of 
my key informants.  
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A note on policy analysis 
When embarking upon policy analysis, it is vital to bear in mind, as Mosse points out, 
that “the relationship between policy models and development outcomes is complex 
and obscure” (2005:230). The policy overviews given of the conservancy programme 
and the Alto Bermejo Project, whilst supplemented by interviews and observations 
acquired during the course of fieldwork, do not provide cast-iron indications 
therefore, of how events ‘on the ground’ actually unfolded in either context. These 
were subject to considerable change, reformulation and renegotiation. Some 
components were quietly dropped, whilst others received greater prominence and 
attention. In short, policy documents were treated as a starting point, not a set of 
reliable predictions outlining the causal processes through which objectives would 
inevitably be brought about. I do not go quite as far as to view policy solely as a 
means by which to mobilise and enlist support, to “legitimise rather than to orientate 
practice” (ibid:14). As the discussion in the conclusion indicates, I would prefer to 
leave some space, albeit of constricted and hazy dimensions, for policy to orientate 
practice. Yet it remains the case that there is no possible way in which this can 
happen if policy has not legitimised the need for practice in the first place. What the 
policy documents of the conservancy programme and the Alto Bermejo Project do 
give us is a much clearer sense of are precisely the kinds of ideas, concepts and 
beliefs which legitimate intervention. It is, clearly, of key importance to the thesis to 
demonstrate that neither initiative can be understood without recourse to the concept 
of sustainability, so central is it to their very existence. Moreover, the privileged 
status which it has acquired is a causal determinant of who participates and on what 
basis. However, I do not wish to claim that, once the notion of sustainability is 
subscribed to and written into policy scripts, all action flows simply and 
unproblematically from there. Ultimately, the thesis does not chart the outcomes of 
the initiatives in my fieldsites, nor their relationship to the policy documents of the 
conservancy programme and the Alto Bermejo Project. It was too soon in either 
context for these to be clear, and research over a longer timeframe would be required 
to answer such questions.  
 
Research dissemination 
In both Namibia and Argentina, I attempted to feed research findings into local policy 
processes. In Namibia, I was a research associate with the Multi-Disciplinary 
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Research Consultancy Centre (MRCC) at the University of Namibia. The Centre 
insisted, rightly in my view, on the importance of producing research which would be 
deemed of local relevance. To this end, I gave a presentation at the MRCC, soon after 
my arrival, on what I intended to do with the fieldwork, and once again at the end of 
the fieldwork period on preliminary findings. In addition, I produced an MRCC 
research paper (Newsham 2004), written mainly for a conservancy practitioner and 
conservancy committee audience, which covered the two conservancies, Tsiseb and 
Sorris-Sorris, which I had selected as fieldsites.  
With respect to fieldsite selections, I took advice from Alfons Mosimane, head of 
the Life Sciences Division at the Centre. Some conservancies, especially Torra and 
≠Khoadi ||Hôas, have received more attention than others, and I concurred with 
Alfons – and others – that it would be fruitful to bring such considerations into my 
fieldsite selection criteria. Tsiseb and Sorris-Sorris, both next to each other, had been 
the subject of some research by Alfons himself (Jones and Mosimane 2000) and also 
the Wild Project (i.e. Long ed., 2004). This was a mutually beneficial arrangement, in 
that I would not go into two conservancies ‘cold’, so to speak, but nor would my 
research be covering old ground needlessly.  
Sadly, Sorris-Sorris research does not find its way into the thesis, for two reasons. 
One is simply for considerations of space: the breadth of the comparison has required 
strategic decisions to be made about the information covered. The second is because, 
when I crashed and wrote off my car in March 2004, my research timetable in Sorris-
Sorris was affected far more than my timetable for Tsiseb and was inevitably left 
incomplete.  
In Argentina, although I was not formally affiliated to any research institution, I 
did forge links with the Laboratory for Ecological Investigation in the Yungas 
(LIEY), and was invited in October 2005 to give a presentation on my work to date in 
Namibia and Argentina. Moreover, I wrote a report for the Administration of National 
Parks (Newsham 2005) on one of my fieldsites, Lipeo, located within Baritú National 
Park, and which figures, again for reasons of space, only fleetingly in the thesis. I had 
hoped that it would: provide an opportunity for Administration of National Parks staff 
working in Buenos Aires to gain a better idea of how it is to live inside a national 
park; to offer recommendations for change that might be of benefit both to the 
Administration and to inhabitants of Baritú National Park; and finally to convey the 
opinions and demands of the people of Lipeo to those who might be able to do 
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something about them. Sadly, my suspicion is that the report does little more than 
gather dust. 
  In both Namibia and Argentina, I spent a lot of time wondering what people at 
the local level would gain directly from my research. I had my doubts that a PhD 
thesis, product of years of academic training – and at any rate written in English, 
which was the first language of very few of the people with whom I conducted the 
research – would serve much locally identifiable purpose. Therefore, I decided to 
engage in activities that were of local use. In Sorris-Sorris, I wrote their conservancy 
budget for 2003/4 and identified sources of further funding for maintaining the 
vehicle that had been donated to the conservancy by the WILD (Wildlife Integration 
for Livelihoods Diversification) Project. In Tsiseb, I conducted research with the 
Traditional Authorities at the request of the conservancy manager and executive 
committee. I also ferried people to and from their homesteads for the (aborted) AGM 
of 2004. In Los Toldos, Argentina, I took photos of artisans and their wares, for 
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Chapter II – self-referential knowledge, 




This chapter attempts to demonstrate why key insights from the sociology of 
scientific knowledge are useful in helping us to understand how it is that having – or 
not having – knowledge about sustainability affects who participates and how in the 
Conservancy Programme in Namibia and the Alto Bermejo Project in Argentina. 
Drawing in particular on work by Barry Barnes (1983, 1988), the self-referential 
component of knowledge about sustainability is ascertained and explained. Crucial to 
understanding how knowledge about sustainability comes to be accepted, and what 
effect this has on who can participate and on what basis, is Barnes’s concept of 
cognitive authority. Having knowledge about sustainability and simultaneously being 
the source of cognitive authority for such knowledge is what renders indispensable 
the participation of actors who have – or are deemed to have – relevant knowledge 
about sustainability. It is this dynamic I refer to by the notion central to this thesis, 
‘circularity in intervention’.  
In addition to these insights, I set out the reasons why I follow the ‘finitist’ 
account of knowledge set out by Barry Barnes, David Bloor and John Henry in their 
book, Scientific Knowledge: a Sociological Analysis (1996). Given the variety of 
conflicting beliefs held about both the Conservancy Programme and the Alto Bermejo 
Project, and the associated difficulties of discerning true from false ones, it makes 
sense to employ the standard finitist move of setting them all on the ‘same footing’, 
so to speak (Breslau, 2000). Finitism shapes, then, my preferred methodological 
approach, which is: to understand and explain why some beliefs are held in 
preference to others, and investigate the consequences – especially for participation – 
that follow from privileging some beliefs above others. Understanding the goals and 
interests of relevant actors when taking one belief in preference to another is central 
to this task.  
Before going any further, it is as well to address an important question, namely, 
what is the definition of knowledge? Here I accept the one formulated by Barnes, 
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Bloor & Henry, which views knowledge as “the possession of the members of a 
culture or subculture, transmitted from generation to generation as a part of their 
tradition, and dependent for its credibility on their collective authority” (1996 111).  
 
2. Knowledge about sustainability: introducing insights 
from the sociology of scientific knowledge 
 
Knowledge transfer 
An intrinsic feature of the conservancy programme and the Alto Bermejo Project is 
that they require knowledge and skills to be transferred in order to achieve their stated 
objectives. It is, for example, impossible to establish a conservancy without knowing 
what it means to do so or how to go about it. Equally, in order to make agroforestry 
activities in Los Toldos serve both conservation and development objectives, it is 
necessary to know how to make outcomes comply with criteria for sustainability.  
Such observations may appear obvious, but they lead on to the important point 
that conservation-development initiatives are not self-generating. The knowledge 
necessary for them has a source. It is developed and worked on by people with 
knowledge and skills – from government, donor agencies, NGOs or universities, for 
instance – deemed to be relevant and necessary to the achievement of policy goals. 
What these people have in common is the role they play in rendering knowledge 
relevant and conferring authority on beliefs which are to underscore policy. Securing 
funding for particular initiatives can consolidate the authority of the knowledge 
deployed in policy design and implementation. Moreover, in order for a conservancy 
or an agroforestry initiative to be deemed to be ‘working’, the ostensible beneficiaries 
of conservancies in Namibia or agroforestry initiatives in Argentina have to be able to 
‘do it for themselves’. These beneficiaries may then negotiate, change, recast, 
subvert, ignore or remain ignorant of some or all of the transfer process, thereby 
changing the perspectives, strategies and expectations of those who are transferring 
the knowledge. The NGO, government, academic and other actors involved in the 
Conservancy Programme and the Alto Bermejo Project may in response reformulate 
their own thoughts on what it means for activities to be considered sustainable and 
how to go about achieving sustainability. And yet, even before we reach this stage in 
the analysis, if we are to understand the relationship between knowledge about 
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sustainability and participation, we need to be aware of that, even if the definition of 
sustainability is contested and many-splintered, an underlying consensus on its 
importance has already been achieved. Neither the Conservancy Programme nor the 
Alto Bermejo Project could exist were the need for sustainability not a settled matter. 
It is the belief that there is a need for sustainability that justifies the transfer of 
knowledge, skills and resources deemed necessary to allow local resource users to 
undertake activities that serve conservation and development objectives 
simultaneously. Both the knowledge to be transferred and the process through which 
it is transferred significantly affect who participates and on what basis, as well as the 
consequences that follow from the transfer. The people with knowledge deemed 
indispensable to the achievement of policy objectives cannot but be heavily involved 
in its transfer. Therefore, they influence significantly what there is to participate in 
from the outset and what type of participation will characterise decision-making 
processes. This is the essence of circularity in intervention. 
It is not my intention to suggest that only the government, NGO, academic, 
private sector or local actors with specialised knowledge about how to achieve 
sustainability objectives make all the decisions either in the Conservancy Programme 
or in the Alto Bermejo Project. My aim is to draw attention to the privileged status 
that the focus on the need for sustainability has acquired, and to argue that the 
acquisition of this status prefigures and to some extent predetermines participation in 
the Conservancy Programme and the Alto Bermejo Project. This leads us to an 
important question: how does knowledge about sustainability acquire its privileged 
status? Or, in other words, how do people in such empirically distinct contexts come 
to agree that sustainability is an imperative objective whose implications cannot be 
ignored? Important questions have a habit of leading to other, even more important 
questions, and so it is in this case. To ask how knowledge about sustainability 
becomes privileged to enquire into the character of knowledge itself. For the purposes 
of this enquiry into knowledge about sustainability, I use an approach borrowed 
largely from the sociology of scientific knowledge.  
There are three main concepts in a sociological approach to knowledge which are 
of relevance and utility for this thesis. The first relates to the self-referential, self-
validating character of much knowledge. The second is concerned with how to 
evaluate competing beliefs or ideas and respond appropriately to the difficulties of 
establishing the correctness or incorrectness of one belief or idea above another. The 
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third is connected to the importance of identifying the goals and interests that are 
furthered when groups of people accept one belief but not another. The rest of the 
chapter explores these themes, and considers their influence on and methodological 
implications for my own research. This discussion is at points fairly abstract, and its 
relevance to participation in conservation and development initiatives in Namibia 
may not seem immediately obvious. However, I hope with this chapter to establish by 
degrees the relevance and utility of the analytical devices I have chosen.  
 
Knowledge and self-reference 
We may plausibly say that to know something entails classifying it as one kind of 
thing, as opposed to some other kind of thing (Barnes, Bloor & Henry 1996, chapter 
3). Initially, it seems almost self-evident to say that once a thing’s similarities and 
differences to other things have been established, we can safely refer to it as just that 
one thing; we know what it is and what it is not. Beneath these beguilingly simple 
observations lies an age-old conundrum: the problem of reference. Veteran 
sociologist of knowledge Barry Barnes has characterised this as “the relationship 
between our speech and that which is spoken of” (Barnes 1983 524). How can we be 
sure that what we say about a thing corresponds to what that thing is?  
Another characteristic of reference is the tendency of some of the things we talk 
about to refer only to themselves, to have no point of reference that exists 
independently of what we say about them (ibid). Many of the customs and activities 
of a society exist because we collectively refer to them. Some things are, therefore, 
because we say they are; some things consist of other references to them. In this way, 
they are self-referring and, crucially, self-validating. In clarifying how this is so, I 
shall focus on the much-debated article by Barry Barnes, ‘Social Life as Bootstrapped 
Induction’ (1983), and also one of his books, The Nature of Power (1988). An 
exploration of his work on reference – and especially self reference – lends itself very 
helpfully to the question of how to think about the concept of sustainability and its 
widespread acceptance.  
In order to make sense of how we apply concepts, he introduces two concepts of 
his own, the ‘N’ and the ‘S’ term. ‘N’ terms, then, are what Barnes calls natural kind 
terms, and proceed on the basis of seeing (or otherwise perceiving) an object and 
attaching a label to it by matching it to a pre-established pattern. Barnes takes the 
example of a leaf on a tree. In and out of school, we learn by example what leaves 
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are. If we come across a tree, we may well see small objects upon it that make us 
think of leaves. Where they are judged to be sufficiently similar, we attach the ‘leaf’ 
label. Where they are not considered sufficiently similar, by inference, we do not 
attach the ‘leaf’ label. The elements of referring to ‘N’ term terms are here evident. 
An object is recognised and matched with the pattern to which its specific empirical 
properties are thought to correspond. Once designated, the designation is stable: it 
does not tend to change over time. Leaves today will still be leaves tomorrow.  
In contrast, ‘S’ terms, or social kinds (later to be called social objects; cf. Barnes 
1988) are terms which are not applied to things as the result of an inspection of their 
empirical properties. However, with established, routinised usage they come to seem 
as real to us as any ‘N’ term. ‘S’ terms also proceed on the basis of recognition and 
pattern attachment, but they are often used to mark a distinction between one thing 
and another where no empirical difference is evident. For example, the difference 
between a queen and a slave is not marked by one having red hair and the other dark 
brown, by different eye colour, height, weight or shoe size. Rather, we recognise 
queens and slaves when they are so recognised by everyone else who applies the 
term. Whilst ‘queen’ tells us nothing in itself of the empirical characteristics of the 
person to whom it is applied, it clearly does have its uses and seems as real to us as 
the person to whom the pattern is attached. It indicates the sort of behaviour that is 
expected towards the person we designate ‘queen’. One may choose not to be 
deferential on meeting Queen Elizabeth II, but only against the weight of 
considerable expectation. We might, then, see ‘S’ terms as a “target” or a “foci” for 
dispositions or behaviour (ibid:525), terms which indicate the relationship in which 
people or things stand to each other.  
 
Cognitive authority  
If ‘S’ terms do not refer to the empirical characteristics of the things to which they are 
applied, then what their users do mean by them must be “a matter for their judgment, 
their decision” (ibid:526). Here the self-referential, self-validating character of the S 
type is very clear: something is referred to in one specific way because that is what it 
is agreed to be. We end up referring to other references to the S type, not to 
something independent of it. But how might such agreement be brought about? It is at 
this point that Barnes introduces the notion of ‘cognitive authority’. To make the 
concept more intelligible and pave the way for his wider argument, he entreats us first 
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to take the case of an individual who, within the context of his or her social grouping, 
can essentially designate something as ‘S’ and have it accepted by others as ‘S’ 
therein. As an idealised scenario, ‘S’ could be whatever such an individual referred to 
as ‘S’; this would be the epitome of self-referential knowledge, and the designator 
would enjoy total cognitive authority. The most illuminating example Barnes gives is 
that of a subordinate army officer designating a given hill as an ‘objective’ because it 
is so designated by his commanding officer (ibid:530). Needless to say, the 
individuals under the charge of the subordinate commanding officer will likewise 
designate the hill as the ‘the objective’.  
Now, the cognitive authority in this case derives from the character of a military 
institution, one in which deference to authority is a precondition of membership. 
These conditions are favourable to the acceptance by the many of a designation by the 
individual, and the ‘S’ term concept serves to explain the situation very well. 
However, one might expect it not to be capable of explaining belief and action in 
situations in which people were not obliged to think or do as they were told. Yet the 
wider significance of the ‘S’ term is that it does indeed obtain in such situations. Even 
where no individual has what s/he designates accepted by others simply because s/he 
has pronounced it, self-reference characterises many of the things that we treat as 
‘real’. The example Barnes gives to substantiate this claim is money. Despite its 
centrality to the organisation of the majority of societies in the world, it does not exist 
independently of our references to it. We may take it to refer in the last instance to the 
quantity of precious metal of which it is held to be the equivalent; but this 
equivalence is established by contingent judgment and agreement, rather than by any 
inherent property of the precious metal in question. In the case of money, then, we 
might say that the cognitive authority for its designation resides in all the users of the 
term. Further, as a collective, to designate metal, plastic or paper as money entails a 
coordination of belief (Barnes, Bloor & Henry 1996), that is, a consensus on what 
constitutes money and what does not. It is because of the existence of this consensus 
that we know – and continue to know – what counts as money and what does not.  
That all instances of referring to money refer actually to other instances of 
referring to money does not stop us from fixing its meaning, or from organising our 
lives around the transactions and exchanges that it makes possible. We have no need 
of challenging the notion on the grounds that it is a self-referential term.  
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‘N’ and ‘S’ terms, as Barnes is at pains to make clear, are heuristic devices, useful 
for the purposes of analysis, not absolute categories into which all acts of 
classification will neatly fit. Acts of reference in everyday speech may be said to have 
both an ‘S’ and an ‘N’ component; ‘N’ and ‘S’ need not therein be treated as mutually 
exclusive. Further, following through the logic of ‘S’ terms might lead one to 
conclude that reference, whether to natural or social kinds, was a wholly self-refuting 
– and thereby meaningless – enterprise (1983:540-1), for reasons that receive fuller 
treatment later on in the chapter. Though for Barnes it is not necessary to reach such a 
conclusion, he sounds a requisite note of caution in the use of the logic of self-
reference.  
In what way might acts of reference have both an ‘N’ and an ‘S’ component? 
Self-referential acts of classification are often related to – and affected by – physical 
objects which are a source of reference for speech acts independent of language. It 
may be as well to talk of S types as describing our relationship to such things, as 
Barnes does in a later work, The Nature of Power (1988). Taking the example of a 
summit, he points out that it is “that part of the mountain which exists in a 
relationship with all its other parts”. If we want to verify that something is a summit, 
we will not be able to find it as an empirical property of the mountain itself, but rather 
in “its relationship with its context” (ibid:47), which turns out to be “a context of 
human activity” (ibid:49). A summit is only a summit because we treat it as such, 
because of our actions in relation to it. Of course, the mountain or hill would have to 
be present in order for there to be talk of a summit in the first place, but that does not 
make a summit an inherent property of a mountain. Taking up another example, that 
of the target, Barnes outlines the consequence of this thinking: 
 
We now are the context which makes the object what it is. The target is the target because we 
believe it to be the target…In ceasing to believe that it is a target we dissolve away its nature 
as a target. In coming to believe that an object is a target, we constitute the context that makes 
it a target, and hence we constitute it as a target (ibid:49). 
 
The all-important corollary to this observation is that not only is the S term a self-
referring phenomenon, but it is also self-validating: “we validate what we believe by 
referring to what we believe” (ibid:49). It is precisely the way in which self-referring 
terms stand in relation to physical objects that makes talk of self-reference seem so 
counter-intuitive. Nonetheless, the self-referring component in our knowledge 
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becomes apparent once we separate physical objects from the relationship in which 
we stand to them. In this way, therefore, everyday speech acts can be said to have an 
‘N’ and an ‘S’ component.  
I hope with this discussion to have teased out of Barnes’s work on self-referential 
knowledge the ideas and insights that are most pertinent to my own work. What 
remains is to apply them. 
 
3. Self-reference, cognitive authority and sustainability 
 
‘S’, ‘N’ and sustainability 
If we ask the question of precisely what sustainability refers to, it becomes apparent 
that it comprises both ‘S’ and ‘N’ components. Is it, for instance, an empirically 
verifiable property of a solar panel? Is that property what we refer to when we talk of 
sustainability? Following Barnes – or even, perhaps, if we disagreed with his broader 
argument – we would conclude that no, sustainability does not inhere in solar panels. 
Rather, it might be suggested that a solar panel is in itself a device that converts 
sunlight into electricity. It only relates to the concept of sustainability to the extent 
that it furthers the achievement of a specific goal, for instance that of meeting the 
needs of current generations without compromising the capacity of future generations 
to meet their needs (WCED 1987). It is not widely controversial to suggest that the 
conglomeration and arrangement of physical materials that make up a solar panel 
have an existence independent of definitions of a solar panel or descriptions of its 
functions. Nonetheless, its status as a sustainable form of electricity generation 
derives from how it stands in relation to a context of human activity; and it will only 
remain sustainable to the extent that we believe it to be so. To paraphrase Barnes, we 
are, then, the context which constitutes sustainability. It is in this sense that 
sustainability has a self-referring (S) component as well an N component: it refers to 
a belief about how humans should or should not live, according to the perceived 
consequences of living in some ways as opposed to others. Whatever meets or 
undermines the goal of sustainability does so only to the extent that we believe it to 




Sustainability and cognitive authority 
If talk of sustainability refers to the relationship in which particular things or 
processes stand to a context of human activity, it follows that it is held up, at least 
partially, by the cognitive authority invested in them. Without the presence of 
cognitive authority – i.e. if sustainability were a term no-one accepted – it would not 
be possible to establish its legitimacy or meaning. This leads me to a question which 
is central to this thesis: where does cognitive authority for references to sustainability 
reside? In order to address it, I introduce here a distinction between general and 
limited cognitive authority. 
Clearly, part of the answer to this question is that it depends upon what we refer 
to by sustainability. For the verb ‘sustain’, for instance, cognitive authority for its 
correct application resides with a great many users. Given that ‘sustain’ has 
etymological roots in the Latin term sustinēre, in the sense of ‘uphold’, we can infer a 
great deal of stability in its designation: the concept has been long used to mean the 
same thing. As with money, we may not know exactly how the idea of sustaining 
something was initiated, but it self-evidently was, and in this case many centuries 
ago. ‘Sustain’, then, is an example of the source of cognitive authority being general 
– it resides in all of our collective references to it. 
However, when it comes to designating as sustainable or unsustainable certain 
activities, there are rather fewer of us who would be prepared to make the designation 
by ourselves. There is a limited number of people whose designation of a particular 
thing as sustainable will be accepted as credible. Thus, by limited cognitive authority 
I mean just such occasions when the cognitive authority for a designation lies with the 
few rather than the many. We might, then, equate a given source of cognitive 
authority with more familiar terms, such as ‘specialist’ or ‘expert’. It is also helpful to 
think about the extension of cognitive authority as an act of coordination of beliefs, 
with ever more people coming to hold a particular belief about a particular thing 
(Barnes, Bloor & Henry 1996:121). Coordination may come about either through 
becoming accepted as a cognitive authority or accepting the statements of those who 
are already considered to be a source of cognitive authority. We do not, then, need to 
be specialists ourselves to start designating occurrences as sustainable or otherwise; 
we can call something sustainable (or not) because we accept the authority of an 
expert who calls that thing sustainable (or not). And yet, to the extent that a 
designation of, say, current air travel levels becomes widely accepted as 
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unsustainable, the cognitive authority upon which its credibility partially depends will 
change from being limited to being general.  
In making this point, it is not my intention to imply that there is now longstanding 
stability in the application of terms such as sustainability. On the contrary, in the 
literature on the concept massive disagreements remain on what the term should or 
should not refer to (see chapter three). One might say that no one source has a 
monopoly of cognitive authority for the correct designation of the term, and that 
therefore it has not reached the sort of stability of designation that use of words like 
‘sustain’ have in everyday, unreflective speech. Indeed, given that stable designation 
is much more easily achieved when we do not reflect on our grounds for designation, 
within more specialist contexts in which more attention is paid to what terms do or 
should refer to, it may not be very realistic to hope for such stability of designation. 
Nonetheless, enquiring into the source of cognitive authority helps us to understand 
why it is that terms such as ‘sustainable’ continues to be employed routinely even 
when, upon reflection, it may be hard coherently to specify what we refer to.  
To recap, then, there are two noteworthy characteristics of knowledge about 
sustainability, at least as we find it in the context of international donor-funded 
initiatives with simultaneous conservation and development objectives in Namibia 
and Argentina. The first is that it can be highly specialised, requiring its holders to 
have the exposure and capacity to deploy large and diffuse bodies knowledge, 
ranging from the science of soil conservation, silvi- or aquaculture to theories of 
collective action, institution-building and governance, to name but a few aspects of 
sustainability. The wider our definitions of and criteria for sustainability become, the 
more one has to learn in order to be considered a source of cognitive authority. It is 
because of how much we think is necessary to take into account that, when it comes 
to separating what action is sustainable from what is not, few will have – or be 
accepted as having – such knowledge and rather more will not.  
This is connected to the second characteristic of knowledge about sustainability, 
its privileged status. It acquires this status in part because not everyone is in 
possession of such knowledge, and in part because it is widely seen to be extremely 
useful in the pursuit of the goal of not jeopardising the ability of humans to meet 
needs both current and future. Crucially, then, within the ambit of conservation and 
development processes, a range of academic, NGO, donor and government actors 
constitute the context within which references to sustainability are meaningful. In 
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generating that context, they also constitute themselves as cognitive authorities. The 
same logic also applies to many other commonly-used terms, such as conservation, 
development, participation, decision-making, policy or implementation. This thesis 
only traces its ramifications through for the concept of sustainability, but clearly, the 
analysis could be extended to encompass a much broader arena.   
  
Self-reference, cognitive authority and participation: circularity in intervention   
The cognitive authority held by people who have – or are deemed to have – 
knowledge about sustainability may have profound consequences for participation in 
initiatives attempting to work towards the wider goal of achieving sustainability. In 
my view, it certainly does have consequences for the initiatives I have studied in 
Namibia and Argentina which attempt to do precisely that.  
It is by virtue of the privileged status of knowledge about sustainability to which 
NGO, government, donor and research actors lend cognitive authority that the 
involvement of such actors is rendered indispensable. A core belief which prefigures 
both the Conservancy Programme and the Alto Bermejo Project is that sustainability 
has to be put into practice; or rather, practice has to come into line with ideas about 
the sustainable use of natural resources. This belief is, I argue, commonly accepted by 
a wide variety of policy, government, NGO, academic, donor and other actors at the 
local, regional, national and international levels. It is in essence the acceptance of this 
belief which justifies and requires the process of knowledge transfer in the first place: 
not everyone is held to know – and therefore not everyone is in a position to do – 
what is required for sustainable common-pool resource use. In this way, the 
participation of those actors with sufficient cognitive authority to make such 
designations is rendered indispensable, and a fundamental determinant of what 
processes there are to participate in from the outset. This I refer to as circularity in 
intervention.  
As an account of participation, either in Tsiseb conservancy or Alto Bermejo 
Project initiatives in Los Toldos, I take circularity in intervention to be one amongst 
other factors. Considered in isolation this thinking could be taken to lead to the 
conclusion that such NGO, government, donor, academic, etc. actors simply control 
the implementation of conservation-development initiatives in Namibia and 
Argentina by virtue of having privileged and, therefore, necessary knowledge about 
sustainability that local actors or resource users do not have. I do not wish to argue 
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that this is the case. This would not take into account knowledge and strategies held 
by people in the local context in which such initiatives were deployed, nor the 
reaction of project implementers to such knowledge and strategies. It may seem to 
render NGO, government, donor or academic actors as the only protagonists in the 
situation, casting local people in the role of passive bystanders, or simple recipients of 
knowledge about sustainability in a one-way transfer process. Both the Conservancy 
Programme and the Alto Bermejo Project, in different ways, view local participation 
as a precondition of sustainability and see local knowledge as an important part of 
setting resource use on a sustainable footing. The traffic travels in two directions, so 
to speak. NGO, donor government and academic actors often extend the cognitive 
authority of the knowledge of the local people they work with by accepting such 
knowledge and emphasising its contribution to sustainable common-pool resource 
use. Furthermore, NGO, donor or government actors willing to share with people who 
do not yet have them knowledge, skills and resources that could be of benefit to 
people in the two, they might be seen as attempting to render themselves, in the long 
term, wholly dispensable. We might thereby come to see the extension of cognitive 
authority as in some way analogous to processes of capacity building and 
empowerment.  
This caveat notwithstanding, the cognitive authority generated and possessed 
within academic, NGO and government spheres is a very important part of the 
explanation. It does support the conclusion that participation in neither context can be 
understood without understanding the link between knowing and deciding. 
In Namibia, the Conservancy Programme is routinely described by terms such as 
‘grassroots movement’, as an initiative that works from the ‘bottom up’. Indeed, 
‘conservancy’ is used interchangeably with the term ‘community-based natural 
resource management’, with a view to emphasising the primacy of local people in the 
conservancy process. Likewise, the language of local, base-level participation is part 
and parcel of discourse connected to the Alto Bermejo Project. But we should not 
loose sight of the importance of the self-referential component of knowledge about 
sustainability and the implications of cognitive authority. If we use terms like 
‘bottom-up’ or ‘grassroots’, then we leave unexamined sources of cognitive authority 
and an entire process of coordination of beliefs and interests, and will fail to 
understand fully what participation really means or entails. This process of 
coordination of beliefs, and how people come to share beliefs prefigures and to some 
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extent predetermines who participates and on what basis in the initiatives studied in 
this thesis. It is not, after all, as if we can talk about participation as a phenomenon 
which occurs independently of a predetermined context that consists of a coordination 
of beliefs which are upheld by specific cognitive authorities. 
 
4. Making the case for finitism 
 
Dealing with conflicting beliefs: ‘N’ terms revisited, ostension and finitism 
In both the Namibian and Argentine initiatives, there are various positions, beliefs 
and preferred know-how which relate to particular circumstances or problems. For 
instance, how can inhabitants of rural areas gain benefits from tourism, as an 
incentive to use a given resource base sustainably, if they possess neither the requisite 
knowledge nor sufficient (access to) finance to start up their own tourism enterprises? 
In both contexts a range of beliefs, opinions and posited solutions can be canvassed 
on this and many other issues. In the face of a variety of differing and often 
conflicting beliefs or perspectives, the question of how to approach them emerges 
continually.  
Following Barnes, Bloor and Henry (1996), the approach that I take is not to 
devise an account of which beliefs about how to make conservation and development 
processes sustainable hold water and which do not. Rather, I attempt to explain why 
some beliefs are chosen in preference to others and what the consequences – 
especially for participation – of such a choice are (cf. Barnes, Bloor, and Henry 1996 
110, Bloor 1991 [1976]).  
In order to show why I adopt this approach, it is necessary at this point to pick up 
once more the previous discussion of self-referential knowledge. If we accept the 
assertion that knowledge about sustainability is at least partially self-referring, it 
follows that to the extent that such knowledge does self-refer, its truth or falsity status 
is a matter for contingent judgement. However, if we revisit the idea of the ‘N’ term 
here, then might we not insist that knowledge about sustainability also refers, albeit 
partially, to something independent of itself? That is to say, its truth or falsity status 
must surely depend also on how well it corresponds to the properties of things and 
processes which are independent of itself. In this way, we might wish to argue that 
true beliefs about whether or not a thing or process is sustainable will reliably 
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correspond to what they describe in a way that false beliefs cannot, and that they can 
be shown to do so. Therefore, why abandon the attempt to separate true beliefs from 
false, especially when they may prove relevant to the achievement of specific goals, 
i.e. sustainable common-pool resource use in Argentina and Namibia? To answer this 
question it is necessary to return to the problem of reference, also known as the 
problem of ostension.  
Barnes, Bloor & Henry define ostension as: “any act whereby a direct association 
is directly displayed or shown or pointed out between an empirical event or state of 
affairs and a word or term of a language” (ibid:52). With ‘S’ terms, we cannot display 
what the term is associated with because, as we have seen, they refer only to other 
words, not to something that exists independent of language. We have to be told what 
‘S’ terms refer to, we cannot be shown. But with an ‘N’ term we can show what it 
refers by pointing to instances of the thing to which it refers. For example, we learn 
what ducks are by being shown one duck, then another, and so on. The difficulty that 
arises is that ostension is an indefinite process because no two things are exactly the 
same as each other. All ducks are the same and yet different, they resemble each other 
but are not identical. Two ducks stand in a “similarity relationship” to each other 
(ibid:50). Ostension would establish that they resemble each other; but this is not 
sufficient to establish what they are, only what they are similar to. We leave open an 
element of indefiniteness. If no two things are quite the same we always leave space 
for the notion of difference, and can always classify them as something different. 
More importantly, if we say only what they are similar to, rather than what they are, 
then we leave ourselves without a “metric” for weighing up similarity and difference 
(ibid:51). How so? Establishing similarity is not sufficient to establish the precise 
value of something, does not say what it actually is, and any metric must of necessity 
be based on a specific, known quantity. Therefore, having been shown what a duck is, 
we may see something similar to a duck and thereby classify it as one. But we could, 
if we wanted to, classify as it something else without inconsistency, because “Any 
thing may be said to be the same as, yet different from, any thing else” (ibid:50).  
We might attempt to make the similarities between one thing and another weigh 
more than the differences by the use of rules, i.e. that ducks must have webbed feet in 
order to be counted as ducks, and in this way establish what was or was not a duck. 
However, the rules would have to consist of words from which we had eliminated 
indefiniteness, if we were not to repeat the problem of establishing a relation of 
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similarity rather than a fixed identity (ibid:52). The significance of this thinking is 
that it applies not just to ducks but also to all other things which are analogous to ‘N’ 
terms. Even though ‘N’ terms do have an independent point of reference, we have not 
as yet managed to eliminate all indefiniteness from our ways of classifying those 
independent points of reference. We have yet to find a way of showing a direct 
correspondence between a word and a thing.  
It is bizarre and perhaps disconcerting that we can classify without having an 
unassailable method of say what a thing is and what it is not; but we can and do. 
More importantly, to acknowledge this problem need not be the same as saying that 
we cannot classify at all, that the exercise is meaningless or futile. We routinely 
classify successfully and on this basis formulate beliefs which allow us to 
comprehend and manipulate our environment, collectively and individually. From a 
pragmatic point of view, our classification systems still work for countless purposes, 
even if we cannot give a complete account of how they work (Barnes 1983:539-40).  
This reasoning leads Barnes, Bloor & Henry to conclude that “our future use of 
conventions is underdetermined and indeterminate” (Barnes, Bloor & Henry 
1996:54). This is the basis of the position which they, in common with other 
sociologists of knowledge, refer to as ‘finitism’. Crucially, they go on to make the 
case for applying finitism to the formation of beliefs, not just our classificatory 
systems. They argue that to acquire a system of classification “is invariably at one 
and the same time the acquisition of a system of beliefs” (ibid:69). On that basis, they 
make the claim that we can have a finitist account of knowledge. Central to the finitist 
account are the following five premises: 
 
1. the future implications of beliefs are open-ended 
2. no statement of belief is ever indefeasibly true or false 
3. All existing exemplifications/confirmations/refutations of a statement of a 
belief are revisable 
4. successive applications of a belief are not independent 




What applies to knowledge more generally also holds for scientific knowledge. In this 
way they put scientific knowledge on “the same footing” as any other form of 
knowledge (Breslau 2000).  
 
Methodological implications of finitism 
The methodological implications of accepting a finitist requires of the researcher a 
change in focus. It means, as noted, leaving aside the task of establishing what 
constitutes true or false beliefs. Even though our beliefs and the theories we generate 
with them are of immense pragmatic value, as mentioned before, but it is as well to 
heed the following warning from another sociologist of knowledge of longstanding 
influence, David Bloor:  
 
The danger comes when such talk, of ‘true’ and ‘false’, etc., is taken out of its workaday 
context and treated as a given in reflective, analytical or philosophical enquiries into the 
working of science. Then it causes trouble by encouraging simple and misleading pictures, 
pictures that purport to refer to the causes of the judgements that we make, when really they 
are the effects of those judgements. (Bloor 1999 90) 
 
Instead, the point of social enquiry becomes twofold. Firstly, it involves the 
causal explanation of why and how one belief is held in preference to another, which 
in itself constitutes an act of coordination between individuals. How and why does it 
come to be that people believe one thing in a coordinated manner and not another? 
Secondly, it involves tracing the consequences of holding – and applying – beliefs for 
the social groups that organise themselves with reference to those beliefs (Barnes, 
Bloor & Henry 1996).  
Adapting for the purposes of this research, the exercise remains fundamentally 
similar. First, it involves an exploration of beliefs relating to sustainability and why 
they are held. Second, it entails tracing the consequences for participation of the 
knowledge about sustainability employed in initiatives which attempt to comply with 
conservation and development objectives.  
To leave to people connected to the Conservancy Programme or the Alto Bermejo 
Project the task of sorting true from false beliefs about sustainability also suits my 
purposes very well. Very strong and contradictory beliefs are held both about the 
Conservancy Programme and the Alto Bermejo Project, and it is not always helpful to 
adjudicate between them. Especially in Namibia, the researcher’s authority to say, for 
instance, what does or does not work in the Conservancy Programme is frequently 
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challenged. Advocating or rejecting some of the positions that have been taken on the 
Conservancy Programme may close the door to other researchers, and this is a 
potential consequence of my research that I would wish to minimise wherever 
possible. It could also jeopardise the funding of particular organisations that work 
within the conservancy programme or the Alto Bermejo Project, another important 
consideration to reflect upon before endorsing a highly critical or condemnatory line 
of argument. Conversely, it may also be said that biting one’s lip for fear of the 
consequences is a departure from independent research and a form of self-censorship. 
Finding the line between these two positions is what has led me to decide to make 
space for differing interpretations of the Alto Bermejo Project and the conservancy 
programme and focussing on why they are held, as opposed to upholding one or 
another in particular as the most truthful assessment.  
However, whilst my line of enquiry does not separate true from false beliefs about 
what will or will not lead to the sustainable use of common-pool resources in 
Namibia or Argentina, it does not require me to refrain from forming and expressing 
my own views. For instance, as is clear from the first pages of the thesis, I do not 
agree that the conservancy programme can accurately be classified as a ‘grass-roots’ 
initiative. Nor do I agree with scholars that view sustainability as a meaningless term 
that cannot coherently be defined. There is a prescriptive as well as a descriptive 
element to this work, which is just as subject to the implications of the finitist account 
of knowing as are all the other prescriptions, viewpoints or beliefs which feature in 
this thesis.  
It is, then, my hope that tracing the consequences for local participation of the link 
between knowing and deciding will have useful implications for policy. A better 
understanding of how knowledge is transferred between actors, contexts and 
languages is helpful in explaining why anticipated policy outcomes do or do not 
obtain. For instance, in the conservancy programme, more clearly grasping what 
conservancy residents come to know from their dealings with the conservancy, be it 
in a workshop on wildlife management, through an Annual General Meeting or 
conversations with members of their conservancy committee, could make us more 
aware of what helps or hinders them in wanting or being able to make decisions. As 
chapter seven shows, it is very hard for local people to participate if they do not 
understand what a conservancy is and what it is trying to achieve. For anyone in the 
position of having to transfer knowledge about, say, using wildlife in one way and not 
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another, it could be very useful to know what is understood, what is not understood, 
as well as what constitutes an accessible or inaccessible mode of knowledge transfer. 
Put differently, by thinking more carefully about the implications of privileging 
knowledge about sustainability for our understanding of participation, “development 
policy makers, practitioners and analysts could improve their work, and the way they 
communicate about it” (Thin 2002 2).  
 
Goals and interests  
For Barnes, Bloor & Henry, to understand what causes one belief to be held in 
preference to another, we need to investigate the goals and interests served therein 
(1996:119-127; see also Barnes 1982a). Scientific knowledge, they argue, is the 
product of activity, and activity is in their view purposive by definition; though as 
noted, this thinking holds for knowledge more generally. Activity is goal-oriented: 
what we want to do shapes how we come to accept the way of doing it, or 
understanding how to do it. There is, therefore, no sense in which activity is 
undertaken in such a way as to serve no purpose. We may not agree with the purpose 
it serves, we may wonder whether it serves its intended purpose, but it remains 
purpose-oriented. Bloor, Barnes & Henry view goals and interests as causally 
significant for changes in knowledge (1996:120). Goals and interests cause 
knowledge either to be upheld and stay the same or to change, but do not cause 
knowledge per se. Further, although goals and interests can never be the “sufficient 
causes” of action, we cannot explain action without making reference to them at some 
point in our account (ibid:120). 
Some further points of clarification may soften the objections which might at this 
juncture understandably arise. Given that using goals and interests to explain action is 
an important methodological strategy for this thesis – and given the hostile reception 
this approach has received in some quarters (i.e. Latour 1993, 1999) – it seems best to 
be explicit about what is meant by the term. First, goals and interests are not to be 
confused with pure self-interest; this is one amongst innumerable goals and interests 
that motivate action. It may be as well here to nip in the bud one implication that 
might be drawn from a narrow view of the significance and analytical utility of goals 
and interests. In the context of the initiatives I studied in Namibia and Argentina, I 
wish to rule out the possibility of explaining the occurrence of circularity in 
intervention purely in terms of the self-interest of actors whose presence is rendered 
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indispensable because of the privileged status of the knowledge they hold about 
sustainability.  
Second, if we accept the argument that all activity is goal oriented, are we not 
missing the rather vital point that much activity is a matter of routine, not followed 
with any particular goal in mind? Indeed, it may well not be too much of a stretch to 
classify most human activity as routine, automatic. If we accept this argument, if 
activity is explained by our predisposition toward routine, then is a goals-and-
interests focus not deprived, correspondingly, of most of its explanatory power? 
Barnes, Bloor & Henry beg to differ. They argue that routines are the consequence of 
goals and interests as much as any other type of activity. Habit and authority, the 
essential components of routines, may be “immediate causes of routine action” 
(ibid:125), but they are not independent from goals and interests, not able to explain 
action in and of themselves. This is because, should circumstance require it, routine 
action would be modified by goals and interests and a new routine established, the 
continuation of which habit and authority would help to explain. Therefore, “in that it 
persists unmodified, routine action is itself explained by its relationship to goals and 
interests” (ibid:126). 
Sustainability is explicitly and widely recognised as a goal towards which 
devoting thought, time, resources and energy is very much worth our while. It is very 
hard to see how we might conceive of sustainability separate from its status as a goal. 
It is equally difficult to argue against the proposition that, if we accept current 
predictions about some of the consequences of existing trends in population growth or 
consumption, it is in our interests to attempt to devise sustainable modes of 
production, transport, consumption, curbing the global birth rate etc.  
To seek to document and explain such changes in beliefs about sustainability 
becomes, then, a methodological strategy. It is my goal to explore changes to 
knowledge about sustainability in both Namibia and Argentina, and this objective 
shapes the structure of the thesis. In parts two and three of the thesis, I attempt first to 
examine what beliefs were previously held, particularly in relation to conservation, 
but also with respect to the relationship between conservation and development 
processes, which were (and in some quarters still are) held to be incompatible. 
Following this, I explore the processes by which different beliefs about how to 
achieve conservation and development objectives came to be influential, at the 
expense of the beliefs held previously. In both Namibia and Argentina, the increasing 
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importance of the concept of sustainability at a global level has been central in 
changes to definitions of conservation and development, how policy should respond 
to such changes and how to go about the sort of conservation and development 
suggested by these definitions. The influence of knowledge about sustainability in 
both contexts thereby forms the basis for the comparison between the two countries. 
The concept of sustainability underpins both the Alto Bermejo Project and the 
Conservancy Programme: all intervention in both contexts has to contribute to this 
ultimate goal.  
 
Why not other approaches from science and technology studies?  
The sociology of scientific knowledge is one of a number of theoretical starting 
points within the broader field of Science and Technology Studies; and perhaps a 
minority one at that. What still remains to be explained is why I chose it and not 
other approaches which are more prevalent in the field. The short answer is that 
it seems to me the only approach which fully acknowledges unresolved tensions 
and problems in our ways of knowing, and calculates the status of what we do 
know on that basis. The long answer follows below. 
A debate of central importance within science and technology studies 
concerns the role of the world, and the things found within it, in the generation of 
scientific knowledge about them. The point on which at least some commentators 
who take otherwise distinct positions can agree is that the world does influence 
our beliefs about it. For Barnes, Bloor and Henry, “the physical environment can 
have effects on cognition no less than the social environment: if one makes a 
distinction between these two environments, then it is arbitrary and unjustified to 
recognize the role of the one and not the other” (1996 79). For Bruno Latour, 
things have to be “allowed to make a difference” (1999 117) to our accounts of 
them and, hence, to social life more generally. The properties of ‘things in 
themselves’ (ibid) are central to an explanation of our beliefs of them and what 
we then do with those beliefs. For example, the properties of a wheel or a laptop 
computer must surely influence both what we claim to know about wheels or 
laptops and how we make or use them.  
Nevertheless, the relationship between the things that are in the world and 
our reports about them is not at all straightforward. But it is as well, before going 
any further, to be explicit about one consequence of accepting the existence of a 
 46
world independent of our beliefs about it, which is necessary to make the claim 
that the world does indeed influence our beliefs about it. This proposition puts 
limits on social explanations of our constructions (or accounts) of the world, in 
particular the proposition that there is nothing beyond language, a conclusion 
which, unless carefully formulated, a social constructionist position can lead to, 
and which I do not accept in this thesis. The world impinges on the society and 
reality we construct for ourselves (Latour 1999).  
The question is, how do we detect and describe the effects that things have on 
our reports and observations about them? It is in the attempts to answer this 
question that approaches diverge. I make no attempt here to survey all of the 
divergent views that stem from this question, such as Andrew Pickering’s 
“Mangle” (1995) or Daniel Breslau’s ‘anti-humanist’ sociology (2000). This is 
partly for reasons of space, and partly out of a concern not to stray too far from 
the chief concern of this thesis. Latour’s work is central to science and 
technology studies, as much for those who find his methods for studying science 
brilliant as for those who find them incoherent, and his ideas give a 
representative flavour of many of the issues and debates within the field. I hope 
also to show what in his conception of our relationship to the world I take issue 
with, and how, following Barnes, Bloor and Henry, we might better understand 
that relationship.    
For Latour, scientists are not the only agents in the construction of scientific 
knowledge; things are agents just as much as scientists are (Latour 1988, Latour 
1999). He makes this argument in order to leave space for ‘non human’ things to 
play their proper role in determining our accounts of and beliefs about them. In 
this way, the world affects society, and, therefore, it is not sufficient to 
investigate solely social phenomena in our accounts of society. However, 
Latour’s proposed manner of understanding the basic relationship between 
humans and the world is radical and controversial.  
In order to comprehend how our relationship with the world generates 
knowledge, Latour proposes that we abandon the dichotomy of subject/object 
(Latour, 1999), that is, the idea of a human subject and ‘knower’ and an object or 
thing about which something is known. Rather, humans and other agents are all 
“quasi-objects” and “quasi-subjects”. In this way, society and nature are “co-
produced” (1988) and can only be fully understood by avoiding explaining either 
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nature wholly in terms of society or explaining society in terms of nature. This is 
the basis for his actor-network theory. It is necessary instead to study the “chains 
of associations” that bring together actors and “actants” (non-human actors), be 
they human, material, psychological or ideological. The individual actors or 
actants in a network can only be defined in terms of their relation to each other. 
In the process of interaction across time between these entities, which is what 
scientific practice is comprised of, knowledge is continually constructed and 
reconstructed.  In this process, actors and actants make an equal contribution, 
things are invested with the same capacity for agency and intentionality as are 
human actors. Dividing the world into knowing subjects and objects about which 
subjects have knowledge is to split nature itself arbitrarily in two, and does not 
give a complete account of things in the (re)formation of our knowledge. This is 
because it focuses only on contributions to knowledge made by our reports about 
things, and not on the contribution made by things themselves. Thus, unless we 
abandon the subject/object dichotomy, things are “not allowed to make a 
difference” to our knowledge of them (1999 125). On these grounds Latour finds 
sociology – and, in particular, the sociology of scientific knowledge – incapable 
of explaining society because it is unable to account for the effects of non-human 
actors upon the network which, presumably, constitutes both society and nature 
simultaneously.     
It would be ungracious and mean-spirited to leave unacknowledged the 
potential utility and value of much of Latour’s work. Even detractors admire his 
keen awareness of the political and power dimensions of the production of 
scientific knowledge (Barnes, Bloor, and Henry 1996). Moreover, his ideas have 
been widely used to interesting effect. To take just one example, his work on 
explaining how knowledge comes to be accepted, in terms of the enrolment of 
different actors and use of the concept of order as a way to show how different 
actors with differing agendas will on some level work toward a common 
purpose, has been used to interesting effect by David Mosse. Mosse deploys 
them in his account of how development policy and projects are produced and 
deemed a success or a failure (Latour 1996, Mosse 2005).  
Nevertheless, his account leaves fundamental difficulties unresolved. First, 
talk of material agency raises troublesome problems related to the idea of 
intentionality. It is hard to see how to define agency without referring to the 
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intentions actors have when they act. And it is equally hard to see how material 
objects can have – let alone act upon – intentions. It seems completely counter-
intuitive to how we relate to the world. Second, following Collins and Yearly 
(1992), Dritsas (2005) has pointed out the difficulties for commentators without 
scientific training – such as Latour and other proponents both of science and 
technology studies and the sociology of scientific knowledge – to study material 
agency. It leads to such commentators studying the reports made by scientists 
about material agency, rather than material agency itself (ibid.). Arguably – and 
it continues to be the subject of intense debate – this deposits Latour back at the 
subject/object dichotomy because he is left studying our knowledge of things, not 
the things themselves.  
The perception, then, that Latour’s metaphysics have not shown how to get 
beyond accounts of things to the things themselves – and, therefore, to gain 
direct access to their agency – has even led to the charge of his having raised 
“obscurantism…to the level of a general methodological principle” (Bloor 1999 
97). David Bloor is one of Latour’s strongest critics, and the harshness of the 
observation is better understood in that light. Moreover, he admits that there are 
parts of Latour’s arguments in which he does not “understand what [Latour] is 
trying to say” (Bloor 1999:135). We may therefore read into Bloor’s words a 
refreshingly honest but potentially damaging admission; after all, how can one 
claim to refute what one does not understand? A possible reply could be, how 
can one defend what is unintelligible? Much in Latour’s – and Bloor’s – work 
stands or falls on the answers to these questions. It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to provide them. Nor can I claim to have gone beyond Bloor’s 
understanding of Latour’s argument. However, despite Latour’s adamance that 
Bloor is simply missing the point (Latour 1999), I would contend that it still 
remains unclear how Latour has justified sufficiently his radically different views 
on what it means to know about the world. On that basis, it seems expedient to 








I hope with this chapter to have achieved a number of objectives. First, I have 
explained why two concepts, self-referential knowledge and cognitive authority, 
contribute to a better understanding of how the specialised character of knowledge 
about sustainability impacts on local participation in initiatives in Namibia and 
Argentina. The ‘circularity in intervention’ which, I argue, characterises participation 
in both contexts is prefigured by considerations of self-referential knowledge and 
cognitive authority. Second, I have outlined some of the basic tenets of the ‘finitist’ 
theory of knowledge, and sought to demonstrate both their relevance to my own work 
and the implications they have for my methodology. By adopting a finitist stance, I 
leave aside the task of determining true beliefs about sustainability from false ones, 
and instead seek to explain how beliefs about how to realise conservation and 
development objectives are predicated on the notion of sustainability, both in the 
Conservancy Programme and the Alto Bermejo Project. This is to be done with 
recourse to an exploration of the goals and interests which underlie the influence of 
the concept of sustainability. My overarching focus is on the consequences for local 
participation in these initiatives of the already-established importance of 
sustainability and the subsequent need to transfer knowledge and skills necessary to 
its achievement.  
In order to track and trace this influence, it is necessary to explore the history of 
the use of the term sustainability, within the specific context of conservation and 
development processes. We need to inspect the wider context in which sustainability 
became a concept on which an international consensus (or coordination of beliefs) has 
been built. It is this task to which it is now necessary to turn. 
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Chapter III  




Sustainability is a hugely influential concept in innumerable spheres of thought and 
activity. This was not always the case; how did it come to be so, and how did beliefs 
about how to do conservation and development change as a consequence? These are 
the two central questions that this chapter attempts to address. It starts with a brief 
historical sketch of how sustainability has come to be such an important and popular 
idea. Much thinking on the notion can be traced back at least as far as the nineteenth 
century, to concerns about the potentially adverse consequences of ‘progress’ and 
global economic expansion. On into the twentieth century, the fear increased that 
unchecked economic growth, massive consumption and population expansion could 
threaten the very survival of human beings. This set of concerns prompts the quest for 
sustainability. The emergence and exponential increase in the influence of this 
concept through certain events – such as the earth summits – and certain institutions – 
such as the World Commission on Environment and Development – is, therefore, 
tracked.  
There is not just one definition of sustainability, nor is there a single approach 
posited for its achievement; on the contrary, a variety, be they techno-, anthro- or eco-
centric, blue-, red- or deep-green have emerged. Consequently, clear consensus on 
precisely what it means or how to bring it about is not the chief characteristic of 
knowledge about sustainability. Like ‘poverty reduction’ or ‘participation’, this 
broad, necessarily vague aim accommodates many diverse and often mutually 
antagonistic interest groups. Consideration is given, then, to this dynamic through 
which sustainability is as hard to object to as its meaning is to specify. Nonetheless, 
agreement has been garnered that sustainability has to be an overarching goal, and 
contrary to the position adopted by some commentators, I contend that it is possible 
to formulate a definition of ‘sustainable development’ which entails no logical 
contradiction. Non-contradictory definitions are already available: even if it is a 
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phrase with many different and sometimes opposed meanings, so too are some of our 
most basic words, but we still employ them meaningfully.  
Given that progress and development are inextricably bound up with the 
consumption of the products of nature, a central part of any attempt to realise a 
sustainable way of living must be concerned with the use of common-pool resources. 
Thinking on common-pool resource is, then, the central theme of section two. The 
following definition of a common-pool resource will serve us here: “a class of 
resources for which exclusion is difficult and joint use involves subtractability” 
(Berkes et al. 1989 91). A definition which employed less precise but more accessible 
terms could be: a type of resource which people cannot easily be stopped from using, 
and which may be partially or wholly depleted, depending on how it is used. Within 
the study of common-pool resources, there has been a re-evaluation of what 
sustainability is, how to go about realising sustainable common-pool resource use and 
indeed the extent to which sustainability is something that can be orchestrated 
through careful management. This reappraisal extends in four broad directions.  
The first has to do with the theoretical models of common-pool resource 
management often espoused by governments in various parts of the world. This vein 
of thinking has attempted to find the explanatory limitations of such models by 
engaging with the empirical study of a variety of existing common-pool resource 
regimes. It has been argued that through this engagement it is necessary not only to 
refine existing models of state or private intervention in common-pool resource 
management (Ostrom 1990), but also to recognise and learn from the inherently 
sustainable character of ‘local’, ‘traditional’ or ‘communal’ common-pool resource 
management regimes that have existed for centuries (Berkes et al. 1989, Feeny et al. 
1990, McCay and Acheson 1987).  
The second strand brings into question some of the assumptions made by the 
science of common-pool resource management employed for much of the twentieth 
century, thereby generating doubts about the extent to which it is possible to establish 
stable, unvarying, routinely predictable forms of sustainable common-pool resource 
management.  
The third offshoot, linked to the second, has taken up and challenged scientific 
narratives of environmental crisis, holding that at least in some cases the evidence on 
which they are based is not as reliable as is sometimes assumed. If the scientific basis 
for such narratives goes unchallenged only because of the glow of the light of 
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imputed authenticity in which they bathe, some commentators conclude that we must 
look to the social, political and historical factors which help to explain why they have 
become invested with credibility over long periods of time (at least in some cases). 
This is very much a sociological approach to scientific knowledge.  
Connected to this attack on the credibility of scientific knowledge is the fourth 
strand, characterised by an attempt to capture the value of local knowledge more 
widely which may have been overlooked or discredited as a result of privileging 
scientific knowledge.  
All of these bodies of literature have been instrumental in changing thinking about 
what needs to be known for sustainable common-pool resource management to be 
realised, and who holds such knowledge. Such changes in thinking are a consequence 
of and contribute to the erosion of the cognitive authority that has for much of the 
twentieth century been invested in the science of common-pool resource 
management; and indeed in scientific knowledge more generally.  
Finally, a note on the use of terminology. With ‘sustainability’ I refer to the a state 
of affairs that can be continued for a long time or indefinitely. With ‘sustainable 
development’, I refer to a form of development which can be continued for a long 
time or indefinitely. The notion of ‘ongoingness’, as it were, is presupposed by the 
WCED definition of sustainable development: “development that meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” (1987 43). 
 
2. The origins and rise of the concept of sustainability 
 
Knowledge about sustainability: an introduction 
Concerns about progress, in the form of continual economic growth, are not 
especially new. In the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill posed a question still 
pertinent in the twenty-first: “Towards what ultimate point is society tending by its 
industrial progress? When the progress ceases, in what condition are we to expect it 
will leave mankind?” (1978 [1857]). Connected questions have been very much 
concerned with the effects of industrial progress on the environment. The increasing 
importance imputed to the concept of sustainability is inseparable from the ever 
greater attention paid to whether humankind is a cause – indeed the principal cause – 
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of environmental change (cf. Mannion 1991 1). If the majority of adverse 
environmental change is anthropocentric, resulting in the destruction of the natural 
capital on which progress is based, that form of progress cannot be sustained 
indefinitely. This linking of progress to environmental limitations, for Glacken, was a 
consequence of a nineteenth-century re-ordering of humankind’s relationship to 
nature, driven by three factors: “the theory of evolution, specialization in the 
attainment of knowledge, acceleration in the transformation of nature” (1973 705).  
Economic growth driven by the consumption of natural capital was a central 
characteristic of a century steeped in global colonial expansion. The contrast between 
landscapes ‘transformed’ through industrialisation and those encountered by 
European colonisers served to heighten awareness of the environmental consequences 
of progress. We can trace back to concerns about such consequences the beginnings 
of the environmental movement, in the form of early conservationists who wanted to 
preserve the ‘wilderness’ they thought lost or tainted in their own countries, a point 
made in more detail in chapter four.  
The environmental movement grew out of, and is often taken to be synonymous 
with, the international conservation groups and lobbies of the twentieth century. The 
early conservation aims of protecting wildlife and ‘wild’ landscapes for their intrinsic 
value gradually scaled up to wider concerns about the state and fate of the whole 
planet (Jenkins 2001 5). This global perspective took its cue from the discipline of 
ecology, whose respectability and credibility as a science was well-established by the 
1950s (Redclift 1987). With its emphasis on ecological systems, the delicate balance 
between system components, ecology posited the link between damaging change to 
the system and the very survival of humankind (Jenkins 2001:6). The 
environmentalism of the 1960s subsequently sought to make prominent the notion 
that establishing a harmonious, enduring relationship between humans and nature was 
therefore imperative. At the same time, the environmental movement was becoming 
increasingly international in its reach and organisational structures, due, according to 
McCormick, to: the expansion of scientific research; much greater ease of national 
and international travel; population growth and broad socio-economic change 
(McCormick 1989 1).  
Preoccupation with the effects of human consumption on the ecosystems that 
provided the inputs for economic growth laid the ground in the 1970s for the 
contention that there were environmental limits to economic growth, a controversial 
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debate that came to be held on the international stage. The notion of limits was first 
popularised by the group of academics who met to form the ‘Club of Rome’, led by 
Aurelio Peccei. The Club’s findings were reflected in and popularised by the book 
Limits to Growth, (Meadows, Randers and Meadows, 1972) which attracted the 
attention of government, private and civil sector actors and groups the world over. 
Other publications, such as Carson’s Silent Spring (1963) and John Alexander 
Loraine’s pessimistically-titled The Death of Tomorrow (1972) raised similar issues, 
and all such publications served to earn their authors the moniker of ‘prophets of 
doom’. The collaborative works of Dennis and Donella Meadows with Jørgen 
Randers (i.e. 1972, 1992, 2004) serve as a barometer of the change in beliefs about 
the expediency and the consequences of the type of unrestricted economic growth 
widely envisaged for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
Meadows, Randers and Meadows argued that unrestricted economic growth could 
become a victim of its own success if population levels and natural resource 
consumption increased to the point of surpassing the planet’s ecological constraints. 
Ever greater quantities of manpower and capital intended for the furthering of 
economic growth would have to be set aside for tackling the consequences of 
exceeding such constraints, lowering quality of life. Meadows, Randers and Meadows 
used computer modelling to generate 12 potential scenarios for the ‘end’ of growth, 
with acceptable consumption and population levels achieved at one end of the scale to 
catastrophic crash at the other. All twelve scenarios put the end of growth at some 
point in the twenty-first century. Having set up the contrast between needless 
catastrophe and the rosy future that humankind could enjoy if shaken from 
complacency, the aim of the book was to make the case for a global effort to bring 
human impact on the environment to within the world’s ‘carrying capacity’. In other 
words, the object of much global policy would be to bring growth within critical 
ecological boundaries, to facilitate ways of living that could be continued from one 
generation to the next. Limits to Growth, along with other texts, created the context in 
which calls for sustainability would be made. Without an awareness of limits, there 
could be no focus on the need for sustainability. Disagreement over the meaning of 
sustainable development notwithstanding, it is hard to conceive of a definition not 
prefigured by the idea that there are limits within which (re)productive and 
consumptive activity must remain. 
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As the melodramatic implications of the now common term ‘environmental 
prophets of doom’ would suggest, not all were readily convinced at first of the need 
to impose limits on growth. For instance, Herman Kahn, formerly a prominent US 
military strategist and systems theorist, was among those leading the counter-attack, 
arguing: “With current and near current technology, we can support 15 billion people 
in the world at twenty thousand dollars per capita for a millennium – and that seems 
to be a very conservative statement” (cited in Meadows, Randers, and Meadows 2004 
ii). Such sceptical views, whilst still in circulation, have lost much ground, whilst 
concern about the environmental impacts of growth burgeoned in the final thirty years 
of the twentieth century. By the early 1990s, Meadows, Randers and Meadows 
argued in Beyond the Limits that humans had already exceeded the planet’s capacity 
to support a form of existence entailing largely unchecked, exponential growth in 
global population levels and resource consumption (1992). In the twenty-first century, 
their position remained almost completely unchanged: their initial predictions in 
Limits to Growth had mostly, they felt, stood the test of time (2004), and judged that 
what had been done to address the threats posed by global climate change was not 
nearly sufficient. The optimism evident in Limits to Growth for a potentially rosy, 
sustainable future had been by the twenty-first century much diminished, partly by 
what they saw as a string of wasted opportunities for substantial, proportionate 
change, and partly perhaps due to the demise in 2001 of Donella Meadows, the most 
optimistic of the three authors. As preoccupation, then, with potentially irreversible 
environmental change which, for some, could endanger the survival of the human 
species has increased (i.e. Clayton and Radcliffe 1996), the influence of and 
importance attached to the concept of sustainability has grown exponentially. 
These days the international media, the global environmental lobby, governments 
and even multinational companies that have become associated with unwisely 
destructive forms of resource consumption (i.e. Shell, Toyota or British Airways) all 
profess the need for sustainable growth. The importance of sustainability is accepted 
in many, perhaps even most, spheres of economic activity. However, the public 
legitimacy of the concept and its status in policy documents as an indispensable 
prefix may lead us to overstate its actual influence on decision-making and priority-
setting in government or the private sector. Meadows, Randers and Meadows talk of 
the failure to sign politicians up to the ‘cause’ of sustainability to anything like the 
levels of support that economists have garnered for the concept of free trade (2004), 
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which was itself becoming popular around the time Limits to Growth was first 
published. These remarks may plausibly be borne out by the failure of the world’s 
largest emitter of carbon emissions to sign up to the UN Kyoto protocol in 1999, and 
also the likelihood that the majority of countries who did sign up will not comply 
with their emissions reductions targets by 2012. However, in the last couple of years, 
the issue of climate change has received much greater attention and is rarely out of 
the news. Take, for instance, the European Union’s recent talk of setting itself up as a 
model for tackling climate change, or the column inches devoted to the publication of 
the most recent report of the International Panel on Climate Change. Indeed, 
according to The Economist, in the British context at least, “climate change has 
become as much of a political battleground as health, education or immigration”2
 
The emergence of an international consensus on sustainability – actors and 
institutions    
Victoria Jenkins offers a review of the landmark events, institutions conferences and 
manifestos which helped to consolidate the place of sustainability on the international 
political agenda between 1972 and 1992 (2001:49-90), summarised here, 
supplemented with other sources and extended until 2002.  
Although the term ‘sustainable development’ was not, according to Jenkins, 
coined until 1980, it was prefigured by a chain of events initiated in 1972. At this 
point the international community first convened to discuss concern about 
environmental change of anthropocentric origin. Stockholm hosted the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNHCE). On the back of the 
establishment of a broad consensus that action would have to be taken to tackle 
environmental degradation the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) was created. Its 
duties included the facilitation of international cooperation on environmental issues 
and the coordination of the UN’s environment-related activities.  
The ten years that followed the Conference on the Human Environment did not 
pass in a flurry of activity to develop and achieve the objectives it set. Nonetheless, 
the United Nations Environment Programme received support from two large 
international organisations, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). They collaboratively 
                                                 
2 The Economist, March 17th 2007, p35 (see also the Bagehot column in the same edition)   
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published the World Conservation Strategy in 1980. Apparently the first document to 
call for ‘sustainable development’, it sought living resource conservation, but argued 
that this aim would be dependent upon successfully addressing many development-
related problems such as poverty, food security and, of course, population expansion. 
It may therefore have been the first international publication to reconfigure the 
relationship between conservation and development processes, seeing it not as one of 
mutual conflict and antagonism, but of necessary interdependence. To this end, its 
overarching objective was “the integration of conservation and ‘development’ to 
ensure that modifications to the planet do indeed secure the survival and well-being 
of all people” (IUCN/UNEP/WWF 1980, section 1, introduction, paragraph 8).  
In 1982, the first of three anniversary conferences for the one of 1972 was held in 
Nairobi, out of which emerged two things of lasting significance. First, an agreement 
known as the World Charter for Nature was reached, an attempt to establish general 
principles of natural resource conservation which linked the success of any such 
conservation to considerations of human development. Second, at Nairobi the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) was created, leading to the 
publication in 1987 of Our Common Future, which contains the most frequently cited 
(and contested) definition of sustainable development: “development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs” (WCED 1987 43). The Commission was tasked with devising “A 
Global Agenda for Change”, which required the realisation of four linked objectives: 
 
1. proposing strategies for the achievement of sustainable development by “2000 
and beyond” 
2. fostering greater cooperation between countries at different stages of social 
and economic development in the establishment of “common and mutually 
supportive objectives” predicated on the “interrelationship” between 
environment and development 
3. finding “ways and means” for international responses to environmental 
problems 
4. defining shared perceptions and aspirational goals for the international 
community (WCED 1987 ix) 
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This momentum peaked twenty years later with the holding of the UN Conference 
on Environment and Development, more commonly known by the more approachable 
term the ‘Earth Summit’. Alternately described as a success and a failure (Grubb et al. 
1993, Redclift and Sage 1995), the conference brought together 178 countries, 
including 120 heads of state, and produced five agreements that were widely held to 
be “the most comprehensive statement, to date, of a world consensus on the aims and 
means of achieving ‘sustainable development’” (Jenkins 2001 53). These agreements 
are: 
 
1. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development  
2. Agenda 21  
3. The Convention on Biological Diversity  
4. The Framework Convention on Climate Change 
5. The Agreement on Forest Principles (UNEP website) 
 
The Rio Declaration comprised a list of 27 principles on which to base ‘sustainable 
development’. Agenda 21 was essentially a series of documents which constituted a 
global action plan for sustainable development. Many commentators were impressed 
by the breadth of consensus that had permitted the production of these agreements 
(Grubb et al 1993:26). Others argued that they placed little in the way of binding 
legal commitment or obligation upon those party to the agreements (ibid.). Another 
complaint was that no concrete timetable for the actions envisaged under Agenda 21 
had been agreed, nor had any specific mechanisms for their implementation been 
devised. Some concluded that despite the excitement and optimism surrounding the 
Summit, it amounted to little more than talk, and a failure therein (ibid.). Disillusion 
notwithstanding, the first Earth Summit had produced an international agenda for 
addressing environment and development concerns, predicated on the logic of 
sustainability. 
The Rio conference was followed in 1997, at the United Nations General 
Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on Sustainable Development in New York, by 
what came to be known as Earth Summit II. Intended as a review of progress on the 
objectives of Agenda 21 and a re-affirmation of the goals and agreements of the Rio 
Conference, it generated more disappointment than optimism (Osborn and Bigg 
1998).  
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As a result, expectations mounted for the following global event: the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg in 2002. An enormous 
gathering, it brought together 22,000 people, including, as well as many heads of 
state, 10,000 delegates, 8,000 representatives from civil society and the private sector 
and 4,000 journalists – one for every four-to-five of the Summit’s attendees (UN 
2002a). Governments in attendance at the Summit tended to declare it a success, as 
typified by the optimistic response of (former) UK Minister for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs, Margaret Beckett (2002). The Plan of Implementation was lauded 
by the UN as a more focussed document than its predecessor Agenda 21, advancing 
the cause of sustainable development through a clearer identification of the processes 
by which it could be achieved, and by bringing in a wider range of actors than had 
been involved in the Rio Summit of 1992 (UN 2002b). As embodied by the Plan, and 
chiming significantly with the Millennium Development Goals, the priorities for the 
achievement of sustainable development were:  
 
• Water and sanitation 
• Health 
• Biodiversity and ecosystem management  
• Poverty reduction 
• Climate change (ibid)  
 
Other commentators, especially those within the civil society sector, expressed deep 
disappointment at the outcomes, perhaps most pithily captured by WWF’s response to 
the UK Government’s celebratory overtures: “which summit did Beckett attend?” 
(cited in ENDS 2002). Echoing one vein of response to the Rio Summit, the most 
frequent criticism that emerged was related to the perceived lack of commitment to 
setting timeframes for unambiguous targets, creating mechanisms for realising stated 
objectives and little or no mention of dedicated funding for priority activities (cf.  
Seyfang 2003, Von Frantzius 2004). For some, it was even a “step away” from 
sustainable development (Coates 2002). Others argued it did not send a “strong 
political signal” to negotiators in the Doha round of the World Trade Organisation 
talks to incorporate sustainability criteria into final agreements (Von Frantzius, 2004). 
These talks were at any rate suspended in July 2006.  
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Whatever conclusion is arrived at about the merits and disappointments of the 
Johannesburg Summit and the conferences in Stockholm, Nairobi and Rio that 
preceded it, the effect they have had on raising the credibility and legitimacy imputed 
to the concept of sustainability is hard to underestimate. As a part of this process, the 
notion of broad participation as a cornerstone of sustainability has also gained wide 
acceptance, its importance frequently stressed, for example in the Johannesburg Plan 
of Implementation (UN 2002b).  
 
The meaning of ‘sustainability’ – are we being conned?  
Although a global consensus on the need for sustainable development is often 
assumed, there is markedly less consensus on what the concept refers to. A number of 
different positions have emerged regarding priorities for sustainability and how to set 
about their achievement. The most common complaint made against the notion is that 
it is held to be contradictory; but I argue that it can be formulated in a variety of ways 
without entailing any logical contradiction.  
In the context of sustainable development, Michael Redclift captures what is 
commonly taken to be a dilemma for any attempt at a definition of sustainable 
development: “Like motherhood and God, it is difficult not to approve of it. At the 
same time, ‘sustainable development’ is fraught with contradiction” (1995 17). Whilst 
the verb ‘sustain’ conveys a “passive” connotation, the adjective ‘sustainable’ is often 
used in what Redclift terms an “active” sense, to prescribe a given course of 
appropriate action (ibid:18). Unfortunately, Redclift sews confusion where he seeks 
to clarify, because he does not specify the meaning of ‘active’ and ‘passive’. In the 
strictly grammatical sense, his usage of ‘active’ and ‘passive’ would appear to be 
inconsistent. Grammatically speaking, ‘sustain’, as a verb, has an active function in a 
sentence, whereas ‘sustainable’, being an adjective, is neither passive nor active, as it 
can be neither the subject nor the object of a sentence. If by ‘passive’ he refers not to 
what a thing is or does, but rather what happens to it, what it merely reacts to, as in an 
army which sustains casualties, his point is more intelligible. However, we might also 
talk of a lode-bearing wall that sustains the weight of structures built on top of it, 
which carries an active connotation, one of continuously resisting pressure. We could 
argue from there that phrases like ‘sustain casualties’ are figurative, and merely 
borrow the more standard sense of ‘sustain’, that of resisting pressure. The difference 
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between active and passive in this other sense, then, is not as clear cut as one might 
hope. 
Nonetheless, Redclift could – and does – still claim that ‘sustainable’ is used in a 
variety of contradictory ways. This argument is made also by Potter who, in an article 
entitled ‘Sustainable development: are we being conned?’ (1997 147-148), turns to 
the Oxford English Dictionary to make his point. The O.E.D. defines ‘sustainable’ as 
“to keep going continuously”, and ‘development’ as ‘growth or evolution’. If we 
accept those definitions, he argues that the sort of economic growth which is widely 
held to have taken us ‘beyond the limit’ (Meadows, Randers, and Meadows 1992) 
could be classified as ‘sustainable development’. However, this dilemma is resolved 
with the observation that economic growth is a form of sustainable development until 
it stops being so; to say that it can be sustainable does not oblige us to say that it will 
always be so. The point at which it becomes unsustainable is the point at which it 
becomes desirable or necessary to search for another mode of economic activity that 
will be sustainable. There is no logical contradiction in arguing that any form of 
economic activity could be classed as ‘sustainable development’, as long as it is 
recognised that it is only sustainable up to a point. The object and means of 
sustainability are, then, up for renegotiation, and that is the point at which debates 
concerning sustainable development now stand.  
Furthermore, the idea that ‘sustainable development’, defined purely in terms of 
growth, is ipso facto oxymoronic (i.e. Pearce et al. 1989), has been challenged by 
several authors, including Jørgen Randers (1994). Oluf Langhelle (1999 136) argues 
that the possibility of sustainable growth depends on whether “economic growth (i.e. 
growth in the money value of the annual production of goods and services) can be 
uncoupled from physical growth (the growth in population, energy use, resource use 
and pollution output)”. Verifying whether economic growth can be sustainable, he 
states, would be a matter for empirical investigation, not a self-evident truth.  
To be fair to commentators such as Redclift, Potter and Pearce, though, the 
warning that we should be careful in our use of the terms ‘sustainable’ and 
‘development’, is well worth heeding. They are indeed too “frequently strung 
together” (Potter 1997:147) without due care being paid to their many-splintered 
implications. This concern with usage is also taken up by Rosaleen Duffy, who 
contends that because sustainability underwrites the rhetoric of so many different 
groups of actors with diverse or opposed aims and interests, it is in fact rendered 
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meaningless (2000:4-6). As another prompt for employing due caution in our use of 
the term, this can be considered a useful observation. Moreover, Duffy’s approach 
reminds us that the varied definitions of the term are formulated to serve varied goals 
and interests. For instance, it is conspicuous that people from the World Bank and 
animal rights pressure groups formulate their agendas in terms of sustainability, and 
indeed its vagueness permits it to be used in the description of a number of objectives 
very much at odds with each other. But is the concept of sustainability therefore 
meaningless? I contend that it is not. 
Many words have a bewildering number of meanings. If we look up ‘take’ in the 
concise OED, even ignoring its idiomatic connotations in phrasal verbs, we find that 
it can be employed in no less than 35 different senses as a verb, and four as a noun 
(more than 100 senses are covered in the complete OED). Teachers of English as a 
second language may understandably worry about how much of the complexity and 
flexibility of this indispensable word they will be able to convey to their students. But 
how many of those for whom English is their first language ever give it a second 
thought? ‘Take’ is not commonly thought a meaningless word, but we can wonder at 
the diversity in its usage when we do stop and contemplate it. Furthermore, it has 
proved possible to document this diversity, although perhaps not definitively; there 
may be even more senses of the word yet to be identified or accepted, as the O.E.D.’s 
lexicographers would readily admit. We may never know all the meanings of ‘take’, 
but we know enough to use it meaningfully. What, then, stops us from adopting the 
same attitude toward words like ‘sustainability’? It would appear to be inconsistent to 
single out some words for having very different meanings whilst taking for granted 
the many-sided quality of others. It may therefore be fruitful to take up the 
lexicographer’s challenge of documenting at least some of the more common 
meanings of sustainability. Granted, given the global span of the notion of 
sustainability, the sheer numbers of different NGO, activist, lobby, government, 
donor, media and other groups that use it, one could easily argue that it could come to 
have more shades of meaning than a single person could ever comprehend. However, 
we can grasp a good many of them, and there have already been helpful attempts to 
do just this. As Duffy’s work itself may be counted among these, it is all the more 
peculiar that she should conclude the term to be meaningless.  
One way to gain a clearer idea of the numerous ways in which the term is 
deployed is to break down the ideas most frequently associated with it. In this respect, 
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the work of Mitchell, May and McDonald (1995) is of considerable utility. It 
identifies the four principal components of the term ‘sustainability’ common to its 
varied use across the literature: 
 
1. Futurity 
2. Environment  
3. Public participation 
4. Equity  
 
‘Futurity’, synonymous with ‘future orientation’, refers to the idea, expressed in the 
definition of sustainable development offered by Our Common Future (WCED, 
1987), that the current generation bears to future generations the responsibility of 
ensuring that the capacity to meet needs continues to be available. ‘Environment’, of 
course, refers to the classic concerns central to the ‘limits to growth’ thesis, typified 
by some central demands of the IUCN’s (1980) World Conservation Strategy: 
maintaining vital ecological processes; protecting genetic diversity; the sustainable 
use of flora, fauna and ecological systems. The focus on environmental issues, with 
the concerns raised about the limits to growth, is the longest-standing of these four 
components. Public participation, as noted, has become increasingly seen as a 
prerequisite of sustainability, especially since the commitment to it indicated in the 
Rio Declaration. Equity is linked very much, for instance in Our Common Future, to 
the notion of futurity: a more equitable distribution of the spoils of economic growth 
is deemed to be essential to meeting needs both current and future.  
Sustainable development is often held to comprise three connected elements, 
namely social, environmental and economic. They are seen in UN Agenda 21 
documents as objectives towards which development strategies should work (UNEP 
1992), and echoed by numerous commentators on debates about sustainability (i.e. 
Holling, Berkes, and Folke 1998). Not everyone, however, is content to elevate 
social, environmental and economic factors to such lofty intellectual heights. Neil 
Thin argues that the ‘three pillars’ framework (social, environmental, economic) 
clouds rather than clears our thinking about sustainability (2002). His central 
objections to the framework are twofold. First, he posits that ‘social’ is often poorly 
defined, referring to things as diverse as the provision of public goods and services 
(as in the social sector) on the on hand, and social pathologies or problems, such as 
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poverty or crime, on the other (ibid.:20). Second, he contends that separating society 
and economy is to set up a “false opposition”, a consequence of the attempt to 
separate and isolate the discipline of economics from other social sciences perhaps, 
but not a rigorous analytical tool (ibid.:24-25). He deems these flaws terminal and on 
that basis calls for the replacement of the ‘three pillars’ approach with a framework of 







Thin’s framework is an attempt at refining our thinking on sustainable development. 
Thin documents many of the themes and issues related to sustainability, links and 
arranges them with a view to producing more rigorous analysis. We might, then, see 
his work as taking up the lexicographer’s challenge, so to speak. Will it replace the 
‘three pillars’ approach? Questions of analytical clarity notwithstanding, that the 
‘social, environmental and economic’ focus presently is accepted and widely drawn 
upon works in its favour. It would be an interesting sociological task to track the 
whys and hows of BITE’s progress, but sadly it falls outwith the remit of this thesis.  
Another helpful and frequently-employed means of classifying and coming to 
terms with the varied applications of the concept of sustainability is to put such 
applications on a scale with opposed values at each end. Perhaps the chief advantage 
of the scale is that it avoids ‘either/or’ classification, providing instead for a 
(potentially infinite) range of positions somewhere between polar opposites. 
However, such scales are not free of disadvantages. Not all positions, groups and 
actors can be put on just one scale.  
The most commonly encountered scale in the literature on sustainable 
development runs between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ forms of sustainability. Examples of 
‘weak’ being synonymous with ‘bad’, and ‘strong’ with ‘good’, are not too hard to 
find in the literature. Weak forms of sustainability are most often held to be those 
                                                 
3 In fact, Thin whittles down the four components of BITE to just two, the biophysical and the 
social. However, perhaps so as not to sacrifice such a satisfyingly memorable acrostic for one that 
invites unwanted if amusing associations (BS), he sticks with BITE. 
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which view human knowledge and technology as the way to secure sustainable 
development (cf. Buckley 1995). Its proponents might be said to agree to a greater or 
lesser extent on the proposition that any form of common-pool resource use is 
acceptable if it does not threaten the survival of humankind. The exhaustion of any 
type of natural resource, ecological system or region could conceivably be justified in 
the name of this type of sustainable development (Pearce et al 1989), although few 
commentators show this level of commitment to the idea. Weak sustainability does 
therefore impart intrinsic value to human survival, but not necessarily to the survival 
of biodiversity. Its value is instead measured in terms of its importance to the survival 
of humankind, which in some scenarios could even be nil (i.e. the quest to find 
another planet to live on in the event of the conditions for human life on earth 
becoming too adverse).  
Strong sustainability is characterised by the level of commitment to avoiding the 
destruction of the planet’s biodiversity. The extinction of humankind might 
conceivably be justified in the interests of not damaging biodiversity if the logic is 
followed to its conclusion, but few commentators profess the need to do so. More 
popular champions of strong sustainability, such as Herman Daly and Cobb insist on 
the ecological imperative of imposing limits on economic growth and of the need to 
establish an equilibrium, or “steady-state economy” (i.e. Daly, Cobb, and Cobb 
1990). This requires the survival of much but not all biodiversity.  
Although the weak and strong scale gives a flavour for one of the central divides 
in thinking on sustainability, it is as well to be aware of a tendency on the part of 
some commentators to assign a moral connotation to the terms. ‘Weak’ and ‘strong’ 
might easily be replaced with ‘anthropocentric’ and ‘ecocentric’; although this may 
assume that humans and environments can be separated, which has become 
increasingly contested (see section three). The position taken by Our Common Future 
(WCED 1987) is often characterised as ‘anthropocentric’ and criticised for not 
specifying environmental limits to economic growth. Langhelle, though, notes that it 
does in fact set limits and suggests that many of the criticisms which construe it as a 
justification of current economic growth may derive from a superficial reading of the 
text (1999).  
Another important scale running in parallel with ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ 
sustainability seeks to chart the political location of actors involved with 
environmental issues. Therefore, we have ‘blue’ greens and ‘red’ greens. Blue greens 
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occupy the right wing of the political spectrum. Blue-greens are said to draw 
influence in the formulation of their ideas about sustainability from utilitarianism, 
liberalism and free market principles (Duffy 2000:5). Accordingly they are often 
associated ‘weak’ forms of sustainability (Beckerman 1994).  
Red-green refers to a variety of positions on the left (ibid.). That more effort is 
made to discriminate between the positions on the left than on the right may indicate 
that environmental politics are associated more frequently with the left (cf. Eckersley 
1992). Red greens, like blue-greens, profess their commitment to sustainable 
development but are more likely to emphasise the need for changes to social, political 
and economic institutions if development is to be set on a sustainable trajectory (i.e. 
Bookchin 1991). There is another shade of green which is commonly used for the 
purposes of classification: ‘deep green’. Deep greens seek to distance themselves 
from positions which draw on either capitalist or socialist notions about society 
(Duffy 2000). Putting them on the blue-red scale, then, would raise objections, 
although their commitment to maximum environmental protection explains their 
association with ‘strong’ sustainability (ibid). Deep greens may rate James Lovelock 
above either Adam Smith or Karl Marx. Lovelock’s ‘Gaia hypothesis’ (1979) 
challenges the idea that humans should dominate the environment and determine its 
fate, arguing that we are another part of the wider ecological system and should be 
subordinate to it therein.  
It is possible to locate the underlying emphases of both Namibia’s Conservancy 
Programme and the Alto Bermejo Project in Argentina within these scales. Both, I 
would argue, can be classified as blue-green in orientation, principally because 
neither posits the need for fundamental change to social, political or economic 
institutions in order to achieve objectives. Both are clearly and explicitly designed to 
be compatible with a liberal democratic political system and a capitalist economy.  
The Conservancy Programme is predicated on the notion that the future for 
wildlife outwith protected areas, and especially areas also inhabited by humans, 
depends on the extent to which it can effectively compete with other forms of land 
use. It is therein utilitarian in its approach to wildlife conservation, and seeks to set up 
incentive structures which will lead to the sustainable use of a proportion of a given 
wildlife population, thereby permitting that population as a whole to survive. In 
accepting controlled hunting for the pot and trophy hunting as generators of sufficient 
to curb widespread illegal hunting, the Conservancy Programme rests on one of 
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Bentham’s famous principles, that of making decisions which promote the greater 
good (even where that entails individual sacrifice), in this case the greater good both 
of human and wildlife populations. This is incompatible with some formulations of 
the intrinsic value of wildlife, especially those which place animal and human rights 
on a par; although it is not logically incompatible with the goal of protecting wider 
ecological systems. Moreover, it configures the market as a conservation strategy.  
Likewise, the Alto Bermejo Project takes a utilitarian approach to conservation 
outwith protected areas. For instance, agroforestry initiatives in the municipality of 
Los Toldos, in Salta Province, Northwest Argentina, focus on promoting activities 
which give municipal residents a reason to reduce the amount of subtropical mountain 
forest (or Yungas, as it is known in Argentina) cleared for cultivation. Like the 
Conservancy Programme, sustainable use is favoured, or rather posited as the only 
realistic method of conservation. Supplying the means for increased yield on the same 
amount of land and producing a more diverse and marketable range of crops, is 
intended to reduce pressure on the Yungas whilst enriching livelihood strategies by 
adding choice and value to existing activities. The market value, not of the Yungas as 
such, but of the produce of land already under the plough, is supposed to serve as an 
incentive for conservation and an engine of local and (of course) sustainable 
development.    
 
3. Changes to theories of common-pool resource use 
 
Models of common-pool resource management  
A big part of any drive for sustainability has to be focused on what we do with the 
planet’s resources and how. The most contentious set of issues clusters around the 
question of what to do about it. Two broad solutions to problems of resource 
depletion and potential or actual extinction have been offered to policy makers: state 
control or privatisation of natural resources (Clark 1976, Ostrom 1990). Neither has 
satisfied the expectations placed upon them.  
Both private and state solutions to common-pool resource dilemmas have been 
highly influenced by two theoretical models in particular: Garret Hardin’s Tragedy of 
the Commons (1968) and Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action (1965). 
Ostrom’s seminal book Governing the Commons (1990) sought principally to 
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undermine the stranglehold of Garret Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ over debates 
in policy and academic circles about how to manage natural resources. Hardin 
furbished us with a seductive and enduringly influential application of the prisoner’s 
dilemma game to global natural resource use patterns which would, he argued, 
eventually cause the destruction of the resource base itself if no external intervention 
(from the state or the private sector) was forthcoming. Through constructive 
engagement with rational choice and game theories, and through the empirical study 
of common-pool resource use regimes which, she contended, had not destroyed the 
natural resources on which they relied, she argued that the logic of tragedy was not 
inevitable in all the circumstances to which it was applied. She also gave detailed 
descriptions of how some common-pool resource management regimes had escaped 
the logic of tragedy, in some cases over the course of several centuries. She 
formulated an oft-cited set of principles identifying eight conditions which, she 
contended, successful common-pool resource management regimes all appeared to 
meet. Such regimes also served Ostrom in her advocacy for the idea that the free-rider 
problem, strongly associated with Mancur Olson’s (1965) work on collective action, 
could be and had been solved, albeit under specific conditions. Her work has been 
instrumental opening up policy debates to incorporate systems of common-pool 
resource management other than state or private sector intervention. But her position 
does not derive from a rejection of the ‘tragedy of the commons’. It derives, rather, 
from a detailed consideration of where it may and may not be applicable, and on what 
basis (see also Dolsak and Ostrom 2003, Ostrom 1992, Ostrom 2002, Ostrom, 
Gardner, and Walker 1994).  
Challenging and qualifying state and private intervention models has opened up 
space for much greater recognition of other forms of institutional arrangements, and 
the impetus for the documentation of other ways of solving commons dilemmas. It 
has become increasingly common to doubt whether natural resource and other natural 
scientists have a monopoly on information about ecosystems and how to manage 
them. It has become more credible to hold that the concentration on state or private 
intervention may have simply overlooked the pre-existence of vast bodies of local 
knowledge on the environment in which people lived, and the ways in which this 
knowledge had been used to construct common pool resource regimes which had 
proved themselves sustainable over time.  
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The metaphor of the medieval commons in Hardin’s most famous work, 
construing it as an open access resource, has since been challenged in certain quarters 
as something of a misnomer. It has been argued that the medieval commons in 
England was in fact a comprehensively regulated and monitored system which 
operated successfully over centuries (Feeny et al. 1990 84). Whether the sort of 
tragedy Hardin describes did in fact occur widely has been disputed (i.e. Dasgupta 
1983, Potter 1974, Schumacher 1979). Some hold that the link between social 
survival and careful resource use had not been sufficiently examined, either (cf. 
Bromley 1986). Taking evidence from anthropological, sociological, economic and 
ecological research, Berkes and Farvar conclude: 
 
The truth is that traditional systems…..have been the main means by which societies 
have managed their natural resources over millennia on a sustainable basis. It is only 
as a result of this that we have any resources to speak of today (1989 6) 
 
Statements such as these feed into debates on participation. They have the effect 
of de-legitimising the decision-making hegemony of some actors – i.e. resource 
management scientists with specialist knowledge, whilst legitimising a range of other 
actors. Chief among these are local, often rural actors who have come to be seen not 
only as competent ‘managers’ but as necessary participants in any viable effort to 
achieve sustainability objectives (Redclift and Sage 1995). Enlisting the support of 
such actors is also seen as doubly important when their resource use often has little to 
do with government policy on resource management based on sound, scientific 
principles (ibid).  
 
Challenging assumptions of the science of common-pool resource management 
Not only has scientific knowledge about common-pool resource management been 
judged not always to be applicable, but a re-appraisal of the science in which 
conventional definitions of sustainability ground their assumptions has occurred. 
Some commentators question the notion that is it possible to predict and maintain a 
sustainable level of common-pool resource use. 
Using a given resource in a manner that ensures its continued availability for 
future generations presupposes that it is possible to predict the level of resource 
regeneration successfully and stay within it. However, to assume that "a level of 
sustainable utilisation exists and that it is able to be objectively measured and 
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identified" may in fact negate "the socio-economic and political dimensions of 
sustainability” (Brown 1997 86). It may also put “undue emphasis on natural science 
to define sustainable use where, in reality, the uncertainty of complex processes and 
dynamics may preclude such definition" (ibid). Ecological systems have a habit of 
changing (Ludwig, Hilborn, and Walters 1993), and cannot be counted on to be stable 
or predictable. If environments are unstable, ever changing, and if disequilibria are 
the rule, not the exception, then once again we are confronted with the question of 
how coherent the notion of sustainability is.  
Since the 1970s, much work has been undertaken on what has been called the 
‘science of surprise’, in which the role of surprise and disturbance in ecosystems has 
been brought into the foreground. One of the biggest problems with resource 
management that this work identifies is that management itself can change ecosystem 
structures (Gunderson, Holling, and Light 1995). A longstanding goal of common-
pool resource management science has been to maximise the use of a specific 
resource unit, i.e. fish or timber, and attempt to stabilise the yield that can be 
extracted from year to year (Holling, Berkes, and Folke 1998). This, the argument 
runs, is a huge failing of natural resource management science: it treats such resource 
units as discrete entities, not integrated parts of a much wider ecosystem: to change 
one part of it has repercussions for the rest of the system (ibid). Although the 
reduction of variability – ‘freezing’ it in one stage of natural change – makes it easier 
to extract benefits in the short term, feedback about what is happening to the resource 
is eliminated. This can cause a chain effect: “the accumulation of perturbations, 
[invites] larger and less predictable feedbacks at a level and scale that threaten the 
functioning performance of the whole ecosystem.” (Berkes and Folke 1998). If there 
is distinct uncertainty surrounding the science on which assumptions of sustainability 
are predicated, then what are the consequences for common-pool resource users who 
may be unable to specify safe levels of resource usage? 
Holling, Berkes & Folke describe another ‘stream’ of science, which is one of 
“the integration of parts” (Holling, Berkes, and Folke 1998 346) as a result of its 
interdisciplinary nature. It is characterised by “systems approaches and parts of 
evolutionary biology that extend to the analysis of populations, ecosystems, landscape 
structures and dynamics, to include the interactions of social systems with natural 
systems” (ibid). In this way, advocates of this approach argue that space is left to 
recognise that these systems are not constant, but are changing over time, in part in 
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ways we cannot always predict, in part due to the impacts of management 
(Gunderson, Holling, and Light 1995), and in part because of the continual increase in 
the scale of human influences (Daly, Cobb, and Cobb 1994).  On these grounds, then, 
it could be argued that the distinction between social and ecological systems is 
arbitrary and misleading; a supporter of holistic approaches to common-pool resource 
management might say that they are irreducible.  
In light of this holistic perspective, the concept of sustainability and, hence, 
sustainable development, has also been reinterpreted. If ecosystems are reduced to 
discrete, isolated entities for the purposes of making usage of the resource more 
predictable, there is a risk of ignoring their symbiotic relationship with wider social 
and ecological systems (Ibid). It is this contention that has led some to reach the 
conclusion that any definition of sustainability, therefore, has to incorporate the 
following three imperatives: 
 
1. The environmental imperative of living within ecological means 
2. The economic imperative of meeting basic material needs 
3. The social imperative of meeting basic social needs and cultural sustainability. 
(Holling, Berkes & Folke, 1998) 
 
Given the difficulties associated with defining and achieving sustainability and 
the perceived shortcomings of conventional resource management science, there have 
been many claims over the last decade or so to seek new approaches and perspectives 
on the relationship between ecological and social systems.  
Adaptive management is the counterpart to more conventional forms of resource 
management. It attempts to factor in the unpredictability of the interactions between 
people and ecosystems (Berkes & Folke, 1998). Resource management is to be seen 
as an ‘experiment’ from which managers can learn (Walters 1986). Just as individuals 
learn, so too can institutions. Therefore, adaptive management is to be based on social 
and institutional learning (Lee 1993). It emphasises the importance of feedback from 
the environment in shaping policy, and is intended to serve as a way to eliminate “the 
barrier between research and management” (Berkes & Folke, 1998:11).  
In so doing, adaptive management seeks to ape ‘traditional’ resource management 
systems, holding them up as reliable sources of knowledge for alternative models for 
sustainable common-pool resource use. That it has become commonplace to maintain 
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that so much can be learned from previously overlooked or discounted knowledge 
traditions is another indicator of the erosion of cognitive authority which has for so 
long ensured the privileged status that scientific knowledge, or what passes for it, has 
enjoyed. Once again, the question of whose knowledge counts arises, and has served, 
within the study of common-pool resources (but also within wider conservation and 
development arenas), to reinforce the notion that previously excluded knowledge-
holders are to be listened to and learned from. In other words, as the cognitive 
authority of holders of ‘traditional’ common-pool resource knowledge has increased, 
so have demands for their involvement in the quest for sustainability.  
 
Unpicking environmental narratives  
The influence on environmental policy and practice of narratives which either 
describe currently occurring or impending environmental crises has attracted no small 
amount of attention. Aside from their dissemination at large international gatherings 
such as the Earth Summits, they are also widely reported in the mass media, and often 
drawn upon by NGOs and other groups concerned with environmental matters in 
order to mobilise support for particular courses of action (Leach and Mearns 1996). 
Having acquired the status of ‘received wisdom’, these narratives are frequently and 
widely circulated. But a number of scholars have over the past two decades made the 
case for subjecting them to keener scrutiny (i.e. Adams 1996, Hoben 1995, Keeley 
and Scoones 2003, Leach and Mearns 1996, Scoones and Thompson 1994). The 
tendency to employ inherited methods without verifying their applicability to the 
context under consideration has come under fire (Keeley and Scoones 2003, Leach 
and Mearns 1996). The practice of continual adherence to policy based on 
scientifically questionable grounds has prompted a consideration of other reasons 
which might explain the perpetuation of narratives of environmental degradation. On 
this basis, the credibility of crisis narratives relating, among other phenomena, to 
deforestation (Fairhead and Leach 1998), soil fertility (Keeley and Scoones 2003) and 
desertification (c.f. Rohde 1997b, Sullivan 2000) has been brought into question; 
although few, if any, of these commentators would seek to claim that these 
phenomena simply do not exist.  
Emery Roe’s notion of narrative and counter narrative (1991, 1995) is an 
analytical device of choice for scholars looking at the resilience of environmental 
narratives. It has been taken up by Leach and Mearns (1996), but also by Adams and 
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Hulme (2001) in relation to wider narratives about conservation. In one sense, 
narratives are for Roe the means by which policy makers and planners in 
development (and other) spheres deal with complexity and uncertainty. They are 
stories with a beginning, middle and an end, which describe how events will – or at 
least should – unfold when “carried out as described” (1991 288). Narratives serve 
two basic purposes. First, they attempt to get people to act in one way and not 
another; and second, they are “the primary means whereby development experts and 
the institutions for which they work claim rights to stewardship over land and 
resources they do not own” (1995 1066). On this reading, were there no crisis, there 
would be no need for expert intervention. Counter narratives operate according to the 
same logic: they also tell a story, but one which is more compelling than that which it 
replaces, to the extent that it gains widespread acceptance (1991:290). One might 
expect the counter narrative to undermine the status of experts along with the expert 
knowledge they try to debunk, but for Roe, this is to miss the point. Instead, he 
argues, the underlying purpose of narratives and counter narratives is not to establish 
definitively the right or wrong way to do things: “whether right or wrong, counter-
claims and changing claims of experts serve principally to reinforce and widen the 
belief that what they, the experts have to say really matters and matters solely by 
virtue of their expertise” (1995:1066).  
For scholars in the field, it is of huge significance that environmental narratives 
do not persist on the basis of an unassailable truth claim. Leach and Mearns echo Roe 
when they state that: 
 
the interests of various actors in development – government agents, officials of donor 
agencies, the staff of Northern and Southern non-governmental organisations, and 
‘independent experts’ – are served by the perpetuation of orthodox views, particularly those 
regarding the destructive role of local inhabitants” (1996 19-20).   
 
 By serving these interests, the argument goes, narratives about the environment or 
about development become institutionalised, entrenched and disseminated 
internationally (Chambers 1993), even in the face of empirical evidence which would 
appear to contradict them. If we wish to understand how these narratives persist, it 
follows that we need to make recourse to an examination of the context in which they 
are generated, in all of their social, political, institutional and economic dimensions.   
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Clearly, much analysis of environmental and development narratives is inspired 
by work within the disparate field of science and technology studies, at times more 
explicitly and at others less so. It is not surprising, therefore, that the sociology of 
scientific knowledge approach which I employ – one position amongst many within 
the crowded and contested field of science and technology studies – has much in 
common with accounts mentioned above.   
 
Local knowledge 
The rediscovered respect for knowledge systems related to often centuries-old 
common-pool resource management systems as a model of sustainability is part of the 
wider trend through which local knowledge more widely has been posited as a 
credible alternative to ‘Western’ scientific knowledge. Over the past couple of 
decades many anthropologists (and others) have devoted energy and time to the task 
of ‘rescuing’ local or indigenous forms of knowledge, and analysing the 
consequences of transferring ‘Western’ knowledge without long-standing analysis of 
the context in which it is being applied (Warren 1998). This focus influenced and 
found parallels in some instances of development practice which, to borrow a slightly 
mischievous turn of phrase from Pottier (2003), had ‘discovered’ the skills, traditions 
and practices that constituted what came to be known as ‘indigenous technical 
knowledge’. This concept was popularised through work on the now well-known 
‘farmer first’ approach (i.e. Brokensha, Warren, and Werner 1980, Richards 1985). 
As such, indigenous technical knowledge was set up in contrast to ‘scientific 
knowledge’, although it was deemed to be complementary or even ‘better’ in terms of 
its own context than the knowledge carried by scientific experts sent to improve the 
techniques of local level farmers in developing countries (Richards 1985). It has been 
used by Robert Chambers to argue for the need to renegotiate the roles between 
development professionals and the poor people with whom they work. He saw this 
renegotiation as an antidote to the arrogance and ignorance of ‘top-down’ approaches 
to development (Chambers 1983, Chambers 1995, Chambers 1997).   
As the debate has moved on, the notion of ‘indigenous knowledge’ as used when 
it originated has seen its own assumptions scrutinised, to the point that ‘local 
knowledge’ is often used in its place. It is also now more common to talk of 
‘knowledges’, in order to evade the charge of reification (c.f. Scoones and Thompson 
1994). It has been argued, too, that to think of local knowledge(s) as fixed and 
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unchanging is inaccurate (Fairhead 1993). Setting up a distinction between scientific 
and local knowledge in terms of distinct “ontological categories” has been frowned 
upon (Pottier 2003). Calls for more attention to be paid to how knowledge is 
produced “within and between societies, groups and regions” (ibid:14) serve to 
emphasise that knowledge about sustainability has many sources. Such calls also seek 
to invest agency in holders of local knowledge tradition. They want such knowledge 
to be brought into analyses of sustainability, and pave the way for the argument that 
widening the circle of participation is a precondition of sustainable common-pool 
resource use.  
An important corollary of these changing perspectives is that local knowledge 
bearers have attained in some cases the status of cognitive authorities from whom to 
learn in order to understand how to manage common-pool resources sustainably. This 
change in attitude towards local knowledge holders has had clear implications for 
debates regarding who is capable of participating in the decision-making processes 
through which sustainable resource use is to be achieved. 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate how and why knowledge about 
sustainability became so important and influential at a global level. It has explored the 
broad changes in issues in and closely related to common-pool resource theory that 
have had the effect of configuring local participation and local knowledge as 
prerequisites for the achievement of a sustainable way of living. Here, then, we have 
an account of the wider background in which the principles which underpin policy 
and intervention in both the Conservancy Programme and the Alto Bermejo Project 
have emerged. The focus on the concept of sustainability has prompted calls for a 
reconciliation of two processes which have often been set up in opposition to each 
other, those of conservation and development. Whether or not this is possible on a 
global scale remains to be seen, but both initiatives can be read first and foremost as 
attempts to foster such reconciliation, at least at the local or national level. Both, too, 
can be located within broader attempts to redefine both conservation and 
development in terms of the sustainable use of common-pool resources. This is an 
exercise to which the next chapter is devoted. 
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Chapter IV 




The wider thinking on sustainability discussed in the previous chapter prefigures 
the type of ‘community conservation’ of which both the Conservancy Programme and 
constituent components of the Alto Bermejo Project are examples. The increasing 
prominence of the concept has led to the setting of conservation and development 
processes in a relationship of necessary interdependence. Against this background the 
emergence of the ‘community conservation’ counter narrative becomes intelligible. 
This chapter explores the ‘community conservation’ counter narrative, which has 
challenged the previously hegemonic narrative of ‘fortress’ conservation. After a 
brief discussion of the drawbacks and utility of narratives, section two kicks off the 
chapter with an outline of the ‘fortress’ and ‘community conservation’ narratives, 
with two purposes in mind. First, by focussing on the contrasting beliefs and 
approaches entailed by both, we gain a clearer idea of how knowledge about 
conservation has changed in light of the increasing importance of the concept of 
sustainability. Second, the exercise serves to clear the ground for extrapolating the six 
principles which, I contend, underpin policy and implementation in both the 
Conservancy Programme and the Alto Bermejo Project. These six principles in turn 
form the basis for the comparison between the two initiatives. The most central 
characteristic of these narratives, then, is that the former defines conservation in terms 
of not using biodiversity, whilst the latter defines it in terms of sustainable use. 
Section three proceeds to locate the conservancy programme and the Alto Bermejo 
Project within the latter of these two narratives. 
That local knowledge of common-pool resource management might in fact hold 
important lessons for the achievement of the goal of sustainable common-pool 
resource use has influenced debates about participation in conservation and 
development arenas. However, it remains the case that whether one values scientific 
or local knowledge(s) about common-pool resource management, or even if the 
exercise of setting up this distinction is brought into question, the link between 
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knowing and deciding remains intact. It is necessary to have knowledge deemed 
relevant to the achievement of sustainability objectives to be able to participate in the 
processes through which sustainability is to be realised. As knowledge about 
sustainability is very specialised, not everyone has it and even amongst people who 
do, not everyone will be accepted as a credible authority when it comes to designating 
what is or is not sustainable. The chapter concludes, then, by emphasising that when 
considering local participation in ‘community conservation’ initiatives like the 
conservancy programme and the Alto Bermejo Project, the specialised character of 
knowledge about sustainability must be borne in mind.  
  
2. Narrative and counter-narrative: ‘fortress-’ and 
‘community’ conservation 
 
Narrative and counter-narrative 
Adams and Hulme (2001), among others, have argued, Roe’s concept of narrative and 
counter narrative is of great utility for exploring the changes that have taken place in 
thinking on how to realise conservation objectives, and indeed about what 
conservation actually is or should be. It is now fairly commonplace to contrast the 
narrative of ‘fortress conservation’ with the counter narrative of what I follow Adams 
and Hulme in calling ‘community conservation’ (c.f. Adams and Hulme 2001, Hulme 
and Murphree 2001a). Terms other than ‘community conservation’ are also 
employed, a point to which we shall return; suffice it here to clarify the character of 
‘community conservation’ as a generic term. If the thinking and methods grouped 
under community conservation are not all alike, they do have points in common.  
One of the offshoot terms of community conservation, community based natural 
resource management (CBNRM), very clearly embraces the idea of common-pool 
resource management as conservation. Namibia’s Conservancy Programme is 
explicitly identified by government, non-government and research actors involved 
with it as an instance of community based natural resource management. The 
components of the Alto Bermejo Project that occur in Los Toldos might also be said 
to correspond to the notion of community based natural resource management; 
although no direct translation of the term exists in Spanish, and therefore it is never 
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explicitly referred to as such. Both, though, are underpinned by tenets from this 
counter narrative.  
Before embarking on the task of outlining ‘fortress’ and ‘community’ 
conservation, a thought on narratives. Narratives cannot but reify a complex 
intersection of ever-changing beliefs, processes, occurrences and people. This 
observation would appear to beg the question: if so much simplification is involved, 
why bother? Is a narrative not an attempt to impose a static, fixed version of reality 
onto an infinitely complex and disorderly series of events? In trying to make sense of 
empirical experience, would it be better to think not in terms of the stable picture 
offered by a narrative, but more in terms of a moving, under-specified target of which 
we catch fleeting and often contradictory glimpses? Talk of complexity, which seems 
de rigueur these days in the social sciences, has much to recommend it, in that it 
continually reminds us not to conflate narrative description with that which the 
narrative attempts to describe. It opens up the question of what lies beyond the 
narrative. It brings attention also to the political implications of reifying narratives, to 
the extent that they do not invite us to imagine alternatives, but rather to accept the 
stability of the status quo (Barnes, Bloor, and Henry 1996).  
However, I follow Barnes, Bloor & Henry here in their defence of the necessity of 
at least some reification. First and foremost, as they point out, we are hardly in a 
position to dispense with our reifying tendencies. In the vein of Schutz (1964) and 
Thomason (1982), they warn against underestimating “the extent to which culture and 
cognition generally are actually constituted by, and dependent for their very existence 
upon reifications” (1996:84-5). In the face of incomprehensible complexity, 
simplification is inevitable and indispensable. Second, to accept the need and utility 
of reified narratives that help us make some sense of reality does not oblige us to 
render sacred the claims they make: “one way of exposing the constructed character 
of reality is to criticise it by explicit reference to another” (ibid:86). In this light, 
Roe’s dual focus on the interplay between narrative and counter narrative, and his 
insistence not on abandoning the concept of narrative per se (1991, 1995) is an 
intellectually honest and useful approach. From a pragmatic perspective, it makes of 
reification an advantage, not a disadvantage. It also leaves room for modifying 
narratives and counter narratives in the face of belief-altering experience, and for 
investigating the beliefs which constitute narrative and counter narrative 
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symmetrically (cf. Bloor, 1991). And finally, it provides an interesting, if not 
universally accepted, model for feeding research into the policy-making process.  
 
‘Fortress conservation’  
Conservation has long been bound up with the powerful, enduring concept of 
wilderness. At the core of the early forms of conservation that first arose, according to 
Grove (1987), in the British empire of the 18th century, lay the conviction that parts of 
the world were still comprised of wilderness, that is, those parts of nature that had not 
been touched by human hand (Adams and McShane, 1992). In an age of colonial 
expansion and industrialisation – in short, of momentous and relatively rapid change 
–the idea of ‘wilderness’ was taken up and popularised by figures of the Romantic 
Movement such as David Thoreau (ibid). It symbolised what humans could not, and 
for some, should not dominate or control. In the nineteenth century, accounts from 
explorers such as Mungo Park, David Livingstone, Henry Morton Stanley  and 
Richard Burton further whetted the public appetite for tales of ostensibly wild, 
untamed places (MacKenzie 1989). The accounts of these explorers helped to 
consolidate the notion of wilderness as untouched, pristine landscapes which were, 
crucially, free from human presence. The romantic desire to protect wilderness 
against human incursion and transformation acted as a powerful incentive for the 
establishment of protected areas, which occurred in Southern Africa from 1892, with 
the creation of the Sabie Game Reserve in 1892, later to become Kruger National 
Park (Adams & Hulme 2001).  
The flip side to the notion of wilderness was thinking associated with Darwin, 
with regard to human ability and propensity to dominate the environment (Worster 
1987). Some accounts of Darwinian evolutionary theory (although not Darwin 
himself) famously turned the untamed yet benign and noble wild of Romantic 
imaginings into a nature ‘red in tooth and claw’. For some commentators, this 
reinterpretation had the effect of instilling in Victorian science a pressing need for 
nature to be subordinate to the diktats of rational management (ibid). The twin 
notions of preserving the untouched character of wilderness and the strategic 
management of wild nature – the one premised on leaving a landscape as found, the 
other on intervention and manipulation – make strange bedfellows. Nonetheless, both 
are inherent to the concept of the protected area.  
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The basic premise for ensuring the requisite protection of wilderness was to 
maintain the separation of humans from other species and the environments they 
inhabited (Adams and McShane 1992, Adams and Hulme 2001, Brockington 2002, 
Hulme and Murphree 2001b, MacKenzie 1987). Just as humans were not to inhabit 
the wild, nor were they to consume it. At first, not all consumptive use was 
prohibited. The legislative origins for conservation derive from European colonial 
attempts to control hunting of both the local African populations but also by the 
influx of European hunters. Historian John Mackenzie traces the first such attempts at 
introducing legislation back to the Cape in 1650s, attributing it to the Dutch East 
India Company (1989). African methods of hunting were outlawed by fledgling 
colonial administrations on the grounds that they were barbaric and cruel. In contrast, 
European hunters who employed rifles and gave their quarry a ‘sporting chance’ of 
escape were allowed to continue hunting activity in the game reserves being 
established at the end of the nineteenth century (ibid). African subsistence hunting 
was reclassified as ‘poaching’, and thereby criminalised (ibid). Here, then, were the 
cornerstone tenets of the model that would come to be known alternately as ‘fortress 
conservation’ (cf. Adams & Hulme 2001; Brockington 2002), ‘fines and fences 
conservation’ (Wells, Brandon, and Hanna 1992), ‘coercive conservation’ (Peluso 
1993) or ‘preservationism’ (Adams & McShane 1992).  
Because the histories of hunting and conservation are so intertwined, much 
emphasis has been placed upon the preservation of wildlife. Indeed, the focus on 
wildlife, not ecological systems as a whole, is one of the basic characteristics of the 
‘fortress’ approach. In the context of wildlife conservation the principal focus for 
conservationists in Africa, Pimbert & Pretty identify three premises in particular upon 
which the ‘fortress’ narrative rests: 
 
• wildlife conservation only works if there is no killing or utilization of wildlife 
• wildlife conservation in developing countries can be achieved by military-
style enforcement which denies the people who live with wildlife or own the 
land that supports it the opportunity to derive any benefits from it, be they 
economic or otherwise  
• the aims of conservation and development are mutually exclusive (1995:15) 
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Conservation movements emerged and solidified in Europe and the US, leading to 
the formation of institutions specifically for the purpose of the preservation of 
wilderness towards the end of the nineteenth century (MacKenzie 1989, Nash 1973). 
An early conservation lobby of some influence, the Society for the Preservation of the 
Fauna of the Empire (SPFE), headed by the aristocrat Richard Buxton, brought 
together hunters, naturalists and colonial officials (Adams & McShane 1992). Their 
continuous lobbying of the British government to control hunting activity may not 
have led to greater enforcement of legislation, but it helped to keep conservation in 
the public arena (ibid). Two international conferences, in 1900 and 1933, were 
dedicated to conservation in Africa. The second of these produced two important 
precedents. First, it was the launch pad for the Convention for the Protection of 
African Flora (Mackenzie 1989). Second, in its call for sufficient land permanently to 
be set aside to permit wildlife migration, it presaged the age of the national park 
(ibid).  
By the end of the Second World War, conservation was an internationally 
influential discourse, a standard section in colonial bureaucracies, and increasingly 
constituted an attempt to apply scientific principles to the management of land 
(Neumann 1997, Scott 1998). The establishment in 1934 of the International Union 
for the Protection of Nature (later to become the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, or IUCN), and later the World 
Wildlife Fund also, was instrumental in projecting conservation into a global arena 
(Adams & Hulme 2001). Conservation as an issue was picked up by key players in 
central international staging posts: UNESCO in Paris, the World Bank in 
Washington, the IUCN in Geneva and the UN in New York (ibid). A rash of national 
parks were created during this era, either through being converted from the colonial 
game reserves that had been established from the late nineteenth century, or through 
extending the conservation remit onto new lands (Adams 2004).  
Africa as a continent was central to the global conservation campaign. A sample 
of the results of this effort would include: 
 
• The Arusha Declaration of 1961, with its focus on wildlife conservation 
• The 1963 conference in the Belgian Congo on conservation in Africa  
• The numerous IUCN missions to African countries 
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• The adoption by the Organisation of African Unity in 1968 of the African 
Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Adams and 
Hulme 2001, Boardman 1981, Fitter and Scott 1978)  
 
These efforts were boosted greatly by the energetic endeavours of conservation 
writers/lobbyists in the 1950s and 60s, who stoked up fears for the future existence of 
Africa’s wildlife, predicting the mass extinction of much or all of the continent’s 
‘charismatic megafauna’. Chief among these was the towering figure of zoologist 
Professor Bernhard Grzimek. Considered a master propagandist, he authored the 
widely-read Serengetti Shall Not Die (translated into at least twenty-three languages), 
in which he declared that wild Africa was dying (1960). He entreated readers to 
support his cause, namely that of attempting to ensure that the same fate did not befall 
the Serengetti Plains, the focus of his work and energy. This book became what 
Adams & McShane have called the “manifesto of preservationism” (1992:52). 
Grzimek matched his rhetoric with deeds, for instance firmly opposing any moves 
which might accommodate the Maasai who occupied Serengetti or which might give 
them legal grazing rights (ibid).  
The claims made by Serengetti Shall Not Die, from wildlife numbers on the Plains 
to the magnitude and severity of the threats arrayed against them, have been 
repeatedly challenged. Grzimek is often accused of falsifying his data in order to 
support his vision of impending extinction and crisis (ibid). Yet he and others such as 
Guggisberg (1966), author of SOS Rhino, reached wide audiences through books and 
the big screen. The power of the images that they created has not been diminished 
over the years; they are still held to underpin western perceptions of Africa (i.e. 
Gavron 1993). Further, Adams & Hulme argue that, because of the global dominance 
of western communications media, “International ideas about conservation are…also 
now genuinely African” (2001:12).        
  
‘Community conservation’  
The legitimacy of the ‘fortress’ narrative has since the 1980s been increasingly called 
into question (Adams and McShane 1992, Adams and Hulme 2001, Brockington 
2002, Brockington and Homewood 1996). What Adams and Hulme (2001) term the 
counter narrative of ‘community conservation’ became a powerful source of influence 
in conservation and development circles in the 1990s. ‘Community conservation’ is in 
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many ways an offshoot of broader debates about sustainability, drawing heavily upon 
developments in the field of common-pool resource theory over the past three or four 
decades. Most centrally, beliefs concerning the existence of pristine, wild landscapes, 
uninhabited by humans, and therefore unspoilt by their destructive tendencies, have 
come under sharp and sustained attack. Further, the counter-narrative has dovetailed 
with the wider changes to beliefs about who should participate in the decision making 
processes through which development (and conservation) intervention is brought 
about (i.e. Chambers 1995, Chambers 1997). 
As noted, ‘fortress’ conservation holds the preservation of wilderness to require 
the exclusion of human settlement within protected areas. Consequently, eviction of 
inhabitants from places with a history of settlement that precedes the protected area is 
commonplace across many parts of Africa. The trials and conflicts of the Maasai of 
the Serengeti with conservationists have become the subject of an exhaustive 
anthropological literature (i.e. Brockington 2002, Brockington and Homewood 1996), 
but countless other peoples have been resettled to preserve in ‘pristine’ state the land 
and the natural resources from which they make their living (i.e. Oates 1999, Wells, 
Brandon, and Hanna 1992). In all of these cases, attention is understandably drawn by 
‘community conservation’ proponents to the costs of ‘fortress’ conservation for those 
who are directly affected by it. Costs other than eviction include livestock predation, 
damage to property and even death. These are common for people who share land and 
resources with large mammals such as elephants or with predators such as lions or 
jaguars. But preservation is not only costly for those who live in or near protected 
areas. The costs of ‘fortress’ conservation are much higher than most governments, 
(especially Western ones) are willing to pay, more than most can afford (Adams and 
McShane 1992). The enormous difficulty of effectively enforcing military-style 
measures without huge cash injections is the story of ‘protected’ areas all over Africa. 
Empirical work conducted by theorists on common-pool resource use by people 
in Africa and other parts of the world has been used to question the assumed need for 
the separation of people from wilderness. With significant bodies of literature seeking 
to demonstrate the successful working of local and regional common-pool resource 
regimes the world over, and with other scholars challenging the legitimacy and scope 
of other narratives of environmental crisis, it is not as easy to make the case for 
eviction as it once was. Over a decade ago, representations of pristine wilderness 
were deemed the ‘myth of wild Africa’ (Adams and McShane 1992). Very much in 
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the vein of common-pool resource theorists such as Fikret Berkes and M. Taghi 
Farvar, Adams and McShane contend that historically, African societies have used 
common-pool resources provided by their environment sustainably. They point out 
that such usage did not lead to the total destruction of the very resources which have 
become the object of preservation. They challenge the view that African wilderness 
has to be defended “even against the people who have lived there for thousands of 
years” (Ibid, xviii).   
A now fairly standard response to the separation of people from ecosystem 
envisaged in the notion of the unspoilt wilderness is to argue that most parts of the 
world’s landmass have at some point been host to or embroiled in human activity (i.e. 
Martin 1994a, Pimbert and Pretty 1995). Critiques of ‘fortress’ conservation policy 
and practice have sought variously to: question the sustainability of interventions 
made in its name (Reij 1991, Shaxon et al. 1989) (Chambers 1997, Fairhead and 
Leach 1998); highlight environmental degradation caused by undermining livelihood 
security (Koch 1994, Roy and Jackson 1993), illustrate its neglect of indigenous or 
local knowledge and management systems and the often high subsistence value 
attached by people to wild resources (i.e. Novellino 2003, Sullivan 1998). Instead, it 
has been argued that the imposition of laws to govern hunting activities and the 
establishment of protected areas has disrupted and destroyed resource-use regimes 
that had guaranteed the continued existence of the biodiversity so highly esteemed by 
advocates of the protected area (Adams and McShane 1992, Brockington 2002, 
Murombedzi 1992, Pimbert and Pretty 1995).  
As a consequence of these critiques, it is less politically correct to brandish local 
natural resource users living in or near protected areas the “culprits” of environmental 
degradation. The re-evaluation of the place of humans within ecological systems – as 
opposed to notions of their separation from them – has led to a distinction being 
drawn between conservation as preservation and conservation as sustainable 
common-pool resource use. On these grounds, the case for greater participation of 
local resource users has been made, becoming one of the mainstays of the 
‘community conservation’ paradigm (Adams and Hulme 2001, Hulme and Murphree 
2001b). By recasting local people less in terms of destroyers and more in terms of 
‘custodians’, the counter narrative seeks to render their participation an imperative. 
Local people should be involved not just because conservation has costs for them but 
because they are in possession of knowledge necessary to the achievement of the 
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overarching objective of sustainability. Indeed, following this logic, local people 
should be included precisely because conservation is intrinsic to the durable common-
pool resource use regimes which, historically, have often been engineered at the local 
level. 
It is worth noting here the link between knowledge and participation. Local 
people, by dint of having knowledge about sustainable common-pool resource use, 
are cast by the counter narrative in the role of cognitive authorities. This is in 
diametric opposition to their status in the ‘fortress’ narrative as inexpert and liable to 
cause damage without specialist intervention to preserve biodiversity. But for both 
narrative and counter narrative, knowledge remains the precondition for participation 
in the decision making processes through which action to curb unsustainable 
tendencies is to be brought about. The reversal of roles for local people has led to a 
widening of the definition of conservation to include the sustainable use of common-
pool resources. This has contributed to conservation coming to be seen as an activity 
to be undertaken outwith the protected area.  
Another way to approach the sustainability of conservation efforts is through the 
observation that the designation of protected areas covers only a small percentage of 
the world’s valued biodiversity. The world hardly lacks protected areas: by 1994 they 
covered around 7.73 million km² (Pimbert & Pretty, 1995). By 2003, this figure had 
increased to approximately 18.8 million km² (Roe and Holland 2004). But the logic of 
sustainability would dictate that what falls outwith the remit of the protected area, 
which is still the overwhelming majority of the planet’s biodiversity, is in greater 
need of conservation (i.e. Newmark and Hough 2000). Any kind of conservation on a 
much wider scale must of necessity be reconciled with human use and consumption 
of biodiversity. Because of the imperative of reconciling the use of biodiversity with 
its preservation, the notion of sustainable common-pool resource use has come to be 
accepted, at least in some quarters, as a viable – indeed perhaps the only viable – 
method of conservation on a much broader scale.  
In opening up definitions of conservation beyond preservation through 
prohibition, the sustainable use of common-pool resources can be seen to link 
conservation and development processes in a relationship of necessary 
interdependence. On the one hand, the magnitude of resistance to conservation 
measures which seek to exclude people from an area is likely to be proportional to the 
amount of land claimed for the exercise. For instance, resistance to the idea of 
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depopulating half the planet for the purposes of preserving it would most likely be so 
great as to preclude its realisation were it to be attempted. The incredulity with which 
such suggestions – earnestly made by some commentators – frequently meet serves to 
demonstrate the limits of acceptance within which exclusionary forms of conservation 
operate. Therefore, the logic of sustainability would predict that ‘fortress’ 
conservation cannot be realised on a general scale, and that any enduring forms of 
conservation must presuppose human inhabitation and use of valued landscapes and 
biodiversity. On the other hand, it is questionable whether any form of development 
which discounts the effects of the way we live currently on the way we will live in the 
future can be sustained indefinitely.   
 
3. The Conservancy Programme and the Alto Bermejo 
Project within ‘community conservation’ 
 
Differing types of community conservation 
A plethora of terms have emerged to describe the varied approaches clustered under 
the banner of ‘community conservation’. Unsurprisingly, some of terms overlap: all 
are in one way or another prefigured by the concept of linking conservation and 
development processes through the notion of sustainability. Barrow & Murphree 
(2001) offer a good starting point in this respect, with their typology of different 
initiatives, as seen in table 3.1 below. 
Protected area outreach is often an attempt to make some reparation for the 
problems that the establishment of national parks and other types of protected areas 
can cause to people who live within or adjacent to them. Although the state retains 
ownership of the area, affected communities, at least in theory, are to be permitted 
some minimal level of rights to resource use or some form of compensation if usage 
rights are prohibited or curtailed. They seek to recognise the problems facing people 
living near protected areas, generate some benefit for them from the protected area, 
and solve conflicts between people and management/protection authorities (ibid). 
Protected area outreach initiatives are also often known as integrated conservation 




Table 3.1 – different forms of community conservation 






Objectives Conservation of 
ecosystems,  
biodiversity and  
species 
Conservation with some 





State owned land  
and resources  
i.e. national  
parks 
State owned land with 




tenure and ownership 
arrangements  
Local resource users  
own land and  
resources either  
de jure or de facto.  




State determines  
all decisions  




state and user groups 
about managing some 
state-owned resources. 
Management 
arrangements critical  
Conservation as  
element of land use. 





Low  Middling High  
*(in comparison with East Africa)       from Barrow & Murphree 2001:32  
 
Collaborative management, entails, ostensibly, the meaningful involvement of all 
interested parties in management functions and activities related to conservation 
(Borrini-Feyerabend 1996, cited in Barrow and Murphree 2001). In the Southern 
African context this translates into something resembling the joint management of 
resources between state and communities, state and the private sector or communities 
and the private sector. This category describes rather well the kind of arrangements 
that are often found – and incorporated into national policy – in, for instance South 
Africa (see Mahony and Van Zyl 2001, Poultney and Spenceley 2001, Spenceley and 
Seif 2003, for examples of private-public partnerships and collaborations).   
Community-based conservation initiatives are sometimes posited as an alternative 
to integrated conservation and development projects, on the grounds that they are 
attempts to devolve ownership and management rights to users of valued biodiversity 
(i.e. Newmark & Hough 2000). Integrated conservation and development projects 
have been, by and large, associated with the buffer zones surrounding protected areas, 
whilst community-based conservation initiatives tend to operate on land which is 
neither a protected area nor a buffer zone. There is no hard and fast rule here about 
where either type of approach takes place, though. If ICDPs were limited only to 
buffer zones and protected areas, one might make a plausible claim to distinguish 
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them from community-based conservation on the basis of decision-making and 
authority. At least notionally, community-based conservation puts local biodiversity 
users in the role of conservation authorities and decision-makers. In contrast, owing 
to the character of buffer zones, local biodiversity users may be party to decisions 
about conservation and development processes, but ultimately are not authorities who 
have the last word in decision-making. However, there is a sense in which the 
drawing of this distinction is perhaps unnecessary, given that community-based 
conservation is simply a type of integrated conservation and development, albeit with 
significant implications for questions of tenure security and control over decision-
making processes.   
Community-based conservation tends to be defined in terms of four main 
assumptions. First (and perhaps foremost), local people are by and large to be seen as 
capable and knowledgeable common-pool resource users who are often as well-
placed, if not better-placed, as government or private sector actors to manage the 
resources on which they depend. The second emphasises the need to offer an 
incentive, be that economic, social or whatever, to people who live with the costs of 
conservation. Asking someone to continue to bear existing costs or even increased 
ones is unlikely to meet with success if they have no incentive to do so (Martin 
1994a, Murphree 1997). The third is that devolution of ownership, responsibilities for 
and ownership over wildlife to local people is the best way to provide this incentive 
(Murphree, 1997a). The fourth is that communal institutions and management 
structures need either to be supported, resurrected or created in order to allow 
communities to benefit from wildlife conservation (Barrow & Murphree 2001).  
Namibian conservancies have also been classed as examples of community-based 
conservation, generally held to be the most prevalent set of arrangements that 
Southern African initiatives are designed around. Indeed, the Conservancy 
Programme, as well as its forerunner, Zimbabwe’s Campfire Programme, have been 
seen as flag-bearers for the community conservation counter narrative (i.e. Barrow & 
Murphree 2001, Jones & Murphree 2001). In Namibia, it is more common to refer to 
community-based conservation as community based natural resource management; I 
treat them as synonymous, and employ the latter of the two terms simply to observe 
usage patterns in Namibia. Further, as stated before, the agroforestry components of 
the Alto Bermejo Project also correspond to the notion of community based natural 
resource management. Chapters six and ten, respectively, explore in depth the ways 
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in which policy and implementation in both contexts view sustainable common-pool 
resource use as a means through which to serve both conservation and development 
objectives simultaneously.  
 
The six ‘principles of sustainability’ shared by the conservancy programme and 
the Alto Bermejo Project  
The previous chapter discussed wider debates about sustainability, charting how 
sustainability objectives are closely bound up with the use of common-pool resources. 
This chapter has traced the influence of recent thinking on sustainable common-pool 
resource management on the counter narrative of community conservation, and 
located the conservancy programme and the Alto Bermejo Project within it. Having 
done so, it is now possible to extrapolate six ‘sustainability principles’. It is the 
underlying influence of these principles on both the conservancy programme and the 
Alto Bermejo Project that forms the basis of the comparison, rather than Namibia and 
Argentina per se, or even the initiatives themselves, which are by no means identical. 
The principles are:  
 
1. It is more important to address questions of how to ensure the continued 
existence of biodiversity outwith protected areas (i.e. Adams and Hulme 2001, 
Cumming 2004). 
2. Careful use of common-pool resources is more likely to ensure their continued 
existence for future generations than is a blanket prohibition on any kind of 
use (Adams and McShane 1992, Murphree 1997, Pimbert and Pretty 1995). 
3. It is not a foregone conclusion that people who use common-pool resources 
will destroy them whenever no state intervention occurs or individual property 
rights regime is established; there is much evidence to the contrary (Berkes 
1998, Feeny et al. 1990, Ostrom 1990).  
4. Conservation often fails when people who have to live with the costs of it 
have insufficient incentive to do so. Indeed, conservation efforts will fail 
wherever they beg, rather than answer, the question of sufficient incentive 
(Jones 2000, Ostrom 1990).  
5. Realising the economic value of a common-pool resource and ensuring that 
resource users benefit economically from the exercise is a crucial part of 
answering the question of sufficient incentive (Bond 2001, Hulme and 
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Murphree 2001a, Murphree 1997). That said, other, less tangible benefits are 
also vital to this exercise, and may be overlooked if the importance of 
economic incentives in themselves is overstated (Emerton 2001) 
6. Conservation efforts will also fail if the resource users most in a position to 
determine how it is used are not involved in the decision-making processes 
that attempt to conserve said resource. Involvement in such decision-making 
processes is likely to make little difference unless users have defined, 
recognised usage rights (Ostrom 1990, Ostrom 1992, Pimbert and Pretty 
1995). 
 
That these principles are drawn upon for the formulation of policy and intervention in 
such distinct countries is testament to the credibility invested in them at international, 
national and local levels, and an eye-opening indicator of their sheer reach.      
 
The robustness of the community conservation counter-narrative  
The scope of influence of community conservation is all the more remarkable when 
the criticism to which the counter narrative has increasingly been subjected is taken 
into account. That said, however, some commentators have recently argued that such 
influence is on the decline in conservation arenas. Whether or not this is the case, it is 
still very much worthwhile examining how narratives and counter narratives can and 
do persist even in the face of strong criticism.   
Let us begin the inspection of this criticism by sounding the now obligatory note 
of caution regarding use of the term ‘community’. From both ‘fortress-’ and 
‘community’ conservation perspectives (and more widely), it has been argued that 
there is a tendency to flatten out the complex, frequently-changing character of the 
bundled, tangled relationships between a given group of people, moulding them to 
their allotted role in a given storyline. Assumptions which homogenise or reify 
‘communities’, which do not recognise the differences in interest, status, wealth, 
gender, access to resources, livelihood activity, ethnicity etc are often seen as 
inherently problematic (i.e. Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Brown 1999, Mosse 1994, 
2001). Concerns have been voiced that talk of benefiting communities may gloss over 
the uneven distribution of benefits between community members owing to ‘elite 
capture’ (Brosius, Tsing, and Zerner 1998).  
 91
Before considering other lines of criticism of community conservation, it may be 
as well to clarify the implications of rendering problematic terms such as 
‘community’. To do so deposits us back at the inevitable trade-off between, on the 
one hand, a level of complexity that surpasses our capacity fully to comprehend it 
and, on the other, the need to engage with it as best we can. Clearly, plausible 
analysis is not derived from a shallow consideration of the object of analysis, be that a 
community, a narrative, or anything else. Questioning the way in which terms such as 
‘community’ are employed helps avoid complacency – as long as it is acknowledged 
that some simplifying is unavoidable. We may not be able to side-step the reifications 
that help us to understand our experiences, but we can at least attempt to refine them 
or use other reifications to remind us of their shortcomings. Given that the term 
‘community’ has proven sufficiently resistant to coherent definition in my own field 
sites both in Namibia and Argentina, I have opted either for the terms ‘local people’ 
or ‘residents’, which have proved a little more flexible. And yet neither of these terms 
has escaped criticism (see Neumann 1997 for reservations about use of the term 
‘local’ and Brown, 1999 for similar concerns with respect to ‘resident’). Ultimately, 
to hold out for the term which is in no way problematic is the analytical equivalent of 
building castles in the sand. From the pragmatic standpoint adopted here, it is better 
to choose a term, acknowledge and then work with its limitations.  
The dependency of some community conservation initiatives on what Emerton 
has termed ‘benefits-based approach’ to community based natural resource 
management has been called into question (2001). Benefit distribution may not in 
itself be sufficient to ensure local engagement in wildlife conservation. Incentives for 
local people to participate depend not just on benefits received, but also on economic 
costs incurred, on the livelihood activities which compete with wildlife, on intra and 
intra-household distribution of benefits and costs and a range of other factors which 
limit or shape the nature of benefits communities can gain from wildlife (ibid).  
Adding grist to the mill, Bond analyses the revenues raised by Campfire projects 
between 1989-1996, and finds that the median benefit per household from wildlife 
dropped from US$19.40 to US$4.49 (2001 33). Income derived from wildlife, he 
concludes, does not compete significantly with other forms of land use which are 
often in conflict with Campfire’s conservation brief. Indeed, Fabricius, Koch & 
Magome argue that “those initiatives that do yield high financial dividends are 
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unsustainable exactly because the non-financial benefits are secondary” (Fabricius, 
Koch, and Magome 2002).    
 Another line of criticism has concluded that community conservation initiatives 
have simply been a failure on all counts. Research on combined development and 
conservation projects suggests that their performance in terms of both development 
and conservation criteria leaves much to be desired (i.e. Barrett and Arcese 1995, da 
Fonseca et al. 2005, Neumann 1997, Oates 1999). Perhaps inevitably, it has been 
argued that this counter narrative, launched as an attempt to dispel the myth of wild 
landscapes free from human presence, is itself simply a myth (Brosius 2004).  
The strength of these criticisms is leading some to suggest that, with the 
emergence of another narrative, the writing may be on the wall for the community 
conservation counter narrative (i.e. Chapin 2004, Wolmer 2006). Such observations 
can be traced to the 2003 World Parks Conference, at which the concept of ‘eco-
regional’ conservation appears to have figured prominently (Wolmer 2006). Also 
known as ‘landscape level’, ‘ecosystem’ or ‘transboundary’ conservation, the 
ecoregional approach envisages conservation areas which extend beyond park, 
reserve and national boundaries, thereby making the connections between biological 
‘hotspots’ through ecological corridors, deemed necessary to the continued existence 
of biodiversity, and which current protected areas are too small and separated to 
guarantee (i.e. Cumming 2004). For some, an eco-regional focus may herald a revival 
of the ‘fortress narrative’, stretched across a much wider landscape, and a desire to 
return to conservation based on “sound science” (Wolmer 2006). As a result, it has 
been contended (and angrily rejected by a number of conservation organisations), 
people have once again dropped out of the landscapes envisioned by ‘eco-regional’ 
conservation (Chapin 2004).  
Reports of the death of the community conservation counter narrative may be 
premature. Certainly, its influence on Namibia’s Conservancy Programme and in 
Argentina’s Alto Bermejo Project continues to be very much in evidence. Further, the 
concept of sustainability, which underpins community conservation, is not likely to 
diminish in influence very soon. It is, then, perhaps less likely that any narrative so 
directly and explicitly connected to the overarching goal of sustainability will be 
easily overturned or forgotten. Nonetheless, it is very plausible to suggest that the 
counter narrative of community conservation is simply one in a series and likely to be 
superseded by another at some point. It may from this point of view be more useful to 
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speak of the ‘shelf-life’ of one narrative and to investigate the factors and 




In the context of the counter-narrative of community conservation, representations of 
conservation and the role of local people within it have changed. No longer is it 
unproblematic to see them as the cause of the problems which expert conservationists 
must attempt to resolve, chiefly through the separation of that which is to be 
conserved from those who will destroy it if left to their own devices. On the contrary, 
the pronouncements of such experts have experienced a loss of legitimacy and 
credibility, an erosion of cognitive authority. For proponents of community-based 
approaches to conservation, it is no longer solely about preservation and protected 
areas. The logic of sustainability points to the need to focus on the far greater 
quantities of biodiversity which exist outwith the protected area and to the need to 
make conservation processes sustainable by making them acceptable to those who 
bear the costs of them. This is to be done partly by viewing conservation in terms of 
common-pool resource use and partly through recognising that collective use of 
resources does not and has not always led to the tragedy of the commons in the 
absence of state or private intervention. It is now a standard argument that in fact it is 
precisely because much local knowledge about common-pool resource use is 
compatible with the notion of sustainability that valued biodiversity continues to 
exist. Local people are frequently represented as competent and capable common-
pool resource users, who must be recognised as such if conservation – as sustainable 
common-pool resource use – is to be a meaningful exercise outwith the protected 
area. Indeed, ‘fortress’ conservation, the narrative against which community 
conservation sets itself, has been charged with disrupting sustainable forms of 
common-pool resource use (i.e. Murombedzi 1992, Neumann 1997). It has, therefore, 
sometimes given current conservation and development practitioners the task of 
resurrecting the common-pool resource institutions that had existed prior to 
conservation interventions requiring the establishment of a protected area and the 
forced eviction of people from the land they had inhabited.  
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I need now to return to the notion of circularity in intervention. I argued in chapter 
two that people who have knowledge deemed necessary for the achievement of 
sustainability goals are simultaneously the source cognitive authority which shores up 
the credibility of such knowledge. Not everyone has such knowledge and therefore 
not everyone can be a source of cognitive authority; it tends to be concentrated in 
certain spheres of actors, such as academia, government, NGOs and donors. It is this 
dynamic which renders people with knowledge about sustainability indispensable 
participants in initiatives, such as the Conservancy Programme or the Alto Bermejo 
Project, which are framed in terms of the overarching goal of sustainability. However, 
if part of what is believed necessary for the achievement of combined conservation 
and development objectives is that local people and knowledge are or can become 
engines of sustainability, it follows that the expert involvement of government, donor 
non-governmental and academic actors should be or should become less necessary. 
Indeed, in the specific cases of the Conservancy Programme and the Alto Bermejo 
Project, it is expected that eventually a scenario of local self-sufficiency will indeed 
come to pass.    
Nonetheless, knowledge about sustainability continues in many ways to be a 
specialist affair. The debates over what is necessary for sustainable living produce 
ever more complex prescriptions regarding what should be done and what needs to be 
taken into account for that goal to be achieved. Multi-disciplinary, holistic approaches 
are deemed essential simply to understand what is meant by sustainability 
(notwithstanding how widely contested the term is). Specialists in various fields of 
operation – academia, policy-making, donor agencies, NGOs – continue to be sources 
of cognitive authority for knowledge about sustainability, and on that basis continue 
to render themselves indispensable to the processes through which sustainability is to 
be brought about. For any given outcome to be designated sustainable, there has to be 
some specialist input precisely because the efforts of specialists are geared towards 
constituting the context in which references to sustainability are intelligible. This 
tendency need not always be purposive or intended; specialists may not always seek 
to render themselves indispensable, and their actions may not always be explained 
simply by recourse to a consideration of self-interests served through continued 
involvement in a given initiative. And yet this indispensability is to some extent at 
odds with the logic of empowerment, and remains so for as long as specialist 
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knowledge about sustainability continues to underpin policy and implementation and 
continues to be concentrated amongst a few project actors.   
If the knowledge about sustainability that underpins thinking on combined 
conservation and development initiatives continues to be a significantly specialist 
affair, then we cannot be too surprised if policy and intervention predicated on such 
knowledge in Namibia and Argentina is accordingly dependent at least partially upon 
the participation of specialists who invest that knowledge with legitimacy and 
credibility in the first place. What there is to participate in is to a considerable extent 
pre-defined, and implementation requires the knowledge and skills of a wide variety 
of actors, some of whom have significantly more cognitive authority than others. In 
parts II and III of the thesis, then, the consequences for local participation of these 







Chapter V: A historical introduction to Namibia  
 
1. Introduction 
The historical processes through which Namibia was created have led the majority of 
its inhabitants to experience vast structural disadvantage and inequity. From the 
establishment of German colonial rule in the 1880s until the declaration of 
independence in 1990 – the period covered in this chapter – government policy 
systematically favoured the interests of white settlers, which both German and South 
African administrations used to consolidate their hold on the territory. Namibian 
history can, then, be read as one of the exclusion of the majority from some of the 
most central decision-making processes taken within human societies: where to live, 
how to make a living, what rules to follow and to which authorities the just 
enforcement of those rules should be trusted. Concomitantly, the history of the 
struggle to gain independence from colonial rule can be read as one of resistance to 
such exclusion.  
This chapter offers a broad outline of Namibian history, starting in 1884 with 
German colonisation and ending in 1990 with the declaration of Namibian 
independence. It forms the context within which to locate the conservancy 
programme, and sheds light on the wider structural constraints that affect how local 
people interact with the programme. Two themes run through the chapter:  
 
1. Land tenure and/or restrictions on access to land, perhaps the most central factor 
in Namibia’s recent history 
2. What Laurent Kaela has termed ‘the question of Namibia’, that is, the violently 
contested process through which Namibia’s status – either territory to be 
assimilated into South Africa or proclaimed an independent, sovereign nation – 
would be decided (1996).  
 
Because of Namibia’s settler colony origins, access to and ownership of land was 
the key organising principle for both the German and the South African 
administrations. Changing land distribution patterns established at the end of the 
nineteenth century was also one the fundamental goals of the liberation struggle; 
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distribution has continued since independence to be a bitterly divisive issue and a 
widely-held source of grievance. Furthermore, it is essential to understand the 
country’s private-communal land tenure split in order to comprehend the genesis of 
the conservancy concept first on commercial (private, mostly white) farm land and its 
subsequent extension into Namibia’s communal lands (the name for homelands after 
independence).   
The events through which Namibia’s future status was determined constitute a 
vital strand in Namibian historiography. In many ways, the struggle over the 
country’s future was the struggle of establishing the legitimacy of contrasting 
representations regarding the capability of Namibia’s black majority to determine 
their future in an international political order populated by nation states and colonial 
powers. On the one hand, the reason why South Africa would be given the mandate to 
govern South West Africa after World War I was due to the consensus that the 
territory’s inhabitants were incapable of forming and governing a nation. It was 
expedient for South Africa and other nations to subscribe to that view: they were 
vying for control over the colonial possessions Germany would forfeit after the War. 
On the other hand, the reason why South Africa was not permitted immediately to 
annexe the territory was because of the conviction among some League of Nations 
members, such as the USA, that its people should have the right to determine their 
own future and eventually achieve independence.  
As the twentieth century progressed, the aspiration of self-determination and 
independence for colonial territories of all kinds would acquire ever greater 
legitimacy. The actors resisting South African rule, and especially the South West 
African People’s organisation (Swapo), consistently exploited this tendency: they 
made independence possible in part by winning the battle of representation. Swapo 
became expert at persuading the international community that not only was South 
Africa’s rule illegal, but that it was also deliberately impeding Namibians from 
developing the capability for self determination. Resistance became symbolic of the 
capacity of Namibians for self-determination even in spite of South African 
oppression. South Africa, in contrast, foundered on the rocks of its own intransigence.  
However, Swapo’s strategy of harnessing international pressure for the cause of 
self-determination also generated unpalatable consequences. As an exile movement – 
and owing to South Africa’s crackdown on political activity in South West Africa – 
Swapo never brought to fruition the attempts at resistance that emerged within 
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Namibia. Its leadership would also leave itself open to the charge of elitism and even 
authoritarianism in the way in which it dealt with internal dissent. It has also been 
accused of sidelining all other potential candidates for the role of the sole legitimate 
representative of the Namibian people. Nonetheless, the victory of the view that 
Namibians were ready for independence, albeit with some assistance from the United 
Nations, recast the black majority in the light of capable, willing agents of change 
freed at last from the yoke of colonial oppression. Therefore, the achievement of 
independence opened up a policy space in which actors with policies that appeared to 
reinforce this message enjoyed much room for manoeuvre. Crucially, proponents of 
the conservancy programme would exploit this opportunity to get change in the 
conservation agenda on the table.  
The chapter divides this thematic history into four further sections. Section two 
covers the establishment of German colonial rule, from its shaky inception, the 
establishment of the Police Zone, the German-Herero war of 1904-07 and the 
subsequent dispossession of the Herero and Nama of their land and livestock. Section 
three covers the arrival of the South Africans in 1915, charting the administration’s 
consolidation of control over land within the Police Zone, the formalisation of a 
system of native reserves for the black population, and the co-optation of 
‘indigenous’ political structures. Section four explores the introduction of apartheid-
style homelands and other related segregationist legislation. It then moves on to the 
increasing efficacy and scale of resistance to the South African presence, ending with 
an account of the factors and events through which an independence settlement was 
finally brokered. 
Within this account, more attention is paid to the experiences of two ethnic groups 
in particular to German and South African rule, the Damara and the Herero, than it is 
those of other groups, such as the Ovambo, Basters, Tswana or the San. This is partly 
because the Damara and Herero constitute the majority of the residents of Tsiseb 
conservancy, the focus of my fieldwork. It is partly also because more has been 
written on the role of these groups in the forging of resistance to colonial rule – at 





2. German colonisation and the establishment of the settler 
agricultural economy: 1884-1915 
 
The underwhelming annexation of German South West Africa4
Although not reducible just to the ‘land 
question’, from the formal establishment of 
German rule from 1884 onwards, land 
dispossession and redistribution nonetheless 
comprise two central strands in (cf. Werner 
1993). It was under German colonial 
administration that the system of denying land to black ‘indigenous’ inhabitants, 
whilst distributing it on an ever more inequitable scale to European settlers, was first 
initiated (Adams, Werner, and Vale 1990 7). This enterprise was set about with a 
view to removing from blacks the means for self-sufficiency, be that gained through 
trade, pastoralism, agriculture or hunter-gathering, in order to force them into 
providing the wage labour necessary for commercial settler agriculture or other 
sectors such as mining (Riddell 1978 3).    
Parts of modern Namibia, then designated German South West Africa, were first 
annexed by Germany in 1884, although the colony’s notional borders solidified 
somewhat when agreements were struck with Portugal and Great Britain, in 1886 and 
1890 respectively (LAC 2000 6). However, when outlining processes of ‘annexation’ 
in this context, care must be taken not to gloss over the resistance, sometimes 
overwhelming, that German colonials encountered. They met with peoples that, 
throughout the nineteenth century, had become well-armed as a result of the 
exigencies of livestock and indentured labour trade with the cape colonies, as well as 
educated and literate through the influence of the Christian missionaries that had been 
present before the arrival of the German military contingent (Gewald 1999). For 
instance, initial attempts at negotiating ‘protection’ treaties with formidable Ovambo 
chiefs, who held significant military advantage over the comparatively small German 
garrison, were brushed aside (Hailey 1946, cited in Werner 1993:139).  
                                                 









That the German administration made no headway with settling its citizens in the 
North, because it never enjoyed formal jurisdiction over the Ovambo, Kavango or 
Caprivi territories, has prompted the observation that colonisation left life largely 
unchanged for South West Africa’s northern inhabitants, who constituted a majority 
(Harring and Odendaal 2002, Werner 1998). The limitations of German enforcement 
over the territories and peoples for which it claimed jurisdiction were institutionalised 
at the start of the twentieth century through the establishment of the Police Zone. In 
this area, the colonial administration sought to acquire and clear land for settlement 
and to offer protection to German settlers (see Katjavivi 1988 for a history of the 
police zone). The boundary of the Police zone stretched in a crooked arc from 
halfway up the Skeleton Coast (on the Atlantic ocean), pushing northeast through the 
Namib desert to the level of the Etosha Pan, then eastwards into Kavango before 
dropping down, close to Grootfontein, on into the Kalahari, ending on the border with 
Bechuanaland (Botswana), 20-30km North of Mamuno (in modern Botswana). 
Germans were prohibited from settling in any territory to the North – the Kaokoveld, 
Ovambo, Kavango, Caprivi (UNDP 1988 50) – whilst residents of these areas could 
only enter the Police Zone when hired as wage labourers (ibid).  
Even others, especially the Herero, Damara and the Nama who, through  
inhabiting areas which fell within the Police Zone would become ever more subject to 
German rule, were at first well able to defend land and livestock (Drechsler 1980). 
However, where German colonials were powerless to conquer, they could still divide. 
They became very adept at turning intra- and inter-ethnic tensions to their advantage. 
They played chiefs off against each other, promising protection to one against his 
adversaries. In return, a chief would consent neither to alienate land to nor enter into 
treaties with a ‘different nation or members thereof’ (Werner 1998:42). This 
diplomatic sleight of hand allowed the German administration to strengthen the chiefs 
whose support it had enlisted, and pressed them to weaken or destroy the power base 
of those who were most hostile to the German presence (ibid). It led, for example, to 
the installation of Samuel Maherero as paramount chief of the Herero in 1891, despite 
there never having been previously such a position in the Herero political hierarchy 
(ibid).  
It led also to a renegotiation of existing relations between different groups, not 
least between the Herero and the (Berg) Damara. Jan-Bart Gewald (1999:93-99) 
charts the process through which the Damara found it expedient to forge alliances 
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with the colonial administration. In essence, they sought to renegotiate their 
subordinate position with regard to the Herero, who would often round them up for 
export, via Walvis Bay, to the Western Cape, where they would work as wage 
labourers on farms. The Germans saw fit to interpret them as a subjected race and to 
declare them in need of freeing from oppression. It was an expedient position to take. 
In Okombahe, the Germans were instrumental in the creation of the first paramount 
chief of the Damara, thereby altering the balance of power between the Herero and 
the Damara in favour of the latter, precisely because they were perceived as a more 
reliable ally. Furthermore, the new chief was obliged to supply wage labour to the 
German administration. Therefore, the prerequisites of German and South African 
administrators significantly shaped the structures of what would in the post-
independence setting be referred to as ‘Traditional Authorities’.  
 
Colonial consolidation: rinderpest, malaria and the failed Herero and Nama 
Revolt, 1904-1907 
Even these tactics did not guarantee the European settlers ownership rights to land. 
Although German South West Africa’s first governor, Theodore Leutwein, had 
managed in the 1890s to secure access to Herero land, the Herero, viewing land as 
communally owned, did not want to sell either it or their livestock to settlers 
(Drechsler 1980). However, in 1897, a rinderpest epidemic decimated an estimated 95 
per cent of Herero stock. The effect was compounded in 1898 by a malaria outbreak 
that was thought to have killed 10,000 Nama and Herero (Werner 1998). These 
natural disasters affected the balance of power between Europeans and Namibians. 
Most inoculated settler stock survived the rinderpest outbreak, whilst remaining 
Herero stock lost much value and was cheaply bought by settlers (ibid). The crisis 
experienced by the Herero, a predominantly pastoralist group, forced impoverished 
chiefs such as Maherero to sell land for the first time, and his subjects to seek wage 
labour (Bley 1971). Such was the extent of the dispossession of the Herero of their 
land and livestock – by 1903 it was estimated that within the Police Zone they had 
lost 3.5 million hectares, out of a total of 13 million (Bridgman 1981) – that the  
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Box 5.1: A brief historical sketch of Damara and Herero ethnicity  
The foraging, hunting and herding groups clustered under the term ‘Damara’ are 
generally thought to have occupied Central and Western Namibia for a long time, 
and, like bushmen, to be the aborigines of south-western Africa, predating the arrival 
of Bantu-speakers like the Herero. They speak a click language commonly known as 
Damara-Nama (Khoekhoegowab), a name which hints at their interwoven (recent) 
history with the Nama (but not at their equally interwoven history with the Herero). 
Their commonalities with the Khoekhoe notwithstanding, they are not traditionally so 
classified. Nor are the Damara well-researched. Many commentators still rely on 
early ethnographies dating from the turn of the century onwards. The work, dating 
from the 1920s and 30s, of Heinrich Vedder, a Rhenish missionary, is therefore still 
used but often, as Barnard does, with a generous handful of salt at the ready and an 
awareness of the theories of superior and inferior races evident in Vedder’s thinking. 
Confusingly the term ‘Damara’ was used by early ethnographers to refer to those 
people that Namibians now designate as ‘Herero’; whilst ‘Berg Damara’ was 
reserved for the people now commonly known as Damara. From the nineteenth 
century or perhaps earlier, they stood in a servant-master relationship with the 
Herero and to a lesser degree the Nama also. From the 1850s onwards, they were 
sucked into the new trading relations that accompanied the arrival of the Oorlam 
Afrikaners, and were often exported by the Herero as wage labour bound for the 
Western Cape. But they would learn to use the missionary stations and later German 
colonial rule as a means to redefine their subordinate, low-status relationship to 
other groups. Prior to 1890, the Damara did not appear to have descent-defined 
tribal units, nor were there tribal chiefs. In that year, Cornelius Goraseb was 
appointed the first Paramount Damara Chief, in Okombahe, and was perhaps the last 
powerful Damara chief.  
 
In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the majority of Damara have lived in west-
central Namibia, owing to the programme of forced resettlement which obliged 
thousands to relocate in the 1960s. Sadly, the Damara are still seen stereotypically as 
‘low status’ people who have lost their traditional identity. There is evidence to 
suggest this is far from the case. Sullivan has vigorously challenged the assertion that 
the Damara no longer gather veld foods with an impressive study on contemporary 
food-gathering. In my own fieldwork in the Brandberg area, it was also clear that 
many Damara maintained small-stock herds and, where possible, vegetable patches. 
Some also hunted for the pot, sometimes out of poverty, but often ‘for the taste’.    
 
‘Herero’ is a term used to refer to people that speak Otjiherero, a Bantu language, 
and have lived variously as agro-pastoralists when times were good or as hunter-
gatherers when required. Speakers of Otjiherero dialects have also variously been 
called Ovaherero, Ovambanderu, Ovahimba, Ovatjimba, Ovazemba and Vakwandu. 
Although all of these groups share a number of characteristics, including social 
organisation, modes of economic activity, cosmology, and spatio-political 
organisation, it is the Ovaherero which are referred to in this chapter when the term 
Herero is employed. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Herero were a 
highly decentralised group, living a transhumant existence. Change occurred as a 
consequence of the arrival from the south of the Oorlam Kapteins – and in particular 
Jonker Afrikaner in the 1830s. The Kapteins would raid the herds of Herero and 
other pastoralists, with a view to trading their acquisitions with the cape colonies; 
and became very wealthy in the process partly through trading and partly through 
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control of access to trade routes across ‘their’ territories. Herero who suffered cattle 
raids would either become raider clients of Jonker Afrikaner, or would become 
Ovatjimba, hunter-gatherers whose principal subsistence resource was Tjimba 
(aardvark), sometimes seeking shelter and protection on the Rhenish mission stations. 
The emergence of the Ovahona, or chiefs, was a result of Herero appropriation of 
Oorlam centralised authority structures, as well as of the imperative for a powerful 
leader who could fend off other raiders, be they Afrikaner or Herero. The Herero 
would eventually appropriate the raiding and trading ways of the Afrikaners so 
successfully that they were able to break ranks with Jonker Afrikaner. They defeated 
him in battle in 1861 and establised control over much of central Namibia. On the eve 
of colonisation there were nine recognised Ovahona, but none claimed to be a leader 
above all others. It was under German colonial rule that this further centralising 
addition to authority structures was added, when administrators exploited conflict 
over the succession of Tjamuaha.        
 
Sources: (Barnard 1992, Gewald 1999, Lau 1987, Rohde 1997a, Sullivan 2004, 
Vedder 1966 [1928]) 
 
Rhenish Mission Society to the colonial administration proposed the establishment of 
grazing reserves (Werner 1998). Paramount Chief Maherero agreed, and so did many 
Herero, but the size of the reserves was fiercely contested. Maherero wanted smaller 
ones, so as to sell more land and gain more revenue, whilst other chiefs thought this 
unfair and called for them to be extended (Pool 1979).  
Tensions over access to land, as well as anger at trade terms considered highly 
unfavourable and dishonest, were at the heart of the rebellion by the Herero, which 
was aided by the Nama. Worried that confinement to the grazing reserves of the 
Police Zone would only bring total subjugation, Samuel Maherero attacked German 
settlers and soldiers in central Namibia in January 1904 (Bley 1971). For the first six 
months, the Herero enjoyed success and recovered much of the land which they had 
ceded since 1897. However, the appointment of General von Trotha led to a complete 
reversal of all the gains made (Drechsler 1980). After German forces inflicted a heavy 
defeat upon the Herero at the battle of Waterberg in 1904, they proceeded to drive the 
remaining Herero into the dry, barren sands of Omaheke. The area was cordoned off 
and those inside left to a ‘slow and agonizing death’ (ibid:155). As if uncertain that 
even this act, accepted by most commentators as one of genocide, would prove 
sufficient to quash any further chance of a Herero insurrection, Von Trotha issued in 
October 1904 what became known as the extermination order. It proclaimed that no 
Herero presence would be tolerated within the Police Zone: all Herero men found 
inside were to be shot, all Herero women and children driven out (ibid:156-7).  
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The consequences of this failed rebellion were catastrophic and immeasurably sad 
beyond even the galling, grim statistical indicators available to us. Up to 80% of the 
Herero and 50% of the Nama perished as a result of the war (ibid:214). All Herero 
land and most cattle were confiscated and given over to European settlers (Bley, 
1970:171). Remaining Nama land to the south was subsequently seized. On the back 
of the revolt, a number of new laws were introduced, which: 
 
• obliged Africans to carry identity cards  
• restricted them to owning livestock or land only with the (seldom given) 
permission of the governor  
• limited the amount of Africans that could reside on white-owned land (Werner 
1998:47).  
 
By 1914, at least within the Police Zone, whites owned 90 per cent of large and 
70 percent of small livestock (Goldblatt 1971 173-174). Out of a total of 42.3 million 
ha available for settlement, white farmers had 13.4 million ha; black Africans – the 
vast majority – occupied 2.76 million  ha (Olivier 1961 47, cited in Werner 1993). 
This land comprised reserves for groups, such as the Damara, perceived to have been 
loyal during the revolt of 1904-1907. 
 
3. South West Africa under South African rule: the first 
phase of settlement, 1915-1960 
 
The changing of the guard5  
The outbreak of World War I brought an end to 
German colonial rule in South West Africa. 
Germany surrendered on 9th July 1915, paving 
the way for the territory to become a 
Protectorate of Great Britain (Harring & 
Odendaal, 2002:22). In accordance with the 
terms of the 1919 Treaty of Versaille, reigning British Monarch George V entrusted 
                                                 
5 South West African Flag 31st May 1928-21st March 1990. Source: 
http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Namibia.htm  
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the Union of South Africa with the mandate obtained from the League of Nations 
(ibid). At the heart of the negotiations over the mandate system was a tension. Those 
countries given the mandate over one or another of the territories Germany forfeited 
at the end of World War I generally wanted to annexe them. South Africa was no 
exception (Kaela 1996). However, this objective ran counter to the aims expressed 
within Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which referred to the 
mandate system. The overarching responsibility entrusted to mandated countries was 
to ensure “the well-being and development of such peoples” as lived in the territories 
covered by the mandates (cited in Kaela 1996:4). This was to be achieved through the 
tutelage of these peoples “for eventual self-determination and independence” (Kaela 
1996:2). A compromise was thus reached between mandated countries bent on 
annexation and actors, such as US president Woodrow Wilson, who favoured self-
determination and independence. Mandated countries would not be permitted to 
annexe territories, but nor would immediate self-determination and independence be 
an option for those territories (ibid).  
Moreover, Article 22 did not explicitly oblige mandated countries to prepare 
territories for independence, but only implied it. Nor was independence defined as a 
self-evident corollary of self-determination. This left the door open for the 
incorporation of those territories at some later point, but closed off the possibility of 
immediate annexation (ibid). The fight for Namibia’s status for most of the rest of the 
twentieth century can be traced back to this fudge. The ideal of independence would 
eventually triumph, but the compromise handed Jan Smut’s South Africa, which 
would once again pursue annexation at a later date, firm, enduring control.    
In the years of military rule from 1915-1919, South West Africa’s black African 
inhabitants wasted little time in turning the vagaries of de facto South African control 
to their advantage. Pastoralists were quick to abandon their workplaces and reclaim 
ancestral lands (Werner 1998). Until its mandated country status was confirmed 
South Africa could only offer its own settlers grazing and occupation licences, but not 
land ownership. Moreover, the policy of clamping down on ‘squatters’ was undercut 
by the policy of encouraging urban Africans to resettle in rural areas, to provide wage 
labour for settler commercial agriculture (ibid). At first, black Africans had welcomed 
the arrival of the South Africans, hoping for better treatment than that which they had 
received during their first experience of colonisation. But it became increasingly 
evident that the monopoly over land that white settlers had enjoyed under German 
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rule was to be preserved as the basis of economic, social and political control in the 
South African era. The continuity between one regime and that which replaced it was 
underlined by the South African policy of continuing to recognise the Police Zone, 
and indeed of extending it in 1950.  
 
Settling in 
From 1920 onwards, the South African administration set out an explicit policy of 
encouraging poor white South Africans to settle in its newly-acquired territory and of 
providing financial and logistical support for the enterprise (Union of South Africa 
1935, cited in Adams, Werner and Vale 1990). It established a Land Board in 1920 
and a Land Bank in 1921 (Werner 1998). Settlement patterns and arrangements for 
land ownership and access mirrored South African ones, and the 1922 Native 
Administration Proclamation was therefore based on legislation such as the South 
African Native Land Act of 1913 (Harring & Odendaal 2002, Werner 1993, 1998). 
This act had set various precedents, such as the prohibition of land transactions 
between whites and blacks, and also the separation of black and white settlement 
areas (Harring and Odendaal 2002), with a view in particular to avoiding black 
‘islands’ amidst white ‘seas’ (Werner 1993:142). The 1922 Native Administration 
Proclamation offered laws for creating and administering native reserves. The Native 
Reserves Commission set about creating them. The Commission recommended that 5 
million ha be set aside within the police zone for the establishment of native reserves, 
but by 1925 only 2,813,741ha had been made available for ten reserves that were to 
house 11,740 inhabitants (Emmett 1999 103). In contrast, 7,481,371 ha had been 
made accessible to 1,106 white settlers over the same timeframe (ibid). Little changed 
the basic settlement pattern over the intervening decades. Only three more reserves 
were established between 1925 and 1951 (RSA 1964, cited in Werner 1993:143). By 
1946, 32 million ha of surveyed farms, all within the Police Zone, were owned or 
leased by white settlers – 39 per cent of the surface area of South West Africa – 
whilst native reserves within the Police Zone constituted only 4.1 million ha (ibid). 
By 1960, white owned land had increased to 39 million ha (UNIN 1987 39).  
The people installed in the native reserves received very little assistance from the 
government, The reserves, stripping people of prime land, putting them in marginal 
areas and concentrating them in such a way as to aggravate competition for available 
resources led to what has been called “a parody of pre-colonial herding and 
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cultivation” (Chambers & Green 1981:231). Until the 1940s, average spending on 
black agriculture remained at around 4.5%, never exceeding 7% (Dowd 1954, cited in 
Adams, Werner and Vale 1990:35). Black Africans were obliged to seek wage labour 
on commercial (white farms) despite the bad working conditions. Even during the 
drought and the Great Depression of the 1930s the state was not inclined to support 
native reserve inhabitants, but instead pursued a policy of encouraging ‘self-reliance’ 
(Werner & Adams 1990:37).  
In contrast, white settler agriculture expanded rapidly between the 1920s and the 
1960s, precisely because of the massive subsidies received by white farmers from the 
government. In addition to access to the best land, it was also provided at cheap 
prices and farmers, through the land bank, had access to cheap finance. Moreover, the 
infrastructure was built with a view to serving white settlers more than native reserve 
inhabitants: to this day, for instance, Namibia’s tarmac roads, as well as the 
frequently-maintained gravel roads, serve commercial farming areas better than they 
do Namibian communal areas. 
 
Black Africans, the South West African Administration and further annexation 
attempts 
Subject to the consequences of decisions about land distribution in which they had 
not been invited to participate, black Africans fared little better when it came to 
representation in South West Africa’s government. The South West Africa 
Constitution Act No 42 of 1925 created an administrator and (all-white) Legislative 
Assembly and Executive Committee, which could pass laws and ordinances on all 
issues that were not ‘reserved’ by Pretoria (Harring & Odendaal 2002:24). Amongst 
these reserved matters was anything referring to ‘native affairs’, including 
conservation policy.  
The Native Administration Proclamation Act No 15 of 1928, which established 
the post of ‘chief native commissioner’, was the mechanism through which black 
African involvement in the South West African Administration was shaped. A (white) 
supreme chief, resident in South West Africa was presided over and influenced 
‘native’ political institutions, and as such had the power to: 
 
• recognise, appoint or remove any headman or chief of an ethnic group, 
location or native reserve 
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• remove an ethnic group or a section of it from one part of the country to 
another 
• alter the boundaries of the territory occupied by an ethnic group 
• over-rule any customary law or decision taken by chiefs or headmen (Native 
Administration Proclamation 15 of 1928, cited in Harring and Odendaal 
2002:24) 
 
Robert Gordon maintains that it was through the chief native commissioner that the 
ethnic polities and politics of South West Africa were co-opted and manipulated by 
the South African authorities (1991). “Chiefs and headmen”, he argued, “had to be 
kept strong enough to control their own people but weak enough to be controlled by 
the regime” (Ibid:28).  
The aim of establishing some black African involvement in the South West 
African Administration may have served as a means by which the South African 
government could claim that it was fulfilling its obligations under its League of 
Nations mandate to prepare the territory’s peoples for self-determination; though 
clearly not for independence. On the contrary, it claimed that “there is no prospect of 
the territory ever existing as a separate state, and the ultimate objective of the 
mandatory principle [i.e. independence] is therefore impossible of achievement” 
(cited in Kaela 1996:12). Consequently, with the dissolution of the League of Nations 
at the end of World War II, the government in Pretoria argued for the incorporation of 
South West Africa into the union (Dugard 1973). The League’s successor, the United 
Nations Organisation (UNO), it refused to sanction this proposition. The UNO 
wanted South West Africa to be placed under the auspices of the trusteeship system, 
the ostensible replacement of the mandate system, with a view to securing its 
independence “without delay” (Kaela 1996:12). The Union as a result chose not to 
recognise the legitimacy of the UNO to rule on the question of what arrangements 
should follow for South West Africa (ibid:18). The South Africans once again 
assumed the black majority incapable of self-rule, whilst continuing to ensure that 
they were not acquiring the capacity for self-governance through offering minimal 
government services to black. What little was provided to the black population stood 
in stark contrast to the high levels of support to white settlers. The exclusionary 
dynamic started under German rule was thereby repeated.   
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The victory of the Nationalist Party in the 1948 elections ensured that the line of 
non-recognition of the United Nations would be pushed even harder (ibid:137). The 
uncompromising South African stance generated long-standing uncertainty 
surrounding the future status and development of Namibia. It was well into the 1980s 
before those backing independence gained the upper hand. Throughout the 1950s and 
on into the 1960s, resistance from within the territory increased, from seasoned 
opponents such as Hosea Kutako, with the help of activists like Michael Scott, taking 
the form of petitions and evidence documenting the harsh conditions in the native 
reserves (First 1963). In 1950 the International Court of Justice ruled that the League 
of Nations mandate was still in force, that the United Nations General Assembly was 
the legitimate supervisory body for the mandate and that South Africa was therein 
required to submit to its authority (Dugard, 1973:115). Although the ruling put the 
UN in a position of legal strength, it did little to change the balance of power: it was 
offered as an advisory opinion which South Africa was not obliged to accept (ibid).  
 
4. Apartheid’s homelands and the struggle for 
independence, 1960-1990 
 
The Nats and the creation of the homelands 
This well-intentioned huffing and puffing within the UN did not stop the South 
African government from pursuing its objective of the incorporation of Namibia, at 
least on a de facto basis. The Nationalist Party (more commonly known colloquially 
as ‘the Nats’), under the Prime Minister H.F. Verwoerd, thereby recommended the 
adaptation for Namibia of apartheid legislation already in force in South Africa. With 
respect to land distribution policies, the government produced a Report of the 
Commission of Enquiry into the Affairs of South West Africa, more commonly 
known as the Odendaal Report (1964). The recommendations set out in the Odendaal 
Report ushered in the final round of forced removal and resettlement (Werner, 
1993:145). The Commission’s ostensible brief was to promote “the material and 
moral welfare and the social progress of the inhabitants of South West Africa, and 
more particularly its non-white inhabitants” (General Rehabilitation Commission, 
cited in Adams, Werner, and Vale 1990 1). As in South Africa, ‘separate 
development’ was espoused as the best way to achieve this objective. Arguing that 
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native reserves had failed to permit their residents to meet even minimum subsistence 
needs, the Odendaal Report proposed the creation of ‘self-governing’ homelands, 
each with their own Legislative Assembly (1964 85).  
In 1968, the Development of Self Government for Native Nations in South West 
Africa established ten reserves – homelands – and recognised six “native nations” as 
their occupants: Ovamboland, Hereroland, Kaokoland, Okavangoland, Damaraland 
and Eastern Caprivi (Harring and Odendaal 2002:26). The establishment of the 
homelands entailed the consolidation of the seventeen existing native reserves into 
the ten homelands. ‘Citizens’ of the new ‘nations’ would be obliged to live within 
their boundaries, paving the way for resettlement, thereby completing the segregation 
along racial lines that was at the heart of the apartheid system.  
Land was also added to the amount covered by existing reserves, with the 
purchase of an additional 426 farms and the de-proclamation of government land 
contiguous with existing reserves (Werner and Adams 1990). Consequently, land 
available to black Namibians rose from 22 million to approximately 32.7 million ha 
(Werner, 1993:146). However, much of the land was desert or semi desert, often 
devoid of sufficient water for agricultural or pastoral purposes; according to Werner, 
fully 87% of Damaraland could only be classified as desert or semi desert (ibid). 
Although after independence the homelands would be reclassified as ‘communal 
land’, and subsumed into geographical, not ethnic, regions, land settlement and 
distribution patterns remain broadly similar to those brought about as a result of the 
Odendaal Commission’s recommendations.  
If the aim of creating homelands was to placate their residents, it failed: anger 
remained at the fact that they did not alter but rather perpetuated the territory’s 
inequitable land distribution patterns. The desire for land redistribution was one of the 
core issues at the heart of the liberation struggle, and has continued to be one of the 
most pressing concerns of Namibian communal land inhabitants ever since 
independence. 
 
The emergence of the South West African People’s Organisation (Swapo) 
Black resistance within South West Africa to South African rule emerged against the 
explosive backdrop of 1950s African nationalism and the onset of the first wave of 
independence across the African subcontinent. By 1960, within the South West 
African context, three principal political groupings had emerged: the Chiefs’ Councils 
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(in particular the Herero Chiefs’ Council led by Hosea Kutako); the South West 
African National Union (SWANU) and the South West African People’s 
Organisation (Dobell 1998 27). 
 
Map 5.2 South West African Homelands (1978) 
 
Source: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas, 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/namibia.html  
 
Swapo was started by Ovambo migrant workers exposed to the teeming mass of 
political activity in the Cape Town of the 1950s (ibid:29). From its inception as the 
Ovambo People’s Congress (OPC) in 1957, it was re-launched in South West Africa 
in April 1959 as the Ovambo People’s Organisation when its founder, Andimba 
Toivo ya Toivo, was rumbled by South African authorities and deported from Cape 
Town (ibid).  
The Ovambo People’s Organisation (OPO) became Swapo, a national 
organisation, partly in response to the outcome of resistance to the forced resettlement 
of residents of Windhoek’s Old Location to Katutura. The Council of Chiefs, 
SWANU and the OPO had jointly organised a boycott of municipal services, which 
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ended in blood-soaked clashes with the police, in which upwards of sixty protesters 
lost their lives (see Vigne 1973 for a more detailed chronicle of these events). 
Prominent leaders, including future Namibian president Sam Nujoma, went at this 
point into exile in Tanzania. Tellingly, they also made the transition because they 
thought Ovambo People’s Organisation would be better-received at the United 
Nations if reinvented as a national movement (Dobell, 1998:31). Swapo would prove 
remarkably effective at monopolising the resources offered by the United Nations, the 
Organisation of African Unity, the Soviet Union and other international sponsors 
(ibid). 
Swapo became increasingly dependent upon its relations with international bodies 
and actors to achieve its objectives, not least among them the UN, which was very 
sympathetic to its cause (Kaela 1996). However, events in the 1960s made Swapo 
alter its plan to seek independence through the application of international pressure. It 
would continue to do so, but became frustrated with the lack of progress that this 
strategy initially produced. Liberia and Ethiopia had in 1961 brought before the 
International Court of Justice a case against South Africa’s continuing occupation of 
South West Africa, but the Court ruled finally in 1966 that neither country had legal 
standing to bring the case (ibid). This was the final straw for Swapo, which one 
month after the ruling launched the armed struggle they had been threatening since 
1962 (Dobell 1998:35). Their first skirmish with South African forces took place on 
27th August 1966 when South African forces attacked the base Swapo had established 
in  Omgulumbashe, North-west Ovamboland (Leys & Brown, 2005:2). The odds 
favoured the South African troops overwhelmingly: they killed two and captured 
fifty-four (ibid). 
Swapo turned its military defeat into a propaganda victory: two months after, the 
UN General Assembly formally revoked South Africa’s mandate and resumed 
sovereignty over South West Africa (Dobell, 1998). But the conflict prompted a 
crackdown on Swapo operatives inside Namibia, who were rounded up and mostly 
given sentences of between 5 years and life in Robben Island (Leys & Brown, 
2005:2). This left Swapo with little capacity to conduct operations inside South West 
Africa, and its decisions and strategies were determined henceforth solely by its 
leaders in exile, who concentrated on waging their struggle within the international 
arena. Dobell argues that these owing to these circumstances, Swapo lost contact with 
its base, with the result that decision-making would become increasingly centralised 
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(1998:36). The organisation became more pragmatic and less ideologically driven, in 
order better to exploit the resources available from international sources. It learned to 
speak a number of “languages” – the UN, East/West Bloc and African idioms – but 
did so “at the cost, perhaps, of developing a coherent vision of a transformed, 
independent Namibia” (ibid:37). 
 
Internal frustrations and external triumphs in the 1970s 
Despite the crackdowns and heavier surveillance to which black political activists in 
South West Africa had been subjected in the 1960s, there was a resurgence of popular 
resistance at the beginning of the 1970s. It occurred in the wake of the 1971 ruling by 
the International Court of Justice, in which the 1966 ruling against Libya and Ethiopia 
was reversed. South Africa’s rule over South West Africa was declared illegal, and all 
UN members were requested to abide by this position and make clear their support of 
it in any dealings they had with South Africa (Dugard 1973). Although the leadership 
in exile in Tanzania had very little to do with the orchestration of these largely 
spontaneous protests, it was quick to claim credit for them and use them to shore up 
its legitimacy in international diplomatic spheres (Dobell 1998:141). The rapid 
manner in which the South African government quashed the rebellion soon, though, 
showed up the lack of Swapo leadership and support for them within South West 
Africa (ibid). The majority of the Swapo Youth League – which had spearheaded 
domestic resistance – headed for Angola, as part of a mass exodus of up to 8,000 
Namibians, subsequent to the withdrawal of Portugal in 1974 (Leys and Brown 
2005). Cutting down on internal activities had its advantages for the Swapo 
leadership in exile. It left them in greater control of the struggle and reduced to 
nothing the possibility of the factions of the organisation within the territory emerging 
with an alternative set of leaders and variant plans (ibid).  
Although Swapo did not lose popular support within Namibia, its exiled 
leadership angered some of the organisation’s members, especially within the Swapo 
Youth League, and were accused, as early on as the Tanga conference held in 
Tanzania in 1970, of not fomenting or supporting ‘grass-roots’ resistance within the 
territory and of being unaccountable. The response from the leadership at the 
conference was, for Dobell, revelatory: 
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In his opening address to the Congress [Sam] Nujoma responded to the criticisms by SWAPO 
members in a way which was to become standard practice among the leadership – by 
adopting the more militant language of the critics, while turning their charges against them. 
The speech was to warn officially (and ominously) against the “enemy agents” who would 
subsequently be found to be at the root of each successive crisis in the movement, thereby 
providing a convenient explanation for inconvenient manifestations of discontent in the 
ranks, and evading time and again the need for critical self-examination (1998:38) 
 
“Enemy agents’, once identified by the leadership, were dealt with strictly and 
quickly. In 1976, in conjunction with Swapo Youth League members, a group of 
PLAN fighters based in Zambia rebelled, complaining of a lack of supplies and 
medical care at the front, and of corruption and conspiracy with the South African 
Defence Forces among their commanders (Dobell 1998:48). In response, the Zambian 
army, at the behest of the Swapo leadership, arrested 27 Swapo members in Lusaka, 
including Executive members and Youth League activists, some of whom were sent 
to be detained in Tanzania for up to two years (ibid; Leys and Brown 2005). 
Following the arrests, a further 1,600-1,800 people were detained, officially to 
eliminate from the organisation the spies alleged to be passing on sensitive military 
information to the South African government. Leys and Brown argue that whilst these 
tactics probably did reveal some spies, their bigger effect was to generate paranoia 
within the exiled community (2005). Furthermore, the treatment of detainees would 
presage concerns regarding Swapo’s human rights record in the post-independence 
era (cf. Daniels 2003). 
Some commentators (i.e. Leys & Brown 2005) maintain that the Swapo 
leadership should not be judged too harshly for these actions. Dobell argues that they 
themselves were hostage to “Zambia’s political imperatives”, given that the Zambian 
president, Kenneth Kaunda, was engaged in Kissinger’s détente strategy, along with 
South Africa and Angola (1998:49). Zambia may well not have been prepared to run 
the risk of a PLAN rebellion on its soil compromising the détente. Moreover, 
Swapo’s leadership could claim to have made significant headway with its attempts to 
bring international pressure to bear on South Africa. It had been named the “authentic 
representative of the Namibian people” by the UN General Assembly in 1973. It had 
been instrumental in getting the UN to the table (if not immediately to approve) 
Resolution 435, the most wholehearted condemnation yet of the South African 
presence in Namibia (Serfontein, 1977). Nonetheless, the perceived reluctance of the 
leadership to engage in decision-making by consensus, combined with its 
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unwillingness to pursue mass resistance at home, thereby leaving itself cut off from 
its base, were sources of long-standing grievance.  
South Africa also appeared to be caught on the back foot. It found itself obliged to 
counter the barrage of international criticism against its rule by speeding up its 
development programmes for the homelands, and convened the Turnhalle conference, 
which offered South West Africans the possibility of ‘total autonomy’ (Kaela, 
1996:89). Kaela argues that this was offered because the South African government 
had accepted that it would have to leave the territory, and had decided instead to 
attempt “to control the process of change to ensure that the outcome was to its liking” 
(ibid:138). He goes on to argue that one of the principal factors which sank the 
process was Swapo’s absence from it. This contributed to ensuring that Turnhalle was 
not legitimate in the eyes of the UN, and also meant that any internal independence 




The events of the 1980s made it increasingly 
difficult for South Africa to maintain its 
intransigent position of refusing to allow 
Namibians to determine their future. 
Zimbabwe’s independence constituted a source 
of optimism for Swapo and consternation for the 
South African government. The Transitional Government of National Unity that 
South Africa had set up for Namibia at no point acquired legitimacy, domestically or 
internationally (Wood 1988). Ultimately, though, it was the sea-change in the 
international environment which forced South Africa to adjust its policy within the 
region and which would bring about Namibian independence (Saunders 1992).   
When even the superpowers displayed an increasing appetite for détente, it is no 
surprise that South Africa became less convinced that the benefits of support for 
UNITA rebels in the Angolan civil war outweighed the costs (ibid). Those costs 
increased yet further, as Cuba sent 15,000 troops to reinforce the Angolan 
government, in a final push to secure a convincing victory. When neither side could 
                                                 
6 Namibian Flag, adopted 21st March 1990. Source  http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Namibia.htm  
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gain the upper hand in the battle of Cuito Canavale without inducing heavier human 
and economic costs than they were willing to bear (Wood, 1998), one of the most 
important conditions for Namibian independence was in place. As well as its military 
difficulties, South Africa was also being squeezed by economic sanctions, which 
helped to persuade it that it had no choice but to seek military disengagement. On 
December 13th, 1988, South Africa acceded to talks in Brazzaville at which Swapo 
was conspicuous by its absence, having not been invited (Dobell 1998). The talks 
resulted in the signing, 9 days later in New York, of an agreement to implement UN 
Resolution 435, which called for the holding of elections for a constituent assembly 
and, of course, full independence for Namibia. The New York agreement linked the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola with the withdrawal of the South African 
Defence force from both Angola and Namibia (Leys & Brown 2005:12), thereby 
paving the way for the return of the exiled Swapo leadership. Elections were held in 
1989, in which Swapo won a 57% majority, in spite of the efforts of the South 
African government to subsidise political parties which it stood a better chance of 





The achievement of independence signalled, then, the end of the exclusion of the 
majority of Namibia’s inhabitants from the political processes overseen by the state. 
By the 1960s onwards, opponents of South African rule – and Swapo in particular – 
had won the argument, in the international arena, about whether or not the territory 
should become an independent nation. Of course, that independence had come about 
was not just because the United Nations accepted the case for it: the costs of holding 
on to Namibia had become too high for South Africa. The enthusiasm to wage the 
cold war had sagged on both sides of the Iron Curtain, with implications for all allies 
of the super powers, South Africa included. South Africa had ever-increasing trouble 
at home to contend with, was faced with international sanctions and a regional war it 
could not afford. Swapo was at the heart of the campaign to delegitimise South 
African rule in Namibia and to persuade the international community that Namibians 
were capable of self-rule. It had turned that belief into political reality, and profited 
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handsomely from the establishment of representative democracy in Namibia. For it 
would not just win the first elections with a convincing majority, but would go on to 
increase its share of the vote, from 57% in 1991 to 74% in 1994, 76% in 1999 and 
74% in 2004 (Directorate of Elections 2004), headed in the first three of those four 
elections by its charismatic and controversial but enduringly popular leader, Sam 
Nujoma. He will be remembered not just for dominating ‘his’ party but also for 
stepping down from office, even when a majority of Namibians would have 
supported the necessary amendment of the constitution required for him to stand in 
the 2004 elections. This act means that Namibia’s first statesman is more likely to be 
remembered as another Mandela, rather than as another Mugabe.  
The declaration of independence was accompanied by a hunger for new and 
different policies that would better reflect the needs and demands of the black 
majority. The representative democratic structures through which these policies were 
to be pursued would, moreover, provide models for decision-making which, in view 
of the struggle to achieve independence, resonated with the legitimacy of a long-
denied but just cause. It is against this background that the introduction of the 
conservancy programme and the representative form of participation in conservancy 
decision-making processes are more fully understood. The implications of this 
background are explored further in the following two chapters.  
However, the legacy of independence was also one of vast inequity, one indeed 
that had left Namibia as one of the most inequitable countries in the world (UNDP 
1998 9). The political order had experienced radical change, but the economic order 
remained largely intact. Land ownership has proved an extremely thorny issue, not 
amenable to swift resolution (see Harring & Odendaal 2002 for a review of the 
resettlement programme from 1990-2001). Much comment has been made on the 
provisions in Namibia’s constitution for the protection of private property, and the 
obligation on the part of the government to proceed with land reform on the basis of 
the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ principle  (Dobell 1998, Harring and Odendaal 
2002, Nujoma 2001, Saunders 1992). The constitution also provides for government 
expropriation of land (and a guarantee of compensation for any expropriated land), 
which offers another avenue for land redistribution and one that since 2004 the 
government has looked upon as a way to quicken the land reform process. But the 
challenge remains immense and the pace of reform is as yet too slow to sate the 
clamour for redistribution.  
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The majority of black Namibians continue to live on state-owned communal land 
and, despite the efforts of government to improve conditions and access to basic 
infrastructure and services such as health and education, they still compare badly with 
white Namibians. Crucially, in terms of the resources, knowledge and skills that are 
required for national development objectives, Namibians in communal areas are fairly 
poor, and much intervention is justified on the basis of the provision of such 
resources, knowledge and skills. Those resources, knowledge and skills available to 
communal area inhabitants – or lack of therein – constitute important factors which 
determine the basis on which poor, black Namibians participate in development (and 
conservation) initiatives. They affect also the extent to which these Namibians can 
define what development is or needs to take place in the first place. Namibia’s 
conservancy programme must be located within this broader national context of 
knowledge transfer.  
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Chapter VI: Namibia’s conservancy 
programme  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Namibia’s conservancy programme is a nationwide initiative which permits 
communal land inhabitants to request the devolution from central government of 
limited rights to manage wildlife and benefit from tourism operations. It is the 
product of a rupture in thinking on how and where to go about achieving conservation 
objectives, who should go about their achievement and, crucially, the basis on which 
they would be inclined to do so. In the context of the conservancy programme, 
conservation is an activity to be pursued outside the protected area. It is to depend on 
the efforts of local people who, instead of being characterised as a threat, become 
instead protagonists in the conservation process. Any conservation activities must 
therefore involve local people in the important decision-making processes and offset 
the costs incurred by those people; they must coincide, not conflict with, local 
livelihood strategies.  
Put differently, the conservancy programme is a nationwide attempt to set 
conservation and development processes in a relationship of necessary 
interdependence. The acceptance of this different way of thinking about conservation 
came about largely as a result of Namibia’s hard-earned independence from South 
Africa in 1990. A ‘policy space’ opened up, into which the notion of ‘community 
based natural resource management’ fitted hand-in-glove.  
This chapter starts, in section two, with a consideration of conservation policy in 
Namibia prior to independence. Essentially, the concept of achieving conservation 
outside the protected area by fostering sustainable natural resource use was part of 
conservation policy in South West Africa: the Nature Conservation Ordinance of 
1975 sought to give some resource users an incentive to conserve the wildlife 
resources to which they had access. But it applied only on privately-owned land and 
only in relation to white people. The policy context that emerged after Independence 
permitted the extension of the Nature Conservation Ordinance to communal land, 
from 1996 onwards.  
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This exercise leads, in section three to an analysis of the influence of the six 
‘principles of sustainability’ on conservancy policy and legislation. So central is the 
concept of sustainability that it is, I contend, impossible to understand the emergence 
and continuation of the conservancy programme without some prior knowledge of it. 
The post-independence discussion ends with the establishment of the first communal 
area conservancies in 1998, and the rapid pace at which people, mostly in the Erongo, 
Kunene and Caprivi regions, took to the idea of establishing one in their own area.  
Section four explores the ‘rolling out’ of the conservancy programme on a 
national scale, the mechanisms through which this process occurred and the funding 
framework which made it possible. From 1998 onwards, the programme expanded 
quickly. The rapid pace was in large part down to a concerted effort of coordination 
on the part of the organisations (governmental and non-governmental) that supported 
communal area inhabitants with conservancy formation. These activities were 
financed as part of the Living in a Finite Environment programme, a Worldwide Fund 
for Nature (WWF) initiative for which funds were secured from the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID).   
The chapter concludes with a summary of the extent of change that conservation 
thinking had undergone post independence. Attention is drawn to the fact that the 
actors who had been central to pressing the community conservation agenda during 
the formulation were also, logically enough, leading the charge for implementation of 
the conservancy programme. By dint of the financial resources they commanded, 
NGOs became very important to the implementation of the programme, perhaps even 
more so than the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, which had enacted the 
legislation but lacked funding. The actors with sufficient cognitive authority to install 
new ideas in the conservation policy process were the obvious choice when it came to 
implementing the new policy.  
 
2. A brief history of conservation policy change in Namibia  
 
Contextualising historiography 
The following account presents, in broad brush strokes, a historiography of the events 
leading up to the emergence of Namibia’s conservancy policy and legislation. The 
account leans heavily on structured and semi-structured interviews with some of the 
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central actors in the creation of conservancy policy and legislation who drove the 
process, and who have left their imprint on the development of the programme. 
Although I also cite written sources, at least two of these are written by one of these 
actors. These people continue to work in and exert influence upon the conservancy 
programme. They remain key actors with vested interests, as much related to 
emotional considerations as to ones of power or economics. Whilst it is true that all 
depend for their livelihood on their earnings from involvement in the programme, 
they have also devoted a significant part of their lives to it. I do not want to eulogise 
these actors and render their responses to my questions about the history of the 
conservancy as some ‘definitive’ version of events. Nor do I wish to discredit them 
even before the story I have weaved from their words has begun. I wish, rather, to 
contextualise the account, to give a reminder of the necessity of attending to the goals 
and interests (Barnes, Bloor & Henry 1996) connected to it.  
During the interviews, whilst some differences emerged, there was a notable 
consensus on which had been the principal events and what factors had constituted 
the most important causes of policy change. The point on which most consensus 
exists about the conservancy programme is that it has been a radical and successful 
approach to conservation and development. Terms such as “visionary” and 
“pioneering” cropped up repeatedly, and in two interviews grand claims were made 
for the importance of the conservancy model. For instance, one interviewee stated, 
“I’d challenge anyone to find a development programme anywhere in the world that 
delivers the same conservation and economic value over the same time period as the 
conservancy programme has”7.  
It is probable that the positive character of the account given of the emergence of 
the conservancy programme is motivated at least partially by considerations of the 
necessity and expediency of presenting in highly favourable terms a programme 
which is considered worthy of continued funding despite its flaws. Moreover, I had 
heard, previous to the interviews, the opinions that three of these four candidates held 
on the validity of research conducted by people who were not from Namibia. Among 
the common points made were: 
 
                                                 
7 Interview with Chris Brown, director of the Namibia Nature Foundation, 3.12.2003, Windhoek. 
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• an annoyance with the perceived tendency of ‘external’ researchers to make 
sweeping claims on the basis of superficial acquaintance with a highly 
dynamic and complex set of interlinked empirical contexts   
• a fear that unjust criticism based on poor understanding might affect the 
programme’s ability to attract funding 
 
Given the strength of such perceptions, it would not be surprising for those 
interviewed to feel it necessary to project an image of conservancy success when 
talking to me, a complete ‘outsider’. Feeling the need to project ‘success’ is not 
automatically an attempt to hide a lack of it ‘on the ground’; this interpretation, I 
think, would be a shallow reading of the goals and interests motivating these key 
conservancy actors. But it seems probable nonetheless that concerns about what 
might be done with the information they offered me affected both the manner in 
which it was given and how much of it was given. In this light, the account below 
(especially the section on getting policy and legislation change ‘on the table’) is best 
read.    
 
Beginnings, precedents and problems 
The events that would culminate in the creation of the conservancy programme are 
commonly traced back to the end of the 1970s, locating them in the Kunene region in 
the Northwest, at that point divided into the homelands of Damaraland and 
Kaokoland (Jones 2001 162-164, Long and Jones 2004b 25-31, Sullivan 2003a). At 
the beginning of that decade, wildlife levels were held locally to be fairly high 
(Vaughan et al. 2003). By the end of it, the picture had changed, largely as a result of 
the outbreak of the Angolan civil war and the Swapo guerrilla incursions in Northern 
Namibia (Jones 2001, Long and Jones 2004b, WWF 1995). High levels of illegal 
hunting were reportedly engaged in partly because of the easy availability of firearms 
during the liberation struggle, partly due the commercial value of ivory and rhino 
horn, and partly for reasons of subsistence, after the deaths of many cattle as a 
consequence of drought (WWF, 1995). Especially affected by these circumstances 
were big game animals – elephant, black rhino and zebra – of high commercial value 
(Gibson 2001). The South African Government apparently did little to remedy this 
situation, perhaps because the most frequent illegal hunting was allegedly conducted 
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by South African Defence Force Personnel in their counter-insurgency operations in 
Northern Namibia (Jones 2001).  
By way of response to a seemingly open access situation, Garth Owen-Smith and 
Chris Eyre, of the government’s Directorate of Nature Conservation, started speaking 
with traditional leaders to gauge their opinions on what might be done (Long & Jones 
2004). Continued contact with the traditional authorities raised suspicions within the 
ministry over the political motivations of these communications, and Owen-Smith 
found it expedient to quit the Directorate. He established, along with Blythe Loutit 
and Ina Britz, the Namibian Wildlife Trust in 1982. The Namibian Wildlife Trust 
suggested to the headmen that they appoint their own “community game guards”, to 
monitor the situation rather than to apprehend illegal hunters (Jones 2001). The game 
guards were perceived by the NWT, amongst others, to be instrumental in reducing 
illegal hunting, and enjoyed high levels of local support. For this reason, it is often 
held by conservancy commentators that long before there was any economic 
incentive on offer, people in the Kunene region wanted to conserve wildlife for 
posterity (Jones 1999a, 2001, Long and Jones 2004b).  
Later in the 1980s, Owen-Smith started to work with anthropologist Margaret 
Jacobsohn, who was studying the adverse effects that the beginnings of tourism were 
having on the Himba living in Purros, Northern Kunene. Begging from safari tourists 
was becoming a livelihood activity for Purros inhabitants. Competition for tourist 
revenue increased, social tensions arose and tourists were not made happy by the 
begging (Jones 2001). After discussing the matter with residents at Purros, an 
agreement was made with two safari operators who regularly took tourists through 
Purros that they would levy US$5 per tourist, and give this money to the residents. 
The consequences are said to have set influential precedents on two levels. First, 
according to Jones, the begging was reduced; second, local people made a link 
between the much-welcomed cash income and the wildlife the tourists came to see, 
becoming less likely to kill potentially dangerous animals like elephant and lion 
(ibid). By 1991 the community game guard scheme was well-established. Jacobsohn 
and Owen Smith started another game guard scheme in the north-eastern region of 
Caprivi, and went on to set up another NGO, Integrated Rural Development and 
Nature Conservation (IRDNC). The Ministry of Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism, 
(predecessor to the Ministry of Environment and Tourism) asked Jacobsohn and 
Owen-Smith for assistance in drafting new policy on wildlife conservation. Integrated 
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Rural Development and Nature Conservation went on in the 1990s to become the 
biggest of all of the NGOs in the support network for emerging and established 
conservancies known by its acronym, NACSO (The Namibian Association of 
CBNRM – community based natural resource management – Support Organisations).  
   
Conservation policy prior to Independence 
As noted in chapter five, when under South African rule, white Namibia was 
administered from Windhoek through the South West African Administration 
(SWAA). Black Namibia was, in contrast, administered from largely from Pretoria, 
through the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (DBAD). 
According to Long and Jones, a consequence of this divide was that conservation 
policy, implemented by the SWAA, concentrated on protected areas, game reserves 
and wildlife management on privately-owned, commercial farms (2004:28). It was 
not until 1975 that conservation legislation covering the homelands came under the 
remit of the South West African Administration. The legislation that came out of the 
administrative divisions reflected this skewed focus, which is more than evident in 
the Nature Conservation Ordinance of 1975 (GRN 1975a, GRN 1975b, GRN 1975c).  
Under the Ordinance, much greater rights to manage wildlife – including hunting 
and selling it – and also to keep any financial proceeds from management 
arrangements they set up, were given to private land owners. The objective was to 
increase numbers of wildlife outside of protected areas through stacking the 
incentives in favour of keeping, not hunting to extinction, wildlife living on 
commercial farm land. Up until that point, big game had provided unwelcome 
competition for grazing resources that farmers wanted to reserve for their livestock. 
By allowing farmers to keep the gains from trophy hunting and other tourism 
activities, the Nature Conservation Ordinance helped wildlife to become a resource 
that could, in financial terms, compete with – and even outperform – livestock. It 
encouraged private land owners to pool land and other resources to establish 
conservancies, areas large enough for the purposes of wildlife management. The 
legislation met with spectacular success: between 1972 and 1992, according to the 
Directorate of Environmental Affairs, combined wildlife numbers on private farmland 
rose by 80% (Barnes and Jager 1996). It also generated significant wealth for the land 
owners.  
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The Ordinance proved central to the future of Namibian conservation outside 
protected areas in the 1970s. It had resonance for the future because it was very much 
in tune with a wider sustainability agenda and consonant with a number of the six 
‘principles of sustainability’. It accepted controlled consumptive use of wildlife as a 
form of conservation, which accords with the second principle (i.e.  careful use may 
prove a more effective conservation method than blanket prohibition). Predicated on 
the notion that conservation on private farm land could be achieved if farmers had 
financial reasons to do so, it corresponded to principle five, which recognises the role 
of financial rewards in providing sufficient incentive for those who bear the costs of 
conservation to continue to live with them.     
However, The Nature Conservation Ordinance was also a product of its time, 
because it was applied only on private land, and therefore comprised another example 
of rights and privileges being accorded to white but not black South West Africans. 
The decision not to enact the same legislation in the homelands perhaps reflected the 
lack of will on the part of the Directorate of Nature Conservation to work with the 
chiefs and headmen in the homelands, who were responsible for wildlife in their area 
and enforcers of customs governing its use (cf. Hinz 2003). It indicates the extent to 
which conservation in South West Africa was done both by whites and for whites 
within spheres of exclusively white political and economic dominance.  
In giving use rights over wildlife to private land-owing farmers, but not to black 
farmers living on homelands, the Nature Conservation Ordinance echoed legislation 
in other parts of Southern Africa. Chief amongst them was the Parks & Wildlife Act, 
passed in Rhodesia in 1975. Taken together, they indicate a consensus on the 
effectiveness of introducing structures from which financial rewards could be gained 
from the conservation of wildlife on privately-owned land. When Rhodesia became 
Zimbabwe in 1980, the newly-elected Zimbabwean African National Union–Patriotic 
Front (ZANU-PF) developed considerable interest in extending the remit of the Parks 
& Wildlife Act to cover the former homelands in which lived the vast majority of 
Zimbabwe’s peoples. The new government did not object to the aims or objectives of 
the Bill per se, only to the discriminatory basis on which it was applied.  
An administration intent on representing and furthering the interests of the black 
majority proved amenable to suggestions that what had been done for white farmers 
could and should also be done for black farmers. This reasoning would give rise, in 
the mid-to late 1980s, to the Communal Areas Management Programme for 
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Indigenous Resources, better known by its refreshingly snappy acronym, Campfire8. 
All people who lived with the costs of Zimbabwe’s wildlife were to be given 
sufficient (financial) incentive in order to be willing to continue living with such 
costs.   
It was this extension of the logic underpinning legislation designed with privately-
owned land in mind that caught the eye of South West African conservationists such 
as Garth Owen-Smith and Chris Eyre. But the South African government was also 
aware of the Zimbabwean experiment. The black empowerment objectives so 
explicitly part of Campfire’s raison d’être were not to be encouraged in the South 
West African setting. Involving a new, low-status constituency in a decision-making 
process traditionally the preserve of white South African males was, under the 
circumstances, a subversive and provocative course of action. It implied devolution, 
albeit limited, of responsibility and power down to a level that had largely been 
disenfranchised from political processes connected to the state. Pre-Independence 
attempts made from within government to draw attention to Campfire were, then, 
“shot down by Pretoria”9. For the work that they had done together Chris Eyre, Garth 
Owen-Smith and Margaret Jacobsohn apparently came to be regarded as “loony 
lefties”, even as “dangerous terrorists”10. As a result there were, allegedly, even 
attempts on the part of the South African administration to remove Owen-Smith from 
South West Africa11.  
It was apparently not, though, solely the potential for what were ostensibly 
conservation-related activities to provide a front for black political resistance which 
prompted a prickly response from Pretoria (and Windhoek). All candidates 
interviewed, as well as various written sources (i.e. Long & Jones 2004, Jones 2001), 
concurred that white conservation authorities did not consider black homeland 
inhabitants capable of managing wildlife or other common-pool resources on a 
sustainable basis. The community game guard system was premised on the opposite 
assumption that homeland inhabitants were not only capable of managing wildlife, 
                                                 
8 Marshall Murphree, one of Zimbabwe’s best-known social scientists, an important actor in the 
formulation of Campfire policy and legislation in the 1980s and much involved in monitoring 
evaluating the programme in the 1990s and into the 2000s, has written several accounts of the 
beginnings of the Campfire programme (i.e. 1997, 2001). For anyone interested in more than the 
brief overview I give here, these are a good place to start. 
9 Interview with Chris Brown, Director of NNF (Namibia Nature Foundation), Windhoek, 
3.12.2003  
10 Interview with Margaret Jacobsohn, co-director of IRDNC, Windhoek, 22.1.2004. 
11 Ibid.  
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but desirous of doing so under favourable circumstances. Far from being a threat 
against which wildlife should receive as much protection as possible, poor black 
farmers, headmen and chiefs were being called upon to guarantee the continuing 
existence of wildlife outwith the protected area. In twenty-first century Namibian 
conservation, such thinking is often held to be self-evident. However, South West 
African conservation has to be read against the background of white minority rule. 
The ethos to ‘save’ wilderness from humans had yet to suffer the crisis of legitimacy 
that would develop as a result of the growing influence of the ‘community 
conservation’ counter narrative. Therefore, vesting even limited agency in local 
people, believing them competent to manage wildlife was a proposal that probably 
stuck in the craw of those administration officials who continued to see conservation 
as the domain of specialists.  
Of course, in other countries such as Kenya or Tanzania – and indeed within 
South West Africa in relation to conservation policy for protected areas – the 
‘fortress’ narrative was still predominant. Nevertheless, challenges to its hegemony 
would be mounted on the back of the passing of laws such as the Ordinance or 
Zimbabwe’s Parks and Wildlife Act, and the underlying changes in perception of who 
could ‘do’ conservation, where and how, of which such legislation was the product.  
 
3. Independence and ‘policy spaces’ 
 
Getting policy change on the table in post-Independence Namibia  
Before there could be a conservancy programme, there had to be fundamental 
change in the government’s conservation agencies. In large measure, the political 
support that has been given to the conservancy concept, and the unlikely consensus 
that was generated over a new and, at that point, relatively untried approach to 
conservation, are the result of Namibia’s independence in 1990. The ‘changing of the 
guard’ quickly opened up a ‘policy space’ in which previously marginalised 
suggestions and ideas could be heard and discussed; especially if they appeared to 
chime with the broader agenda of change that the recently-elected SWAPO 
government had in mind. The new national policy context broadly espoused, amongst 
a plethora of affirmations, the need to: 
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• restore agency and freedom to all the peoples oppressed, impoverished and 
politically marginalised under the South African rule   
• put the instruments of government at the disposition of all Namibia’s citizens, 
not just the white minority 
• redress the balance of historical injustice and inequity by giving all Namibians 
equal rights and equal access to opportunities 
      
From these aims, the integrated conservation and development approach and its 
proponents gained credibility and influence over a remarkably rapid period. It focused 
on wildlife management as a livelihood activity that could compete with others. It 
envisioned a process of empowerment through granting rights to those previously 
denied them. Many of the aspects that formerly had made it appear suspicious and 
subversive appealed to a new, predominantly black political order; its credibility may 
even have been reinforced by the rogue status accorded to it by the previous regime. 
Against this background of reaction and change, “you could come in with technical 
approaches which broadly fitted a wider government agenda without too much direct 
political interference” (Jones, pers. com.). The ideas that would be brought together to 
formulate the policy and legislation behind the conservancy programme found 
patrons higher up in the political hierarchy, a factor which would become highly 
important in pressing the case for moving from the drawing board into the realm of 
implementation. 
It is important to nuance the extent to which this policy space led all resistance to 
Campfire-style conservation to crumble. As in so many other aspects of the country’s 
governance, Independence undermined, without necessarily replacing, ‘the rules of 
the game’ and opened up the process of establishing a new set. The reconstituted 
ambit of the Ministry of Wildlife Conservation & Tourism (soon to be re-branded the 
Ministry of Environment and Tourism) was characterised chiefly by a dynamic of 
continuity and change. The political masters had been replaced, but many bureaucrats 
remained in their positions, perhaps more than anything for reasons of pragmatic 
expediency. They were, after all, qualified “conservation professionals”, there was 
not yet a post-South West Africa generation with a different work ethic to take their 
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places12, and the Government of Namibia had adopted a policy of national 
reconciliation between ethnic groups. A purge of government employees on a racial 
basis would be difficult to justify and could conceivably have backfired. As a 
consequence there remained a considerable professional cadre who objected to a 
redefinition of their job description.  
Therefore, the key proponents of community-based conservation approaches, 
mostly concentrated in the Directorate of Environmental Affairs, constituted a 
minority view within their Ministry (of Wildlife Conservation and Tourism) even 
after the changes to the political landscape ushered in by Independence. Being so 
heavily outnumbered, the question within the Directorate became one of how to 
overcome resistance13. The answer appears to have come not through attempting to 
win over the sceptics, but rather to circumvent them. Ideas were taken straight to the 
new Minister, Nico Bessinger, who had previously been an architect, and therefore 
unconnected to the conservation movements of the time14. The principal advocates of 
what would become the conservancy programme found a powerful sponsor in 
Bessinger who, sympathetic to their aims, successfully presented their case 
favourably to the cabinet and pushed down reform in quarters that would not have 
adopted it of their own volition. 
There was another factor which mitigated in favour of the would-be reformers. 
The employees in the Ministry that had been present under the apartheid regime were 
in a much less secure position after Independence15. It was not clear what treatment 
they would receive from the new government, especially if they were to act in a way 
which could be construed as racist. With the minister behind the “community based 
natural resource management” orientation of the Directorate of Environmental 
Affairs, it was harder to make overt objections, and inadvisable to express in public 
the view that poor, black communal land farmers were not capable of managing 
wildlife. Nevertheless, other forms of resistance did appear to emerge, for example 
the bogging down of requests for hunting quotas and permit applications made by 
                                                 
12 Interview with Chris Brown, Director of NNF (Namibia Nature Foundation), Windhoek, 
3.12.2003 
13 In our first interview of 9.12.2003, Brian Jones wondered whether “resistance” was too strong 
a term to describe the reaction of some employees of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism. 
However, we did not settle on a more appropriate word. As it had not been challenged by Chris 




conservancies. Some field staff, geographically distanced from the debates occurring 
in Windhoek, and a little more autonomous in their actions, would apparently later 
refuse to acknowledge inhabitants’ rights to manage wildlife in areas where a 
conservancy had been established, interpreting legislation inconsistently and on some 
occasions obstructively.  
 In 1992, a series of socio-ecological surveys were conducted in different parts 
of the country, to establish the views and needs of communal area inhabitants with 
respect to wildlife conservation (Brown 1993). The results of the survey were 
interpreted as providing a popular mandate for the idea of bringing local people much 
more centrally into decision-making processes concerning natural resource 
management. The demands that were being made at the local level “coincided with 
approaches that technicians favoured”, resulting in an “overlap of agendas and 
interests”16. At the same time, some pilot projects were initiated which, along with 
work being done by IRDNC (Integrated Rural Development and Nature 
Conservation), were interpreted within the Ministry as suitable precedents to inform 
policy and legislation17.   
 
Post-independence policy and legislation: tracing the influence of the six 
principles of sustainability 
The formulation of the policy in terms of which conservancy legislation would be 
framed indicated that the proponents of community conservation had won the 
ideological battle.  The Ministry’s official perceptions of conservation had changed 
significantly. No longer was it an activity to be confined to protected areas, game 
reserves and private land; there was a need to address conservation within the ambit 
of the communal lands (‘communal’ replacing ‘home’ shortly after independence). 
Nor was it solely down to white (male) conservationists to ‘save’ Namibia’s wildlife; 
the people who lived with it had to participate as much more central actors in wildlife 
management in communal areas. They had come to be seen as perfectly capable of 
assuming this role. But if they were to be persuaded to do so, then the grievances they 
had with regard to the costs of living with wildlife had of necessity to be addressed. A 
key factor in making conservation more palatable, then, was to ensure that it was 
                                                 
16 Interview with Brian Jones, (then) Senior CBNRM Technical Advisor to USAID in Namibia, 
3.12.2003, Windhoek  
17 Ibid. 
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defined sufficiently flexibly to allow controlled wildlife consumption, and also to 
minimise where possible the difficulties of accommodating big game such as elephant 
or rhino, which could trample crops, destroy property of present a threat even to life 
and limb. In other words, conservation and development processes had to be 
reconciled if they were to achieve their objectives over the long term. This 
reconciliation, then, is the link to sustainability, which is at the heart of thinking on 
communal area conservancies.  
The way to achieve these aims was by tackling an issue of historical injustice: 
giving white farmers rights to manage and benefit from the wildlife on the land they 
owned, whilst denying these same rights to black farmers, could not be perpetuated in 
the newly-independent Namibia. The majority of people must also be allowed to form 
conservancies if they so desired. Therefore, the influence on policy formulation of the 
six ‘principles of sustainability’ that I set out in the previous chapter is abundantly 
clear, and is illustrated below in box 6.1. This exercise is done with reference to the 
core policy document which captured the core vision for the extension of conservancy 
formation to communal areas.   
Once all these aims had been established, policy makers then faced the challenge 
of implementation. If communal land inhabitants were to be the recipients of such 
rights, through what mechanisms or institutions was wildlife to be managed? In the 
search for answers to these questions, and for models that might serve government 
and NGO staff turned both to other community conservation initiatives occurring in 
Southern Africa and to the literature on theories of common-pool resource 
management. Campfire, as previously noted, was the biggest inspiration; though 
perhaps as much because of its perceived flaws as its strengths. Of course, in many 
ways Campfire had ‘broken the mould’. However, some, perhaps even the majority, 
of Campfire’s practitioners were concerned by the programme’s institutional 
arrangements for wildlife management. Because black farmers in the (newly-
renamed) communal areas did not have individual titles, the (legally recognised) 
‘appropriate authority’ to manage wildlife was delegated not to specific individuals or 
groups, but rather to Rural District Councils within communal areas.  
This arrangement was held to have a number of disadvantages, from the point of 
view of practitioners who argued that sustainable wildlife management would 
correlate positively with the full devolution to the local level of rights to manage 
wildlife. First, it meant that Rural District Councils could take up to half of the 
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revenues generated from the activities, such as controlled trophy hunting. These were 
deemed central to providing the incentives necessary for resource users to place a 
more positive value on the presence of wildlife their area and, thereby, to stop seeing 
it as incompatible with other locally important land uses such as livestock grazing. 
Second, it introduced an element of dependency upon the probity of rural district 
councils, who in the Zimbabwean context could not always be relied upon to deliver 
the full share of revenues owing to the inhabitants of a Campfire area (cf. Duffy 
2000b, Murombedzi 1992, 1997, 2001). Therefore, giving rural district councils such 
a central role had, some argued, contributed to a process not of decentralisation, but 
rather of ‘recentralisation’ of the rights to manage wildlife (Murombedzi, 1992). 
Namibian government and NGO staff liaising with Campfire practitioners saw this as 
a lesson from which they could learn, and determined that policy and legislation 
should allow rights over wildlife management to be devolved directly to Namibia’s 
communal land inhabitants18.  
Common-pool resource management theory plugged implementation gaps in the 
model offered by Campfire; although it should be noted that this programme had also 
drawn heavily on this literature in its inception (see Murphree 1997 for more detail). 
Interviews make clear the extent to which policy makers such Brian Jones and Chris 
Brown were aware of this body of literature. For instance, Brian Jones made explicit 
reference to authors such as Elinor Ostrom – and in particular her best-known work, 
Governing the Commons (1990), as well as Bromley and Cernea (1989). He posited a 
correlation between the conservancy programme and Ostrom’s 8 principles for 
enduringly sustainable common-pool resource management (Jones 1999b); though in 
later work he sought to qualify this appraisal somewhat, with a more nuanced account 
of the fit between the theory of common-pool resource management and the 
conservancy programme  (Jones 2003). 
Policy makers endeavoured to fit combined conservation and development 
objectives in communal areas within the overarching framework of sustainable 
common-pool resource management not by the state or privatisation-led initiatives, 
but rather by local actors. The message drawn from this literature in the early 1990s, 
though, by policy makers and those they consulted was that if communal area 
                                                 
18 This point was made in interviews with Chris Brown, Margaret Jacobsohn and Brian Jones, but 
see also Jones (2001). 
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residents were to be successful in the management of common-pool resources, the 
institutions they employed would have to:  
• specify geographic boundaries in which resource use would take place 
• identify set of eligible resource users  
• devise generally-agreed rules on resource use 
• make arrangements for monitoring and ensuring compliance with those rules 
• enjoy the legitimacy in the eyes of resources users, not just from the state 
(Long & Jones 2004:31) 
 
The 1996 amendment to the Nature Conservation Ordinance 
All of the above stipulations would in one way or another be reflected in the 1996 
amendment to the Nature Conservation Ordinance that would permit the 
establishment of conservancies on communal land. The core objective of the new 
legislation was to: 
 
amend the Nature Conservation Ordinance, 1975, so as to provide for an economically based 
system of sustainable management and utilisation of game in communal areas (GRN 1996a, 
emphasis added) 
 
The centrality, then, of the concept of sustainability to the legislation could hardly 
have been more explicit.  
The amendment made provision for communal area residents to apply to the 
Minister of Environment and Tourism (the new name for the Ministry of Wildlife 
Conservation and Tourism) to grant permission to establish a conservancy. An 
‘application for declaration of a conservancy’ form (GRN 1996b) was to be sent to 
the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, accompanied by: 
 
• a list of the names of the conservancy committee members  
• the conservancy’s constitution 
• the boundaries of the geographic area to be covered by the conservancy  






Box 6.1 – The influence of the six ‘principles of sustainability’ on the MET’s Wildlife 
Management, Utilisation and Tourism in Communal Areas Policy of 1995 
 
There are various Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) policy documents which 
relate to the conservancy programme and in which the overarching influence of the concept 
of sustainability can be discerned clearly. Among these are the ‘White Paper on Tourism’ 
(MET 1994) and ‘Promotion of Community-Based Tourism’ (MET 1995a). The policy 
document which most explicitly deals with the conservancy programme, though, is the 
Wildlife Management, Utilisation and Tourism in Communal Areas Policy (MET 1995b). By 
way of recapping, below are listed the six ‘principles of sustainability’, extrapolated in the 
previous chapter, which underpin thinking and policy in both the conservancy programme 
and the Alto Bermejo Project, and form the basis of comparison between the two initiatives. 
Following this, the ways in which they have influenced the central objectives of Wildlife 
Management, Utilisation and Tourism in Communal Areas Policy are explored.  
 
1. It is more important to address questions of how to ensure the continued existence of 
biodiversity outwith protected areas (i.e. Adams and Hulme 2001, Cumming 2004). 
2. Careful use of common-pool resources is more likely to ensure their continued existence 
for future generations than is a blanket prohibition on any kind of use (Adams and 
McShane 1992, Murphree 1997, Pimbert and Pretty 1995). 
3. It is not a foregone conclusion that people who use common-pool resources will destroy 
them whenever no state intervention occurs or individual property rights regime is 
established; there is much evidence to the contrary (Berkes 1998, Feeny et al. 1990, 
Ostrom 1990).  
4. Conservation often fails when people who have to live with the costs of it have 
insufficient incentive to do so. Indeed, conservation efforts will fail wherever they beg, 
rather than answer, the question of sufficient incentive (Jones 2000, Ostrom 1990).  
5. Realising the economic value of a common-pool resource and ensuring that resource 
users benefit economically from the exercise is a crucial part of answering the question of 
sufficient incentive (Bond 2001, Hulme and Murphree 2001a, Murphree 1997). That said, 
other, less tangible benefits are also vital to this exercise, and may be overlooked if the 
importance of economic incentives in themselves is overstated (Emerton 2001) 
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6. Conservation efforts will also fail if the resource users most in a position to determine 
how it is used are not involved in the decision-making processes that attempt to conserve 
said resource. Involvement in such decision-making processes is likely to make little 
difference unless users have defined, recognised usage rights (Ostrom 1990, Ostrom 
1992, Pimbert and Pretty 1995). 
 
 
Box 6.1 (cont) 
 
 
The Ministry of Environment and Tourism’s Wildlife Management, Utilisation and 
Tourism in Communal Areas Policy (1995b)  
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Policy objective Correspondence with six ‘principles 
sustainability’  
A. To establish ... an economically- 
based system for the management and  
utilisation of wildlife and other renewable  
living resources on communal land so that  
rural communities can: 
a) participate on a partnership basis with 
this (MET) and other Ministries in 
the management of, and benefits from,  
natural resources; 
b) benefit from rural development based 
on wildlife, tourism and other NRM; and 
c) improve the conservation of natural  
resources by wise and sustainable 
resource management and the protection 
of biodiversity. 
A. The reference to an ‘economically- 
based system’ for wildlife  
management demonstrates the  
influence of principles 4 and 5, the  
perceived need for wildlife to ‘pay its  
way’ in order to be considered  
worthy of conservation.  
a) setting rural communities on a  
‘partnership basis’ chimes with  
principles 3 and 6: it implies they are 
sufficiently competent to enter into 
partnership and that their  
involvement is crucial to the success of 
any management efforts 
c) again, this is an affirmation of  
principle 5, assuming that  
economic incentives offer a way to 
achieve conservation and  
resource management objectives      
B. To redress the past discriminatory  
policies and practices which gave  
substantial rights over wildlife to  
commercial farmers, but which ignored 
communal farmers. 
B. The need to give communal farmers  
rights is prefigured by a re-evaluation of  
their capacity to manage wildlife  
sustainably, in line with principle 3.  
C. To amend the Nature Conservation 
Ordinance of 1975 so that the same  
principles that govern rights to wildlife 
utilisation on commercial land are extended 
to communal land. 
C. This objective essentially advocates an 
extension of the domain in which 
conservation activities are undertaken,  
thereby echoing principle 1. 
D. To allow rural communities on state land
 to undertake tourism ventures, and to enter 
into cooperative agreements with  
commercial tourism organisations to  
develop tourism activities on state land. 
D. This objective sees non- or low-
consumptive uses of wildlife such as  
tourism and controlled trophy hunting as  
the sort of careful use of wildlife  
envisioned in principle 2 which would 
provide the incentives for conservation 
envisaged in principles four and five. 
Any application had to convince the Minister that: 
 
• the relevant committee was representative of the community residing in the 
area to which the application related 
• the constitution of such committees provided for the sustainable management 
and utilisation of game in such area 
• such committee had the ability to manage funds and an appropriate method for 
the equitable distribution, to members of the community, of benefits derived 
from the consumptive and non-consumptive use of game in such area 
• the geographic area to which the application related had been sufficiently 
identified, taking into account also the views of the Regional Council of that 
area 
• the area concerned was not subject to any lease or was not a proclaimed game 
park or nature reserve (Ibid, emphasis added.) 
 
This legislation was an exercise in devolving management rights – albeit limited ones 
– down to the people who shared land, water and other resources with wildlife and 
bore the costs entailed. It consciously avoided transferring these rights to Namibia’s 
regional councils, for fear that it would recreate the same problems of benefits capture 
that Campfire-related legislation had permitted, whereby the revenue generated from 
wildlife-related tourism activities remained at the discretion of district councils whose 
interests could not unproblematically be conflated with those of the people they 
purported to represent. But rather than abandoning the idea of representatives – which 
in effect was the role allocated to Rural District Councils – the 1996 amendment 
enshrined it, setting up the conservancy committees as the conduit for representation. 
However, the logic behind devolution was that ownership of wildlife or other 
common-pool resources should be at the local level in order to be enduringly 
sustainable, and it was against this measure that the gains and constraints produced by 
the legislation would ultimately come to be judged. The amendment of 1996 was not 
just, of course, an attempt to steer clear of what Campfire had ‘got wrong’; the 
thinking that underscored Campfire policy, if not always the practice. It continued to 
be in many ways a source of inspiration, and indeed the benchmark to aim for in the 
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midst of the negotiations and compromises that would characterise the process of 
turning policy into legislation.  
As in Zimbabwe, Namibia’s communal area inhabitants did not legally own 
wildlife or, more importantly, the land on which the wildlife was found; these 
remained government property. The 1996 amendment to Namibia’s Nature 
Conservation Ordinance did not attempt to change this; nor could it have done, 
enacted as it was prior to wider legislation, the Communal Lands Act (GRN 2002), 
which would reform the country’s communal land tenure arrangements. Moreover, 
the idea of full devolution of ownership and management rights over wildlife to 
communal area inhabitants did not command universal support within the Ministry of 
Environment and Tourism (Jones and Murphree 2001, Long and Jones 2004b, Brown 
pers. com., Jones pers. com.). The amendment did go further towards this aim than its 
counterpart Zimbabwean legislation, with the consequence that the conservancy 
committee, not the regional council, would be invested with legal rights to manage 
wildlife. Some rights, though, remained with central government. For instance, the 
Ministry of Environment and Tourism would still be responsible for issuing permits 
for trophy hunting operations, and would still be responsible for the issuing of the 
Permission to Occupy (PTO) Licences (changed into ‘leaseholds’ with the Communal 
Lands Act) which were needed by any tourism operator seeking to secure a 
concession within communal areas.  
That not all agreed on the need for full devolution is in part an indication of the 
differences of opinion over what the role of the government within the conservancy 
programme should be, an issue which has continued to be the subject of much debate. 
Many of the background events that happened during my fieldwork can be interpreted 
in the light of ongoing negotiations and renegotiations of the role of government 
within the programme, vis-a-vis the role of non-governmental support actors. 
Although these partly related to the allocation of funds for the programme, they can 
also be traced back to the processes through which conservancy policy and legislation 
were first generated.  
Compromise and caveats regarding the role of government notwithstanding, the 
legislation can in many ways be said to be a ‘victory’ for the actors, especially within 
the Directorate of Environment Affairs, who advocated ‘community conservation’. In 
partially achieving their aim of devolving rights to manage wildlife down to the level 
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of communal area inhabitants, they committed to making local resource users central 
to a set of resource use decisions which could benefit them.  
 
4. Implementation of the conservancy programme  
 
A quick start 
Once the 1996 amendment was passed, conservancy formation was quickly initiated 
and in high profile fashion. The first conservancies – Torra, Nyae Nyae, ≠Khoadi 
//Hôas, and Salambala – were established in 1998, with the (then) Namibian President 
himself, Sam Nujoma, on hand to issue the registration certificates at a glitzy opening 
ceremony held in Okapuka Lodge, near Windhoek19. Nujoma was on this occasion 
presented by WWF US – the programme’s principal funder, in tandem with USAid – 
with the Gift To The Earth Award, part of the WWF's Living Planet Campaign, which 
declared the conservancy programme to be ‘globally important’ and acclaimed it in 
particular for its people-centred approach to conservation20. By the time of this 
official launching of the programme, there were sixteen areas in various stages of 
applying for conservancy status21. Between then and October 2005, these and another 
twenty six conservancies would be ‘gazetted’, that is, their status as legal entities was 
established through publishing the date of their creation in the Government Gazette. 
A further thirteen areas would by this point have started the process of applying for 
conservancy status. Map 6.1 (below), charts the whereabouts and status of ‘gazetted’ 
conservancies and areas hoping to acquire conservancy status as of October 2005. 
What is immediately apparent from the map is that the majority of conservancies are 
found either in the Kunene region, in the North West, or in the Caprivi region, in the 
North East. This mirrors partly the areas of greatest wildlife prevalence within 
Namibia, but also the fact that the forerunners to the conservancy programme, the 
community game guard schemes were first piloted in the Kunene region and 
subsequently in Caprivi.  
Conservancies do not establish themselves. In order for this rapid growth to be 
possible, the people wishing to form conservancies in their area needed to be given 
                                                 





significant and enduring assistance from the Ministry of Environment and Tourism 
and a raft of non-governmental organisations. Moreover, a stable source of funding 
for the provision of such assistance needed to be secured. The Worldwide Fund for 
Nature’s Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) programme was designed with these 
needs in mind. Starting in 1994 and funded by the US Agency for International 
Development (USAid), Living in a Finite Environment financed the precursors to the 
conservancy programme and, following its launch, those organisations involved in its 
implementation. With funding in place, it was necessary to make the most of the 
available knowledge and skills that would be of use first of all in the process of 
formulating conservancy policy and legislation. For this reason, a ‘collaborative 
group’ was formed in 1994, with a view to coordinating the activities of those 
stakeholders who shared the idea of linking conservation and development through 
sustainable natural resource management (Long and Jones 2004b). This was replaced 
by the LIFE steering committee, which performed the same coordinating functions. 
The LIFE steering committee was itself shortly to undergo transformation into 
another body, that which continues to be responsible for the overall coordination of 
assistance to communal area inhabitants trying to establish a conservancy or run an 
established one. This is known as NACSO, the Namibian Association of CBNRM 
(community-based natural resource management) Support Organisations22. Although 
the Living in a Finite Environment programme funding has been extended, once until 
2004 and again until 2010 more recently, establishing NACSO was borne partly of 
the perceived need to have a coordinating body that would have, as it were, a life after 
LIFE (Long 2004). It was also a consequence of debate and dissatisfaction regarding 
the existing roles and distribution of responsibilities within the steering committee, as 
well as of a perceived need to ‘Namibianise’ – i.e. bring more black Namibian actors 
into – the decision-making processes which determined what needed to be 




                                                 
22 Due to its length when fully unfurled, ‘NACSO’ is the only acronym in the thesis which is not 
subjected to the rule of being used either not at all, or as little as possible (and if used, then only 
within one page of an instance of use of the broader title it abbreviates). 
23 Also interview with Alfons Mosimane, Head of Life Sciences, Multi Disciplinary Research 
Consultancy Centre, University of Namibia, 24.3.04 
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Map 6.1, established & ‘emerging’ communal area conservancies in Namibia as 




It acquired a constitution and a fixed structure in 2001, which established its core 
functions as: 
 
• the coordination and supporting of both conservancies and implementing 
organisations 
• lobbying for policy and legislation change wherever the need for it is 
identified 
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• monitoring and evaluating the conservancy formation process nationwide 
(ibid.) 
 
One might add to this list the disbursement of funds to the conservancies. Each year, 
conservancies can submit a budget proposal, with a view to securing funds to cover 
running costs.   
 
The founding members of NACSO include:  
1. Integrated Rural Development & Nature Conservation 
2. Legal Assistance Centre 
3. Namibian Community-Based Tourism Association 
4. Namibia Development Trust 
5. Namibia Nature Foundation 
6. Nyae Nyae Development Foundation 
7. Rössing Foundation 
8. Rural Institute for Social development & Empowerment 
9. Multi-Disciplinary Research & Consultancy Centre/University of Namibia 
10. Directorates of Environmental Affairs, within the Ministry of Environment 
and Tourism (MET) 
11. Directorate of Tourism, (MET)  
12. Directorate of Forestry (MET) 
13. Directorate of Parks & Wildlife Management, (MET) (ibid). 
 
Owing to the demands placed on funds and capacity, NACSO determines the amount 
of assistance to be given to a conservancy according to the revenue-generating 
potential and conservation value of its natural resources, with special reference to 
wildlife resources. The conservancy is then classified in terms of one of three 
categories: 
 
1. Fast-track conservancies: estimated to be able to pay for their own running 
costs within five years or less 
2. Medium-track conservancies: estimated to be able to pay for their own 
running costs in five or more years 
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3. Slow-track conservancies: might never generate sufficient revenue to cover 
costs, but deserve support on account of possessing biodiversity of high 
conservation value (Long 2004:42) 
 
In all three scenarios, conservancies would be assigned a principal support 
organisation. That is, one support organisation in particular (almost always one of the 
NGOs) would assume responsibility for assistance with guiding local people first 
through the process of conservancy formation and then with the task of becoming 
self-sustaining. Further assistance from other NGOs with expertise in specific fields, 
such as establishing tourism ventures within conservancy boundaries or training in 
wildlife management, would then be enlisted through the principal support 
organisation. In the case of Tsiseb conservancy, to which the following chapter is 
devoted, the principal support organisation is the Rural Institute for Social 
Development & Empowerment (RISE). Other organisations, such as the Namibian 
Community-Based Tourism Association are often in and around the conservancy, on 
account of it playing host to three tourism ventures which depend to varying degrees 
on Tsiseb’s wildlife and other natural resources.   
It is worth noting the withdrawal of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism 
from the membership of NACSO, though its staff continued to attend NACSO 
meetings and to coordinate activities with NACSO partners during the fieldwork. The 
official reason given for withdrawing are bureaucratic concerns raised about the 
extent to which the Government, “can legitimately be subsumed as a part of an 
independent organisation that spearheads a national programme to support 
community-based natural resource management” (Ibid:42). Privately numerous actors 
speculated (or asserted) that the Ministry of Environment and Tourism was concerned 
at the amount of power that NACSO conferred upon non-governmental organisations 
in its decision-making processes, and also at the prospect of its own suggestions or 
preferences being out-voted by other members. These comments are better 
understood in light of the following two observations. First, the conservancy 
programme was originally a government initiative from which key early proponents 
of the programme left to work in the NGO or consultancy sectors. Second, the lion’s 
share of the Living in a Finite Environment funding was channelled to non-
governmental organisations, giving them much more scope to implement conservancy 





The increasing credibility invested, at the global level, in the concept of sustainability 
led to changes in thinking on conservation and development in Namibia from the 
1970s onwards. The notions of using natural resources carefully as a way of 
conserving, of seeing all manner of people as capable of conserving biodiversity, of 
tackling the question of sufficient incentive for conservation outside the protected 
areas are all found, as has been shown in chapters three and four, in global debates 
about sustainability. They underscore policy and legislation for the conservancy 
programme, from the mid 1970s onwards on private land and the mid 1990s in 
Namibia’s communal areas. Communal land inhabitants, from being viewed as 
incapable and excluded from conservation efforts therein, are now seen as actors of 
vital importance; without their participation in the decisions most central to the 
management of wildlife, conservancies are, it is commonly accepted, unlikely to 
achieve their objectives.  
From the late 1990s, the conservancy programme expanded considerably as a 
result of its popularity in the communal lands. By 2004, communal area 
conservancies covered a combined total of 78,708km², land on which up to 100,000 
people were thought to live (NNF 2004). As a consequence of such rapid growth, it 
has proved necessary to coordinate and offer considerable support to would-be 
conservancy residents. It is precisely this need for support that most clearly 
demonstrates the character of the conservancy programme as an exercise in 
knowledge transfer. As the following chapter explores in relation to the specific 
example of Tsiseb conservancy, it is no mean feat to start and then run a conservancy. 
In terms of forming conservancy institutions, devising zones within a conservancy for 
different land uses, training community game guards, negotiating contracts with 
tourism operators or setting off-take quota for trophy hunting, the support 
organisations that have much more relevant knowledge than do conservancy 
residents. Were this not the case – if the relevant knowledge and skills were already 
available in the areas where efforts were being made to start conservancies – then 
there would presumably be no need to such support activities. However, the support 
is legitimised by the fact that the case for knowledge transfer – in the form of capacity 
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building to help people run conservancies sustainably – has already been made. It is 
rendered necessary by the requirements of conservancy policy and legislation, and 
especially by the stipulation that resource use is to be set on a sustainable basis.  
It is interesting at this point to reflect on a certain continuity of involvement of a 
set of actors in the conservancy programme. As noted, some of the principal actors in 
the conservation experiments of the 1980s, such as the game guard scheme, were 
important and influential actors in the process of reconfiguring the conservation 
agenda. They were so successful at re-defining conservation in terms of sustainability 
criteria that these are now enshrined in Namibian legislation. Commanding such 
influence over this process established the cognitive authority of the proponents of 
‘community conservation’. Securing funding for the implementation of the 
conservancy programme had the effect of consolidating this authority. It helped them 
set the agenda for implementation, especially in view of the disparity between the 
funds available to non-governmental organisations and the Ministry of Environment 
and Tourism for conservancy-related activities. With this financial clout came the 
suspicion, on the part of some government (and research) actors, that non-
governmental support organisations had too much control (cf. Long and Jones 2004b, 
Sullivan 2003a, Sullivan 2004). Precisely what constitutes ‘too much control’ is a 
question that this thesis does not attempt to answer. But issues of control – and, 
thereby, participation – are bound up with the privileged status accorded to 
knowledge about sustainability. It is against this wider background that the analysis 
of participation in Tsiseb conservancy in particular is to be considered. 
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Chapter VII: knowing and deciding in Tsiseb 
conservancy 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This chapter explores the ramifications for implementation of having – or not having 
– the sort of knowledge deemed necessary for achieving the overarching goal of 
sustainable common-pool resource use. It seeks to demonstrate the importance of the 
link between knowing and deciding, and the consequences for who participates and 
on what basis in key conservancy decision-making processes. This is done with 
reference to the specific example of Tsiseb conservancy, in Namibia’s Erongo region.  
Section two offers a profile of Tsiseb conservancy and its numerous activities, 
chiefly the Brandberg White Lady Lodge, the African Hunting Safaris trophy hunting 
venture, the Daureb Mountain Guides Association and the conservancy information 
centre. It also seeks to analyse how these activities relate back to conservancy policy 
and legislation, establishing therein the influence of the six principles of sustainability 
on the implementation of conservancy policy and legislation.  
This introduction to Tsiseb conservancy paves the way for a discussion, in section 
three, of the arrangements for local participation in the conservancy’s decision-
making processes. Like other Namibian conservancies established on (state-owned) 
communal land, Tsiseb is governed through an elected committee system. During the 
course of fieldwork, a new set of institutional arrangements was being introduced, 
with a view to allowing the conservancy’s members to make greater input into the 
conservancy’s decisions. Both before and after the new measures, decision-making 
has been characterised by ‘representative’ participation. The conservancy members 
themselves transfer the right to make most decisions to their elected representatives 
on the conservancy executive committee, rather than directly making the decisions 
themselves. Decision-making in Tsiseb therefore is based on – and is an extension of 
– the principles of representative democracy which prefigure Namibia’s national 
system of governance. The strengths and weaknesses of Tsiseb’s ‘representative 
participation’ are therefore roughly those of representative democracy in Namibia 
more widely.  
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Putting Tsiseb in this wider context is especially pertinent given that the 
legitimacy of participation in the conservancy programme has been challenged, on the 
basis that conservancy residents lack sufficient opportunities to participate in 
important decisions (Long and Jones 2004a). The question is raised of what sorts of 
expectations it is legitimate to hold of representative participation: do we merely end 
up justifying ‘committee-based natural resource management’ by endorsing 
representative participation; or, conversely, are we imposing a ‘tyranny of 
participation’ (cf. Cooke and Kothari 2001) by insisting that the decision-making in 
Tsiseb be more direct, even when to make it so might even require the break-up of the 
conservancy into several, smaller ones? These are vital questions for people involved 
in the conservancy programme to tackle, be they policy makers, fieldworkers, 
conservancy committee members or residents. I suggest that it will be easier to do so 
once conservancy governance institutions are put within the wider context of 
representative democracy in Namibia.  
Section four explores the extent to which Tsiseb conservancy can be considered, 
as it is by some conservancy programme actors, as a ‘grass-roots’ initiative. The 
section examines why it may plausibly be so described in the case of Tsiseb. 
However, it then goes on to make the point that to designate Tsiseb as coming from 
the ‘grassroots’ obscures the necessarily heavy involvement of – and dependency on 
– support organisations from the governmental, non governmental and private sectors 
in the running and upkeep of the conservancy. This high level of involvement is 
necessary because Tsiseb depends for the realisation of its objectives upon a process 
of knowledge transfer, and subsequently on having – or not having – the necessary 
knowledge. The processes through which support actors are rendered indispensable 
are illustrated with the examples of the adoption of the new institutional arrangements 
for decision-making in Tsiseb, and also of the contractually-bound relationship 
between the conservancy and the investors of the Brandberg White Lady Lodge, one 
of Tsiseb’s joint venture agreements. In the course of the research, it was unclear how 
long the indispensability of support actors would continue. The final aim of this 
section, then, is to turn to an account of the goals and interests which might account 
for this situation. 
It is left to the conclusion to emphasise that circularity in intervention is not ipso 
facto a negative or pernicious phenomenon. It has advantages and disadvantages 
according to perspective and context. Vilifying it may lead us to miss the many 
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aspects of Tsiseb conservancy – and the conservancy programme more generally – 
which understandably have commanded considerable praise. But to ignore it leaves 
our account of participation incomplete.  
 
2. A profile of Tsiseb conservancy’s activities24  
 
Background information 
Tsiseb conservancy lies in the Erongo region, north-west Namibia. After introductory 
meetings in 1998, it began to coalesce over a period of three years and was ‘gazetted’ 
in February 2001. That is, its status as a legally recognised entity was established 
through publishing the date of its creation in the Government Gazette. Spanning a 
vast area of 808,300ha, it had 504 registered members in 2004 (RISE 2004). Its 
principal support organisation is the Rural Institute for Social Development and 
Empowerment (RISE), although owing to the number of tourist activities that occur 
within its boundaries, frequent assistance is also provided by the Namibian 
Community-Based Tourism Association. Included within the conservancy’s 
boundaries are the Daureb (Damara name) or Brandberg (Afrikaans name, though the 
word is German in origin) Mountain, which features some of the most important rock 
art in Africa, and a stretch of the Namib Desert, host to a significant population of 
springbok. It shares boarders with neighbouring Doro !Nawas and Sorris-Sorris 
conservancies to the north, with the Skeleton Coast Park to the west, the Motet 
Reserves to the north east, Spitzkoppe Reserves to the east and commercial farms to 
the east and south. It lies within an arid ecological zone of semi desert, yet supports a 
significant amount of flora and fauna. Of most interest to the conservancy itself is the 
quantity and variety of wildlife in the area, which includes desert adapted elephant, 
mountain zebra, kudu, springbok, oryx and ostrich, among other species (RISE 2004).  
It is estimated that there are between 1,000 (Mosimane 2000) and 1,240  people 
living within the conservancy’s boundaries, who are engaged in various livelihood 
activities (RISE 2004). Many are subsistence farmers who keep livestock and some of 
whom practice small scale crop production. Others are engaged in tin or semi-
precious stone mining activities as a primary or supplementary form of income. In the 
conservancy’s biggest population centre, however, many people are unemployed. 
                                                 
24 This section is derived largely from Newsham (2004:9-18) 
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Subsequent to the closing of the tin mine in 1993, the number of jobs available 
dropped sharply, and although some have found jobs in local government positions, 
retail outlets or in a domestic capacity, 32% of households listed pensions as a 
primary source of income (Mosimane, 2000). Use of natural resources in the area 
forms part of most people’s livelihood strategies, as several types of tree, stone and 
plant are employed in the construction of homesteads, livestock pens and as a source 
of income. The predominant ethnic group in the area is Damara, but Oshivambo and 
Otjiherero speaking peoples also reside within the conservancy. 
 
Activities in Tsiseb 
Tsiseb has come to be seen by some observers as a conservancy ‘to watch’, mostly 
due to the sheer amount of activities to which it plays host. This section covers the 
principal activities for which the conservancy is best known, namely: 
 
• Community Game Guard scheme  
• African Hunting Safaris trophy hunting 
• Brandberg White Lady Lodge and Campsite 
• Daureb Mountain Guides Association 
• Daureb Crafts Co-operative 
• Conservancy Information Centre 
 
What all these activities have in common is the common objective of making the link 
between conserving wildlife and gaining development benefits. The majority of these 
benefits are economic in nature, consisting of employment opportunities or revenues 
paid to the conservancy, to be spent, at some point in the future, on whatever the 
Tsiseb’s residents collectively decide. 
 
Community game guard scheme  
In terms of wildlife management, Tsiseb conservancy’s most central activity is the 
community game guard scheme, one of the defining characteristics of communal area 
conservancies across Namibia. During the field research period, there were nine game 
guards employed by the conservancy, whilst the conservancy itself was divided up 
into eleven areas in which game guard patrols were to be conducted. Paying the 
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salaries of the game guards is one of Tsiseb’s biggest running costs and a significant 
source of local employment, given the dearth of jobs in Uis following the closure of 
the tin mine. The responsibilities of the game guards were broadly similar to those 
held by game guards in other communal area conservancies, consisting largely in 
mounting regular patrols to monitor both the status of Tsiseb’s wildlife populations 
and also illegal hunting activities. If hunting activities were encountered, game guards 
were to report details to the Ministry of Environment and tourism. Both illegal 
hunting and the animals spotted on patrol were to be registered in the ‘event book’, 
which comprised a means of generating useful data for the annual game count that 
took place across a number of conservancies. The game count is one of the principal 
indicators used to evaluate the performance of individual conservancies and, of 
course, the conservancy programme as a whole. Aside from the ‘event book’ data, the 
game guards also took part in the activities organised specifically for the purposes of 
the annual game count. In Tsiseb conservancy, this takes the form of driving along 
eight roads or paths, registering which species had been seen and taking note of the 
numbers. For 2002 and 2003, the annual game count produced the following figures:  
 
Table 7.2 – Wildlife numbers in Tsiseb conservancy 2002 and 2003 (principal 
species recorded)  
 
Species 2002 2003 
Elephant - 25 
Kudu 150 60 
Ostrich 200 300 
Springbok 4500 6000 
Zebra 150 300 
Source: MET  
 
Although they paint a picture which would appear at first sight to leave space for 
optimism, these numbers were approached by their compilers with due caution. They 
were calculated on the basis of a road count which was conducted along only 8 roads 
in an area spanning 8,093km² and with observations from the game guards 
themselves. Moreover, as only two years’ worth of data were available at this stage, it 





African Hunting Safaris trophy hunting   
Tsiseb has a quota for huntable game, issued by the Ministry of Environment and 
Tourism (MET), which determines how many game animals can be harvested. This 
quota, then, is one of the rights over wildlife management that is made possible by the 
1996 amendment to the Nature Conservation Ordinance. On the basis of this quota, 
Tsiseb conservancy has entered into an agreement with African Hunting Safaris, a 
trophy hunting outfit. The remit of African Hunting Safaris (AHS) to operate in the 
area is specified by a legally binding contract. Tsiseb conservancy undertakes to 
provide a quota of two oryx and ten springbok for the company, in return for which 
they must pay, annually, a concession fee of N$16,680, which must be paid even if 
African Hunting Safaris does not hunt the full quota.  
The contract also includes an “empowerment clause”, which refers to the benefits 
to Tsiseb conservancy residents that AHS is obliged to provide. These benefits take 
two forms: 
 
1. Local employment – African Hunting Safaris is required to employ locally, 
wherever possible 
2. A transfer of the knowledge and skills necessary for the conservancy to run its 
own trophy hunting concession.  
 
As well as selecting, wherever possible, employees from Tsiseb conservancy, AHS is 
required to train employees by sponsoring them to attend the Hunting Assistant 
course run by the Namibian Professional Hunters Association. This course provides 
general skills for people working in the tourism industry, as well as preparing them 
for the role of hunting assistant. African Hunting Safaris must also pay the costs of a 
suitable employee to be trained as a professional hunter. In August 2004, African 
Hunting Safaris planned to send off two existing conservancy employees to qualify as 
professional hunters25. The intention, then, is not only to provide employment. 
Rather, in training a conservancy resident to become a trophy hunter, there is 
potential for the conservancy to offer the quota locally, as opposed to bringing in 
expertise from elsewhere. A consequence, it was hoped, of having a local, 
professionally trained hunter would be to capture a much higher proportion of the 
                                                 
25 Telephone interview from Edinburgh with Eric Xaweb in Uis, Namibia, 2.7.2004 
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revenue that can be made from trophy hunting, as well as to increase the sense of 
“ownership” over the hunting process felt by conservancy residents. The character of 
the venture as an exercise in knowledge transfer which depends not on what Tsiseb 
conservancy residents do know but rather on what they do not is, then, clear. Equally 
clear, though, is that in principle at least, African Hunting Safaris is contractually 
required ultimately to render its own presence within the conservancy dispensable. 
The extent to which it was in the process of doing so and over what timeframe was as 
yet unclear by the end of field research.  
 
The Brandberg White Lady Lodge and Campsite 
What is now the Brandberg White Lady Lodge has experienced a number of 
managers and management styles over the last few years. It started in 1998 as a 
privately-run enterprise known as the Ugab Wilderness Camp, set up on the Ugab 
River and lying within 25km of the Brandberg Mountain. However, the owner 
seemingly disappeared, and over time the conservancy assumed control over it. A 
couple of managers were put in place by the Namibian Community Based Tourism 
Association (NACOBTA), with the intention of having the campsite run by the 
conservancy itself as soon as the requisite skills base had been acquired. However, 
when this strategy did not consistently turn a profit, it was decided to enter the site 
into a tendering process run by the Namibian Community Based Tourism 
Association. The purpose was to invite private investors to start up in a number of 
conservancies across Namibia, and to enter into a joint venture with the conservancy 
in which they chose to work. Within the tendering process, out of the five sites in 
conservancies that were offered, only Tsiseb attracted an investor, Kobus de Jager, 
owner of a construction company, who planned to upgrade the existing campsite 
structure by constructing a lodge and up to 60 chalets. The lodge was completed in 
May 2004.  
As with the trophy hunting initiative, the Brandberg White Lady Lodge joint 
venture is governed by a contract. A vast, comprehensive document, the contract 
covers all aspects of the establishment of the lodge, from the projections of revenue 
for the next twenty years to the application for the leasehold necessary for the 
enterprise to exist on communal land. It guarantees the conservancy a 10% share in 
the business itself and a role in making “business decisions” relating to the lodge, as 
well as 10% of the profits after tax. On a yearly basis, the investors are required to 
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pay the conservancy a minimum of N$250,000 (£17,850 approx26), in revenue from 
both the campsite and the lodge. Moreover, as with the contract governing trophy 
hunting activities in the conservancy, it has an “empowerment clause”. This clause 
specifies the wage levels of permanent staff, N$500 (£35.71) per month and 
increasing to N$1000 (£71.43) per month for the manager. These rates are 
significantly above the local average of N$200-300 (£14.29-21.43), as calculated by 
Mosimane (2000). All staff are required to be residents of Tsiseb conservancy. As 
from the second year of operation, N$20,000 has to be put aside each year for the 
purposes of training. 80% of management staff has to be locally employed by the 
third year of operations, and there is the option for the conservancy to take over the 
running of the venture at the end of the twenty year lease period. In a poor area which 
boasts so few employment opportunities, these potential benefits are highly 
significant.  
Evidently, the principal attraction which renders the site on which the lodge 
stands is the White Lady rock art, in conjunction with the Brandberg itself. But, as the 
Brandberg White Lady Lodge’s slogan, “home of the desert elephant” explicitly 
indicates, one of the area’s best-known – and locally most troublesome – wildlife 
resources is a fundamental component of the tourism product the lodge offers. That 
the site is located within an elephant migration route is, of course, no coincidence.  
Elephants, much loved generally by people who do not have to live within at least a 
60km radius of them, are feared and loathed by people in Tsiseb conservancy for 
three principal reasons: 
 
1. Ripping up pipes and breaking pumps, they leave water points unusable for 
people, damage livestock kraals and other forms  of property  
2. They are seen as a risk to life and limb 
3. They are one of the principal factors which render agricultural activities 
impracticable, on account of their tendency to eat or trample crops. 
  
In theory, the Brandberg White Lady Lodge has the potential to change people’s 
attitudes towards elephants, to the extent that the considerable benefits the Lodge 
offers are linked explicitly by those people to the continued existence of this 
                                                 
26 All conversions are done at average exchange rates for 2007 of N$14 to the pound.  
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unpopular animal, and that people receive those benefits. Recruiting the private 
sector, moreover, to bring in the necessary expertise and capital better to realise the 
site’s economic potential, through a contract which obliges them to transfer this 
expertise to some conservancy residents, is an attempt to offer a solution to questions 
of how poor people with little or no education, skills or experience in the tourism 
industry are supposed to create and run a successful tourism venture.  
 
Daureb Mountain Guides Association  
At the Brandberg Mountain operates one of Namibia’s best-known “community-
based tourism enterprises”, the Daureb Mountain Guides. The guides started in large 
measure as a response to the closing of the Uis tin mine, which brought widespread 
unemployment to the local population. The guides came together as a loose, wholly 
informal association in 1993, known then as the Brandberg Mountain Guides, in order 
to give some of the town’s unemployed young men the opportunity to earn an 
income. An Irish teacher, Colm Moore, working at Petrus !Ganeb Secondary School 
in Uis, had started an environmental club, in which school students who would later 
become mountain guides started to learn not just about the environment, but also 
about the Brandberg Mountain specifically. It was at the environmental club that the 
idea of the potential for deriving income from tourism was first mooted. Through the 
club, students learned the tracks and trails of the Brandberg, and were taken to see the 
White Lady rock art. In 1993, the six founding members of the group started to offer 
tours. At first operations occurred on a very informal basis, and guides had little 
knowledge or experience of what was required of a tour guide, or of the tourism 
industry more generally. Between 1993 and 1998 the guides underwent a process 
which was intended to allow them to solidify into a more clearly-defined, structured 
entity. They received assistance from the Ministry of Environment and Tourism and 
the Namibian Community-Based Tourism Association (NACOBTA) with enterprise 
development, formal guiding training, devising a code of conduct, accounting and 
acquiring a corporate identity, among other things.  
At present they offer a number of different tours, ranging from a trip to see the 
White Lady rock art alone, a tour which takes in a wider variety of sites of artistic and 
archaeological interest, to expeditions to the Königstein (meaning King’s stone), the 
highest peak of the Brandberg Mountain.   
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The Daureb Mountain Guides Association’s links to the conservancy are different 
from those of African Hunting Safaris or the Brandberg White Lady Lodge. They are 
not a product of the conservancy’s legal powers to negotiate benefits from tourism 
operators or to initiate tourism ventures, having existed prior to the creation of the 
conservancy itself. However, of all the tourism-related businesses in the area that 
predate the formation of the conservancy, it is the only one which has entered into an 
agreement to make a financial contribution to it. The Memorandum of Understanding 
drawn up with Tsiseb stipulates that 10% of the Association’s profits are to be paid to 
the conservancy’s Community Fund. As well as this formal link, during the fieldwork 
period, two of the executive committee’s members were Daureb Mountain Guides. In 
conjunction with their government-recognised responsibility to conserve the rock art 
and biodiversity at the Brandberg Mountain, they conform to and are part of the 
conservancy’s objectives. They were locally the most widely-known of all of the 
initiatives operating within Tsiseb and, generally speaking, the best-received in the 
eyes of its residents (notwithstanding their reputation for decadence and debauchery 
amongst the more strictly religious conservancy residents). As a source of 
employment which causes minimal environmental damage, created and run by local 
people, its raison d’être can be said to make the link, albeit indirectly, between the 
level of conservation of a set of potentially valuable natural resources and the 
magnitude of development benefits.   
 
Daureb Crafts 
Daureb Crafts is a local crafts co-operative which, although run and principally 
utilised by one woman, provides an outlet for local inhabitants to sell their wares. At 
present there appear to be few crafts makers involved in the cooperative, but this may 
change over time. Previously Daureb Crafts occupied smaller, rather less prominent 
premises, but has since moved to the Conservancy Information Centre, where sales 
are reported to have risen markedly.  
 
Conservancy Information Centre  
On Saturday, 24th April 2004, Tsiseb opened its Conservancy Information Centre in 
Uis. The land on which the information centre stands is being paid for by the 
conservancy, in the form of a loan from Standard Bank. The building itself was paid 
 157
for by funds sourced by NACOBTA from the European Union. The centre was, at the 
end of the fieldwork period, intended to house: 
 
• the conservancy’s office 
• a venue for meetings – the conservancy chambers 
• a kiosk 
• a tourism information centre which incorporates the Daureb Mountain Guide 
Association’s office  
• a retail outlet for Daureb Crafts 
• a soon-to-be-launched internet café run by local entrepreneurs.   
 
The information centre, located in Uis, may be in a good position to benefit from 
Namibia’s growing share of the international tourism market. Uis is situated between 
a couple of major tourist routes used for travelling either to or from north Namibia. It 
is the only town for a considerable distance with a petrol station and supermarket. In 
and of itself it is not a tourist attraction, but it is a very practical place to break up a 
journey between Namibia's capital, Windhoek, and various North-western 
destinations such as the Twyfelfontein rock art site. Moreover, for tourists coming 
from the south or the east and travelling west or North West, the information centre is 
the first building to be encountered when entering Uis. There is, therefore, potential 
for attracting the custom of tourists passing through.  
 
3. Actors and institutions: ‘representative’ participation in 
Tsiseb conservancy  
 
Representative participation, spaces and institutional structures 
As noted in the previous chapter, local participation in wildlife management is a 
central tenet of conservancy policy and legislation. Without it, the chances of 
achieving sustainability objectives are not considered to be very high. The extent to 
which the 1996 amendment to the Nature Conservation Ordinance corresponded to 
what had originally been envisaged of it was evaluated essentially in terms of how 
many rights to make decisions about wildlife use it granted (or denied) communal 
area inhabitants. It would be odd, therefore, to find the conservancy programme 
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wanting in its commitment to local participation, when it is widely taken to be 
indispensable to sustainable wildlife management. But how is this commitment is 
translated into mechanisms and institutions for making decisions within Tsiseb 
conservancy?  
It is helpful at this juncture to make recourse the concept of ‘space’, developed in 
relation to participation in the work of Andrea Cornwall, amongst others (2002, 
2004). Cornwall points out that thinking about participation in terms of space obliges 
us to pay attention to its ‘situated’ character. Participation takes place in specific 
physical locations, an observation which is as important to heed as it is glaringly 
obvious in hindsight, as this account of conservancy resident participation in Tsiseb 
should make abundantly clear. Space is also a useful concept for a number of other 
reasons, not least because it guides our thinking towards a consideration of the “ways 
in which particular sites come to be populated, appropriated or designated by 
particular actors for particular kinds of purposes” (ibid:75). Put differently, we might 
suggest that talk of space encourages us to be aware of four related factors: 
 
1. How the goals and interests of different actors explain their reasons for 
participation 
2. Why they prefer to participate according to one set of ‘rules’ as opposed to 
another  
3. What they are prepared to do to ensure one set of ‘rules’ is accepted in place 
of another (and how likely there are to achieve this goal) 
4. Who participates more and who less according to the accepted set of ‘rules’  
 
Furthermore, we can distinguish between different types of spaces: closed, invited 
and claimed spaces are the three which most frequently appear in the literature (i.e. 
Brock, Cornwall, and Gaventa 2004, Cornwall 2002, 2004), and are commonly set 
along a continuum, i.e. from closed spaces as ‘least’ to claimed spaces as ‘most’ 
participatory (Gaventa 2004 35). Other types of space, such as within or outwith the 
state, formal or informal, physical or psychological might also be added to the list. 
The most useful to the discussion of Tsiseb conservancy, as I hope to demonstrate, 
are invited and claimed spaces.  
The diverse and numerous activities that take place within Tsiseb require the 
involvement of numerous actors from different backgrounds and with different 
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knowledge and skills sets. There are, too, fundamental demographic and geographic 
factors which place constraints on who can participate in the conservancy’s decision-
making processes more generally. Tsiseb had during the fieldwork period over 500 
registered members and over 1000 residents, an amount of people which would be 
difficult enough to accommodate into an institution which has to make operational 
decisions on a daily basis even if all members were easily reachable. The sheer size of 
Tsiseb conservancy makes it much more difficult to involve residents. The 
conservancy information centre, the hub of conservancy activities, is based in Uis and 
constitutes the physical space in which the majority of conservancy-related decisions 
are taken. However, Tsiseb’s members and residents are scattered across the 
conservancy, often in remote places which do not have telecommunications 
infrastructure and that are difficult to access even with a 4x4 vehicle. The practical 
difficulties of trying to involve all of its members and residents in decision-making 
processes derive, therefore, from getting people together in one physical space in 
which decisions can be made; and doing so on a budget which limits the amount of 
transport options that can be provided. These considerations have very much shaped 
the mechanisms and institutions through which decisions are made.  
Owing in large measure to these intimidating logistics, the participation of 
conservancy residents in the day-to-day running of Tsiseb has been delegated to 
representatives. The number and functions of representatives have changed over time, 
but the principle of decision-making by representatives has not. The most important 
space in which residents have the opportunity to make decisions is the Annual 
General Meeting. The meeting can be seen as somewhere between an invited and a 
claimed space. It is invited in the sense that holding it is required by the 
conservancy’s constitution and organised by the conservancy committee; but it is 
claimed by different interest groups as a space in which a number of purposes may be 
served. Perhaps the chief official goal of the Annual General Meeting is to allow the 
conservancy residents to vote on the most important decisions regarding the running 
of the conservancy, both present and future. To give examples, the AGM has been the 
space in which:  
 
• elections for conservancy committee members are held  
• Tsiseb’s constitution was adopted  
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• The annual budget is approved 
• changes were made to the constitution: they could only be done with the 
support of a majority of the residents who attended the AGM  
• the private investors behind African Hunting Safaris and the Brandberg White 
Lady Lodge sought permission to start operations in the area  
• the decision to build the conservancy information centre (and commit to the 
financial obligations entailed therein) was made 
• changes were made to the institutional structures through which Tsiseb is 
governed 
 
The Annual General Meeting serves other purposes too, in particular the 
dissemination of information. Progress reports are offered to the residents, on the 
various conservancy activities, and suggestions are made for future activities, for 
people to be thinking about. Time is spent on clarifying the purposes and status of 
current activities to those who have not heard about them or do not understand them. 
Feedback is also sought, and residents have the opportunity to air their views on the 
performance (or perceived lack therein) of the conservancy over the course of the 
year.  
We can, then, see the Annual General Meeting as the space in which the 
overarching priorities and medium-to-long term goals of the conservancy are to be 
agreed upon. But given the amount of activities that take place within the 
conservancy, it is not possible for decision-making to be left to a once-yearly 
occasion. Even if it were, it would be necessary to carry out the actions about which 
decisions were taken. For instance, the annual budget has to be prepared, meetings 
with the community game guards have to be held in order to monitor wildlife 
movements and illegal hunting, training workshops on all manner of conservancy-
related activities must be attended, liaison with the Brandberg White Lady Lodge and 
African Hunting Safaris must be maintained, and so on. These are overseen by the 
conservancy’s committees.  
When the conservancy was first established, it had one committee, comprised of 
40 members, many of whom were representatives of the various areas into which the 
conservancy can be subdivided. This approach was abandoned, though, as it came to 
be seen as too cumbersome, as a drag on quick and effective decision-making. 
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Subsequently the ‘executive’ committee was formed to take its place, its members cut 
to the more manageable number of six elected members, and one (non-voting) 
Traditional Authority representative (the role of the Traditional Authority in the 
conservancy is considered separately in the following section). At the same time, the 
position of conservancy manager was created. This is a salaried post, its holder 
responsible for ensuring that decisions taken either at the AGM or under the auspices 
of the conservancy committee are executed. The salary was intended to address 
questions of incentive to be involved in the execution of decisions. Tsiseb 
conservancy is a busy place, with many meetings, training sessions and workshops to 
attend. The committee members have their own concerns to attend to, and the more 
commitments they have, the more difficult and tiresome it becomes to comply with 
all of them. The committee operates on a voluntary basis, although (somewhat 
modest) sitting allowances are provided as an incentive for attendance. The result is 
that, the greater the commitment required of executive committee members, the less 
incentive for involvement there is. From this viewpoint it made sense to offer 
sufficient financial incentive for the level of involvement required for the 
conservancy to progress. It was also an easy sell to donors as a tangible development 
benefit. The position of conservancy manager was taken up by Eric Xaweb, a former 
committee chair and one of the people who had been involved from the beginning in 
the setting up of the conservancy, and who continued to be manager well beyond the 
end of the field research period in June 2004.  
Despite these efforts to make the decision-making process more efficient and 
effective, there were complaints that conservancy residents were not well-informed of 
the committee’s activities27. It was not sufficient to provide updates at the Annual 
General Meeting; nor was the occasion seen to allow sufficient input of the views and 
desires of conservancy residents into the decisions that were taken in their name. For 
this reason, further changes to the committee were proposed. To the executive 
committee was added an overall management committee, which would resuscitate the 
position of area representatives, but with some changes. The conservancy 
management committee would comprise 25 members in total: 16 of these were area 
representatives, 6 were the conservancy executive committee, 2 were Traditional 
Authority representatives and, finally, one was the conservancy manager. The 
                                                 
27 Interview with Don Muroua, CBNRM (community-based natural resource management) 
Program Manager for RISE, Windhoek, 25.3.04 
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conservancy was subdivided into four distinct areas, each area being assigned four 
representatives. These representatives were to talk locally with people and take their 
feedback and concerns to the conservancy management committee meetings that were 
to be held every three months. In this way, it was hoped that decisions would be 
better informed by the opinions and preferences of conservancy residents. Feedback 
on what had been decided in the management committee meeting could then be taken 
back, through the area representatives, to the people they represented. The 
management committee would exist, then, to guide the executive committee, which in 
turn was to oversee the work of the conservancy manager. But it avoided a situation 
in which all decisions had to be taken always by 25 people: the executive committee 
and the conservancy manager retained this role, allowing issues that arose on a daily 
or monthly basis to be dealt with quickly, but overseen by the management 
committee. 
The relationship in which decision-makers ostensibly stand to each other is 
captured in figure 7.1, on the following page. It should be noted that the conservancy 
management committee was not fully functioning during the research period. It is not, 
therefore, possible to comment on the consequences of its introduction or on how it 
was perceived by conservancy residents.  
The institutional arrangements for decision-making in Tsiseb conservancy are, 
then, manifestations of and critical engagements with the principle of representative 
democracy. It is within this wider knowledge tradition that these arrangements are to 
be located if we want to understand the reasons why they are assumed not just to be 
legitimate but also appropriate for the context in which they are applied. 
Independence ushered in representative democracy for a majority, not solely a 
minority, of Namibia’s inhabitants; its installation is one of the bases on which the 
legitimacy of Namibia’s sovereignty is internationally recognised. The institutional 
structures are based on ones which can commonly be found in representative 
democracy more widely – i.e. committees whose members are chosen by election. 
That these structures are intended to reflect the will of the majority of Tsiseb’s 
residents is also intelligible in view of the widespread credibility that the notion of 
majority governance enjoys in Namibia (as in many other countries).  If the ‘set rules’ 
for wildlife management in Tsiseb are based on the idea that elected representatives 
sit in committees and take decisions by majority consensus, it is because there is an 
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available knowledge tradition which provides widely-accepted models and precedents 
for legitimate decision-making.  
 




TSISEB CONSERVANCY MEMBERS 
 
AREA REPRESENTATIVES 








Adapted from NACSO Institutional Working Group ‘Organigram’ 
*TA is short for Traditional Authority  
 
 
If it is accepted that the goal is to make decisions by consensus of the majority, then 
models of representative-democratic decision, the logic runs, are in the interests of the 
people of Tsiseb. 
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Tensions between ‘representative-democratic’ and ‘Traditional-Authority’ 
decision-making models 
However, for a proposition to be widely-accepted is not to be accepted universally as 
the most legitimate model for decision-making. Indeed, in the case of Tsiseb there is 
another knowledge tradition which we might also call upon in the quest for legitimate 
models for decision-making. The alternative model is that embodied by the 
Traditional Authority structures in Tsiseb conservancy, headed up by Chief Elias 
//Thaniseb. It has lost considerable ground to the ‘representative-democratic’ model, 
partly because of the preference in conservancy policy and legislation for 
representative-democratic decision making.  
As the previous chapter made clear, the Damara proved adept at using the German 
presence as a means to re-negotiate their status vis a vis other ethnic groups, and in 
particular with the Herero and the Nama (Gewald 1999:93-99). But their strategy also 
led to changes in Damara society, most significantly the introduction of a much more 
clearly-defined hierarchy. Before the German colonial administration invented the 
position of Paramount Chief of the Damara in 1890, there were no known tribal 
chiefs (Barnard 1992:198). But after the death of Goraseb in 1910, none of his 
successors enjoyed quite the same authority (ibid). Perhaps, given the lack of 
leadership structures in pre-colonial times, this should come as no great surprise. And 
yet it should not be forgotten that the institution of the chief was also utilised (and re-
shaped) under South African rule as a form of cheap governance in the native 
reserves, and on into the replacement of the native reserves with homelands. Chiefs, 
including those in Damara areas, were given functions and responsibilities and 
allowed to retain powers held either before German colonisation or accrued therein; 
including powers over wildlife use (Hinz 2003). Independence conferred much 
legitimacy on a unified central government. The abandonment of the administrative 
split, in which part of South West Africa’s administration was done in Windhoek and 
part of it in Pretoria, has made it much more powerful than the South West African 
Administration which it replaced.  
As an initiative heavily-sponsored by and dependent for its existence on the 
Namibian government, it is easy to see Tsiseb conservancy as having the effect of 
taking away – or at least substantially diminishing – the wildlife custodian role played 
by the chief prior to its establishment. This, at least, is similar to how it is seen by 
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Chief Elias //Thaniseb, the Damara Traditional Authority in Tsiseb conservancy. It is 
easy to see him as the embodiment of a weakened authority figure. To a certain 
extent, it remains the case that when decisions are to be made, for instance about 
moving onto land under Chief //Thaniseb’s jurisdiction, his approval is sought and 
followed. Precedents still exist, then for giving his preferences more weight than 
those of actors lower down the hierarchy, both by himself and by the people he 
governs. Yet with the emergence of rival governance institutions – the local, regional 
and central organs of the state – whose members are elected on the basis of universal 
suffrage, there can be little question that his powers have been reduced. 
Commensurately, so too has been the weight given to his preferences. In focus group 
work with the Traditional Council, consisting of Chief //Thaniseb and four of its 
members, the claim was made that prior to the establishment of the conservancy, the 
Traditional Authority was more active in enforcing customary law governing wildlife 
use. The question of who should take decisions, and on what basis – especially with 
respect to wildlife use – has become less clear. Following independence, the 
precedent of decision-making by consensus, either by local people themselves or by 
their elected representatives, has become increasingly accepted. Of significant 
consequence to the chief, it is at odds with the idea of the consultation of and 
deference to his authority28.  
Such, then, in crude broad-brush strokes is the legacy of the erosion of Chief Elias 
//Thaniseb’s authority. Again, it is necessary to qualify this argument. Chief 
//Thaniseb continues to command not just considerable respect locally, but also 
considerable discretion over important issues of local governance. Nonetheless, he 
enjoys these powers on a de facto, not a de jure basis. Chief //Thaniseb faces a further 
challenge to his legitimacy because he is not legally recognised, under the Traditional 
Authorities Act (GRN 2000) by Namibia’s government.  
The establishment of Tsiseb conservancy is an instance of a reduction in the 
chief’s powers, owing to the introduction of a rival decision-making model. Despite 
their previous importance to making decisions about wildlife, the 1996 amendment to 
                                                 
28It should be recognised when making this argument that the amount of power ceded by 
Traditional Authorities varies from region to region. Chiefs in Caprivi, for instance, continue to 
command more respect than their counterparts in Southern – though perhaps not Northern – 
Kunene (for examples of this trend, at least in respect of wildlife management functions, see 
Long & Jones 2004b). Nonetheless, whilst debate still exists with regard to how much power has 
been ceded and where, it is treated as a settled matter that chiefs no longer command as much 
power as they used to.  
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the Nature Conservation Ordinance does not specify the role that should be assumed 
by the Traditional Authorities. Detractors claim that this lack of specification has 
excluded and further weakened the Traditional Authorities, thereby marginalising an 
important cultural resource from which too little is being learned. Defenders claim 
that first, given the regional variations between the roles and responsibilities of 
Traditional Authorities, it is better not to prescribe in legal terms one role, but rather 
to let it be negotiated according to local custom; and second, that there is nothing in 
the amendment to stop local Traditional Authority institutions from being designated 
as the conservancy committee29. Whatever view one takes on the merits or failings of 
not specifying the basis for involvement of the Traditional Authority in the running of 
conservancies, in the case of Tsiseb, the Traditional Authority – for better or for 
worse – has become less important in setting the rules for wildlife use.  
Although deference to the authority of the chief is not the accepted model for 
decision-making used by the conservancy, it still vies for attention and legitimacy 
within the contested spaces of the conservancy executive committee and the Annual 
General Meeting. It has its place within the most recent conservancy institutional 
structures shown in Figure 7.1. However, the end result of the negotiations over the 
role of the Traditional Authority was that a member of the Traditional Council was to 
be on the conservancy executive committee, but in a non-voting capacity. The 
committee was to inform the Traditional Authority of all conservancy activities and to 
take on board any advice offered. The Traditional Authority was also invited to fill 
the role of dispute resolution within the conservancy.  
This redefinition of what he perceived to be his legitimate role, as well as the 
delegation of functions to other actors, was not well-received by Chief //Thaniseb. All 
the objections he and other members of the council put to me in the Focus Group 
stem from the belief that the chief’s legitimate authority to lead the conservancy 
decision-making process has not been duly recognised by the conservancy committee. 
He argued that the conservancy committee only consulted him or brought him into 
the decision-making process when it was unavoidable. He cited his role in 
determining the boundaries of Tsiseb conservancy. These were created through a 
process of negotiation with other chiefs in the region, in which agreement was 
reached over respective claims to areas of jurisdiction. He argued that locally, it was 
                                                 
29 Interview with Brian Jones, (then) Senior CBNRM Technical Advisor to USAID in Namibia,  
Windhoek, 22.1.2004 
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recognised that he had powers over land use. The conservancy was, to his mind 
operating on his land, and should on that basis be subject to his jurisdiction, but was 
not. In addition, Tuban Goseb, one of the members of the Traditional Council, 
maintained that the government had given chiefs the right to lead conservancies, but 
that as soon as Tsiseb was ‘gazetted’, the conservancy committee had shut out Chief 
//Thaniseb, thereby putting itself above the Traditional Authority.  
The same argument was made with respect to the establishment of the Brandberg 
White Lady Lodge and Campsite. In order to build the lodge and erect the campsite 
on communal land, the investors had to secure a Permission To Occupy (PTO) 
document. Permission To Occupy was a product of Namibia’s land tenure 
arrangements. It was originally a means under South African rule by which to offer 
investors something approximating private ownership in the homelands. As fencing 
off land or appropriating it for private purposes was illegal in the homelands, the 
government deemed it necessary to have the fall-back option of the PTO. However, it 
could not be granted without the chief’s consent, and could be tapped as a source of 
income therein. With the advent of communal area conservancy legislation, however, 
conservancies were supposed to be able to use the PTO as a bargaining chip, a way to 
secure concessions from private investors looking to establish tourism activities 
within the conservancy boundaries. In other parts of Namibia’s Northwest, chiefs 
have seen this stipulation as a threat and have felt excluded from decisions that had 
formerly, as they saw it, been theirs to make (Jones 2003, Vaughan and Katjiua 
2002). In none of my encounters with Chief //Thaniseb did he mention revenues from 
the Permission to Occupy process, but this may have been another power, albeit of 
ambiguous legal status, which the establishment of Tsiseb conservancy removed from 
him. 
In response to these points, the conservancy manager, some (though not all) 
members of the conservancy executive committee and also staff at RISE concurred on 
the following responses. First and foremost, it was observed repeatedly that whereas 
the conservancy had a standing in law, the chief had not been recognised by the 
government. The conservancy committee could therefore legitimately have chosen 
not to invite the Traditional Authority into any of its meetings or activities. It could 
have demarcated the boundaries of the conservancy without his assistance. But it had 
not done so; on the contrary, it had negotiated with the chief the role he was to play, 
and he himself, it was claimed, had chosen not to sit on the committee, and had 
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acquiesced in foregoing his voting rights. The reason for not giving voting rights to 
the Traditional Authority was borne of concern that the committee would then not 
make decisions by consensus, but rather would reflect simply the chief’s preferences 
This would defeat the point of members being elected by conservancy residents as 
their representatives. It was also argued by RISE staff that Traditional Authority had 
been kept much better-informed than had the headmen of other conservancies in 
Erongo and Kunene in which the organisation worked. In their commitment to the 
principle of elected representatives making decisions by consensus, the conservancy 
manager, executive committee and RISE staff were effectively putting this decision-
making model ‘above’ that offered by the Traditional Authority. That they were in a 
position to do so and that the chief could not stop them reflected a wider national 
situation in which representative-democratic institutions for decision-making trump 
those associated with the Traditional Authority.  
 
Traditional Authority, the conservancy and party politics 
Arguments about the role of the Traditional Authority within Tsiseb may be 
connected to local party-political issues. These are best understood against the 
background of concerns that conservancies may become used as a ‘campaigning tool’ 
for local politicians, who either heap praise on them and claim credit for success 
when seeking re-election, or heavily criticise them and blame an incumbent for their 
failures30. A linked concern, especially in view of the financial resources 
conservancies command, is the misappropriation of funds. Both the conservancy 
committee and the Annual General meeting have been used as spaces within which 
political contests unfold, and there have been attempts to unseat central conservancy 
actors from their positions.  
Within Tsiseb conservancy, accusations of corruption have been made. 
Conservancy manager Eric Xaweb became in 2003 the subject of a whispering (and 
then a shouting) campaign which claimed that he had been siphoning off money 
provided for the conservancy by the Rural Institute for Social Development & 
Empowerment. One committee member made public claims to have evidence of 
financial mismanagement of conservancy funds, and even suggested that Mr. Xaweb 
had been in the pay of the private investors chosen to run the Brandberg White Lady 
                                                 
30 Interview with Don Muroua, CBNRM (community-based natural resource management) 
Program Manager for RISE, 25.3.04  
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Lodge. These declarations prompted the conservancy executive committee to call a 
public meeting to deal with the dispute, to be mediated by Chief //Thaniseb and 
attended also by a regional official from the Ministry of Environment and Tourism. 
The committee member who had made the allegations was invited to present this 
case, as well as the evidence accumulated for it. When the individual declined to 
make an appearance and RISE declared itself to be satisfied that all funds given to the 
conservancy had been accounted for, no further action was taken. Because the 
individual making the allegations was not prepared to defend them at the meeting, the 
question as to why they had been made public was raised.  
The counter claim asserted that Mr Xaweb had been singled out for this treatment 
because of his political affiliations. There can be few secrets in Uis, and Mr Xaweb’s 
status as a strong supporter of Swapo is widely known. Damara voters tend to prefer 
the United Democratic Front (UDF) to Swapo, a tendency which is reflected in the 
balance of political power in Uis Village Council, which has since independence 
played host to a UDF majority. In this context, then, it was seen by some as 
suspicious that from 2002 onwards, there was a majority of known Swapo supporters 
on the conservancy executive committee. It was suggested, therefore, that the 
corruption allegations had become so widespread not because of an abundance of 
evidence to support them, but rather because of the fear, on the part of UDF 
supporters, that local Swapo operatives, with an eye on forthcoming elections, would 
establish a monopoly over the use of conservancy resources and would be able to 
convert the conservancy’s perceived success into political capital. The allegations 
were, from this viewpoint, an attempt to sabotage any such plans.  
Intriguingly, the UDF’s default status as the party of local government in Uis was 
challenged in the local elections of 2004. Local SWAPO activists mounted an 
energetic and highly visible campaign, which led to two of their candidates being 
returned as councillors on the Village Council, out of an overall total of five, their 
best result in the post-independence elections period. One of these candidates was 
conservancy manager Eric Xaweb. The concern was raised that his election to local 
government, had provoked a conflict of interest: if the conservancy was supposed to 
be separate from local politics, then it was inappropriate for its manager also to hold 
the position of village councillor. Moreover, concerns about allegations corruption, 
checked by the conservancy’s public meeting to deal with them the previous year, 
were starting to re-emerge, and were a contentious issue at the 2004 conservancy 
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Annual General Meeting in June. By that point a ‘concerned group’ (reportedly 
spearheaded by United Democratic Front supporters) had loosely coalesced, and 
wanted to use the AGM as a platform at which to hold the conservancy manager and 
committee to account. Eric Xaweb, who had started to threaten to sue anyone who 
continued to level charges of corruption against him which they could not 
substantiate, was not ‘ousted’ by these events.  
Where does the Traditional Authority fit into these party-political clashes? 
Traditional Authorities in Namibia are not supposed to align themselves politically. 
Chief //Thaniseb’s public position is one of non affiliation. He once joked during 
focus group work that support for political parties in Namibia was akin to support for 
football clubs. I took this as a wry suggestion that loyalty to the ‘team’ might be put 
above the ‘team’s’ performance, implying that it might for that reason be better to 
steer clear of the ‘game’ altogether. In practice, though, there is no clear separation of 
state and traditional politics. For instance, Justus //Garoeb, Paramount Chief of the 
Damara, is President the United Democratic Front one of Namibia’s parliamentary 
opposition parties. Kuaima Riruako, Paramount Chief of the Herero, forced an 
acrimonious split in 2003 from the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) to form his 
own parliamentary party, the National Unity Democratic Organisation (NUDO). 
Therefore, even with a fervent desire for impartiality, it might prove difficult for a 
chief to be a politically disinterested party in all disputes.  
However one views the relationship between Traditional Authorities and state 
politics, against this tangled backdrop the suspicion of partisanship on the part of 
Chief //Thaniseb towards UDF supporters in conservancy-related disputes becomes 
more intelligible. This allegation was made particularly with reference to the handling 
of the allegations of corruption by the conservancy manager. Criticism was levelled at 
Chief //Thaniseb by the MET official who had been present at the public meeting of 
2003 called to deal with allegations of corruption. He was charged with giving 
credence to allegations that had not been substantiated. Another charge (though not 
by the conservancy manager, whom the allegation most favoured) was that the Chief 
had allowed himself to be associated with the ‘concerned group’ who were seen by 
some actors to be making accusations of corruption for which compelling evidence 
was lacking. In short, the fear was expressed that the chief was backing one ‘side’ 
over the other, not arbitrating neutrally between the two. Moreover, we might even 
speculate that it would be in the chief’s interests to support the UDF, in the face of 
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actors and processes that have limited his own role in decision-making processes 
concerning wildlife and even land use. It should be reiterated, though, that Chief 
//Thaniseb would simply reject this analysis outright, and it was beyond the scope of 
my research to confirm or refute it. 
Fascinating though the political struggles connected to who participates in Tsiseb 
conservancy’s decision-making processes are, I do not wish to accord them too much 
explanatory power in understanding who participates and on what basis in Tsiseb’s 
decision-making process. Focus groups, interviews, discussions with key informants 
and participant observation at conservancy-related meetings and events did not 
produce evidence that anyone was included or excluded on the basis of party-political 
affiliation. Conservancy committee members, including those known to be Swapo 
supporters, were voted in at the Annual General Meeting, not handpicked by a 
shadowy political commissar lurking behind the scenes. A more important factor is 
who has, or does not have, the knowledge deemed necessary to ensuring that the 
conservancy is run in such a way as to achieve its sustainability objectives. It is to an 
exploration of this factor that we now turn.   
 
4. Circularity in intervention 
 
‘Representative’ and ‘grass-roots’ participation   
The implications of the ‘representative’ arrangements for participation in Tsiseb 
conservancy should now be clear. First and foremost, they constitute a response to a 
classic dilemma of collective action that stems from:  
 
1. the number of people (over 1000) who, by dint of being resident within the 
conservancy boundaries, are accepted as having a legitimate right to 
participate in decisions about how to manage wildlife; 
2. the geographical dispersedness of those people across an area in excess of 
800,000ha, with few communication aids through which to overcome the 
difficulties entailed by such distance, and; 
3. the quantity of decisions that need to be made, which often need to be taken 
on a daily basis, ruling out the possibility of limiting all decision-making to 
Annual General Meetings  
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The (re)introduction of the area representative system is an attempt to provide more 
frequent opportunities for local feedback to find its way into the decision-making 
processes presided over by the executive committee and the conservancy manager. It 
is a response to shortcomings often associated with the representative model, but 
essentially an acceptance of it. The legitimacy or lack therein of the committee and 
management structures derives from two principle sources: 
 
1. acceptance or rejection of the knowledge tradition of representative 
democracy, in terms of which Namibia’s institutions for national governance 
are also conceived, as providing the best model for decision making in the 
circumstances which Tsiseb faces 
2. the extent to which the representatives are perceived either to be using their 
positions to the greater benefit of conservancy residents, or to be abusing their 
positions to advance party-political interests and failing to keep in check an 
allegedly corrupt conservancy manager  
 
It is in the wider context of representative democracy as a model for decision-
making that claims by influential conservancy actors, such as Margaret Jacobsohn, 
that the conservancy programme – and by implication Tsiseb conservancy – is a 
‘grass-roots’ movement, are to be understood. It is common to talk about grass-roots 
activists in political parties within a representative democracy; indeed the respect 
given to a party is sometimes measured according the extent to which it is seen to be 
driven by the concerns that surface at the grass-roots level. An analogy could be made 
with Tsiseb’s representative structures. The conservancy management and executive 
committees can only be occupied by local people from the area Tsiseb covers. They 
operate locally, within the conservancy and they exist for the purpose of addressing 
local issues of wildlife management. It is also helpful to bring out here another aspect 
of the meaning of ‘grass roots’, in the (OED) sense of ‘fundamental level; the source 
or origin’. Commentators such as Jacobsohn may well perceive no difficulty in 
accommodating this definition with their own view, given that it was the people 
living in the area that is now Tsiseb conservancy applied for the establishment of the 
conservancy.  
However, I contend that to see the residents as the ‘source’ of the conservancy is 
to obscure the conservancy programme’s essential character as an exercise in 
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knowledge transfer. I suggest that it is more accurate to locate the source of the 
conservancy programme in the concept of sustainability. Indeed, the stated objectives 
of the programme are unintelligible without prior knowledge of sustainability, or 
indeed of the debates and processes through which it has come to be seen as essential 
to organise countless human activities in accordance with sustainability criteria. 
Chapter six has shown how this concept underlines conservancy policy and 
legislation. Any implementation of such policy and legislation, then, requires of its 
implementers knowledge about how to set about using local wildlife resources in such 
a way as to serve conservation and development objectives. This leads to the 
following basic dynamic. In terms of the requirements for legal recognition, as well 
as the requirements for being able to use the rights to benefit from tourism in ways 
that will generate revenue from wildlife resources, conservancies depend more on 
what communal area inhabitants do not know than what they do know. And it is this 
knowledge gap which renders indispensable the participation of conservancy support 
organisations. The very history of the conservancy programme is testament to fact 
that the participation of communal area inhabitants only became feasible once they 
were recast as competent resource users, not threats to conservation, by the people 
who had specialised knowledge about sustainability and the ability to attract the 
resources necessary to try to put their ideas into practice. But these causally important 
processes disappear from sight if we view the conservancy programme in the light of 
a grass roots initiative. It is a very popular initiative. It is based on ideas on which 
important consensuses have been generated at local, regional, national and 
international levels; and this is (at least in my view) an exciting prospect. But if we 
are to understand who participates and on what basis, making recourse to the concept 
of a grass-roots movement is, I think, the wrong way to go about it. 
Linked to these observations is the factor of length of involvement in the 
conservancy programme. Some of the most consistent proponents of redefining 
conservation in terms of sustainability were involved in the precedents for the 
conservancy programme in the 1980s, in getting these ideas accepted within the post-
independence government, in implementing them and from there in the monitoring 
and evaluation of implementation. For instance, the directors of IRDNC and NNF in 
2004 (and still in 2007), two of the biggest conservancy support organisations, are 
considered ‘pioneers’ precisely because of their centrality to so many of the events 
from which the conservancy programme emerged. They have been influential in 
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bringing about a situation in which sustainability is the overarching goal of 
conservation policy and legislation; in other words, they have been instrumental in 
the process through which sustainable use of natural resources has become more 
generally accepted as a means through which to achieve conservation and 
development objectives. They have been successful in getting potential funders such 
as the Worldwide Fund for Nature and the US Agency for International Development 
to accept such ideas and on that basis have secured the financial resources necessary 
for implementation. They have then been involved in the move from policy 
formulation to implementation. It is therefore possible to see these actors in the light 
of (limited) cognitive authorities.  
This last point will benefit from elaboration. Recall the argument made in chapter 
two that sustainability is a concept with a self-referring component. It refers partly to 
empirical states of affairs, such as the numbers of kudu in Kunene or elephant in 
Caprivi, of course; but ‘sustainable wildlife management’ is not an empirically 
verifiable property of elephants or kudu. In the annual game count, there have been 
more kudu or elephant counted year on year, but the designation of this occurrence as 
‘sustainable’ describes not the animals themselves, but rather the relationship in 
which they stand to a context of human activity (cf. Barnes 1988:49). In the example 
given, this context may be constituted by activities such as killing or not killing 
animals. The limit at which killing stops being sustainable and becomes unsustainable 
is not just determined by reference to empirical states of affairs, such as how many 
animals there are, but also by the cognitive authority of the people who designate 
such activity sustainable or unsustainable. The credibility of the designation of a 
given activity as sustainable wildlife management therefore has to be reinforced 
partly by cognitive authority. In other words, there is a point at which a particular 
form of wildlife management is accepted as sustainable because it is said to be so, 
because others – and sometimes because specific individuals – refer to it as 
sustainable. The designation is therefore circular, in the sense of being self-
referential. This is the essence of ‘circularity in intervention’.   
Recall also remarks in chapter four about the specialised character of much 
knowledge about sustainability, of the myriad and diverse things it is necessary to 
know in order to be able credibly to designate activity sustainable or otherwise. As a 
result, not everyone will be able to make such designations credibly. When it comes 
to designating what is and what is not sustainable, cognitive authority is often limited 
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to the few and not to the many. So, I think, it has been with the conservancy 
programme. Some actors have been able to designate credibly what is necessary for 
the advancement of sustainability objectives, and part of the reason why their 
designations are accepted is because such actors have sufficient cognitive authority to 
effect change in ideas about the value of this new knowledge. Recognising who has 
cognitive authority can help us, then, to understand why their participation is 
indispensable to the continuance of the conservancy programme and also to make 
more visible a factor – that of having or not having knowledge about sustainability - 
which is an important determinant of participation in the programme. It obliges us to 
bring into our account of participation the processes through which what there is to 
participate in was defined, and how it was defined. On this basis, I argue that if 
knowledge about sustainability – specifically the six ‘principles’ I have identified – 
has come to underpin the conservancy programme, then its validity is upheld by the 
cognitive authority of specific organisation and individuals. As a consequence, the 
people whose cognitive authority was instrumental to getting knowledge about 
sustainability accepted as a basis for conservation and development policy, the people 
who implement conservancy activities and the people who judge whether activities 
are sustainable are often one and the same; and precisely because they were 
successful in getting their knowledge accepted in the first place. In the case of the 
conservancy programme, so far, this type of circular involvement has been self-
reinforcing: involvement in the early stages of policy change has led to involvement 
in implementation, which has fed back into what is known about sustainability, which 
then in turn influences the policy in terms of which implementation is to be shaped, 
and so on.   
 
Examples of the link between knowing and deciding 
The meaning and point of all this dense talk about cognitive authority and circularity 
in intervention will hopefully be easier to understand with reference to specific 
examples.  
Let us return, therefore, to the area representative system, and specifically to its 
introduction. It is instructive to ask how the system was introduced and by whom. The 
source of the ‘organigram’ in figure 7.1 provides us with a clue here: it was devised 
largely by NACSO’s Institutional Working Group, in response to the aforementioned 
concerns that current arrangements were not conducive to effective communication 
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with conservancy residents who, as a result, were not sufficiently informed about 
conservancy activities. Staff at the Rural Institute for Social Development & 
Empowerment (RISE), Tsiseb’s principal support organisation, had been worried that 
if residents did not understand the functioning and the goals of the conservancy, and 
did not see therein the benefits it could generate for them, their ability to participate 
effectively (as opposed to turning up to the Annual General Meeting, enjoying the 
free food and going home again) would be compromised. Therefore, they deemed it 
appropriate and helpful to request assistance from the Institutional Working Group. 
The Working Group produced a document entitled ‘Tsiseb Conservancy: 
Proposed institutional and communications framework’ (Nott 2003). This document 
suggested the changes explored earlier, and effectively offered a framework for 
discussion on who should be involved in what, at what stage and how. After 
identifying the main activities of the conservancy, it split up the decision-making 
processes related to those activities into the following stages:  
 
• Who must initiate the activity 
• Who must be consulted to develop the way forward 
• Who takes the final decision based on the consultation process  
• Who must be informed of the decision taken and progress 
• To who [sic] has the board/conservancy committee delegated responsibility to 
ensure that it happens (ibid:6) 
 
Subsequently, a workshop in Tsiseb was arranged for 22nd-23rd July 2003, to discuss 
whether these arrangements were an acceptable vehicle for improving resident 
participation in the conservancy’s decision-making processes. If they were found 
acceptable to the group, they would be put to the conservancy residents at the Annual 
General Meeting.  
The workshop was facilitated by the document’s author, the conservancy 
manager, a RISE employee, and attended also by conservancy executive committee 
members and a Traditional Authority representative. ‘Facilitation’ commonly implies 
a low-key role, of assembling the relevant people, encouraging them to interact with 
each other. Facilitators intervene only insofar as is necessary for certain helpful 
questions to be posed, or to clarify the objectives of interaction, but otherwise letting 
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those people determine the course of that interaction and then working with whatever 
they come up with. The facilitators of this workshop might well have seen themselves 
in this light; other participants might also have done so. Nonetheless, the workshop 
was first and foremost an exercise in knowledge transfer, partly from the group to the 
facilitators, but more from the Institutional Working Group employee to the rest of 
the group. What the group would participate in was a discussion about whether to 
adopt a model for decision-making that an authority on institutional structures was 
proposing, and that a respected and trusted member of the support organisation 
appeared to endorse. Therefore, the agenda for the workshop was already in large 
measure pre-defined. What is likely to get overlooked by the above conception of 
facilitation is that one of the facilitators was also responsible for much of the content 
that would be facilitated. He had come with what he thought was a good set of 
recommendations for decision-making. This is not to say that his interaction with the 
group members could not have changed his opinion about these recommendations, or 
that he gave the group members no choice but to accept them; far from it. But his 
knowledge of what he was proposing rendered his participation indispensable and 
formed the basis of what there was to participate in. As it happened, the model was 
adopted with minimal adjustments. Either the group came to share the opinions of the 
Institutional Work Group employee, or at least saw fit not to contest them. There was 
a process of coordination of belief (Barnes, Bloor & Henry 1996), or at least 
acquiescence, in relation to what constituted valid knowledge about decision-making 
models.    
A second example (reworking material drawn from Newsham 2004:31-4) entails 
revisiting the Brandberg White Lady Lodge. As noted, the presence in the 
conservancy of the investors running the Lodge is mediated through a contract which 
ostensibly secures three types of substantial benefits for Tsiseb: 
 
1. financial – revenues for the conservancy 
2. employment for residents 
3. a structure through which local people can acquire the knowledge and skills 
through which, eventually, to manage the Lodge themselves 
 
During the negotiation of the contract, the principal actors were the investors, NGOs 
– in particular the Namibian Community Based Tourism Association (NACOBTA), 
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the Legal Assistance Centre and RISE (Rural Institute for Social Development and 
Empowerment) – and the conservancy executive committee. The legal expertise 
necessary for drafting the type of contract which emerged, as well as negotiation and 
facilitation skills, are part and parcel of the joint venture process, and required 
significant human resources that Tsiseb conservancy largely did not possess. These 
were held by the aforementioned NGOs, who consequentially played a considerable 
role in determining the character of the venture. Most conservancy residents could not 
have performed these functions: English, the language in which the contract is 
written, is a second or third language for some and not known by other. Nor was there 
much local experience on which to draw in negotiating favourable terms with the 
private sector. There were, then, significant stages of the joint venture process in 
which conservancy residents could not and did not participate. Their participation 
came in the form of having the final decision over whether to accept or reject the 
proposal; and in this they were guided by the conservancy executive committee, 
which advised the acceptance of the offer. 
Within the contract, the institutional structure through which conservancy 
residents are to participate in the joint venture is also elaborated. This assumes the 
form of the joint liaison committee, which comprises two conservancy executive 
committee representatives, a member of RISE, Tsiseb’s principal support 
organisation, and one private investor representative. In general terms, its role is: 
 
• to share and communicate plans, expectations, concerns and intentions 
between the two parties  
• to monitor the extent to which the contract is being observed by both parties 
• to recommend candidates for employment, and “facilitate the resolution of 
any disputes that might arise between the parties in relation to the employment 
of persons in terms of this agreement”31  
• to highlight, discuss and attempt to resolve issues of importance to either or 
both parties  
 
However, during the course of fieldwork the Joint Liaison Committee appeared 
not to be fulfilling all aspects of its envisaged role. Concerns were expressed about 
                                                 
31 Agreement of Lease for the Ugab River Wilderness Lodge Site in Tsiseb Conservancy, p27 
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the reluctance of the conservancy’s representatives on the committee to hold the 
investors to account on issues of employment and payments owed to the conservancy. 
Significantly, interviews with numerous employees revealed a lack of awareness of 
their contractually guaranteed rights, of what the Joint Liaison Committee was, and of 
its role as a mediator in labour disputes. This is especially pertinent given that the 
interviews revealed that some staff were working without a contract and at a rate of 
N$300 per month, N$200 less than the minimum agreed wage. During the period of 
the research, there appeared to be little or no contact between the Joint Liaison 
Committee and the lodge employees. Concerns were also expressed that the 
committee members were unfamiliar with the contents of the contract, and were 
therefore not in a good position to be able to discern the extent to which either party 
was observing it. When, in the Joint Liaison Committee meetings I attended, the 
committee’s functions were fulfilled, it was by a NACOBTA consultant. He knew the 
contract well, kept in some contact with the Lodge employees and encouraged the 
committee members to hold the investors to their obligations. That NACOBTA actors 
proved more capable participants in processes which they had been central to 
designing in the first place can come as no surprise. It is also illustrative of the size of 
the gap between the knowledge and skills necessary for the types of intervention 
proposed by implementing agencies and the knowledge and skills possessed by 
conservancy residents. Of course, built into the contract is the idea that residents will 
over a twenty year period acquire the skills and knowledge to run the Lodge without 
the need for support either from the NGO or private sectors. This type of objective 
must be borne in mind when making observations about how indispensable NGOs 
were, during fieldwork, to decision making in Tsiseb. Nevertheless, there is little in 
these arrangements that can be described as ‘grass-roots’.  
Looking beyond the Joint Liaison Committee members to conservancy residents 
more widely confirms the inadequacy of the ‘grass-roots’ description. Focus group 
work with residents revealed that often people did not know what the link between 
the Lodge and the conservancy was, what benefits, other than employment, it offered 
what or inducements to conserve wildlife in the area. This is understandable, given 
that for three of the eight focus group sessions conducted with residents, participants 
did not give any indication of knowing what a conservancy was, and requested me to 
explain it to them. Herein lies an important corollary of this focus on the link between 
knowing and deciding: for residents to participate at all, be it in decisions concerning 
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the enforcement of the Brandberg White Lady Lodge contract or other conservancy 
issues, there has to be a basic level of knowledge. In the absence of this, the extent to 
which local people can meaningfully participate in Tsiseb’s decision-making 
processes is limited.  
  
The significance of the link between knowing and deciding 
If it is accepted that support organisations deemed by their funders to have the 
knowledge and skills necessary to achieve the goals of the conservancy programme 
are rendered indispensable by the dynamics of knowledge transfer, another, and 
indeed more important, question suggests itself. What importance are we to attach to 
this phenomenon? First and foremost, I wish to stress once again that our account and 
understanding of participation in the conservancy programme is incomplete if we do 
not explore the consequences of knowledge transfer for who participates and on what 
basis. It has implications for policy formulation: any conservancy policy on 
participation would benefit from – or may be found deficient without – a clear and 
complete understanding of the factors which affect participation in conservancies. 
Whilst it would be inadequate to attempt to explain all participation in conservancy-
related activities purely as a function of knowledge transfer, I contend that a focus on 
it brings to light important considerations which need to be better considered and 
understood than is currently the case.  
Second, talk of the indispensability of support organisation actors, as a result of 
the knowledge gap between implementers and conservancy residents, is related to 
fractiously controversial issues of power and control within the conservancy 
programme. It could easily be enlisted to support concerns that non-governmental 
support organisations have too much control over the conservancy agenda and the 
power to exclude other agendas therein. But it could just as easily be enlisted to 
support the argument that the conservancy model is essentially sound. On this view, 
even if implementation is a far from perfect process, support organisations offer poor 
communal land inhabitants necessary, welcome knowledge and skills which will 
allow them to benefit from conserving wildlife in their area. Both ‘sides’ are explored 
below, but before doing so, it will be wise to clarify my intentions at this point. 
As an external observer whose cognitive authority to designate what the 
conservancy programme is or is not has been challenged, bringing up issues of power 
feels a little like stepping into a minefield. I think it unproductive and unnecessary to 
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exacerbate with my own research the acrimonious character of the relationship 
between some ‘external’ researchers and some of the conservancy programme’s 
practitioners. Nor do I want to make claims that go beyond what I can substantiate 
with my own data. Therefore, in the interests of frank and comprehensive debate, in 
this work I prioritise leaving space open for all viewpoints, rather than seeking to 
adjudicate between them.  
 
Reasons to be concerned about indispensability 
Concerns about the role of support organisations in the conservancy programme 
relate principally to what is included into the conservancy policy agenda, what is 
excluded, and who decides. From this standpoint, the idea that, through having their 
knowledge accepted as a sound basis for policy and legislation, some actors are 
central to predefining what there is to participate in, chimes with a number of 
perceived exclusionary dynamics. Sian Sullivan, perhaps the conservancy 
programme’s fiercest critic, has argued that the focus on “internationally-valued 
wildlife” is skewed along gender lines, as activities connected with the large 
mammals that subsequently receive much attention are the “preserve of men, as 
hunters, herders, ‘traditional’ leaders and conservationists” (2004 91). This bias, she 
contends, is evident in the make-up the community game guard system which, though 
often praised for including local people in wildlife management decisions, serves 
rather to exclude (Sullivan 2003a, 2003b). For her, it extends a conservation agenda 
pushed into communal areas, putting wildlife policing and anti-poaching activities 
(carried out by men) at the expense of rural development (2003a).  
Whilst ‘charismatic’ species like elephant and rhino receive protection, 
compensation to people for living with animals which pose a threat to crops property 
and even life and limb is, she maintains, allocated on a much less frequent basis. This 
was certainly an issue in Tsiseb conservancy, which had no initiative to address local 
concerns about the damage done by elephants to bore holes and crops. Moreover, the 
tourism activities that are supposed to provide the revenue that will provide local 
people with the incentive to continue living with what they see as dangerous animals 
actually produce much greater benefits for the tourism operators and trophy hunters 
who run them. Indeed, Sullivan concludes that ‘CBNRM in practice maintains the 
interests of conservationists, tour operators, hunters and tourists; i.e. those 
conventionally associated with “touristic” enjoyment of, and financial benefits from, 
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wildlife and “wilderness”’ (ibid: 165). The predominant focus on wildlife, for 
Sullivan, means also that a whole set of activities, bound up with considerations of 
ethnicity and gender, do not make it onto the conservancy programme’s agenda. She 
argues that the resource-gathering, which constitutes an important livelihood strategy 
for many Damara across North-west Namibia, as well as a rich and diverse body of 
local knowledge, tends to fall under the radar because it is an activity carried out 
largely by women, and employs a knowledge and skills set that the Damara had been 
thought to have lost (Sullivan 2004). 
Sullivan’s criticisms are echoed in other work, not least that conducted under the 
auspices of the snappily-abbreviated WILD (Wildlife Integration for Livelihoods 
Diversification) Project. WILD was a three-year research initiative, funded by the 
Department for International Development and based in the Ministry of Wildlife and 
Tourism. The overarching objective of the research was to investigate the impact on 
the livelihood activities of communal area inhabitants of changes in natural resource 
use that had been entailed by the initiation of the conservancy programme. The 
project acquired the reputation in Namibia of being considerably critical of the 
conservancy programme. A reader of the project’s Final Report (Long, ed. 2004) 
unacquainted with the tensions and arguments that emerged during the life of WILD 
might be puzzled at its controversial reception. The document is often glowing in its 
praise of the conservancy programme (see Long and Jones 2004a 162 for an 
example), provides reams of helpful socio-economic baseline data on people’s 
livelihoods and fills gaps on issues which all can agree are central to conservancy 
processes, such as wildlife use – legal and illegal – as a livelihood strategy. For all its 
restraint, though, one of its core arguments is that the “current approaches need 
revisiting and reviewing in the context of a better understanding of livelihoods and 
the implications of intervention at household level” (Long 2004).  
Although conservation objectives are being achieved in impressive fashion, it 
contends, the conservancy programme performs less well measured against indicators 
of human-wildlife conflict resolution. It argues that whilst significant benefits and 
revenues are also being generated in some conservancies, the extent to which they 
filter down to residents or provide sufficient compensation for the costs of living with 
conservation is much less clear. Issues of elite benefits capture and conservancy 
committees that are accountable upwards to the support organisations and donors, but 
considerably less so to conservancy residents, are also seen as cause for concern. The 
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document explains these perceived shortcomings by suggesting that livelihood issues 
have received less attention than is warranted owing to an over-concentration on 
conservation objectives. This bias it attributes to a sort of hierarchy within NACSO, 
in which the conservation NGOs have more control over resources than do those 
whose brief focuses more on livelihoods or rural development more widely (cf. Long 
and Jones 2004b). It also draws attention briefly to the rivalries “characterised by 
NACSO stakeholders themselves as the ‘white-led’ versus the ‘black-led’ NGOs” 
(ibid: 42), whilst warning against too simplistic an analysis of this dynamic (ibid:42). 
The chapter goes on to emphasise the value of NACSO as a mechanism for efficient 
coordination and argues that the conservancy programme could not have been 
implemented without it. However, it concludes that “addressing issues of 
development and livelihood support will require some reorganisation of support 
priorities” (ibid: 54).  
Recourse to the notion that the conservancy programme’s agenda is dominated by 
the concerns of a powerful conservationist clique explains the emergence of the term 
‘NGO livelihoods’. The undertone is that the conservancy programme is primarily a 
livelihood strategy for those who control the resources made available to it within the 
framework of the Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) programme.  It surfaces in 
observations about the salaries of NGO workers in comparison to the average income 
of the communal land inhabitants, to the expenses that mount up from the purchase 
and maintenance of four-wheel-drive vehicles etc. Support organisation participation, 
taking an extreme interpretation of this view, is explained by pure self interest. 
Getting the need for a transfer of the knowledge held by those NGOs accepted and 
funded, thereby rendering those with such knowledge indispensable, serves those 
interests well.  
It is doubtful that even the conservancy programme’s staunchest critics would 
seek to explain the motivations of all conservancy support organisations purely in 
terms of self interest. The issue does tie up, though, with the question of how likely 
conservancies are to become financially self-sustaining in the long-run, raised by 
Sullivan, amongst others (2003a). The disappointing economic performance of 
combined conservation and development initiatives in Southern Africa (ie. Bond 
2001, Murombedzi 2001), Sub Saharan Africa (Barrett and Arcese 1995) and 
elsewhere (Wells et al. 1999) makes such concerns especially pertinent. Filtered 
through an ‘NGO livelihoods’ perspective, disappointment may turn out to be design: 
 184
for as long as conservancies do not become financially independent, the rationale for 
continued intervention is guaranteed.  
 
Responding to concerns about indispensability 
Such criticisms have not gone unnoticed, nor have they passed without reply. Were 
the ‘NGO Livelihoods’ thesis to be put publicly in its most extreme form, it would 
meet with much anger and hostility. Given the long working hours and the longing to 
stop spending so much time driving their four-wheel drive vehicles that characterised 
many of the NGO workers that I met, such talk would likely be found offensive and 
cynical. 
To deal with Sullivan first, her work has been attacked on a number on a number 
of fronts. In one article, she recounts how she was thought by some – though by no 
means all – NGO support actors to be publishing ‘defamatory’ and ‘libellous’ 
information about the conservancy programme (2003b). Her work – and by 
implication the work of all ‘external’ researchers looking at the conservancy 
programme – was deemed irresponsible because she could say whatever she desired 
without having to face the consequences of those utterances (ibid). The consequences 
for the conservancy programme of her critique could be adverse, but would not 
prejudice her career. On the contrary, it would help her build an impressive 
publications record. In my own fieldwork in Namibia, I was offered many opinions – 
more often than not without soliciting them – on the validity and morality of 
Sullivan’s work, sufficient to become aware of how deeply it has stirred passions. An 
oft-repeated perception was that she generalised her argument on the basis of too 
small a sample. One commentator opined that she was more interested in interpreting 
the conservancy programme in terms of fashionable theories than she was in engaging 
constructively with its empirical complexities. Another thought she had failed to see 
how far beyond the ‘white male conservationist agenda’ the conservancy programme 
had travelled. The comment of yet another actor was concerned less with the quality 
of her work as with the way in which it was expressed: it was neither diplomatic nor 
constructive.  
The WILD (Wildlife Integration for Livelihoods Diversification) project received 
similar criticism. The accuracy of its data-set was contested; its researchers were 
accused of naïve and superficial understandings of the complex political and ethnic 
dimensions which explained why conservancies might be publicly criticised or 
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praised by residents. Like Sullivan, their research was accused of moving too 
carelessly from the specific to the general. Even when the validity of the research was 
not in question, the fact that as ‘outsiders’ they had required a long time to come to 
understand the intricacies of the conservancy programme meant that, even after three 
years of research, what they has produced could have been done as a six month desk-
study in Windhoek by one of its more seasoned practitioners. Therefore, for one 
critic, it added very little new knowledge and failed to fill the gaps about which it 
would have been productive to know more. It was also thought that the WILD team 
could have been more diplomatic and constructive in their criticism of the 
conservancy programme; although they appeared to fare better in this regard than 
Sullivan.  
In both the criticisms of the conservancy programme and the responses to them, it 
is hard not to suspect anger as a prime motivating factor in explaining the hostility 
generated. In my view, this hostility is regrettable and unhelpful. I suspect that it 
makes commentators liable to be less fair and less respectful of each other’s work, 
sometimes to the point of dismissing it wholesale. This would be an unfortunate 
response from anyone involved in the conservancy programme, as it could lead us to 
overlook points and recommendations that could in other circumstances be deemed 
constructive and valid by commentators on both sides of the divide. I would suggest 
that Sullivan’s work on the gathering habits of the Damara (i.e. 2004) provides 
information of great utility to conservancy policy makers. I myself have come to be 
grateful for criticisms of my own research programme in Namibia, in particular 
regarding how careful I might need to be in employing it generalise about the 
conservancy programme as a whole. At the time, though, I was angered by the 
manner in which these suggestions had been made to me. There is no magic solution 
to stopping disputes becoming too personal, other than leaving space for a variety of 
opinions, with a view to encouraging frank, comprehensive and good-tempered 
debate.  
Clearly, then, the concept of ‘circularity in intervention’ lends itself to critical 
appraisals of the conservancy programme. But it need not be taken as an a priori 
condemnation of the enterprise. If the conservancy programme is fundamentally an 
exercise in knowledge transfer, then does it not follow that, once the transfer is 
complete, the support organisations will become entirely dispensable? If we recall the 
classification of conservancies as fast, medium and long track, could we not argue 
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that it brings into sharp focus the extent to which weaning conservancies off their 
dependency upon support organisations is the overall rationale of providing support? 
There is no obligation to initiate a conservancy; rather, support organisations are 
approached by communal area inhabitants who for one reason or another want to 
form one. Once a conservancy is formed and assigned a support organisation, neither 
its committee institutions nor its residents need take the advice offered by the support 
organisation; nor need they sign up to suggestions to negotiate a hunting concession 
or enter into a joint venture agreement with a private investor. 
Evidence from Tsiseb conservancy can be used to support these points. Tsiseb 
was slowly weaning itself off at least some of the support it received from RISE 
(Rural Institute for Social Development and Empowerment) and NACOBTA 
(Namibian Community-Based Tourism Association), as well as the budgetary support 
it received from NACSO. The executive committee had become capable of taking 
many decisions without seeking advice, and had been inclined on some occasions not 
to follow the advice that was offered. For instance, NACOBTA had advised against 
accepting the bid for the running of the lodge put in by Kobus de Jager, the principal 
investor in the Brandberg White Lady Lodge, on the basis that he did not have an 
established track record of running the size of operation he had proposed. The 
committee, though, decided to recommend to conservancy residents de Jager’s 
proposal at the Annual General Meeting. This decision may or may not have been 
prudent. The Brandberg White Lady Lodge was generating income for the 
conservancy, but investors had fallen behind on monthly payments and were 
encountering difficulties absorbing the heavy start-up costs entailed by the 
construction of the lodge. It was unclear in 2004 whether they would be able to stave 
off potential bankruptcy, but in order to make that possibility a little less likely, the 
conservancy committee had decided to be flexible with payment demands. Whether 
mistaken or inspired, the decision indicates that the conservancy committee was 
starting to take decisions based on its own criteria, not just those of support 
organisations.  
Deciding to accept the proposal that led to the Brandberg White Lady Lodge is 
one thing. Having the knowledge, skills and resources to negotiate the contract 
through which the conservancy’s benefits are legally guaranteed is another. But it 
remains the case that the conservancy committee retained discretion over how much 
of this advice and assistance to accept or discard. Its acceptance indicated a process 
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roughly similar to a coordination of beliefs about the purposes that the Lodge should 
serve. Nothing was forced upon them; rather the agreements were negotiated and 
arrived at by consensus, which, as demonstrated, is an idea from an available and 
widely-accepted knowledge tradition. 
Finally, a comment on the relations between the executive committee and the 
support organisations, which was by and large very amicable. That the RISE staff 
based in Uis were black (one of them was Damara, hailing from the nearby town of 
Omaruru) made good relations easier; although relations with the white as well as 
black NACOBTA staff that made visits to Tsiseb were just as friendly. Perhaps most 
importantly in regard to the question of indispensability, RISE staff in particular 
made it clear one various occasions, such as executive committee meetings, that the 
conservancy had to prepare itself for their departure. Owing to the popularity of the 
conservancy programme, RISE was providing support to increasing numbers of 
conservancies and was being called upon ever more to assist in the process of 
conservancy formation. They could not maintain the same level of support for Tsiseb 
that they had in previous years, attended fewer conservancy committee meetings and 
were called away from Uis with greater frequency, reflecting a shift in their priorities.  
 
5. Conclusion  
I hope with this chapter to have illustrated the importance of exploring the link 
between knowing and deciding if we are to understand who participates and on what 
basis within Tsiseb conservancy. As the course of my analysis suggests, I think that 
what applies to Tsiseb may well apply to other conservancies. The extent to which it 
does will depend according to context. We might wish to use it to locate 
conservancies on a sliding scale, running from the indispensability to the 
dispensability of support organisations. I hope also to have demonstrated that, whilst 
viewing the conservancy programme as an exercise in knowledge transfer can lend 
support to a variety of (sometimes diametrically opposed) standpoints regarding 
issues of power, control and their effects upon implementation, it is not intended 
solely as a criticism. Rather, it is intended as a way of clarifying what type of 
participation characterises the conservancy programme, and the extent to which 
having or not having knowledge affects who participates and on what basis. 
Moreover, in a context in which increasing attention is now being paid to the 
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specifics of participation, as opposed to agreement on the premise that local 
participation is a good and necessary condition of sustainable natural resource 
management, I think that having a clearer view of a central factor in determining 
participation in the conservancy programme is very helpful to the policy-making 







Chapter VIII  
The municipality of Los Toldos 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The municipality of Los Toldos is located in a sub-Andean mountain chain running 
through the province of Salta and on into Bolivia. The landscape is therefore one of 
sweeping valleys, towering peaks and steep slopes with a dense cover of subtropical 
mountain forest, better known in Argentina as the ‘Yungas’. This forest has become 
an object of considerable conservation value and forms the ‘eco-region’ across a part 
of which the activities of the Alto Bermejo Project unfold. The Yungas are not only 
found in Argentina. In total, this type of forest stretches down the eastern slopes of 
the Andes from Venezuela to Northwest Argentina in a series of discontinuous strips 
covering 4.5-4.8 million hectares (Brown et al. 2001). Within Argentina, it stretches 
southwards along the eastern Andean foothills, in narrow strips for roughly 700km, 
from the border with Bolivia in the North, down to the province of Catamarca (Brown 
and Grau 1993). 
Altitude is the principal variable which determines the composition of vegetation 
within the Yungas, and the range of 400-3000m (above sea level) across which the 
forest grows, can be divided into three distinct layers: 
 
1. Piedmont forest. This layer grows between 400-700m and is also known as 
“transition forest” (Cabrera 1976). Much of this forest type has since 
disappeared, owing to the expansion over two centuries of the agricultural 
frontier (Brown et al. 2001 629)  
2. Mountain Forest, which grows between 700-1500m (ibid.)  
3. ‘Cloud forest’, which grows between 1500-3000m, so-called because of the 
cloud formations that envelop large areas of the forest at such altitudes during 
the rainy season (ibid).  
 
Ever since a section of the Argentine-Bolivian border was re-drawn in 1938, the 
Valley of Los Toldos, which incorporates the present day municipality of Los Toldos, 
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has been located within the Department of Santa Victoria, in the province of Salta, 
Northwest Argentina. Historically, however, the village of Los Toldos is a product of 
settlement patterns in the Tarija Valley in modern Bolivia. Its current situation was 
forged principally through the interplay of: colonisation; migration; war; trade; the 
adjustment of national borders between Argentina and Bolivia; and the uneven 
industrialisation of the Argentine Northwest.  
This chapter kicks off in section two with a broad-brush sketch of these 
interwoven processes which, when taken together, constitute a history of geographical 
isolation, marginalisation and concomitant poverty. After offering a brief background 
history of the area, the focus switches to events post-1938 in section three. Three 
themes are explored in particular. First, the municipality continues to have more in 
common with the nineteenth-century, pre-industrial Bolivian setting which first gave 
rise to permanent Hispanic settlement than it does with, say, modern-day Buenos 
Aires. Second, changes have occurred following the assimilation of Los Toldos into 
Argentina, not least because of the increased presence of the state from the mid 1960s 
onwards. The municipality is less poor as a result of its incorporation into the 
Province of Salta, but toldeños, the inhabitants of Los Toldos, have become 
increasingly dependent upon state resources. Third, this dependency facilitates the 
development of the political machines that are part and parcel of municipal, regional 
and national politics in Argentina (cf. Levitsky 2001, 2003). I draw on Susan Stokes’s 
(Stokes 2005) account of perverse accountability in order to demonstrate how access 
to valued state resources is often determined by political allegiance. The chapter 
concludes with a consideration of how this history of isolation and poverty has 
shaped the basis on which toldeños engage with and participate in the Alto Bermejo 
Project. 
Finally, a note on the focus on the specific history of Northwest Argentina. This 
contrast with the general history given for Namibia reflects nothing more than the 
sources available during the research period. Had there been more material available 









Map 8.1 – The municipality of Los Toldos  
Source: LIEY  
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Not a great deal is known about the inhabitants of the upper basin of the River 
Bermejo prior to the arrival of the Spanish, although the “Yungas” (subtropical 
mountain forests) of the zone are thought to have been inhabited since approximately 
10,000 B.C. (Brown et al. 2001 646), and in greater numbers than currently inhabit 
the zone (Bolsi 1997, Reboratti 1996). The origins and history of many of the peoples 
thought to have populated the area are still a matter of much conjecture and relatively 
little research, but two that are worth mentioning in connection with Lipeo are the 
Mataguayo and the Chiriguano. The Mataguayo are thought to have been hunter-
gatherers (Reboratti, 1996) and the Chiriguano, of the Tupí-Guaraní familiy, to have 
been shifting cultivators (Ventura 1991) who migrated southwards between the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (Gil Montero and Massé 2004b). ‘Chiriguano’ is a 
Quechua term which translates roughly as ‘those who die of cold’, interpreted by 
Giannecchini (1996) as meaning that they were incapable of living at 4000m above 
sea level.  
It has been suggested that toldeños have continued the farming practices of the 
Chiriguano, (Natenzon 1993, although she is not explicit about the basis on which 
this assertion is made). Interestingly, there is local speculation in Los Toldos that 
Lipeo inhabitants in particular may be of (at least) partial Chiriguano descent, given 
that their facial characteristics are held by some to be different to the more Hispanic 
features claimed for the inhabitants of the nearby village of Los Toldos. Certainly, 
toponymic evidence testifies to Chiriguano presence in the area: Lipeo would appear 
to derive from Ipeu, one of the place names that are taken to denote the arrival of the 
Chiriguano to the upper basin of the river Bermejo (Reboratti, 1996:44). However, to 
cast Lipeo in the light of a surviving remnant of Chiriguano culture whilst setting up 
Los Toldos as a place of a contrastingly Hispanic heritage may have more to do with 
local identity politics, which denote ‘Indian’ as low status and Hispanic as 
respectable, than with significant genetic or cultural differences between the people of 
the two places. Nor are the people of current-day Lipeo alone in practising shifting 
cultivation; rather, it is a livelihood activity common to most of the residents of the 
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municipality of Los Toldos. The historical Chiriguano presence in the area may be 
more likely help us understand local life not just in Lipeo but also in the surrounding 
areas, including into modern Southern Bolivia.  
 
The arrival of the Spanish, war and the establishment of the marquesado  
The period of Hispanic colonisation which, in the case of what is now Southern 
Bolivia and Northwest Argentina, ran from the sixteenth to the end of the nineteenth 
century, was established and consolidated through four central factors: military force 
(Giannecchini 1996), missionaries (Teruel 1999), the introduction of livestock 
(Comajuncosa y Hortet 1993) and intermarriage  between Spanish and autochthonous 
populations (Susnik 1968). Subjects of the Spanish Crown who had travelled to the 
‘New World’ were persuaded to ‘take possession’ of land – and effectively the people 
living upon it – through the granting of the encomienda (the right to put ‘indigenous’ 
inhabitants to work on a piece of land) or the merced (the ceding of a piece of land to 
the subject who would work it or have it worked); although in practical terms, both 
amounted to the same thing, as far as colonial settlers in the zone were concerned 
(Reboratti 1996). On this basis the great latifundios or fincas (estates or ranches) were 
gradually established, becoming important economic centres of agricultural and 
livestock production (ibid.). Eventually, an area which includes the current 
municipality of Los Toldos would be subsumed into the finca named Toldos, which 
itself formed part of a wider marquesado (marquisate, or territory pertaining to a 
marquis), comprising a number of fincas. Important though the marquesados were to 
the economy of the zone until well into the nineteenth century, their constituent parts 
were not homogenous, precisely because not all of the peoples who inhabited the 
further-flung territories to which a Marqués (Marquis) might make claim were easily 
dominated. Establishing the kind of settled agriculture and livestock farming 
activities on which a Marquesado depended was far from straightforward in areas 
claimed and defended by the people who had lived there for centuries before the 
arrival of the Spanish. The chronicles of missionaries of the time make this clear (i.e.  
Nordenskjold 1917), with special reference to the ferocity of resistance that came 
from the Chiriguano who, for Reboratti (1996), were an indomitable and bellicose 
group that waged war not only on the Spanish but also on the Mataguayo. Gil 
Montero and Massé (2004:2) take a slightly different view, arguing that the 
Chiriguano were more selective in their ferocity, tending to make alliances with the 
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Spanish in their campaigns against the Mataguayo. For this reason, they contend, up 
until the start of the nineteenth century, Spanish Christian and Chiriguano groups 
could largely coexist in parts of the Toldos Valley.  
Whatever form the alliances and animosities between these three groups may have 
taken, up until little more than a hundred years ago, Toldos Valley, in which most of 
the present-day municipality of Los Toldos is located, resembled a no man’s land, a 
war zone between the Chiriguano and the Mataguayo peoples (ibid.). This was 
despite the fact that, following the close of the wars of independence from the 
Spanish crown in the 1820s, the valley became part of the Bolivian Canton of Tarija – 
at least on paper. Any sort of human settlement would, therefore, have been transitory 
in character until the Chiriguano frontier had been pushed steadily eastwards towards 
the end of the nineteenth century (ibid.). As Gil Montero and Massé point out, this 
instability contrasts with the image, drawn by a traveller from Salta in 1791, of 
prosperity and plenty derived from working the land in the fertile valleys of Tarija 
(cited in Dalence 1975 [1851]). However, the Toldos valley was probably the last of 
those in Tarija to be conquered, and therefore the prosperity from the surrounding 
environs that did arrive came only at a later stage.  
Whilst this account demonstrates that Uis and Los Toldos evidently share a history 
of colonisation, it also makes clear how very different they are. Los Toldos was at the 
end of a wave of colonisation that can be traced back to the sixteenth century. Its 
peaceable settlement by people of European descent marked the final chapter in the 
story of the area’s territorial consolidation. West-central Namibia, the area in which 
Uis would later be built, was caught up in the ‘scramble for Africa’ which occurred in 
the 1880s. It was settled Europeans, unlike other parts of modern Namibia, and 
indeed comparatively soon after the arrival of the German colonial presence. The pre-
Hispanic indigenous groups in and around the valley of Los Toldos were far more – 
although by no means completely – assimilated first into Bolivian and then Argentine 
identities through inter-marriage than the Damara, Herero and Nama groups were 
assimilated into the identities of German or South African colonisers. The 
environments in which the two places were settled also differed vastly: the valley of 
Los Toldos lay nestled between densely forested Andean mountain chains, whilst Uis 




From the marquesado to patchy industry 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the direct economic importance of the 
marquesado (marquisate) declined. In the first half of the century, this phenomenon 
was due to the interruption of trade routes during the wars of independence (Langer 
and Conti 1991). In the second half, the uneven process of industrialisation gained 
momentum in the Argentine Northwest, and reduced income generated by the big 
fincas (Reboratti, 1996). With the establishment of countries following the wars of 
independence, some marquesados were over time cut in two by the new (albeit 
vaguely drawn) national borders (Langer and Conti, 1991). This was the fate of the 
Marquesado de Tojo, at one point perhaps the richest and most politically important 
in its vicinity (ibid.). Some of the fincas (estates) which comprised it were declared to 
be in Argentine territory, whilst others, such as the Los Toldos Finca, pertained to 
Bolivia. Making what was broadly one unit into two and subjecting it to different 
governments, legal and taxation systems, made it harder to ensure that a marquesado 
based on agricultural production and sale continued to be profitable.  
After the Los Toldos finca had been sold, subdivided into smaller properties and 
resold in the course of the nineteenth century, and perhaps 40-50 years after it had 
become sufficiently peaceable to permit the inhabitation of smallholder farmers, the 
area it covered became part of Argentina. A border change between Bolivia and its 
southern neighbour was drawn up in 1925, in the form of the Carrillo-Diez de Medina 
Treaty. The treaty was ratified in Bolivia in 1929, and finally brought into effect in 
1938 when the Bolivian Vice Canton of Los Toldos was incorporated into the 
Argentine Department of Santa Victoria, Province of Salta32.  
 The nature of income derived from fincas (estates) also changed, from the 
production of goods for sale at markets to the extraction of rent and grazing fees from 
the tenant farmers living on the land. With the development of the sugar industry, 
though, the fincas provided the necessary manpower to process the sugar harvest 
(zafra), at the large sugar refineries. The necessity of paying rent and grazing fees in 
hard currency obliged tenant farmers to look for paid work for several months of the 
year. This was convenient for the province of Salta’s landowning oligarchy, many of 
whom had shares in the province’s sugar refineries. It offered them a ready-made 
workforce, who in addition started to buy food supplies from their landlords, because 
                                                 
32 Tratado de límites con la República de Bolivia, http://www.argentina-rree.com/7/7-061.htm  
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the interruption from working in the sugar harvest did not always permit them to 
carry out all of the livelihood activities which had previously satisfied their families’ 
subsistence needs. In this way, what Reboratti has called the ‘iron circle’ was forged 
(1989). Whether by accident or design, the development of the profitable sugar 
industry in some parts of the Northwest ensured that other parts of it remained poor, 
isolated as they were from many of the benefits of industrialisation, such as 
infrastructural investment and improvements, or greater access to public education 
and health services. At the same time, those who migrated from poorer, remoter spots 
to work seasonally contributed to the development of industrialising areas and 
thereby unwittingly (or perhaps unwillingly) reinforced the inequitable character of 
that development. 
For a significant portion of the Twentieth century, many of its inhabitants entered 
into this cycle. This was not the case for everyone, though: whilst still part of Bolivia 
and even after its assimilation into Argentina, there were significant amounts of living 
in the valley who owned the plots they lived on. A country-wide cadastral survey 
from 1906 registered the presence of 128 properties and 73 title-holders in the Toldos 
Valley, reflecting the aforementioned process of subdivision of the Toldos Finca into 
smaller plots over the course of the nineteenth century33. The majority of these would 
probably have been farmed by their owners (Gil Montero pers. com.), or perhaps 
rented out to one or two small farmers. There may not, in this scenario of 
smallholders, have been the same imperative to rely on the income from seasonal 
labour, and it may therefore not have been sought by all of the valley’s residents. 
Nonetheless, there were still tenant farmers on larger landholdings who felt this 
imperative more keenly. In order to comply with their financial obligations, tenant 
farmers work for up to six months at a time in the San Martín de Tabacal sugar 
refinery, one of the province of Salta’s largest. Indeed, through the first half of the 
twentieth century, sugar harvesting and other seasonal activities became an 
increasingly important source of income for many of the valley’s inhabitants. How 
increasing numbers of small-holder farmers became tenant farmers – i.e. became 
considerably poorer – seemingly in the first decades of the twentieth is not 
understood. Hopefully, it will in future be taken up by impressive scholars of the 
Argentine Northwest such as Raquel Gil Montero.   
                                                 
33 Catastro de la provincia de Arce. Registro de las fincas rústicas del vicecantón de Toldos, 
1906, Bolivian National Archives and Library. 
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However, the modernisation of the process of sugar cane harvesting reduced the 
dependency of the Sugar refineries upon large quantities of manual labour. After 
1960, new technology for cutting and burning sugar cane, as well as for loading and 
transporting it, led to the hiring of far fewer workers for the sugar harvest, leaving 
much of the Northwest’s rural population with more precarious employment 
prospects (Campi 1991). This has certainly been the case in the municipality of Los 
Toldos at large, in which the level of seasonal migration has sharply dropped since 
the 1960s, replaced by a rising trend of permanent migration to urban centres in Salta 
and surrounding provinces (Gil Montero and Massé 2004a, Salta 2002).  
Here once again a fundamental difference can be noted with respect to Uis, which 
was very much the product of the development of the tin-mining industry in West-
central Namibia. It benefited, up until the closure of the mine, from industrial 
development. Moreover, it did not engender a cycle of seasonal migration, as it 
provided sufficiently stable, year-round employment which enabled workers to settle 
in Uis.   
 
3. Los Toldos since 1938 
 
Geography, infrastructure and continuity with Bolivia  
Owing to its history, the municipality of Los Toldos has to this day in many ways 
more in common with rural Bolivia than it does with Argentina. Residents of the 
municipality of Los Toldos often have relatives living in Bolivia. Women dressed in 
wide-brimmed hats, patterned, pleated skirts worn just below the knee and llama or 
vicuna wool shawls are not an uncommon sight either side of a local border which, in 
terms of the movement of persons and goods, is purely notional. During the period of 
field research, there was no border post or customs checkpoint to mark an entry/exit 
point between the two countries (though there was talk at another customs checkpoint 
of building one in the near future). What provides a more tangible degree of 
separation is the River Bermejo, roughly 75km of whose course constitutes the 
western leg of the v-shaped kink in the national border.  
Bolivian influence on the make-up of Los Toldos persists in large measure due to 
infrastructural and geographical factors. To this day, the only vehicle access from 
Argentina to Los Toldos is through Bolivia. The journey involves crossing the River 
 199
Bermejo 50-60km downstream at the (Argentine) border town of Aguas Blancas and 
heading north along the Pan-American Highway. Los Toldos is served by a turn-off 
from the Highway down to the River Bermejo. Once on the other side of the river, a 
wide dirt track winds and twists its way up the valley for twelve kilometres, passing 
en route the settlements of El Condado and La Misión before coming into the village 
of Los Toldos. Since 2002, access has been made much easier by the construction and 
opening of a bridge. Prior to this date, vehicle access was determined by the water-
level of the river, which in the wet season (in summer) was more often than not 
sufficiently high to block the passage even of four wheel drive or other high ground-
clearance vehicles. Goods and people were instead ferried across by means of a 
roldana, a pulley-wheel and cable-operated system. Even before the building of the 
bridge, though, it was easier for people living in the municipality of Los Toldos to 
cross to the Bolivian locale of La Mamora than for them to travel to Santa Victoria 
Oeste, the ‘capital’ of the department of Santa Victoria, which Los Toldos became 
part of in 1938. A round trip on foot from Los Toldos village to La Mamora could be 
done within one day at most. A return journey to Santa Victoria Oeste and back from 
Los Toldos village, in contrast, involved (and still involves) a 40km trek along 
narrow footpaths that cross five Andean valleys. A return trip would require at the 
very least two long and arduous days at a pace that could only be sustained by hardy 
cattle herders (vaqueanos). This journey could not safely be attempted in the rainy 
season.  
There was talk in the 1970s of building a road within Argentina to Baritú National 
Park, which would also have provided access to Los Toldos, thereby rendering it 
unnecessary to enter via Bolivia. However, such suggestions have not as yet made 
significant headway against two strong objections set against them. The first came 
from the Administration of National Parks, which has argued that a route through the 
Park would open up previously inaccessible primary Yungas forest to illegal logging 
activity. Logging does appear to have been poorly controlled in the areas surrounding 
the park (Bianchetti 1973). The second relates to the construction costs of any 
potential route: to go through the Park would be expensive, to go around it even more 
so. Certainly, it would be no small feat of engineering to build across so many tree-
lined valleys, passes and rivers. Given how unlikely it is that Los Toldos will in the 
near future be connected by road to the rest of the province of Salta, the influence of 
and local ties with Bolivia are bound to remain strong.  
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Unchanged local livelihood activities 
The remoteness of Los Toldos both explains why so many of its residents continue to 
earn at least part of their living from activities which have been practised in the 
region for hundreds of years, whilst also shaping the extent and character of those 
activities. The majority of people in Los Toldos depend in varying degrees for their 
livelihood on livestock farming and cultivation, largely for subsistence purposes, 
sometimes for (non-monetary) exchange, known locally as trueque, and occasionally 
for sale at local and regional markets.  
Shifting cultivation is widely practised in the municipality. The following account 
is based partly on personal observation but also on Ramadori’s study of shifting 
cultivation in Baritú, a village in the southernmost part of the municipality which 
(importantly for its inhabitants) is located outside the boundaries of its namesake park 
(Ramadori 1995 208-212). Individual families clear small plots (known as rozas) of 
forest cover, measuring between 0.3ha to 3ha, and normally sow them for between 
one and three years, depending on the altitude. In Lipeo, for instance, where plots are 
generally cleared at 900-1300m above sea level, it is possible to use the same land for 
up to three years. The altitude of Baritú, at 1500-1700m, militates against sowing the 
same land for more than one season. After use, plots are left fallow for up to twenty 
years. Leaving plots to recover sufficient nutrients for cultivation requires a family 
either to clear another or to return to one which has previously been left fallow 
(known locally as a champa). 
Crops are harvested between March and April (autumn), following which the 
clearance of another portion of forest is started, generally next to or as close as 
possible to the harvested plot. Towards the end of winter, cultivators burn cleared 
vegetation on top of the plots, leaving aside some of the felled tree-trunks to fence the 
plots, so as to stop livestock intrusions. In spring (September-October), having burnt 
the vegetation, the plots are sown. Holes are dug in the ashen surface at an average 
distance of 1.15m apart, with 3-5 seeds apportioned to every hole. During the summer 
(November-February), it is necessary to ‘clean’ the plots repeatedly, an arduous and 
unpopular task which involves chopping down re-emerged vegetation whilst taking 
care not to harm the crops sown.  
The most widely grown crop is maize, followed by potatoes and groundnuts, but a 
number of vegetables are also grown, such as peas, broad bean, onion, pumpkin, 
sweet potato, garlic and chilacayote (similar to Thai marrow). Subsistence fruit-
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growing, mostly of orange and lime but also lemon, mandarin and grapefruit in 
smaller quantities, is also widespread. In his study, based exclusively on maize 
production, Ramadori calculated that one hectare yielded 1057kg of maize on 
average, providing an average family size of eight with a maximum of 1,278 kcal per 
day (ibid.:210), much lower than the World Health Organisation’s average of 2,000 
kcal per day for adult women and 2,500 kcal for adult men. Ramadori argues that 
other crops are not grown in sufficient quantities to compensate for this shortfall in 
calorie intake. It is hard to dispute this argument, and, sadly, easy to spot signs of 
malnutrition within the populace of the municipality. However, it should not be 
concluded most people are malnourished: one local medic thinks instances of it are 
more common in areas such as Lipeo, El Arazáy or Baritú, but less so in others, such 
as Los Toldos village or El Condado. Birth rates have dropped and pensions/subsidies 
income helps compensate low roza yields. 
 Livestock farming in Los Toldos complements subsistence cultivation. Although 
sheep are quite often kept as well, occasionally as goat, and despite a recent 
resurgence of farmyard animals such as egg-laying hens, cattle predominate and are 
kept in greater numbers than any other animal. Livestock serve a variety of practical 
purposes in Los Toldos: 
 
• Subsistence – sheep, for instance are bred for meat and, increasingly, for wool 
as a response to an increase in local artisanal production.   
• Cattle are slaughtered for local festivals.  
• Cattle in particular constitute a form of security and savings. 
 
 Livestock, and in particular cattle, also have intrinsic and symbolic value. Herd size 
is an indication of status and sometimes also of power (though it would be erroneous 
to assume that the most important powerbrokers in Los Toldos also had the largest 
cattle herds). Therefore, some people choose not to eat as many of their animals as 
they might in order to maintain a larger herd size.  
As in other parts of Northwest Argentina, toldeños employ a system of 
transhumance, in order to make the best of the grazing resources available to them. 
From November to March, cattle (but not sheep) are taken higher up the mountains to 
pastures above the treeline (2,500-4,000m) From April to October, they are brought 
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down into the Yungas, where the grazing is less nutritious and less abundant, but 
sufficient nonetheless to provide an alternative that takes pressure off the pastures 
further up the mountains.   
In neither cultivation nor livestock farming have toldeños made, until recently, 
recourse to modern agricultural inputs and techniques. The introduction of some of 
these, to the extent that they are deemed useful by potential users, underpins the 
agroforestry initiatives carried out by the Pro Yungas Foundation and the Social 
Agricultural Programme, within the framework of the Alto Bermejo Project (these 
initiatives are explored further on in the chapter). It is not difficult to trace the 
continuance of such practices back to the isolation of the municipality in relation to 
the rest of Argentina. By dint of its location in a heavily-forested, mountainous 
region, it was poorly served by road connections and ill-suited to the agricultural 
economies of scale that had emerged in lower, uniformly flatter parts of the region.  
 
Changes in Los Toldos through assimilation  
Notwithstanding the Municipality’s strong links to Bolivia, it would be very odd if 
becoming part of another, much richer country had not engendered significant 
change. And, clearly, it has, in both predictable and surprising ways. Given the 
history of Los Toldos, it is initially baffling to discover that ‘Bolivian’ is often, 
though by no means always, a dirty word in the municipality. ‘Bolivian’ has become 
a term imbued with undesirable connotations of low status, in contrast with the 
respectability and relative affluence associated with being Argentine. Upon further 
inspection, this adjustment of local identity is indicative of other changes that have 
occurred since the area was assimilated into Argentina.   
Initially, the inhabitants of Los Toldos were not keen to be associated with 
Argentina. The Provincial Government of Salta was slow to adapt to the changed 
border arrangements, and did not until the 1960s make serious efforts to incorporate 
the newcomers into the province. According to the Salta Tribune, a provincial daily, 
the establishment in 1965 of the Municipal Commission (27 years after the border 
treaty was ratified) did not meet with any great amount of local approval. One 
inhabitant was cited in the newspaper as saying 
 
They have brought laws that are not known here and they go against the people. They don’t leave 
people be for tomadas [consumption of alcohol on public holidays] on the days they are accustomed to. 
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They don’t allow trading with Bolivia. They want to oblige us to fly the Argentine flag on our houses, 
with the majority of us here being Bolivians [19.6.1965; my translation]. 
 
Such protests can hardly have been conducive to encouraging the toldeños to embrace 
a more Argentine identity; what, therefore, prompted the change? This question is 
another clear candidate for further research, but the most likely factors are, first, the 
significantly increased state presence in the area and, second, the negative perception 
of Bolivians in the Argentine Northwest more widely.  
Although slow to start, the state’s growing presence, over the course of the last 
third of the twentieth century, became the central source of economic development in 
Los Toldos, especially in terms of employment opportunities. Following the 
establishment of the municipal council, and concentrated mostly in the village of Los 
Toldos, the area has played host to the opening of: 
 
• a primary and lower-secondary school 
• a health clinic, recently expanded to form a small hospital with a travelling 
clinic that visits other villages and settlements in the municipality 
• a town hall 
• a small library 
• a provincial police station 
 
Local and provincial government have become one of the most important sources of 
employment and other forms of revenue. In total, combining municipal and provincial 
jobs with pensions paid, local government accounts for 21% of all sources of income 
for people in the municipality aged over 15 (Salta 2002). This does not include other 
subsidies, such as the Work Plan, the Plan for Household Heads or the food assistance 
for those deemed poorest, all provided by the federal government. The figure is even 
more significant given that 53.7% of those aged over 15 reported that they had no 
source of income (ibid).  Herein lies a significant parallel with Uis, Namibia, where 
pension payouts and state employment are essential contributors to local livelihood 
(see chapter 7). However, this similarity plays out differently between Namibia and 
Argentina, especially in regards to the political systems which characterise the two 
contexts (as the following sub-section explores in greater detail). 
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The greater presence of the state coincided with the decline in opportunities for 
seasonal labour, upon which local livelihood strategies had been partially based for 
much of the twentieth century (Gil Montero and Massé 2004a, 2004b). The amount of 
manpower required for harvesting sugar cane started to drop off in the 1960s and then 
more sharply in the 1970s, owing to the introduction of machines to the process 
(Campi 1991). In turn, and not just in Los Toldos but also in other isolated, rural parts 
of the Argentine Northwest, the drying up of work in the sugar industry led to a 
change in migration patterns from rural-rural to rural-‘urban’ (Gil Montero and Massé 
2004b:12). I put ‘urban’ in inverted commas because by it Gil Montero and Massé 
refer not just to rural migration to provincial or departmental capitals, but also to the 
biggest villages within a given municipality, a use of the term which rather fudges the 
rural-urban divide. Los Toldos village is a case in point: it witnessed a population 
increase in the 1980s and on into the 1990s (ibid.). Montero and Massé argue that this 
upturn is explained by two principal factors: 
 
1. The mortality rate has declined much more sharply than the birth rate since 
the end of the 1960s.  
2. There has been a significant decline in migration patterns to the bigger cities  
 
This second factor in particular is a marker of urbanisation: migration to bigger cities 
has ceased, at least in the case of Los Toldos, because people have replaced seasonal 
labour with state employment and subsidies (ibid). They make the further claim that 
the availability of these income sources has led to the frequent abandonment of the 
livestock and cultivation activities common to the rural economy. Arguably, Gil 
Montero and Massé underplay the importance to livelihood strategies of these 
activities. Nonetheless, salaries, subsidies and other forms of access to state resources 
are a crucial form of income for many in Los Toldos.  
The sheer extent of the state’s increased presence in Los Toldos since 1965 
explains its significant impact on local identity. There is a very straightforward sense 
in which it pays to be Argentine. Without Argentine citizenship, the people of Los 
Toldos would in many ways be worse off. A comparison of modern-day Los Toldos 
with neighbouring Padcaya, the Bolivian Vice-Canton of which Los Toldos formed 
part prior to 1938, is illuminating. Los Toldos remains among the poorest 
municipalities in the province of Salta: according to the Los Toldos Strategic Plan 
 205
document, the basic needs of 69.1% of the population are unmet (Salta 2002:35). Yet 
in Padcaya, according to the Bolivian national census of 2001, basic needs were 
unmet for 88.1% of its residents. The comparatively improved fortunes of the 
toldeños correlate closely with the increased presence of the state since the 1960s. 
Economically speaking, therefore, it makes little sense for the area’s inhabitants to 
play the Bolivian identity card. 
It is easy to see how these economic incentives for the adoption of an Argentine 
identity would have been accompanied by social ones. In Northwest Argentina in 
particular, but also in the country more widely, there is a recognisable (although by 
no means universal) tendency to denigrate people of Bolivian origin (boliviano). It is 
a striking irony that boliviano is sometimes used pejoratively in Los Toldos. Even this 
cursory consideration of Argentine animosity towards Bolivia offers clues as to why 
it would be expedient for toldeños to identify themselves with Argentina. 
 
Local politics: ‘small town, big hell’ 
The local importance of the state is so great that the emergence of a culture of 
dependency is to be expected. The livelihood strategies of many, both in Los Toldos 
and in the department of Santa Victoria more widely, are now tied into various forms 
of local, provincial and national assistance. Dependency is the most crucial factor in 
understanding political dynamics in the municipality. In an economically 
impoverished context, a municipal council with employment opportunities and 
control over state resources can prove a valuable ally or a formidable adversary.  
The dependency of a local populace upon the resources of the state provides, then, 
ideal conditions for the development of machine politics, that is, a system in which 
politicians use their control over access to the resources of the state to seek 
(re)election and for personal or party gain. This may be brought about by acts such as 
vote-rigging or voter intimidation, but another common strategy employed by 
machine politicians is to utilise state resources to buy votes from particular electoral 
groups, or from clients who are able to influence and mobilise electoral groups. A 
huge literature exists on this topic: for instance, James Scott’s (Scott 1969) work on 
the similarities between the graft and patronage common to new nations, such as the 
Philippines, and the political machines of nineteenth-century New York or twentieth-
century Chicago. In Argentina, Steven Levitsky has detailed the transformation of the 
current party of government, the Justicialist Party (known often in Argentina as the 
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Peronist Party, after its founder Juan D. Perón) “from a de facto labor party into a 
patronage based or machine party” (2001:43)34.  
In the department of Santa Victoria, the Justicialist Party reigns supreme, as much 
in the departmental capital of Santa Victoria Oeste as in the municipality of Los 
Toldos. There is so little in the way of opposition that Justicialist Party candidates 
compete against each other in municipal elections. Given the national profile of the 
Justicialist Party and especially the culture of local dependency on state resources, it 
comes as no great surprise to find that the political life of the department would 
appear to bear the hallmarks of machine politics. It is against this wider departmental 
background that the municipal politics of Los Toldos need to be considered.  
If local accounts are to be believed, an example of machine politics is embodied 
by the Ontiveros family, who have dominated departmental politics for three 
decades35. The amount of Ontiveros family members that have held positions in local 
government over the past 25 years is very suggestive of a political machine at work. 
From 1982-2003, Alcides Ontiveros was mayor of Santa Victoria Oeste, the 
departmental capital, and acquired a reputation for graft that led to him finally losing 
the municipal elections in 2003. His wife was the departmental senator, one of his 
brothers, René, was the departmental deputy, another brother, Adolfo, ran the 
secondary school’s hostel, for which yet another brother had won the contract to 
supply bread. In September 2006, Dante Báez, a relation of Alcides Ontiveros, was 
made headmaster of the secondary school in Santa Victoria Oeste. The appointment 
prompted a series of local protests, which were eventually quelled by provincial 
infantry troops.36
Recent work by Susan Stokes (2005:315-325) on machine politics in Argentina 
may well help us to elucidate more precisely the purposes served by installing allies 
in the local government of Santa Victoria department. Central to her account is the 
concept of perverse accountability, which entails a reversal of the intended or desired 
consequences of representative democracy. Instead of elected representatives being 
accountable to their voters, (at least some) voters become accountable to their elected 
representatives. Stokes is concerned with predictive failures in current theoretical 
                                                 
34 See also Levitsky 2003, chapters 1-2 for a more elaborate account of the transformation. 
35 The following account, unless otherwise indicated, draws on interviews with a number of key 
informants in Los Toldos and Santa Victoria Oeste whose identities shall remain anonymous for 
reasons of expediency.   
36Copenoa News Agency, 26th September 2006, 
http://www.copenoa.com.ar/v2/spip.php?article235  
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models of machine politics. In particular, she seeks to understand why it is that 
machine politics persists in countries, such as Argentina, which have adopted the 
secret ballot in all voting procedures relating to municipal, provincial and national 
elections.  
Machine politics is conventionally held to function through a political party (or 
machine) offering individual voters, especially poor ones with no strong commitment 
to any one party, particular enticements to vote for a given candidate. This could, for 
instance, take the form of promising a bag of food in return for a voter’s endorsement 
at the polls. For such a system to work, that voter’s decision must be known to the 
party making the promise. Parties in possession of this knowledge can make the voter 
(perversely) accountable to them in two ways. First, the immediate reward may be 
withheld; second, ‘disloyal’ voters may be punished by exclusion from access to the 
resources of government that a party will command if it wins the election, for all of 
the time it spends in office.  
However, it is precisely this scenario which a secret ballot is designed to prevent: 
theoretically, if the voter’s choice remained secret, s/he could receive the reward and 
vote for another party. If voters can renege on their promise, then it is not expedient 
for machine parties to use resources on them. The consequences of this scenario taken 
at the collective level would spell the end of clientelist politics wherever the secret 
ballot is present, but in the Argentine case clearly does not. Stokes resolves the 
dilemma by documenting the strategies employed by party operatives who strive to 
render the voting process an open secret. Party operatives drive voters to polling 
stations and hand them ballot tickets en route. In Argentina, ballot tickets list only the 
names of a party’s given candidate(s) and can be issued directly by that party. 
Furthermore, in smaller towns and villages, one of Stokes’ interviewees notes that 
there is a lack of anonymity built into the act of voting, captured by the sardonic 
popular refrain, ‘pueblo chico, infierno grande’ (‘small town, big hell’). It is much 
easier for party operatives to discover voter preferences in places where everyone 
knows each other. Because of this lowered anonymity, Stokes contends that voting 
should be analysed in the context of a repeated game, not as a one-off. Voters that 
take a reward but are found to have voted for another candidate will not be considered 
for rewards in further ‘games’ (elections) on grounds of disloyalty. Such voters are 
likely to be aware that they face a higher chance of discovery and that they risk 
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forfeiting future access to state resources if they do vote against a candidate who 
offers them a reward.  
Against the backdrop of the departmental context and the dynamics of Stokes’ 
compelling outline of perverse accountability, we can start to make some sense of 
politics in the municipality of Los Toldos. Although no elections took place during 
the course field work, they were a frequent topic of discussion in my interviews and 
everyday conversations with toldeños. I was informed of vote-buying during elections 
on numerous occasions in Los Toldos; and even more so for Santa Victoria Oeste. 
One interviewee told me that during election campaigns for Santa Victoria Oeste it 
was common for operatives of the Ontiveros re-election campaign to offer people 
gifts such as bags of maize, sugar and also shoes. Another told me of how, for the 
1999 municipal elections in Los Toldos, a truck was sent down to Lipeo to bring its 
inhabitants to the polling station, and that once there, lipeños (inhabitants of Lipeo) 
were given little in the way of privacy when casting their vote. Carolina Cibantos, 
headmistress of the lower secondary school of Los Toldos, worried that voters did not 
always know that their voting preferences were supposed to be a secret37. In the last 
instance, though, secrecy is more easily promised than kept. There were numerous 
occasions on which I heard Los Toldos described with the phrase ‘pueblo chico, 
infierno grande’’, and for good reason: privately-held knowledge frequently and 
quickly becomes public.  
To return to the point made at the start of this section, then, the strong presence of 
state institutions and the dependency of local livelihood strategies on the resources of 
the state lends itself to the perpetuation of machine politics. The lack of alternatives 
for income generation strengthens the hand of people who do have access to state 
resources. Supporting a given political figure is often necessary to acquiring access to 
such resources. Many examples were given to me; here I will limit myself to two.  
First, a dispute between the current mayor, Eleudoro Idiarte, and his predecessor, 
José Luís Ramírez, demonstrates how public resources are utilised to capture the 
votes of the Mothers’ Clubs operating in the municipality. Whilst still mayor of Los 
Toldos, former incumbent José Luís Ramirez had been instrumental in the creation of 
the Mothers’ Clubs (Clubes de Madres) in 1998. These groups were set up in 
different localities within the municipality with a view to assisting the women of Los 
                                                 
37 Interview with Carolina Cibantos, 24.11.04, Los Toldos  
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Toldos in generating alternative sources of household income, and subsequently 
became heavily involved in the Alto Bermejo Project’s agroforestry initiatives in the 
municipality. As the Mothers’ Clubs started to gain a clearer sense of purpose, 
craftwork, with a view to recovering lost traditions and supplementing household 
income through craft sales in local and regional markets, became a popular pursuit.  
The Mothers’ Clubs became very popular. By 2004 there were a total nine 
Mothers’ Clubs in existence. However, the establishment of the Mothers Clubs 
brought rivalries as well as cooperation: the Clubs became divided into the ‘old’ and 
the ‘new’. The event which (chronologically) separated ‘old’ from ‘new’ clubs was 
the municipal elections of December 2003. The emergence of ‘new’ Mothers’ Clubs 
after this point appears to have been a reflection, in part, of tensions between existing 
members of the clubs and women who were seeking to join but, having been rebuffed 
by existing members decided instead to form their own, ‘new’ Mothers’ Clubs. 
However, personal tensions do not fully explain the emergence of these new clubs: 
the ‘old’ Mothers’ Clubs appear to have voted for José Luís Ramirez, the mayor who 
lost in 2003; whilst the ‘new’ clubs, with one exception, appear to have voted for 
Eleudoro Idiarte, who defeated Ramirez. Therefore, it is understandable that locally, 
the formation of mothers’ club groups is widely held to have been politicised. Indeed, 
the potential of the clubs as voting blocks, if given sufficient incentive to be loyal in 
their commitment to one candidate, was demonstrated by voting patterns in the 
election. What incentive was offered by the respective candidates in the 2003 
election?  
By way of assistance to the ‘old’ Mothers’ Clubs, José Luís Ramirez had signed 
over to them a small house owned by the municipal government, which was set up as 
a sales outlet for the crafts they produced. Idiarte, the winner of the 2003 elections, 
weighed in on the side of the ‘new’ clubs, initiating legal action against the former 
mayor on the grounds that he had simply given away state property to the ‘old’ Clubs. 
Most of the ‘new’ clubs were not permitted to sell their craft products in the shop; the 
‘new’ (and only) Mothers’ Club of Los Toldos alone enjoyed access. At more than 
one of this club’s weekly meetings, I heard unambiguous endorsements of the 
‘legacy’ of José Luís Ramírez, whilst encountering instances of equally unambiguous 
disdain towards Eleudoro Idiarte.  
On hearing the news, José Luís Ramírez, at that point living in Salta (Capital), 
sought legal advice. Through his brother, Delfo, it was communicated to the ‘old’ 
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Mothers’ Clubs that he would fight on their behalf to keep the shop, its members 
being in no financial position themselves to hire a lawyer. Having won the votes of 
the members of the Mothers’ Clubs through giving them the shop, they became more 
dependent upon him through the legal action, and quite possibly accountable to him 
come election time. Moreover, the efforts made by both candidates to enlist the 
support of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Mothers’ Clubs, indicates their emergence as groups 
that could potentially deliver a significant number of votes, both from their members 
but perhaps also from their families.  
The second example involves the distribution of food aid provided by the national 
government. The municipal council has a committee whose function is to monitor 
levels of malnutrition in the municipality and ensure that food aid is given to people 
who are either malnourished or at risk of becoming so. However, it is less than clear 
that the food aid is distributed on the basis of greatest need. One woman who had 
been receiving food aid told me of how she was one day informed by the committee 
that her own case was no longer considered a sufficient priority, and subsequently her 
food aid was withdrawn. She later discovered that her name had not been removed 
from the register for recipients of food aid, but that instead her signature had been 
forged, and food had continued to arrive in her name. When she threatened to take the 
matter to the provincial authorities, her ration was quickly reinstated to her. Is this an 
instance of a ‘disloyal’ voter having been held accountable to a politician? It may, 
after all, be coincidental that the woman was a member of one of the ‘old’ Mothers’ 
Clubs, and was known publicly to be a supporter of José Luís Ramírez. However, I 
was told of so many similar incidents rooted in the same dynamic – exclusion from 
access to resources of people perceived not to support a given candidate – that 
coincidence seems less likely to explain this particular woman’s troubles.  
The system of machine politics in Los Toldos – and in Argentina more widely – 
differs markedly, then, from political dynamics found in Uis. Fieldwork in Namibia 
did not uncover the tracks left by a none-too-subtle political machine, but rather a 
running battle between three political groups and two competing systems of 
legitimate decision-making. Swapo and the UDF (United Democratic Front) 
contested local council elections, whilst the Traditional Authority constituted an 
alternative form of governance whose authority had been eroded since the advent of 
independence. As chapter 7 noted, Chief Elias //Thaniseb is not legally recognised, 
under the Traditional Authorities Act (GRN 2000) by Namibia’s government. 
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Nonetheless, the Chief commands much respect locally and remains a local power-
broker whom it would be unwise to alienate.  
Another key difference is evident from this comparison: the existence of an 
important opposition in Uis’s political scene. Swapo has acquired a bedrock of 
support in Uis and gained an additional seat on the local council in the local elections 
of 2003. In short, it now offers a credible alternative to the UDF. Moreover, the 
continued existence of Traditional Authority structures, albeit in weakened form, 
provides a parallel set of political resources for local people to draw upon. In Los 
Toldos, in contrast, the Justicialist Party (PJ) dominates the scene. Whilst the ‘Partido 
Renovador’ (Renovation Party) contests local elections, sometimes alongside local 
independents, the PJ fields the candidates most likely to win. Indeed, oppositional 
politics occurs largely within the party itself, rather than between it and other parties. 
Both José Luís Ramírez and Eleudoro Idiarte ran simultaneously as Justicialist 
candidates, and were the only ones who stood a realistic chance of being elected. 
Much like Argentina at the national level, opposition groups in Los Toldos are 
proving unable to make enduring inroads against a party that has dominated 
Argentina’s periods of democratic rule since the 1940s.   
 
4. Conclusion: the background to local participation 
 
The history of Los Toldos has been marked by geographical isolation and inequity. 
Hispanic settlement was shaped by this wider history. From the seventeenth through 
to the end of the nineteenth century, the valley of Los Toldos was ostensibly a far-
flung and unproductive part of a marquesado (marquisate), but perhaps better 
described as a war zone, as no-man’s land. The battleground eventually shifted 
eastwards, but by that point the industrialisation that was occurring in other parts of 
Bolivia and Argentina had bypassed Los Toldos. At the same time, tenant farmers in 
the area found themselves obliged, if they were to continue to live on the land they 
farmed, to sate the demand for labour produced by the sugar refineries which drove 
that very process of inequitable industrialisation. These, then are central factors in 
accounting for and understanding why Los Toldos continues to be so poor. 
The decline in opportunities for seasonal labour coincided with the increased 
presence of the state in Los Toldos. Although this has not brought about a 
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transformation of the conditions which continue to account for the poverty found in 
the municipality, the state has provided a lifeline to the people of Los Toldos, one 
which halted and even reversed the pattern of rural-urban migration that had become 
increasingly prevalent up until the early 1980s.  
The lack of local alternative sources of employment has resulted in a culture of 
dependency upon the state, and with it, ideal conditions for the spread of perverse 
accountability (Stokes 2005). Perverse accountability has consequences for 
participation in the decision-making processes which determine questions of access to 
and distribution of local state resources. Indeed, perverse accountability in itself is a 
form of participation in a decision-making process. Even to be considered as a 
potential recipient of such resources, it may be necessary for a toldeño to form an 
alliance with an incumbent mayor or a challenger for the post. Toldeños can, then, 
make decisions about which allegiance will best serve them. The ultimate decision 
about resource allocation remains, though, in the hands of whoever controls those 
resources.  
But it is not just control over access to resources that toldeños lack: it is also the 
cognitive authority (Barnes 1983) to define what constitutes the development 
objectives those resources are supposed to serve. What development there is in Los 
Toldos has come from elsewhere, so to speak; it is based on a set of beliefs about 
progress and development not so much found in as brought to Los Toldos. There is a 
knowledge gap between the municipality’s inhabitants the state and other actors 
proposing and attempting to effect its development. The gap is a consequence of the 
historical isolation of the area, and its exclusion from industrialisation and other 
processes which have been transforming other parts of the region to which it pertains. 
For such transformation to occur in Los Toldos, there must be, then, a process of 
knowledge and skills transfer. Of course, for it to take place, toldeños have to find 
some merit in this transfer process in the first place: there must be a consensus 
between actors proposing change and actors to which change is proposed. Indeed, 
there is a significant consensus, at least on the point that some sort of change to 
current levels, of poverty, illiteracy, lack of employment opportunities, mortality rates 
etc, is necessary and potentially beneficial. But the means through which such change 
is to be achieved are not in local hands; instead, they are to be acquired. And it is this 
dynamic which lessens the protagonism of toldeños in the decision-making processes 
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about what needs to be acquired, how best to acquire it and who will be involved in 
the transfer process.  
Under the sort of decision-making process that characterises perverse 
accountability, one might not be surprised to find that the inhabitants of Los Toldos 
could not be described as the protagonists of the development of the municipality. 
However, one might be more hopeful of the arrangements for participation within the 
Alto Bermejo Project agroforestry initiatives in Los Toldos. These are based on the 
premise that anyone can participate, regardless of their political allegiance. And 
indeed, the way in which decisions about resource allocation are made in the 
initiatives contrast significantly with the way such decisions seem often to be taken 
within the domain of municipal politics, a point the following chapter develops. 
Nonetheless, the role of the toldeños within the Alto Bermejo Project must be 
understood against this background of geographical isolation and poverty. This 
background plays an important role in explaining the knowledge gap that exists 
between the people of Los Toldos and the people who propose the need for changes 
in conservation and development processes, to be guided by the concept of 
sustainability. And this knowledge gap is crucial to understanding participation in the 
agroforestry initiatives of the Alto Bermejo Project. It is to demonstrating why this is 
the case that the focus turns in the following chapter. 
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Chapter IX 
The Alto Bermejo Project  
 
1. Introduction  
 
The Alto Bermejo Project is the overarching-framework for a set of initiatives which 
seek to reconcile a conservation agenda with the established common-pool resource 
use activities of the inhabitants of the Yungas, in the interests of sustainability. It 
proceeds from a view of the competencies and capacities of resource users in the 
Yungas which is distinctly at odds with that which has informed conservation policy 
and intervention in the Northwest for much of the twentieth century and on into the 
twenty-first. Conservation activities in the region have mostly taken the form of 
protected areas. Although national and provincial parks and reserves are part of the 
Alto Bermejo Project framework, it also seeks to undertake conservation activities 
outwith the protected domain. The Project’s re-conceptualisation of who can 
legitimately participate in conservation processes, and indeed the status of local-level 
participation as essential if conservation objectives are to be achieved, transforms 
local-level common-pool resource users from threats into opportunities. In doing so, 
what constitutes conservation, as well as the means through which to achieve 
conservation objectives, are conceived in ways that have more in common with 
Namibia’s conservancy programme than with previous Argentine conservation 
policy. This is chiefly because, as with the conservancy programme, the Alto 
Bermejo Project is prefigured by the concept of sustainability. It is in many ways a 
product of the privileged status that, as part one discussed in detail, knowledge about 
sustainability has acquired globally. 
This chapter has two broad aims. First, it provides an overview of the Alto 
Bermejo Project, which comprises a number of different initiatives. Second, it 
attempts to demonstrate how the influence of the concept of sustainability manifests 
itself in the policy which frames the reasons for and means of intervention. Repeating 
the approach taken in chapter six, on the conservancy programme – and thereby 
squaring the comparison – this is done principally by analysing how Alto Bermejo 
Project policy documents are formulated in terms of the six ‘principles of 
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sustainability’ identified in chapter four. Having identified this basis for comparison, 
the chapter goes on to consider the Alto Bermejo Project and the conservancy 
programme in comparative perspective, pointing out that although the ideas 
underlying them are remarkably similar, the two initiatives are in themselves very 
different, and unfold against markedly contrasting backgrounds.  
Whilst a general outline of the PAB – which in its entirety is a numerous and 
diverse set of initiatives spread across an extensive area – and a list of the myriad 
actors involved is offered, my concern is principally with the agroforestry initiatives 
that occur within the municipality of Los Toldos, carried out by the Pro Yungas 
Foundation. These are introduced in this chapter (and explored in greater detail in 
chapter 10).  
 
2.  An overview of the Alto Bermejo Project 
 
Links to sustainability and antecedents  
The Alto Bermejo Project (PAB) is essentially a conglomeration and continuation of 
pre-existent initiatives and activities, and a means through which to provide further 
funding for these. It takes place across two provinces, Salta and Jujuy, involving 
provincial and local authorities in both, federal agencies working in the Northwest, 
private sector actors and the people living in the localities in which project activities 
are situated. Much of the finance for it is provided by the French Fund for the Global 
Environment (FFEM), with counterpart funding from private sector actors and,  
ostensibly, from federal and regional government organisations. Essentially, the idea 
is to coordinate all such activities within the geographical area covered by the Yungas 
Biosphere Reserve, with a view to ensuring that they all contribute to an overarching 
conservation and development strategy consonant with the guiding principles of a 
biosphere reserve.   
In the thinking that underpins its approach to conservation, the Alto Bermejo 
Project has more in common with Namibia's conservancy programme than it does 
with the types of conservation that have been standard in Argentina until recently (see 
Box 9.1 for an example). It corresponds to the six ‘principles of sustainability’ that, as 
I argued in chapter six, also characterise policy statements and influence intervention 
in the conservancy programme. To recap, these are:  
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1. It is more important to address questions of how to ensure the continued 
existence of biodiversity outwith protected areas (i.e. Adams and Hulme 2001, 
Cumming 2004). 
2. Careful use of common-pool resources is more likely to ensure their continued 
existence for future generations than is a blanket prohibition on any kind of 
use (Adams and McShane 1992, Murphree 1997, Pimbert and Pretty 1995). 
3. It is not a foregone conclusion that people who use common-pool resources 
will destroy them whenever no state intervention occurs or individual property 
rights regime is established; there is much evidence to the contrary (Berkes 
1998, Feeny et al. 1990, Ostrom 1990).  
4. Conservation often fails when people who have to live with the costs of it 
have insufficient incentive to do so. Indeed, conservation efforts will fail 
wherever they beg, rather than answer, the question of sufficient incentive 
(Jones 2000, Ostrom 1990).  
5. Realising the economic value of a common-pool resource and ensuring that 
resource users benefit economically from the exercise is a crucial part of 
answering the question of sufficient incentive (Bond 2001, Hulme and 
Murphree 2001a, Murphree 1997). That said, other, less tangible benefits are 
also vital to this exercise, and may be overlooked if the importance of 
economic incentives in themselves is overstated (Emerton 2001)  
6. Conservation efforts will also fail if the resource users most in a position to 
determine how it is used are not involved in the decision-making processes 
that attempt to conserve said resource. Involvement in such decision-making 
processes is likely to make little difference unless users have defined, 
recognised usage rights (Ostrom 1990, Ostrom 1992, Pimbert and Pretty 
1995). 
 
The overview given here, whilst supplemented by interviews and observations 
acquired during the course of fieldwork, is based largely on the February 2002 Project 
Document, which gives an indication of what the Alto Bermejo Project was intended 
to achieve shortly after funding for it had been secured. To reiterate a point made in 
chapter I, “the relationship between policy models and development outcomes is 
complex and obscure” (Mosse 2005:230). Furthermore, it was not, during the course 
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of the fieldwork, a document with which a great many project actors appeared to be 
very familiar, and did not seem to be drawn upon with great frequency to describe 
and explain the PAB. Indeed, the very large number of different actors, initiatives, 
spaces and levels which constituted the Project produced a complex web of activity 
which, it seemed, few who were involved had an understanding of in its entirety. 
Nonetheless, what the document does give us is a much clearer sense of the ideas, 
concepts and beliefs which justify and frame the types of intervention of which the 
Alto Bermejo Project is comprised.  
 
The Yungas: the geographical and ecological focus of the Alto Bermejo Project 
The Alto Bermejo Project is an attempt to integrate conservation and development 
objectives not just within, but also outwith protected areas. It is therefore an 
embodiment of the first of my six principles of sustainability. One of its chief 
concerns – to extend its conservation brief beyond the national and provincial parks 
of Argentina’s Northwest – resonates with recently-influential trends in conservation 
rhetoric favouring wider ecological corridors or other such units which cross 
regional/national borders (cf. Bennett 2003, Brockington 2002, Brosius 2004). The 
focus of the Project is on a large chunk of the area covered by what might be termed 
an ‘eco-region’, rather than a specific species or type of vegetation, within the 
boundaries of an isolated ‘island’ of biological diversity. That ‘eco-region’ is the 
Yungas, the subtropical mountain forest found across parts of Argentina’s Northwest 
(see map 9.1 below).   
Originally, what is now known as the Alto Bermejo Project was expected to be 
international in scope, including a sizeable portion of Bolivian Yungas. This proposal 
had been formulated with a view to creating an ecological corridor between the two 
countries. However, the area within which the activities of the Alto Bermejo Project 
unfold falls exclusively within Argentina. The decision not to make the extension into 
Bolivia was made in light of the fact that in 2001, a Yungas Biosphere Reserve had 
been designated in Northwest Argentina by UNESCO. Its designation prompted a 
concern that there would be a duplication of conservation units vying to conserve the 
same biodiversity38. 
 
                                                 
38 Interview 23.12.2004, with Albane Du Boisgueheneuc, Project Coordinator in the Alto 
Bermejo Project.  
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  Box 9.1 – ‘Fortress’ conservation in Argentina  
In order to illustrate the extent of the changes in thinking about conservation manifest in the 
Alto Bermejo Project, it is helpful to explore dominant notions of conservation dominant in 
twentieth century Argentina. Conservation was (and continues to be) largely an activity to be 
conducted within the confines of the protected area. Very much in line with the ‘fortress’ 
narrative of conservation (see chapter 4), a separation between valued biodiversity and the 
humans who posed a threat to its continued survival was deemed vital. The case of Lipeo 
provides a good example of this thinking and the consequences that stemmed from it (see 
Newsham 2005 for a fuller account). Lipeo is a small village which has since 1974 found 
itself situated within Baritú National Park, province of Salta, designated by the 
Administration of National Parks (APN). Forming part of the Municipality of Los Toldos, its 
current inhabitants (known locally as lipeños) practice shifting cultivation and (mostly 
bovine) livestock farming.  
According to local medical records, 45% of Lipeo’s inhabitants live in a “critical state”, 
defined in terms of unhealthy sanitary conditions, high levels of malnutrition and the 
prevalence of chronic illnesses (Ricardo Merlo pers. com). There is an almost total lack of 
physical infrastructure: access to Lipeo is via a dirt track, impassable by vehicle for much of 
the rainy season; there is no electricity supply, potable water or sewage system. Public 
services in this part of the municipality are limited to a dilapidated primary school and a 
sanitary post. The poverty of Lipeo stands out even within the setting of the municipality of 
Los Toldos, one of the poorest parts of Salta. Since 1974, the inclusion of Lipeo within Baritú 
National Park has until very recently entrenched rather than alleviated this poverty, owing to 
legal restrictions on common-pool resource use and infrastructural development on land 
designated as a national park.  
The impetus to create a park in this part of Argentina was generated through a couple of 
excursions made in the area by a group of naturalists from the Miguel Lillo Institute of 
Tucumán (Natenzon 1993). They gave a presentation to the General Directorate of National 
Parks (as was), which persuaded its directors of the necessity of establishing legal protection 
over a part of the Yungas. Among the reasons given in favour of creating a new protected 
area were that:  
• its “pristine” forests were a good example of their type 
• it was important to preserve the environment for the enjoyment of future generations 
• it was a “living museum” 
• its beautiful landscapes could foster the development of “recreational activities” 
• it was considered to have high potential for scientific and biological studies (Tribunal 
de Tasaciones 1979) 
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In order to comply with existing criteria for the level of protection conferred upon a 
national park, it was necessary to expel all human settlement, and of course to prohibit any 
consumptive use of the biodiversity that was to be preserved. To establish the park, therefore, 
the government had to acquire the land it was going to occupy. Lipeo was in the 1970s 
located within the Rodeo Monte portion of Finca Santa Victoria, its inhabitants living as 
tenant farmers, rather than owners, of the land. When Rodeo Monte was expropriated for 
incorporation into the new protected area, so too was Lipeo. The expropriation process 
recognised the landowners as legitimate pobladores (settlers or inhabitants) of the area, 
whose rights were to be respected, and who were given financial compensation for the loss of 
their land and allowed to keep a portion of it. As tenant farmers, the lipeños were not 
accorded the status of pobladores, but instead were categorised as intrusos, or intruders, in 
the newly-created park. Whilst pobladores can be granted permits for occupation and 
restricted agricultural and livestock-related activities, intrusos cannot, as their presence 
within the boundaries of a national park is deemed to be illegal. The official reason given for 
classifying the lipeños as intrusos rather than as pobladores was that the possibility of 
staying on as tenant farmers ceased when Rodeo Monte passed from the private to the 
national domain. They could not continue to pay rent because it was forbidden by law to rent 
out for occupation any part of a national park. The lipeños were on this basis declared not to 
be “true settlers” (Cichero 1992 5). Therefore, according to this logic there could be no legal 
basis for their continued presence in the park, and nor were they due any compensation.  
The livelihood activities of the lipeños were criminalised overnight when the park was 
officially declared, but restrictions remained unenforced until the late 1970s. Moreover, 
eviction attempts have been incomplete. In 1980, the Administration of National Parks drew 
up an order to evict the people of Lipeo from Baritú National Park which was never fully 
executed, partly because of provincial government resistance and partly due to lack of 
sufficient personnel (Natenzon 1993:51). Some lipeños did, though, leave of their own 
accord. Because of their status as intrusos (intruders), no provision for resettlement pending 
eviction was made, nor was any compensation for loss in earnings awarded. At no point were 
the lipeños included in decisions about the creation of the Park, restrictions on resource use, 
or what should become of Lipeo. The classification of the lipeños as intrusos was not based 
on a detailed knowledge of the impact on the environment of the presence of the lipeños. It 
stemmed from the privileged character accorded to the notions of separating humans from 
the environment and of providing protection to the latter through the establishment of 
protected areas. It also demonstrates how much less necessary it was – at least within APN – 
to consider the human costs of conservation that current ways of thinking about conservation 
are rendering much less politically acceptable. 
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For this reason, apparently, it was decided that the Alto Bermejo Project would 
mostly be implemented within the boundaries of the Biosphere Reserve. At 2.1 
million hectares, the area of the project currently encompasses between 43.75% and 
46.67% of the total amount of Yungas that corresponds to Argentina.Whilst it does 
not cross international borders, 70% and 30% of the project area falls respectively 
within the Provinces of Salta and Jujuy. Although the attempt to reflect the 
distribution of Yungas, even regional or national borders, is reminiscent of the Trans-
Frontier Conservation Area and Peace Park initiatives to be found across Southern 
Africa, an important difference should also be distinguished. The conservation 
lobbies in Argentina and Bolivia do not carry nearly as much clout as those operating 
in Southern Africa. Precisely how concerns about a new attempt to roll out ‘fortress 
conservation’ initiatives on a bigger scale in that part of the world might translate into 
the Argentine context is as yet unclear. There are, to be sure, still few initiatives in 
Argentina which attach such importance to local participation as does the Alto 
Bermejo Project, or which view conservation in terms of use as well as preservation. 
However, local people are unlikely to ‘drop out’ of decisions about common-pool 
resource use in the Yungas simply because there is neither the political will nor the 
resources to enforce strict or prohibitive common-pool resource use regimes outside 
of the protected area.  
The international dimension has not entirely been lost. The Alto Bermejo Project 
takes its name from the Upper Basin of the River Bermejo, in which is located the 
stretch of Yungas that constitutes the focus of all of the Project’s related activities. 
The Project is in itself part of a wider strategy for the sustainable use of natural 
resources in the Upper Basin, known as the Strategic Action Programme (SAP). This 
is a collective effort between the Bolivian and Argentine governments to manage 
jointly the Upper Basin, which extends across the borders of both countries. Both 
governments share the view that the Upper Basin can only be managed sustainably in 
its entirety, as opposed to having two separate national management plans for the 
sections of it which fall into Argentine and Bolivian territory. The Strategic Action 
Programme (PEA) is funded partially by the World Bank’s Global Environment 
Facility, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Organisation 
of American States (OAS), with (ostensible) counterpart funding from the Argentine 
and Bolivian governments (PEA 2000).    
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Map 9.1 – the Alto Bermejo Project area (demarcated in bold black) and the 
distribution of the Yungas in Argentina 
 
Source: French National Forestry Office 
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The Yungas have acquired considerable conservation value in Argentina over a 
relatively short timeframe of 20-30 years, perhaps chiefly because they are reckoned 
to contain 50% of the country’s biodiversity in only 2% of its surface area (Brown 
1995a). Other than Antonio Cabrera’s (1976) work on the phytogeographical regions 
of Argentina, the most frequently-cited studies have been undertaken by the 
Laboratory of Ecological Research into the Yungas (LIEY). A substantial number of 
these were written by its director, Alejandro Brown (i.e. Brown 1995a, Brown 1995b, 
Brown 1995c, Brown 1995d, Brown 1995e, Brown and Grau 1999, Brown and Grau 
1993, Brown et al. 2001), a central actor in raising the public profile of the Yungas. 
This he did partly through an extensive list of publications but also through the 
involvement of LIEY in conservation and development projects in the Yungas 
throughout the 1990s, as well as the subsequent establishment of his NGO, the Pro 
Yungas Foundation. Arguably, it is largely to Brown’s efforts that the popularisation 
of the term ‘Yungas’ can be attributed. More recently, the designation of the Yungas 
Biosphere Reserve itself generated coverage in the local, regional and national press.   
 
Overall scope and structure of the Alto Bermejo Project  
It is precisely because of the wider focus on a large slice of the Yungas that the Alto 
Bermejo Project seeks to take its conservation profile outwith the protected area 
domain. In its explicit commitment to conservation across a much broader landscape, 
the Alto Bermejo Project is, then, clearly underpinned by the first of my six 
‘principles of sustainability’, namely that the focus solely on the protected area as the 
basic unit of conservation is misplaced. It is also because the Yungas are inhabited by 
some of the poorest people in the country that the Alto Bermejo Project also has an 
agenda for development, and ultimately conceptualises the relationship between 
conservation and development as one of necessary interdependence.  
The desire to reconcile conservation and development processes is evident in the 
Alto Bermejo Project’s central objective, which is:  
 
The conservation of biodiversity of the Yungas forest in the High Basin of the River Bermejo 
through the creation and consolidation of an ecological corridor…favouring activities of 




That the PAB is a mechanism through which to bring together, coordinate and 
fund a series of pre-established activities helps explain why such a large amount of 
actors, from the public, NGO and commercial sectors, participate in and, to a greater 
or lesser degree, fund or seek funding for it. It groups these activities and actors under 
the four constituent components, which are posited as the means through which to 
achieve its objectives:  
 
1. The institutionalisation of the Biosphere Reserve and its area of influence 
2. The management of protected areas 
3. The sustainable management of natural resource utilisation for commercial 
and farming purposes 
4. Environmental monitoring of activities in the Project area 
 
What follows is a brief summary of the components, in terms of their activities and 
objectives. The thesis does not engage with every single activity encompassed within 
the Alto Bermejo Project.  
 
1. The institutionalisation of the Yungas Biosphere Reserve  
This component is a response to the perceived need to address the lack of rules 
governing the use of natural resources within the Biosphere Reserve. The many forms 
of resource use that occur within the area covered by the Biosphere Reserve are held 
to generate significant pressure upon its natural resources, as well as involving a wide 
range of commercial, governmental and non-governmental actors. Forms of resource 
use which have caused concern include:  
 
• Intensive agriculture  
• logging  
• subsistence agricultural activities i.e. ‘overgrazing’, burning the topsoil and 
shifting cultivation.  
 
Clear guidelines and norms to regulate such different activities do not currently exist. 
As a conservation unit, therefore, the Biosphere Reserve is supposed to set out 
sustainable use guidelines and integrate a diverse range of interests. This objective is 
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to be realised by the formal creation of the Biosphere Reserve “through a structure 
that integrates and strengthens the links between public entities, NGOs, peasant 
grassroots organisations and the private sector” (FPY 2002:25). More specifically, the 
creation of the Biosphere Reserve is expected to give rise to the following activities: 
 
• The delineation of ecological zones and territorial planning  
• The definition of the limits of conservation spaces within the Reserve 
• Analysis of existing legislation and the extent to which it supports or 
constrains the objectives of the Biosphere Reserve 
• A socio-economic diagnosis of the area’s inhabitants 
• The production of a preliminary planning document that is to be subject to a 
process of “participatory validation” (ibid:26). This will determine the content 
of the final document, which, on completion is to be disseminated to society at 
large.  
 
In these objectives, the concern is not with the imposition of regulations prohibiting 
resource use. The importance attached to a review of existing legislation with a view 
to bringing it into line with the objectives of the Alto Bermejo Project is linked to my 
second ‘principle of sustainability’, of sanctioning careful use rather than prohibition.   
The other objectives of socio-economic analysis and “participatory validation” 
reflect an awareness of the potential costs of conservation for resource users and a 
need to include a wider range of actors in the decision-making processes which will 
establish how natural resources within the Project area should be used. Such thinking 
relates not only to the second of my six principles of sustainability, but also to the 
sixth, which stresses the need for local participation as a precondition of sustainable 
common-pool resource use.   
 
2. The management of protected areas 
There are four protected areas within the boundaries of the Biosphere Reserve which 
in total cover 180,000 hectares. Pintascayo Laguna Provincial Park and Acambuco 
Flora and Fauna Reserve, both fall within the province of Salta and, as federal 
entities, under the jurisdiction of the provincial government of Salta. Calilegua 
National Park is in Jujuy province and the Nogalar National Reserve in Salta 
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province, but both, as national entities, are administered by the Administration of 
National Parks, itself an organ of federal government. The Alto Bermejo Project 
document states that The Pintascayo Laguna Provincial Park and the Nogalar 
National Reserve are both of recent creation and require support in relation to the 
formulation of management plans and to the participation of all the social actors, 
especially the adjacent communities. Action plans have been formulated, though, for 
all of the protected areas, and a sample of planned activities includes: 
 
• Socioeconomic, economic and legal/regulatory analyses  
• Participatory input on the final management plan documents of the reserves 
• The elaboration of environmental monitoring systems 
• the demarcation of buffer zones around the protected areas 
• The ecological zoning of protected areas  
 
The vision of simultaneous conservation and development, the incorporation of 
people into a landscape with conservation value, forms a marked contrast with the 
vision that accompanied the establishment of Baritú National Park in 1974. 
Moreover, although Baritú National Park is not officially part of the Alto Bermejo 
Project, attempts have been made to renegotiate the restrictions on agricultural 
activities in and around Lipeo. These form part of efforts, on the part of the Pro 
Yungas Foundation and also the Social Agricultural Programme, to initiate within 
Lipeo the sorts of agroforestry and other activities commonly undertaken in other 
parts of the municipality of Los Toldos. That some of these activities are now 
permitted to occur by the Administration of National Parks is a clear indication of the 
increasing credibility invested in notions of conservation defined in terms of the 
sustainable use of common-pool resources. In line with principles three and six, 
extension workers employed by the Pro Yungas Foundation and the Social 
Agricultural Programme view the lipeños not as a threat to valued biodiversity, but 
rather as competent common-pool resource users. They are seen as people who can 
and should participate in decisions about how best to manage the resource bases upon 




3. The sustainable use of natural resources  
Under the banner of sustainability, many of the diverse activities which constitute the 
Alto Project are grouped and connected. It pins the future of by far the greater part of 
the biodiversity of the Yungas upon finding ways to make its sustainable use 
attractive to its users. Herein lies a commitment to the second principle of 
sustainability, namely that careful use is better than preservation through prohibition. 
The Project consists of a variety of smaller projects and initiatives that, when taken in 
conjunction, are intended to serve as a model of sustainability which could then be 
applied on a larger scale. It is in the commitment to sustainability that the Alto 
Bermejo Project is essentially comparable with the conservancy programme, even 
though the structure, mechanisms and components through which sustainability 
objectives are to be achieved differ.  
 At present, according to the Alto Bermejo Project document, the commercial 
utilisation of the common-pool resources within the project area is not sustainable. 
The extraction of commercially viable species from the forests, hydrocarbon 
exploitation (petrol and gas), the seasonal burning of land and forest for farming 
activities are all held to exert considerable pressure on a fragile ecosystem. The need 
to manage sustainably both the commercial operations and the livelihood activities of 
the people who inhabit the Yungas or who use the natural resources found within it is, 
therefore, identified as a priority.      
For this reason, one component initiative of the Alto Bermejo Project is the 
commercial operations of the Santa Barbara Forestry Project, financed by 
Candlewood Timber Group, a forestry consultancy firm, and Arlington Associates, a 
company from the energy and natural resources sector, both from the US. The 
initiative aims to provide a model for ecologically sustainable and economically 
viable timber extraction, in order to demonstrate an alternative to current practices 
which appear likely to exhaust the most valuable species, such as cedar and oak. So 
far, the aim of the project has been sustainably and profitably to manage 100,000ha of 
primary and secondary forest in the Yungas, through the extraction of exotic timber 
species of high economic value for sale on the international market of certified wood. 
It has been proposed that this experience might be replicated in two or three pilot 
projects of between 10,000 to 30,000 hectares of forest. The Santa Barbara Forestry 
Project has, then, a clear correspondence with the fifth sustainability principle which 
the Alto Bermejo Project and the conservancy programme have in common, the fifth 
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principle relating to the importance attached to realising the economic value of a 
common-pool resource and ensuring that users benefit economically from the 
exercise. 
Another component project takes the form of an experimental forest nursery. 
Financed by Shell Forestry, a subsidiary of the Shell Group, 50 hectares of both 
native and exotic species with an established economic value are grown, with a view 
to the achievement of the following objectives: 
 
1. creating a seed bank for re-stocking degraded areas in the Yungas 
2. generating an information base for environmentally restorative practices such 
as establishing and commercialising carbon bonds 
 
As well as being instances of attempts to use natural resources sustainably, the 
above projects also represent examples of involving a wider gamut of resource users 
in an over-arching resource-use strategy for the Yungas. Amongst the actors whose 
participation is deemed important for the concept of sustainable use to become more 
widespread are local-level populations, of which there are significant numbers 
peppering the Andean foothills across which the Yungas extend. Many of these fall 
within the Alto Bermejo Project area, although at present, the principal activities at 
the local village level are situated in relatively few sites. These interventions focus on 
the provision of alternative livelihood options and agroforestry techniques for 
subsistence farmers. These are thought to offer the potential to ameliorate pressure on 
the Yungas whilst helping to strengthen the livelihood strategies of Yungas 
inhabitants. Principally, such initiatives occur in the Municipality of Los Toldos, in 
the department of Santa Victoria, and in the small ‘Kolla’ villages of Los Naranjos 
and San Andrés, in the Municipality of Orán, within the department of Orán. The 
initiatives in Los Toldos, as principal Argentine fieldsites in the thesis, are dealt with 
in greater detail in the section on conservation and development in Los Toldos, 
below. Here, meanwhile, it is useful to concentrate on how the contrast between the 
representation of local-level resource users within the Alto Bermejo Project and the 
representation of the people of Lipeo at the time of the creation of Baritú National 
Park. In this regard, the representation of local people within the Alto Bermejo 
Project is more readily comparable with their representation within the conservancy 
programme.  
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Local people in the Yungas are not viewed as merely an obstacle to conservation, 
a threat to valued biodiversity whose destructive way of life must not be permitted to 
compromise a ‘pristine’ landscape. On the contrary, the object of the local 
development components is ultimately formulated in terms of helping the inhabitants 
of Andean villages such as Los Toldos, Los Naranjos or San Andrés not to lose a way 
of life whose value has been eroded, but is worthy of rescue. Indeed, local interaction 
with the environment is frequently talked of by NGO and government actors within 
the Alto Bermejo Project as having produced some of the biodiversity that is these 
days taken to be of conservation value. An example of such biodiversity is the 
preservation of a wide variety of Andean potato seeds, which have disappeared from 
other parts of Argentina and Bolivia. In this sense, local traditions, knowledge and 
ways of living have to some extent become an object of conservation, thereby 
reflecting wider changes in beliefs about what is worth conserving and how to go 
about conserving it. When discussing the future of places like the municipality of Los 
Toldos, it is very common for local government and NGO staff to talk of the need for 
a process of ‘revalorisation’ of local culture and livelihood strategies, and even to 
suggest these to be considerably more sustainable than the lifestyles of city-dwelling 
environmentalists. Such talk chimes with the third ‘principle of sustainability’, i.e. 
that people who use common pool resources will not necessarily destroy them in the 
absence of state intervention or the establishment of private property rights regimes.  
Crucially, recognising and valuing the presence of the inhabitants of the Yungas 
has the effect of legitimising their participation in the Project’s attempts to set natural 
resource use on a sustainable footing. It sets them up as indispensable to decision-
making processes concerning common-pool resource use, as opposed to representing 
them as an obstacle to the continued existence of valued biodiversity. In doing so, the 
Alto Bermejo Project’s participation policy fits with the sixth sustainability principle, 
relating to the importance of involving those actors who use and affect the state of a 
given resource base/valued biodiversity item. Designating toldeños as competent 
resource users contrasts significantly with the designation of lipeños as intruders in 
the context of the national park. 
 
4. Environmental monitoring 
Given the perceived impact on the Yungas of large scale agricultural activities – 
such as clearance of land for cultivation of soya or maize, changes to how soil is used, 
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and traditional forms of exploitation of forest resources, environmental monitoring is, 
not surprisingly, another priority. In particular, the gathering of information on 
aspects of resource use concerning change in the composition of the soil, 
deforestation, water quality and the impact of forest management is deemed 
important.  
One initiative which has been conceived to make a contribution to this objective 
is the ‘Native Forests and Protected Areas Project’, which is intended, through 
applied research, to generate a forestry inventory for the Salta Secretariat of 
Sustainable Development and Environmental Politics, as well as a legal framework 
for regulations regarding the status and use of native forests. It is also designed to 
allow for ‘community management’ of two fiscal lots in General Mosconi, Salta. 
Finally, the project is expected to contribute to the establishment of a geographical 
information system for the upper basin of the River Bermejo.  
  
The actors involved in the Alto Bermejo Project  
The Alto Bermejo Project incorporates a large number of groups and institutions. 
This is a consequence of it being essentially a means for bringing together and 
securing continued funding for existing activities and initiatives, and of the regional 
scale across which it takes place. Listed below in table 9.1, then, are the institutional 
actors that are directly involved, along with a brief description of the types of 
activities and initiatives in which they are involved and also their roles and 
responsibilities. More attention, though, is given below to the groups and 
organisations involved with the agroforestry and other livelihood-based activities that 
occur within the municipality of Los Toldos. 
 
Table 9.1: Groups and organisations involved in the Alto Bermejo Project 
Institutional Actors (Spanish acronym given unless 
otherwise indicated)  
Initiatives / Activities  involved Roles &  
responsibilities 
International Bank for Reconstruction and  
Development BIRD) 
Native forests & Protected Areas 
(PAs) 
Funding provision 
French Fund for the Global Environment (French  
acronym FFEM)  
Initial negotiations & periodic  
project visits 
Internat. donor,  
monitoring &  
evaluation (M&E)  
French National Forestry Office, contracted through  
the FFEM  
Agroforestry in Los Toldos, San 
Andrés & Los Naranjos    
Provide agroforestry 
personnel, overall  
project M&E  
French Agricultural Research Centre for International 
Development, through the FFEM 
Technical assistance  Technical assistance, 
environmental M&E  
Institute for Development Research, contracted through 
FFEM 
Technical assistance Capacity building, 
environmental M&E 
Binational Commission for the Development of the  Agroforestry in Los Toldos, San Finance within the 
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Upper Basin of the River Bermejo and the River 
Grande (COREBE)  
Andrés & Los Naranjos framework of the  
Strategic Action Prog.
United Nations Environment Programme  Agroforestry in Los Toldos, San 
Andrés & Los Naranjos 
Finance within the 
framework of the  
Strategic Action Prog.
Pro Yungas Foundation (PYF), Lead organisation - 
recipient of funding for the Alto Bermejo Project from 
the FFEM 
PA mgmt plans, implement or 
support all sustainable agric. & 
 environmental evaluation 
 initiatives     
Allocate FFEM funds, 
overall coordination of 
Bermejo Project    
The Secretariat of Natural Resources and Sustainable 
Development (Provincial Government of Salta) 









Secretariat of Health, Environment and Sustainable 
Development (Federal Argentine Government) 
Native Forests & PAs  Environmental M&E 
Agricultural Social Programme (PSA) Agroforestry in Los Toldos  Technical assistance, 
provide & finance 
agroforestry personnel  
Secretariat of Production and Environment, Provincial 
Government of Jujuy 
Implement. of biosphere reserve, 
mgmt plans 
Technical assistance 
National Institute for Agricultural Technology (INTA) Native Forests & PAs Technical assistance, 
provide extension  
services 
Nor Andino Argentina Gas Pipeline Ltd. PA mgmt, agroforestry in San 
Andrés & Los Naranjos 
Provision of funding 
for FPY projects  
Pan American Energy Acambuco Provincial. Reserve Funding for creation &
maintenance of  
Acambuco Provincial 
Reserve 
Shell ‘Morado Valley’ forest species 
nursery 
Funding for Fundación 
Yungas activities in 
Morado Valley 
Candlewood Timber Group Inc.  Certified timber extraction Expertise in 
sustainable, profitable 
timber commerce and 
finance for 
environmental M&E  
Greenpeace Argentina Biosphere Reserve  Environmental 
lobbying  
Argentine Wildlife Foundation (FVSA) Wildlife refuge programme  Private land  
conservation &  
certified forestry 
techniques   
Yumos Foundation Communal management of fiscal 




The Laboratory of Ecological Research in the Yungas 
(LIEY), University of Tucumán 
PA management plans,  
agroforestry in Los Toldos, San 
Andrés & Los Naranjos 
Provision of data for 
PA management plans, 
environmental M&E 
Institute of Rural Development, University of Salta Native Forests & PAs Technical assistance 
Municipal Council of Los Toldos Maintenance & management of 
Nogalar National Reserve 
Tech. assistance,  
logistical support 
The people of Los Toldos, General Mosconi & the  
Kolla villages of Los Naranjos and San Andrés 
Agroforestry/livelihood  
initiatives. 
Receive assistance to 
achieve conservation-
development aims 
Tinkunaku Foundation (representatives of the ‘Kolla’ 
inhabitants of the San Andrés Finca) 
Agroforestry/livelihood 
initiatives. 
Advocacy and  
negotiation on behalf 






Local level (in Los Toldos only) 
In the municipality of Los Toldos, the principal groups of actors directly involved 
in the Alto Bermejo Project (PAB) are: 
 
• The Pro Yungas Foundation (FPY) 
• The Municipal Council of Los Toldos 
• The Social Agricultural Programme (PSA) 
• The Producer Groups 
• The Mothers’ Clubs 
• The Santa Ana Cooperative 
 
The Pro Yungas Foundation is a non-governmental organisation established in 
1999. Its origins spring from another institution, the Laboratory for Ecological 
Investigation of the Yungas (LIEY), an academic centre within the University of 
Tucumán. Throughout the 1990s, LIEY provided technical support for the 
agroforestry and resource management activities in the municipality of Los Toldos 
that were funded by GTZ, the German cooperation agency, and also by the Strategic 
Action Programme (PEA), mentioned above. With the increasing commitment of 
LIEY in the area to conservation work with inhabitants of Los Toldos, as opposed to 
its biological and ecological research profile, the centre’s director, Alejandro Brown, 
deemed it expedient to create the Pro Yungas Foundation as a dedicated organisation. 
The Fundación lists as its foremost objectives: 
  
• To contribute to the definition of a regional conservation strategy 
• To conserve the biodiversity of the Yungas 
• To promote the rational and sustainable use of natural resources  
• To promote agricultural development and the improvement of the quality of 
lives of various inhabitants of the Yungas 
• To increase ecological awareness among the population of the regions across 
which the regions across which the Yungas extend (Pro Yungas Foundation 
website, my translation) 
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The Pro Yungas Foundation was designated by the French Global Environment 
Facility to be the sole administrator of the funding they have allocated for the Alto 
Bermejo Project. As the recipient of the largest single financial contribution to the 
Project (€844,758 according to the 2004 budget plan), the Foundation is the ‘lead’ 
institution, a circumstance which has been a cause of resentment and tension between 
government and project actors. Given that the Secretariat of Environment and 
Sustainable Development of Salta was also a contender as a recipient of this funding, 
it is of significance that a non-governmental organisation was chosen in preference to 
an organ of government. It has been suggested at more than one point in the course of 
fieldwork that the reputation for corruption and incompetence of the Argentine state 
was the principal reason why the French Global Environment Facility decided on 
putting the Pro Yungas Foundation in charge of the administration of their funds. 
Entrusting these funds to the Foundation has important causal effects on the type of 
participation that characterises many of the activities contained within the Alto 
Bermejo Project, which are explored in the following chapter.  
As the political head of the inhabitants of Los Toldos, the Municipal Council has 
to approve and, thereby, be involved in the activities envisaged by the Alto Bermejo 
Project39. From the council’s viewpoint, the Alto Bermejo Project should consolidate 
municipal policy on common-pool resource use and regulation, as opposed to existing 
independently of it. The project funds they receive are designated to pay the salary of 
one of the local government’s employees. His role had originally been to work 
directly with some of the Producer Groups and Mothers’ Clubs. By 2004, it had been 
decided that he would instead work in the area of strategic planning. This involves 
collating a database of social, economic and environmental information, as well 
conducting diagnostic exercises with the inhabitants of the municipality, with a view 
to producing a plan for the wider development of the municipality.  
Of course, given the history of machine politics in the department, there was local 
speculation about the character of municipal participation in the Alto Bermejo 
Project. It did not go unnoticed, for instance, that the government employee paid for 
by the Alto Bermejo Project was the cousin of one of the Pro Yungas Foundation’s 
project managers, or that he had worked on the 2003 election campaign of Eleudoro 
Idiarte, the current mayor. It was suggested by one key informant that this made him 
                                                 
39 Interview with Esteban González Bonorino, director of strategic planning for the Municipal 
Council of Los Toldos, 1.12.2004. 
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an acceptable candidate both from the point of view of the Foundation and the 
council. It was also thought that the paying of his salary constituted the means 
through which to gain the acceptance of the local council for the Alto Bermejo 
Project; it might not otherwise have been so compliant. Given the council’s seeming 
indifference to the task of enforcing regulations on local common-pool resource use, 
it is tempting to suspect that it had other reasons for its involvement in the Alto 
Bermejo Project. Not only does it receive resources, but it could feasibly claim credit 
for the Project’s outcomes come election time. It is also worth observing that the Alto 
Bermejo Project document is better at legitimising the participation of the municipal 
council than it is at specifying its role or the expected outcomes such involvement is 
to entail. 
The Social Agricultural Programme is an initiative that was set up by the national 
government in 1993, with the aim of providing support to the country’s minifundista 
(smallholder) farmers, whose dwindling contribution to GDP belies their numerical 
importance in the agricultural sector. The starting point for the Social Agricultural 
Programme is that smallholder agriculture can, through improvements to 
productivity, become sufficiently competitive – albeit on a minimal level – within the 
agrarian market (ibid). Raising productivity through technical assistance – in the form 
of micro-irrigation, fencing cultivated plots, using fertiliser and other such techniques 
– as a means to render smallholder agriculture more commercially viable than it 
currently is – also feeds into wider national poverty reduction objectives. The Social 
Agricultural Programme provides extension workers, who generally set up groups of 
six or seven people with whom to pursue jointly-identified activities. Credit is 
provided on a family basis, once these activities have been costed; although its sister 
scheme, the Poverty Reduction and Rural Initiatives Programme (PROINDER), 
financed by the World Bank, also offers the option of grants which do not have to be 
repaid. The Social Agricultural Programme started its work in the municipality of Los 
Toldos at the beginning of 2004. Whilst some of its work contributed towards Alto 
Bermejo Project activities and is as welcome locally as it is important, it operated 
mostly independently, and for that reason is not considered further.  
The extension workers of the Pro Yungas Foundation and the Social Agricultural 
Programme undertake project activities in conjunction with local groups that have 
formed in each of the small villages and settlements of the municipality of Los Toldos 
– Los Toldos (village), El Condado, La Misión, El Arazáy, Lipeo and Baritú (village, 
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as opposed to National Park) – partly with a view to the achievement of specific 
objectives of current and previous interventions. The type and makeup of each group 
varies from place to place, but they can be classified into two broad categories. The 
first of these encompasses groups which bring people together to work on a cluster of 
the agricultural activities listed above. These include, for instance, the Producer 
Groups, which together to work on a cluster of the agricultural activities listed above, 
or the Fruit Growers’ Group, which has formed around the objective of producing 
fruit for domestic consumption and also for sale in regional markets.  
The second category is comprised of the Mothers’ Clubs which have been 
established in each of the villages/settlements of the municipality of Los Toldos. 
These have already been discussed in chapter eight, and are not therefore further 
dwelt upon here.  
The Santa Ana Cooperative, created in 1998, is an artisan’s cooperative which 
operates a shop in the village of Los Toldos and sends some of its members’ wares 
for sale in a craft market in Salta Province’s capital. Unlike the Mothers’ Clubs it has 
managed to achieve legal status. It is this status which makes it possible for the 
cooperative to sell both its products in Salta’s marketplace and those of the Mothers’ 
Clubs, from whom it also makes purchases. The other important respect in which it 
differs from the Mothers’ Clubs is in its attempts to remain independent of local 
political patronage; indeed, the beliefs of one of its founding members stress the 
importance and expedience of access to sources of income unconnected to the local 
and provincial political economy.     
Prior to the existence of the Alto Bermejo Project, the initiatives carried out by 
the Pro Yungas Foundation and its forerunner in the area, the Laboratory of 
Ecological Research in the Yungas (LIEY), were financed on the basis of an 
agreement between the extension worker and the producer groups or mothers' clubs, 
as to what activities were to be carried out, what skills would need to learned and 
what purchases would have to be made. With the onset of the Project, funds for 
project activities were to be applied for by means of a form that members of various 
groups would complete, with a minimum of 4 people per proposal. Funding could be 
solicited for any of the livelihood activities listed above. The proposal would be 
considered by a small projects committee, on the basis of merit, and successful 
applications would be granted 70% of the anticipated costs of their proposed 
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initiative. As a sign of local commitment, applicants were expected to supply the 
remaining 30% of financing and resources by themselves. 
 
The Alto Bermejo Project and the conservancy programme in comparative 
perspective  
Once the broad outlines of the Alto Bermejo Project are in view, it is easier to trace 
the overarching similarities and differences between the two initiatives.  Because the 
principal focus of the thesis is on how both are prefigured by similar ideas – and in 
ways which produce remarkably comparable consequences – this section concentrates 
on the differences between the two initiatives, and how these arise as a result of the 
wide variations in the contexts in which they take place. This exercise is a necessary 
corrective: the Alto Bermejo Project and the conservancy programme differ in 
fundamental ways and are affected by disparate contextual factors: these must be 
highlighted rather than flattened out.  
The circumstances in which the Alto Bermejo Project and conservancy 
programme emerged were notably distinct. As detailed in chapter six, the 
conservancy programme was made possible by the ‘policy space’ opened up by the 
advent of independence in 1990. There was a clear and imperative rupture with the 
past. The conservancy programme was successfully represented to Namibia’s new 
policy makers as an embodiment of how to change the relationship between the 
government and the wider populace. It did so by plugging directly into the wider 
project of re-casting black African populations as the legitimate majority around 
which a just, egalitarian future would address past wrongs and radically change the 
fortunes not just of the few but of the many. In such a climate it was easy to suggest 
that communal area inhabitants were more than capable of handling the 
responsibilities associated with wildlife management.  
There was also a rupture in the fabric of Argentine political life which took place 
only seven years before the declaration of independence in Namibia, when in 1983 
democratic rule was finally consolidated. But it did not quite change the country as 
radically as independence changed Namibia.   
From the 1930s onwards, the history of Argentina in the Twentieth century was 
characterised by two countervailing forces. On the one hand, there were the attempts 
to establish and consolidate a functioning constitutional democracy; on the other, 
there were a series of military coups which attempted to justify themselves through 
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claims to restore the order and economic stability that, it was argued, civilian regimes 
had not been able to guarantee (Romero 2004). The last coups-d’etat occurred in 
1976, installing a paranoid Junta characterised by extremely violent methods of 
crushing political dissent. Resistance largely took the form of the left-wing guerrilla 
groups that had emerged partly as a result of the cycle of coups, but a pacific response 
also emerged to the revolutionary fervour that had gripped countries such as Chile 
and Cuba in the second half of the twentieth century. The Junta did not just stifle 
consent against those who took up arms against it, however: non-violent dissidents, 
left-leaning intellectuals and other civilian critics numbered amongst those who found 
themselves ‘disappeared’. By some estimates, as many as 30,000 Argentines were 
‘disappeared’ by a dictatorship whose leaders were not the first to use state violence 
against the general populace, but who did so on an unprecedentedly wide and brutal 
scale (CONADEP 1984). For the sake of balance, it should be noted that it was not 
only the military government that wielded such violence against its opponents: left-
wing guerrilla groups often deployed similar tactics against military personnel and 
also civilians. The ‘dirty war’ of the late 1970s – sometimes described as a civil war – 
left bloodied hands on both sides of the divide.   
By 1982, the Junta’s regime was on the brink of collapse. Pre-empting the neo-
liberal reforms that President Carlos Menem would undertake in the 1990s, the Junta 
had attempted to reduce state bureaucracy, introduce some partial privatisation of 
state companies, and had lifted many trade tariffs that had protected local industry 
(De Privitellio and Romero 2000). But the reforms had been neither sweeping nor 
successful, and the country’s economic malaise had, after a purple patch financed by 
cheap international credit, deepened by the start of the 1980s (ibid). Factional in-
fighting within the Junta certainly did not help, and the invasion of the 
Falklands/Malvinas, leading to a predictable defeat and total humiliation, proved to 
be its undoing.   
Elections were held in October 1983, installing in government the Unión Cívica 
Radical (Radical Civic Union, more commonly known by the initials UCR). 
However, the future of constitutional government remained uncertain for the rest of 
the 1980s and on into the early 1990s. Both the presidencies of Raúl Alfonsín, from 
1983-89, and of Carlos Menem, from 1989-1999, were subject to military uprisings 
which demonstrated the will amongst some of the Army’s factions to reassume 
control. Therefore, the establishment of a democratically elected government in 
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Argentina in 1983 did not constitute a break with the past as solid and secure as did 
the establishment of Namibia’s independence in 1990. Since 1990 in Namibia, there 
has been no danger of a return to power of its former rulers. The same clearly cannot 
be said of Argentina: it was not clear until perhaps as late as the mid 1990s that 
constitutional government was unlikely to be disrupted once more by a coup d’état. 
Concomitantly, the emergence of the Alto Bermejo Project cannot be linked as 
directly to the ‘changing of the guard’ as the conservancy programme can be to the 
advent of independence in Namibia. Although the establishment of enduring 
democratic rule re-ignited in Argentina considerable reverence for civic participation 
in the political process, the Alto Bermejo Project did not come into existence as a 
result; nor has there been any need for it to be cast as part of an alternative to a 
previous era in the way that was necessary for the conservancy programme.  
These considerations are linked to another significant point of difference: 
although federal, regional and local government comprise important sets of actors 
within the Alto Bermejo Project, it was not conceived and formulated by the 
Argentine government. The conservancy programme is predicated on the Amendment 
to the Nature Conservation Ordinance, which passed into law in 1996. It was 
essentially designed by the Namibian government, in collaboration with communal 
area inhabitants, NGO, private sector Traditional Authority and other actors. The Alto 
Bermejo Project, as already mentioned, brings together an array of pre-existent 
activities within a framework determined principally (if not entirely) between the 
French Global Environment Fund, the most reliable source of funding for the Alto 
Bermejo Project; and the Pro Yungas Foundation, as the sole administrator of that 
funding.  
As a result of these differences, the influence of the concept of sustainable use of 
natural resources by competent local users – as a means of effective conservation 
beyond the protected area – took root in the two countries in distinct manners. In 
Namibia, although it had links to a tradition of white conservationism (as opposed to 
preservationism) that predated independence, its introduction was swift and dramatic 
for the black African majority. In Argentina, it found purchase in a more gradual 
fashion; and not along explicitly racial lines. The exact course of its diffusion is 
harder to trace than in the Namibian context, but it can be found in the adoption of 
conservation thinking and agendas prevalent at the international level. One clear 
instance of this process is the Yungas Biosphere itself, the organising framework to 
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which the activities grouped under the banner of the Alto Bermejo Project are 
intended to give substance. At the core of thinking on the UN’s biosphere reserve 
programme is the placing of humans within ecological systems and the use of zoning, 
which attempts to tackle the question of moving the conservation agenda outwith the 
borders of the protected area. This vision for conservation embraced by the Alto 
Bermejo Project contrasts markedly with that embodied by the case of Lipeo, within 
Baritú National Park (see box 9.1).   
Although sharing some fundamentally similar objectives, the Yungas Biosphere 
Reserve and a conservancy differ in important respects. Primarily, there is a 
significant difference in terms of the making and allocation of rights to use natural 
resources and/or to benefit from their use by other actors. Within the Yungas 
Biosphere Reserve, regulation governing natural resource use may be introduced to 
the nucleus (i.e. protected area), buffer or transition zones, but it is to be done by 
government, which retains responsibility for their enforcement. In a conservancy, in 
contrast, some rights governing resource use are devolved to conservancy residents 
and enforced by the conservancy committee, principally through the community 
game guard system (although the government retains some enforcement 
responsibilities and is keen to monitor the performance of conservancies as makers 
and enforcers of rules governing wildlife use). Whilst Alto Bermejo Project policy 
documents envisage various forms of consultation prior to any changes in legislation, 
there is no scope for devolution of rights to resource use down to groups of people 
who use the resources of the Yungas.  
Another point of difference relates to the focus of the Alto Bermejo Project and 
the conservancy programme. The Alto Bermejo Project takes as its focus a large 
swathe of an ‘eco region’ – the Yungas – and seeks their conservation in ways which 
contribute to local sustainable development objectives. It is, of course, this focus 
which forms the common link between the diverse activities which constitute the Alto 
Bermejo Project, from agroforestry to the extraction of certified timber. The 
conservancy programme has as its focus not an ‘eco region’ but a type of land tenure: 
Namibia’s communal areas. Conservancies tend to concentrate on the conservation of 
big game animals, partly because of their revenue-generating capacity but also 
because many conservancies are located in semi-arid or arid environments without 
enough rainfall or groundwater to support the kinds of sub-tropical mountain forests 
common in some parts of Northwest Argentina. Whilst conservancies in Northern 
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Namibia might feature management plans for available wood resources, they were 
less of a priority than wildlife in Tsiseb. There were fewer of them, they were not 
identified as a type of biodiversity to be accorded international conservation status (in 
contrast with the Yungas), and they were valued by Tsiseb’s inhabitants for their 
household uses, i.e. cooking and heating, rather than as a key source of income. 
Turning our attention to the dissimilarity in focus between the Alto Bermejo 
Project and the conservancy programme reveals perhaps the most crucial contextual 
difference: that of land tenure. The category of communal land tenure is so central to 
communal area conservancies that it would not be possible to replicate a communal-
area conservancy in most parts of Argentina; and certainly not in Los Toldos. Whilst 
both countries are the product colonisation processes, their separate histories have 
subsequently brought about separate arrangements for the ownership of land. Both 
may be seen on some level as settler colonies, but with Argentina being, according to 
the logic of the settler colony, by far the most successful of the two. In the Argentine 
context, the descendents of European settlers – and the governments they established 
– came to control and inhabit almost all the land in the country. By and large, 
therefore, land ownership in Argentina is based on the principles of private 
ownership; indeed the majority of land is owned privately albeit with some important 
exceptions (important politically rather than in terms of land-mass covered).  
In Namibia, as chapter six made clear, no colonial power managed to put all of 
the territory’s land at the disposal of their settlers; even if they did manage to 
appropriate the most agriculturally suitable land. The pre-colonial populations still 
occupied significant amounts of land, first through the native reserve systems and 
subsequently through the establishment of the homelands. Even at independence in 
1990 the state was able to claim ownership over the (then) homelands: these 
constituted 40.8% of the country’s land40. Conservancies rest upon the legal rights 
that the government, through the 1996 Amendment to the (1975) Nature Conservation 
Ordinance, devolves to those communal area residents who meet the criteria for the 
establishment of a conservancy. These rights are a function, then, of the existence of 
the tenurial category of communal land. It is this which allows some – though not all 
– of the rights of land ownership to be devolved to people who cannot claim legal 
                                                 
40 The post-independence Namibian government’s claim to own the communal lands is far from 
universally acknowledged by all Nambian traditional leaders, communal land inhabitants or legal 
scholars (for more see Harring 1996)  
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ownership over a common-pool resource, thereby providing a legal framework for 
collective action; it is this which provides the basis for a nationwide programme 
which has conservation outwith protected areas as a central aim.   
Because most people in Argentina either do not live on state-owned land or do not 
own large estates and the natural resources pertaining to them, the only type of 
conservancy that could exist would be an equivalent of Namibia’s commercial land 
conservancies; effectively a conservancy on a large stretch of privately owned land. 
Nevertheless, if the people who live on the land do not themselves own it – or are not 
legally recognised owners – it is hard to see how to devolve to them legal usage and 
management rights conventionally reserved for land owners.  
The case of Los Toldos, with contested ownership claims over the same area of 
land which arose as a result of assimilation into Argentina, is even more complicated. 
In a nutshell, despite the existence of Bolivian property deeds covering much of the 
land that was transferred to Argentine sovereignty after the ratification of the Carrillo-
Diez de Medina Treaty, all of that land was permitted to be sold as a finca to 
Argencampo, a timber company. As a result, common-pool resource usage in the 
municipality of Los Toldos is based largely on the de facto basis of possession being 
nine-tenths of the law, with people attending to individual plots used for subsistence 
agriculture, but also accessing the area’s water, forest and grazing resources without 
restriction, despite the fact that few can claim legal ownership over any of the land on 
which these are found. Even by making the assumption that ownership rights will 
eventually be established, they would apply to individual plots of land, not be held 
collectively over a group of resources which spread across individual plots of land, as 
in the case of a communal area conservancy in Namibia.         
The significance of this observation becomes clear if we consider the advantage 
that conservancy residents, through their representatives, can have when negotiating 
the basis on which any sort of tourism enterprise is to operate within a conservancy’s 
boundaries. Both contracts for the Brandberg White Lady Lodge joint venture and the 
African Hunting Safaris trophy hunting quota are testament to the leverage that 
conservancy legislation can provide to poor common-pool resource users who lack 
the knowledge, skills, finance and experience necessary to realise the economic 
potential of ‘their’ resource base. There is at present no legal basis on which people in 
Los Toldos can have a guaranteed claim to benefit significantly from tourism 
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activities, precisely because they have no legal claim on anything in the area which 
might be deemed a tourism attraction.   
 
3. Conclusion   
 
Knowledge about sustainability is given privileged status within the context of the 
Alto Bermejo Project. Such knowledge shapes its wider framework. The objectives of 
the Alto Bermejo Project are framed in the language and logic of sustainability. It is 
very much at odds with the predominant type of protected area conservation in 
Argentina, and of which the history of Baritú National Park provides a good example. 
It constitutes an attempt to pursue a conservation agenda outwith the protected area. It 
redefines conservation in terms of careful use, not prohibition of use. It does not see 
humans solely as a threat to the conservation of valued biodiversity, but instead as 
competent resource users who are capable of using common-pool resources in such a 
way as to ensure their continued existence. Indeed, to ensure the continued existence 
of the Yungas in Argentina, sustainable forms of use of the resources it comprises 
have to be made attractive to the people that live in and around it. Its objectives are 
framed in terms of the over-arching goal of sustainable use of natural resources, and 
indeed are neither intelligible nor justifiable without making recourse to the idea of 
sustainability. Without the perceived need for setting common-pool resource use 
within the Yungas on a sustainable footing, there would simply be no need for the 
Alto Bermejo Project. 
In its commitment to this concept, it is essentially comparable with the 
conservancy programme. The policy documents of both can clearly be read in terms 
of the six ‘principles of sustainability’ extrapolated in chapter four. Both are 
testaments to the staggering global reach of the notion. Having established that 
knowledge about sustainability enjoys a privileged status in the policy texts of the 
Alto Bermejo Project, what remains to be done is to chart the consequences of this 
status for local participation in the Project’s agroforestry initiatives in the 
municipality of Los Toldos. This exercise reveals another fundamental similarity 
between the Alto Bermejo Project and the conservancy programme: both are 
exercises in knowledge transfer. Viewing the PAB in this light is essential if the 
significance of the link between knowing and deciding is to be fully appreciated. 
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Chapter X 
Knowing and deciding in Los Toldos  
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines in detail the Alto Bermejo Project agroforestry initiatives in 
the municipality of Los Toldos, rendering explicit their correspondence to the six 
‘sustainability principles’ gleaned from wider thinking on the notion in chapter four. 
This exercise leads onto a consideration of the type of participation in the 
agroforestry initiatives. I designate this ‘direct’ participation, because decisions about 
what activities to pursue, what resources to utilise and how, are taken directly by the 
people of Los Toldos, in conjunction with the Pro Yungas Foundation extension 
worker. Direct participation contrasts with the other type found in the conservancy 
programme, namely representative participation. Direct participation could not have 
come about without the re-evaluation of local resource users which is entailed by 
acceptance of the concept of sustainability. The toldeños (inhabitants of Los Toldos) 
are treated as competent decision-makers who must of necessity be involved in 
decisions about local common-pool resource use if it is to be enduringly sustainable. 
It is therefore understandable that some may conclude that participation in the 
agroforestry initiatives can unproblematically be designated as ‘bottom-up’.  
However, this designation does not lead to a fuller understanding of one of the 
crucial dynamics affecting who participates and how in the Alto Bermejo Project. 
Like the conservancy programme, it depends for the realisation of its objectives upon 
a process of knowledge transfer, and subsequently on having, or not having, the 
necessary knowledge required to make given outcomes obtain. In order for it to be 
possible for the NGO, government, donor and research actors to be able to designate 
its outcomes sustainable, the people of Los Toldos have to come to accept the 
expediency of the techniques and ways of doing things – the agroforestry activities 
themselves – that are seen as sustainable forms of common-pool resource use. To the 
extent that they do so, there is a coordination of beliefs (Barnes, Bloor & Henry 
1996:121), a consensus between them and the actors that introduce these techniques 
and ways of doing things – in this case the Pro Yungas Foundation. For as long as it 
remains the case that these activities cannot be undertaken solely by the people of Los 
 243
Toldos themselves, but require the assistance of the actors who transfer the necessary 
knowledge and skills, the participation of such actors is rendered indispensable. 
Therefore, circularity in intervention persists. Section four offers an explanation of 
this circularity and explores its short- and long-term consequences. One might expect 
a withdrawal of the Pro Yungas Foundation once the process of knowledge transfer is 
complete; once indeed such actors have rendered themselves sufficiently dispensable. 
But there is little sign that the Pro Yungas Foundation will become dispensable in the 
short to medium term, or indeed plans to. This continued indispensability is not 
reducible simply to rational, self-interested calculation on the part of the Pro Yungas 
Foundation; I attempt therefore to pick out some of the goals and interests which tend 
toward the consolidation of the presence of the Pro Yungas Foundation in Los 
Toldos. 
The chapter concludes that circularity in intervention need not be seen as a purely 
negative phenomenon. Toldeños may not quite be the protagonists in the agroforestry 
initiatives, independent of external sources of assistance, that talk of ‘bottom-up’ 
participation would make of them. For them to become so continues to be a distant 
prospect; but this is not merely down to the actions of the Pro Yungas Foundation. On 
the contrary, it may well be that a speedier withdrawal of the Foundation than is 
currently envisaged would not be welcomed by the toldeños themselves. 
 
2. Conservation and development in Los Toldos 
 
The importance of the concept of the sustainable use of natural resources as a means 
through which to address both conservation and development objectives is explicitly 
manifest in the projects that are undertaken by the Pro Yungas Foundation in the 
municipality of Los Toldos. By enhancing existing livelihood strategies and 
increasing the livelihood options available to the inhabitants of Los Toldos, it is held 
to be possible to improve living standards whilst reducing pressure on available 
common-pool resources. This aim is especially pertinent in respect of food security, 
given the price rises of foodstuffs after the most recent Argentine economic crisis.  
The activities which attempt to achieve this overarching aim can be grouped into 
three broad categories: agroforestry for improved cultivation, livestock farming and 
complementary livelihood activities. Table 10.1 below illustrates the types of activity 
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that occur, lists the expected conservation or development benefit and which 
underlying principle or assumption is implicit in their formulation and 
implementation. The table is followed by a more in depth description of the activities. 
 
Agroforestry for improved cultivation 
Agroforestry and cultivation activities reflect the importance of subsistence 
cultivation in local livelihood strategies. In one form or another, many of these 
activities have been carried out in Los Toldos since 1993. The Pro Yungas 
Foundation offered seven principal activities relating to agroforestry, listed below. 
 
1. Wire-fencing cultivated plots, protecting crops against animal-caused damage. 
The aim is to increase the yield from land already under the plough whilst 
reducing the need to clear forest for cultivation.  
2. Planting forest curtains as a windbreak, with a view to improving productivity 
and reducing erosion.  
3. Macizo planting: planting rows of eucalyptus trees, to create a supply of 
timber more suited to household and work purposes than Yungas species.  
4. Micro-irrigation systems, using small-bore plastic tubes fitted with drip-
valves, to increase yields from existing plots. It is hoped more productive land 
could better meet subsistence food needs and provide as well as a surplus for 
sale, whilst reducing environmental pressure. 
5. Planting peach and orange fruit trees, partially for nutrition purposes, but 
again, also with a view to producing for sale in local Bolivian and Argentine 
markets.   
6. Creating a nursery to increase the variety of local produce and graft local, 
disease-resistant but bitter-tasting orange and peach plants with less disease-
resistant but saleable, sweeter-tasting plants.  
7. Increasing local horticulture production, to reduce dependency on expensive 
Bolivian supplies and to produce a saleable surplus.  
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Less land needed for 
cultivation 
Greater yield,  
less livestock damage 
Awareness of  human costs of 
conservation, incentive  
structure for conservation 
Forest curtains Reduce soil erosion Increase yield Awareness of  human costs of 
conservation, incentive 








better adapted for  
domestic needs  
Awareness of  human costs of 
conservation, incentive 
structure for conservation 
Micro-irrigation Reduce land needed 
For cultivation, less 
pressure on Yungas 
resources 
Higher yield, food  
security, potential for 
surplus production 
Awareness of  human costs of 
conservation, incentive  
structure for conservation 
Fruit cultivation Negligible impact on 
environment  
Food security, potential  
for surplus production 
Aid livelihood security without 
adverse environmental impact 
Plant nursery Negligible impact on 
environment 
Making local plants more
saleable at market, seed 
bank for extending crop 
variety 
Aid livelihood security without 
adverse environmental impact 
Horticulture  Negligible impact on 
environment 
Food security, potential  
for surplus production  
Aid food & livelihood security 
without adverse environmental 
impact 
Livestock farming 
Purchase of  
vaccines 
May help reduce herd 
size and pressure on 
resources  
Less animal deaths from 
disease, more saleable 
and healthier meat  
Aid food and livelihood  





May help reduce herd 
size and pressure on 
resources 
Less animal deaths from 
disease, more saleable  
and healthier meat 
Aid food and livelihood  




Negligible impact on 
environment  
Food security, potential 
for surplus production 
Aid food and livelihood  





Reduce pressure on 
resources by reducing 
prevalence of 
transhumance 
Food security, make 
livestock much more 
valuable at market 
Awareness of  human costs of 
conservation, incentive  
structure for conservation 
Complementary livelihood activities 
Apiculture Negligible impact on 
environment 
Contribution to  
household income 
Aid food and livelihood  
security without adverse 
environmental impact 
Craft-making Negligible impact on 
environment 
Contribution to  
household income 
Aid livelihood security without 




Whilst the importance of livestock farming to household income is recognised within 
the context of the Alto Bermejo Project, there are concerns about the environmental 
impacts of putting livestock out to graze. However, as no impact studies had been 
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made, Pro Yungas Foundation staff were reticent to make claims about the scale of 
impact. All livestock activities were undertaken by a Pro Yungas Foundation 
veterinarian. These activities were not as long established as those relating to 
agroforestry, having been initiated at the beginning of 2004 and did not enjoy 
uninterrupted funding. During the research period, the principal activities carried out 
with respect to livestock farming were:  
 
1. Education about disease prevention general animal welfare  
2. improvement of animal nutrition  
3. Sourcing cheaper drugs for disease treatment, by pooling money locally for 
the purchase of vaccines in bulk and at cost price.  
 
These were characterised by field staff as objectives which were intended to further 
community development41. In the long term, however, work with livestock was 
intended to address also the environmental impacts of livestock rearing, especially of 
cattle grazing. This aim was eventually to be achieved by encouraging a move 
towards semi-intensive livestock production, although only insofar as there was a 
local willingness to make the changes such a move would entail. It would involve: 
 
1. Stabling cattle more frequently than is done under current practice, where 
cows are left to wander and seek pasture wherever they find it  
2. Improving the genetic stock, to make stock more economically competitive  
3. Reducing herd sizes, on the rationale that higher returns can be secured from 
smaller herds of healthier and better-fed animals, thereby reducing the 
environmental impact of herding      
 
Complementary livelihood activities 
This component relates to activities either not previously practised in Los Toldos, or 
whose practice had been in decline but have been taken up once more with a view to 
increasing household income:  
 
1. Apiculture (bee-keeping)   
                                                 
41 Interview with Eloisa Ferro, veterinarian for the Pro Yungas Foundation11.12.2004 
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2. Support for handicraft making, as a (currently unpredictable) source of 
income which makes little or no extra impact upon the environment. 
Assistance takes the form of a rotating fund, providing credit for purchasing 
materials and flexible repayment options  
 
Exploring the assumptions that frame these initiatives reveals their 
correspondence to my six ‘principles of sustainability. As noted, it is held that 
increasing the yield from land under cultivation serves two important purposes. First, 
it may encourage a shift from subsistence to surplus cultivation. Second, increasing 
yields can serve conservation objectives by reducing the amount of forest needing 
cleared and burned. Such thinking is, in theory if not always in practice, a model for 
sustainable agriculture. Although it is not yet clear that planting eucalyptus 
significantly reduces pressure on the Yungas, that it is seen as a potential solution 
demonstrates the privileged status of the proposition that it is imperative to address 
and mitigate the human costs of conservation, thereby corresponding to the fourth 
‘principle of sustainability’. It is thought by Pro Yungas Foundation staff to serve 
both conservation and development objectives, even in the absence of scientific data 
to support the conclusion. It serves as the rationale for the employment of such 
techniques, a basis on which to organise programme activities.    
Many of these activities have in-built incentive structures for their own long-term 
adoption and maintenance, in terms of potential gains in productivity, greater food 
and/or livelihood security concomitant increases in household revenue etc. Many of 
these potential gains are economic in character, making such thinking intelligible in 
terms of the fifth ‘sustainability principle’ as well as the fourth.      
Bee-keeping and handicraft production are included in the Alto Bermejo Project 
activities in Los Toldos because they are considered to aid livelihood security whilst 
causing little or no adverse environmental impact. It would not at all be controversial 
to argue that their environmental impact was negligible or even positive, although the 
extent to which either do so to any great extent is yet to be established. Nonetheless, 
their worth and inclusion in the Alto Bermejo Project derives from their perceived 





‘Direct’ participation in Los Toldos  
The approach favoured within these small projects is, then, essentially one of 
providing technical and financial assistance to people who are persuaded of the merits 
of the knowledge and resources being offered to them. On that basis, different 
techniques from within mainstream agricultural science are suggested to – and 
increasingly accepted by – group members to employ alongside those that have been 
in existence for generations and perhaps centuries. Through working either with 
individual group members on household-level activities or with a number of members 
on shared projects, the idea is that extension workers reach a consensus with 
beneficiaries and assist them in achieving their objectives.  
This, then, forms the basis of decision-making, which might perceivably be called 
‘direct participation’, in the sense that it is group or club members themselves – as 
opposed to representatives of the group or club – who determine what activities they 
will pursue, albeit in conjunction with a person who has the knowledge, skills and 
access to resources that are required for their implementation. The extension workers, 
mostly through groups but sometimes even with individual families, work directly 
with a majority of the families in the municipality. It is this direct working 
relationship which differentiates arrangements for participation within the small 
projects from the conservancy programme in Namibia. 
It is worthwhile drawing out explicitly the links between ‘direct participation’ and 
the ‘principles of sustainability’ that the Alto Bermejo Project and the conservancy 
programme have in common. First, the actors and institutions responsible for 
implementing this part of the Alto Bermejo Project clearly view toldeños as 
competent resource users capable of making sound decisions about resource use and 
agricultural production strategies. This fits well with the third ‘principle of 
sustainability’, that it is no longer a foregone conclusion that people will exhaust 
available common-pool resources whenever there is not a state or private resource 
regime imposed and enforced. Second, that they are viewed as competent resource 
users prefigures the importance of toldeño participation in the Alto Bermejo Project. 
Therefore, they arrive at a decision with the project extension worker, making them 
central to the decision-making processes which determine the activities of the group 
in which they work. This is in line with the sixth principle, that sustainability 
objectives cannot be achieved without the broader participation of common-pool 
resource users in the decisions. Third, not only are toldeños to be incorporated into 
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the decision-making process regarding the utilisation of natural resources, but they 
are also to be given a sound reason to do so (principle four). For this reason, the 
initiatives they undertake with the extension worker revolve around techniques which 
are intended to yield not only conservation but also development benefits.  
The costs of conservation are explicitly addressed in the formulation of the 
agroforestry and other initiatives in Los Toldos and are to be mitigated or 
compensated if they are to be achieved. Clearly, then, beliefs about who can 
participate and on what basis in conservation-related decision-making processes have 
changed, especially if compared with the thinking which culminated in the inhabitants 
of Lipeo being excluded from all of the decisions about the creation and running of 
Baritú National Park. This change in belief is essentially comparable with the type of 
change in post-independence Namibia documented in chapter six. Conservancy 
committees all over Namibia, and the residents they represent, are deemed capable of 
sustainable common-pool resource when the government of Namibia declares 
(gazetting) a conservancy a legal entity. As we have seen, one of the underlying 
beliefs of the conservancy programme is that not only are local people capable of 
participating in the management of common-pool resources, but that their 
participation is indispensable to the overarching objective of sustainability.  
However, it is important not to lose sight of central differences between ‘direct’ 
participation in agroforestry initiatives in Los Toldos and ‘representative’ 
participation in Tsiseb conservancy, as well as variations in the access to and 
distribution of benefits within both settings. Activities in Tsiseb conservancy took 
place across a much bigger scale than those in Los Toldos and involved more people 
which, as discussed in Part II, is one of the principal reasons why participation 
through representatives was adopted. Another important reason why representative 
participation is found in Tsiseb conservancy – and in many other conservancies – is, 
of course, because it is part of the requirements for conservancy formation. A 
representative committee of some sort is one of the criteria specified in the (1996) 
amendment to the Nature Conservation Ordinance. Representative participation is, 
therefore, envisaged for a conservancy even before the process to request the 
‘gazetting’ of one in a given area is initiated. Representative participation stems, 
therefore, from the very development of conservancy legislation. The ‘direct’ 
participation of the agroforestry initiatives in Los Toldos are rooted, in contrast, not 
in national legislation but in processes largely specific to Los Toldos: in the 
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agroforestry work done in the municipality, under the auspices of different projects 
and programmes, since the early 1990s.  
Another crucial contextual factor has a significant impact on how people 
participated in Los Toldos and Tsiseb conservancy respectively: land tenure. 
Communal tenure in Namibia permitted communal area conservancy residents to 
have collective rights over common-pool resources – and especially game animals – 
in the area. No single person ‘owned’ these resources, but all residents had a legally 
valid claim to benefit from their conservation and/or a share of any revenue-
generating activities derived from them. Arrangements in Los Toldos were different; 
and precisely because land tenure in the municipality and the department comprised 
the standard divisions of private property. Each family or individual had some claim – 
without or without titles (most of which were not strictly recognised under Argentine 
law) – to a plot of land on which to set up accommodation and grow produce for 
subsistence, sale or trueque (non-monetary exchange of goods). At the same time, 
however, the transhumance arrangements still used for livestock husbandry did 
constitute a common-pool resource use regime, in that cattle, goats or sheep were 
grazed either within the Yungas in and around the municipality of Los Toldos, or they 
were taken to graze the pastures above the tree line. Herders could make no legal 
claim to the use of this land: their de facto access to it rested upon the lack of any 
challenge to it. Moreover, they were not in possession of the legal right to benefit 
from the use of the resources afforded to them by the Yungas or the pastures.     
In consequence of these differing tenure arrangements, the direct model of Los 
Toldos focussed on working with families. The producer groups that were formed 
comprised members of the families resident in a given part of the municipality, and 
activities concentrated on the resources controlled by those families. New technology, 
such as irrigation or grafting, would be introduced within the context of the groups, 
but each family – or sometimes members of three or four families in collaboration – 
would be provided the equipment, seeds or other input required for the upkeep or 
improvement of resources available to them in a context of the division of private 
property. The existence of this private tenure regime therefore led benefits to accrue 
around individual produce. The incentive for people to adopt the new techniques 
which would ease pressure on the Yungas resource base derived from individual, not 
collective benefits. The precise opposite was the case in Tsiseb conservancy, where 
all activities were forms of managing – and distributing the benefits from – available 
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common-pool resources. The management of those resources was delegated to 
specific institutions: the conservancy committee and manager; the investors and the 
Joint Liaison Committee for the Brandberg White Lady Lodge; African Hunting 
Safaris for the trophy hunting agreement; the Daureb Mountain Guides (and 
increasingly the National Monuments Council) for the Brandberg Mountain. In Los 
Toldos participants in the agroforestry initiatives managed their own resources in 
conjunction with specialist help provided by the Pro Yungas Foundation and/or other 
actors. 
As a result of these different mechanisms for resource management, local 
experiences of participation were concomitantly different. In Tsiseb conservancy, the 
achievement of the conservancy’s conservation and development objectives hinged 
more on what people did not do – kill wildlife – than what they did do. They were 
required to oversee the institutions of resource management, via the Annual General 
Meeting and through meetings with area representatives; much as an electorate 
oversees a government in the broadest sense. Some residents would be directly 
involved, for instance as Community Game Guards, as employees of the Brandberg 
White Lady Lodge, as a safari hunter in training or as a conservancy committee 
member. However these were, of course, the minority. In light of this delegation of 
wildlife management responsibilities to specific institutions, and bearing in mind also 
the difficulties of communication across an area the size of Tsiseb, it is easier to 
understand why conservancy residents who participated in focus groups often 
struggled to see its relevance to their own situation. The members of mothers’ clubs 
and producer groups in Los Toldos, on the other hand, were, by dint of their direct 
involvement in resource management activities, could much more easily perceive the 
link to their own forms of resource use and the benefits that could potentially be 
accrued through the use of new techniques.    
In Argentina the achievement of conservation and development objectives 
depended more on what people did do, i.e. adopt different methods from agroforestry, 
new (for toldeños) approaches to cultivation and livestock husbandry. In Tsiseb, it 
was the conservancy executive committee and staff that did what needed to be done – 
much of which consisted in learning what to do in order to run a conservancy. 
Conservancy residents oversaw, at the AGM, the whole project, But toldeños were 
 252
directly involved in making the difference to their own plots of land – the 
agroforestry initiatives revolved directly around their activities42.  
Moreover, if we look at the agroforestry initiatives in terms of access to and 
distribution of locally valued resources, it becomes clear that ‘direct’ participation 
differs not just from the ‘representative’ model of Tsiseb conservancy. It also differs 
fundamentally from local access/distribution dynamics. As seen in chapter eight, 
access to the resources of the state is to be negotiated through political allegiance. 
Such access is not open to all who seek it; rather, there is evidence to suggest that it is 
used as a bargaining chip to secure consistent voter support in municipal elections. In 
contrast, access to the resources of the Alto Bermejo Project can be solicited by any 
resident of Los Toldos. As toldeño Miguel Tapia explained to me, people trusted the 
extension workers of the Pro Yungas Foundation because they would work with 
anyone, putting at the disposal of the producer groups or mothers’ clubs the resources 
bound up with the agroforestry initiatives – and without expecting political allegiance 
in return43. Ironically, José García, a Pro Yungas Foundation extension worker, 
became very popular, precisely because he was so unswervingly apolitical in the 
pursuance of his work, that he was repeatedly entreated by residents to run for office 
in the municipal elections. In effect, his access to valued resources – and consistent 
tendency to make them available without demanding a pledge of political allegiance – 
had garnered him sufficient political capital to make him a viable candidate, and 
indeed one which local politicians might well have had good reason to fear had he 
chosen to run. 
That project resources could be locally and directly solicited in this way is, of 
course, also intimately connected to beliefs about the necessity and desirability of 
local participation in processes through which conservation and development 
objectives are to be achieved. Indeed local participation partially justifies the very 
existence of the agroforestry initiatives, with toldeños represented as protagonists 
                                                 
42 It should be noted that if toldeño participation in the Alto Bermejo Project overall were 
compared with the participation of the residents of Tsiseb conservancy, greater similarity would 
emerge. The Alto Bermejo Project is coordinated through sub-committees and the regional level 
and an overarching coordinating committee, in line with the decision-making structures 
prescribed in the declaration of a Biosphere Reserve. Toldeños can and have sent representatives 
along to these committees. However, in the case of the first coordinating committee meeting in 
October 2004, the few that did attend seemed not to understand either why their presence was 
requested or what had occurred throughout the meeting.  
43 Interview with Miguel Tapia, member of the ‘Nueva Esperanza’ (New Hope) Producer Group, 
La Misión, municipality of Los Toldos, 12.12.2004. 
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who can modify their agricultural activities in such a way as to boost household 
income whilst relieving pressure on the Yungas. There is consensus within the Pro 
Yungas Foundation and other Alto Bermejo Project institutional actors that this is the 
case, and it precedes the arrangement that producer groups or mothers’ clubs either 
make decisions with the extension worker or directly by themselves. For this reason, 
toldeños are not made perversely accountable (Stokes 2005) to the extension worker 
or the Pro Yungas Foundation in the way they might be were the resources they used 
for these activities provided by the municipal council. 
 
3. Circularity in intervention 
 
Why ‘direct’ participation is still circular  
On these grounds, the Fundación Pro Yungas maintains for understandable reasons 
that it is their beneficiaries who in large measure define the trajectory of the 
agroforestry initiatives. They might thereby intelligibly and plausibly lay claim to 
describing the activities as ‘bottom-up’. However, without wanting to deny the value 
of these initiatives either for such organisations or the people of Los Toldos, applying 
the ‘bottom up’ label in this case does not bring us to a fuller understanding of what 
types of participation characterise intervention in this context.  
It is precisely because current policy and intervention is underpinned by 
commitment to the importance of local participation that the Pro Yungas Foundation 
is rendered indispensable to the initiatives for which it has successfully secured 
funding. One basic dynamic remains unchanged: as in the conservancy programme, 
the initiatives that occur in Los Toldos still depend for the achievement of their 
objectives on a process of knowledge transfer from implementers to beneficiaries. 
This dynamic is only modified, rather than radically altered, even when two core 
beliefs underpinning intervention stress the competence of local people in resource 
management and the importance of their participation, in reconciling conservation 
and development objectives. Being in possession of knowledge about sustainability is 
still necessary in order to be able to define objectives and still serves to evaluate what 
– or whose – knowledge is seen as helpful or necessary in defining what needs to be 
done and how to do it.  
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Let us recap on some of the theoretical insights detailed in chapter two. First, 
recall that I have argued that the concept of sustainability has a self-referential 
component. That is, when we say of something that it is or is not sustainable, we do 
not refer directly to the empirical properties of that thing, but rather to other 
references to it. These references specify the relationship in which what that thing is 
and does stand to a particular set of activities, goals and interests. So, for instance, 
small-bore tubing can be designated ‘sustainable’ in relation to its use in micro-
irrigation systems which are favoured by the Pro Yungas Foundation because of their 
potential to reduce the need for forest clearance for agricultural purposes. But its 
status as a sustainable technology does not derive directly from its physical 
characteristics, but from the purposes that it can be made to serve. Its sustainable 
status is imputed to it, and is intelligible only within the context of established 
reference to sustainability (cf. Barnes 1988). It is a sustainable technology, then, 
partly because it is referred to as such. Crucially, therefore, if its status as 
‘sustainable’ comes not solely from an investigation of its empirical properties, its 
validity – the reason why we accept that it is a sustainable technology – derives also 
from the cognitive authority of the people who refer to it as sustainable. Now, the 
sheer amount of things it is deemed necessary to know in order to produce an 
acceptable definition of sustainability demonstrates that it is a highly specialised body 
of knowledge. Consequently, few people have sufficient knowledge to be able 
credibly to designate as sustainable or, conversely, unsustainable, particular things 
and activities, and hence the cognitive authority for such designations remain at first 
in the specialist domain. However, when non-specialists accept the designations that 
specialists make about what is or is not sustainable, they extend the cognitive 
authority invested in that designation. The designation then becomes general, rather 
than being the preserve of a few people with specialist knowledge, and in being 
generally referred to becomes valid. To repeat a quotation from Barnes “we validate 
what we believe by referring to what we believe” (1988:49). Returning to the 
example of the small bore tubing, then, we can see the Pro Yungas Foundation as the 
source of cognitive authority – in this context – for its designation as sustainable. 
When people living in Los Toldos agree that it is a good idea to initiate micro-
irrigation activities, they are endorsing and extending the source of cognitive 
authority.  
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Having or not having cognitive authority entails fundamental implications for the 
type of participation that characterises the Alto Bermejo Project agroforestry 
initiatives in Los Toldos. This is precisely because these depend upon a process of 
knowledge transfer. The Pro Yungas Foundation is indispensable to this transfer 
process for two principal reasons. First, there is already a consensus on the need to set 
resource use within the Yungas on a sustainable footing, much of which has been 
brought about by the Foundation’s energetic attempts to create a public profile for the 
Yungas of national proportions. This consensus justifies the transfer of knowledge 
deemed necessary for the overarching goal of sustainable common-pool resource use. 
As I have sought to demonstrate with Part I of the thesis, this consensus did not just 
‘happen’. It emerged, was – and continues to be – contested and negotiated within a 
global context of changing beliefs about the potentially adverse impacts of current 
modes of human existence on the environment.  
Implicit in the consensus regarding the necessity of setting common-pool resource 
use in the Yungas on a sustainable footing is the notion that not all have the necessary 
capacity – knowledge and skills – to do so. This leads to the second reason: The Pro 
Yungas Foundation is seen by its funders (principally the French Global Environment 
Fund, or FFEM) as having the capacity to devise appropriate policy, and to design 
and implement corresponding policy solutions for realising sustainability objectives. 
Of course, it is no coincidence that the Pro Yungas Foundation is viewed in this light: 
it has striven to convince the FFEM that it is the best recipient of funding, in the face 
of competition, not least from Salta Provincial Government’s Secretariat of Natural 
Resources and Sustainable Development (see below). Before the knowledge transfer 
process has even occurred, then, considerations of what needs to be known, what 
needs to be done and who can do it have been settled, and in such a way as to 
reinforce both the validity of knowledge about sustainability and the indispensability 
of those actors deemed to be in possession of it. Therefore, much of what there is to 
participate in, who should participate and why it is necessary to participate has 
already been decided.  
Clearly, it would be simplistic to reduce what then happens in agroforestry 
initiatives in Los Toldos to the status of self-evident corollaries of policy design and 
implementation. Perhaps such straightforward causal relationships between policy 
and project outcomes only ever exist in the mind of a funding proposal writer. The 
people of Los Toldos come to the initiatives with their own goals and interests, and 
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generate their own understandings of and uses for project activities. Furthermore, the 
wealth of agricultural knowledge which they bring to the initiatives is recognised and 
valued by Pro Yungas Foundation extension workers; toldeños too can be sources of 
cognitive authority. As we have seen, this much can be inferred from the 
representation of toldeños within the Alto Bermejo Project policy documents 
effectively as capable agents of sustainability. Nonetheless, however events do 
unfold, the agroforestry initiatives depend more on the knowledge held by extension 
workers than on the knowledge that toldeños bring to them. For as long as this is the 
case, and no matter how honourable the intentions of the Pro Yungas Foundation, 
their participation remains indispensable.  
 
Who does what with micro irrigation 
By way of putting these remarks in context, it is helpful to continue with and flesh out 
the example of micro-irrigation. Having consulted with a Pro Yungas Foundation 
extension worker and chosen to pursue one of the agroforestry, livestock or 
alternative livelihood initiatives outlined in table 10.1, an individual must form a 
group of a minimum of four people. Ever since early attempts at combined 
conservation and development were introduced in Los Toldos in the early 1990s, 
group work has been the modus operandi. There is, moreover, a partially intact local 
custom known as the minga which aids group work. Minga refers to the pooling of 
labour resources among a group of people for activities that are hard to achieve 
individually. The most frequent activities a minga is used to achieve are agricultural, 
i.e. clearance of forest for cultivation. The minga lends itself, then, to the Alto 
Bermejo Project agricultural initiatives, as one member of the group may enlist other 
members to work on his or her plot one day, on the condition of returning the favour 
at a later point in time. It serves as an example of the incorporation of local practice 
into project activity. Nonetheless, it is used towards a pre-defined set of activities that 
have been selected by the Pro Yungas Foundation because, as we have seen, they are 
underpinned by a sustainability rationale. Even before discussing how people 
participate and on what basis, what there is to participate in – i.e. the activities offered 
by the Pro Yungas Foundation – has been predetermined. This may seem an obvious 
observation, but it serves to underline that the people of Los Toldos did not and could 
not have put together these activities themselves, and the Pro Yungas Foundation was 
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instrumental in designating them as a sustainable and, therefore, necessary 
intervention. 
If a group wants to set up a micro-irrigation system, it will in the first instance be 
as a result of a consensus with the extension worker. The group has first to agree with 
the extension worker that micro-irrigation techniques are indeed preferable to the 
rain-fed agriculture that they have practised up until that point. Indeed, in practice, 
there is widespread agreement on this point, as evidenced by the popularity of micro-
irrigation. People unproblematically attribute to it much of the improvement in crop 
yields, plant size and quality they experience. They could, of course, always attribute 
such changes to some other phenomenon. But they do not, because they accept the 
explanation of the extension workers and take improvements to crop yields that come 
about after the introduction of micro irrigation as confirmation of the validity of the 
extension workers’ knowledge. Here we can see how the cognitive authority 
underpinning beliefs about the efficacy and utility of micro irrigation moves from 
being specific to general, at least within the context of the agroforestry initiatives.  
Once this consensus on the benefits of micro-irrigation is reached and it is 
deemed an expedient course of action, the group must apply for financial and 
technical assistance from the Pro Yungas Foundation and its proposal is to be 
subjected to evaluation. This is done through completing a form which indicates 
which of the activities will be taken up and how it will be implemented. Given low 
adult literacy rates in Los Toldos, it is unsurprising that the help of the extension 
worker is often enlisted in the completion of the form. Indeed when the form was first 
introduced, the extension worker thought it would be so difficult for groups to 
understand that he often automatically assumed responsibility for its completion, 
thereby pre-empting any requests for assistance. When ready, a proposal is referred to 
a small panel of employees – including the extension worker – of the Pro Yungas 
Foundation, who decide whether to offer the necessary financial and technical 
assistance, based on the merit of the proposal. Presuming that the group’s proposal is 
approved – and there is a high approval rating – they will embark upon it with the 
assistance of the extension worker, with whom they will plan the activity. The 
extension worker will then drive one of the Foundation’s pickup trucks the 150km 
from Los Toldos to Orán, the nearest Argentine town, using Alto Bermejo Project 
funds to buy the pump, small-bore tubing and other necessary hardware. On his or her 
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return, he or she will, with the help of the group, install the micro-irrigation system 
and give instructions on use and maintenance.  
What emerges from this description is the indispensability of the knowledge, 
skills and access to resources of the Pro Yungas Foundation in the implementation of 
the agroforestry initiative. Having been used to secure the necessary project 
resources, the capacity that the Pro Yungas Foundation is deemed to have is what 
justifies the salary of the extension worker, the purchase and running costs for the 
vehicle, the costs of the components for micro irrigation etc. The initiative is, then, 
based more on the extension worker’s expertise and access to resources than it is on 
the agricultural knowledge that toldeños already have, even though this is by no 
means taken for granted. Producer group or mothers’ club members come to view the 
acquisition of this expertise, or at least some of it, as potentially fruitful and on this 
basis choose to participate in the initiatives. Precisely because of the privileged status 
of knowledge held by Pro Yungas Foundation staff – both in relation to funders and 
the inhabitants of Los Toldos – it would be missing the point to cast toldeños in the 
role of protagonists who set the trajectory for project activities. This was already 
defined before any projects were initiated, was conceived in terms of knowledge 
about sustainability and with a view to achieving sustainability objectives. Toldeños 
were not in a position to define this wider trajectory, to designate particular activities 
as sustainable or unsustainable, to procure funding from international sources, or to 
set a combined conservation and development agenda in Argentina’s subtropical 
mountain forest regions. There were sufficient incentives for toldeños to come to 
agree that the agroforestry initiatives could offer them significant benefits, and to 
become involved on that basis. But they did not become involved out of a locally-
generated desire to set their principal livelihood activities on a sustainable footing. 
Nor was there a groundswell of concern regarding the extent to which conservation 
objectives were or were not being met. Neither ‘sustainable’ nor ‘conservation’ are 
important, frequently-employed terms in the local vocabulary; and yet the aims of the 
agroforestry initiatives cannot be even be expressed, let alone understood, without 
them.  
Another indication of the privileged status of the knowledge held by Pro Yungas 
Foundation staff is a tension which arises regarding the extent to which the 
knowledge underpinning agroforestry initiatives complements or replaces local 
agricultural knowledge. With some of the activities, such as employing fertiliser to 
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improve crop yield or grafting plants to produce more saleable fruit, the argument that 
the initiatives do no more than complement existing knowledge and practice can be 
made relatively straightforwardly. No fundamental change in what the toldeños 
cultivate is entailed; nor is it necessary for them to abandon the tradition of shifting 
cultivation to which they are most accustomed. And yet the implications of adopting 
other initiatives would require a much more significant adjustment in local 
knowledge and practice.  
To take an example, the overall aim of the livestock-related initiative is to move 
toward a semi-intensive farming system, by way of stabling animals more frequently, 
improving the genetic stock and reducing herd sizes. This would constitute the 
adoption of a system at variance to the transhumance around which toldeños currently 
organise large portions of the year’s activities. There is locally a perception that it is 
‘natural’ to permit large livestock animals to graze widely, there are festivals to 
celebrate the marking of the animals and there are mental maps of valleys and 
mountain chains formed around transhumance patterns. To adjust these activities 
would entail a concomitant adjustment of local culture. Of course, extension workers 
were aware of this, and stressed that they would only attempt any such modification 
with people who were willing to experiment. Indeed, the comparative reluctance of 
the Pro Yungas Foundation to introduce such measures is a recognition of a domain 
of knowledge underpinned by toldeño cognitive authority. Nonetheless, if people do 
of their own volition adopt at some point semi intensive livestock methods, it will 
constitute the adoption of a new set of beliefs in preference to an existing set. The 
cognitive authority of expert NGO staff would be an important part of what made this 
coordination possible. Toldeños may have convinced the Pro Yungas Foundation to 
value transhumance to the extent that it is not seen to be something that can be 
sacrificed even bearing in mind the posited conservation value of doing so. But it is 
very unlikely that the people of Toldos would be able to persuade the Pro Yungas 
Foundation that transhumance is sustainable, not least because toldeños do not speak 
the language of sustainability.  
 
Indispensable for how long?  
As with the conservancy programme, a number of questions arise with regard to the 
implications of circularity in intervention. Even if the participation of the Pro Yungas 
Foundation is rendered indispensable because it has the knowledge in terms of which 
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the agroforestry initiatives are defined and, through securing funding, reinforces the 
privileged status of that knowledge, then so what? If the agroforestry initiatives entail 
a process of knowledge transfer, then will not the completion of the transfer process 
render the Pro Yungas Foundation wholly dispensable? Might we not see the 
Foundation as actively seeking, through transferring valued and useful knowledge, to 
become wholly dispensable? Is it not possible to read into my account of circularity in 
intervention an attempt to explain the actions of the Pro Yungas Foundation in Los 
Toldos, purely in terms of the ‘NGO livelihoods’ (i.e. self-interest) concerns that have 
been raised with respect to the conservancy programme? As in the Namibian context, 
I do not see circularity in intervention simply as a function of pure self-interest. The 
explanation lies in a subtler understanding of the goals and interests at play. For better 
or worse, I think that the Pro Yungas Foundation is unlikely soon to become 
dispensable in the initiatives and projects that it currently leads.  
 
Indispensable in the wider context… 
Self-interest cannot, of course, be wholly discounted from the explanation. During 
a discussion with the director of the Pro Yungas Foundation, Alejandro Brown, I 
mentioned that during research in Namibia, I had come across the concern, held 
mainly by certain government and research actors, that NGOs benefited more from 
the conservancy programme than the people who justified its existence, neatly 
captured by the notion of ‘NGO livelihoods’. To my surprise, he replied that he 
agreed with the sentiment of this argument (though he was not necessarily endorsing 
it in the specific Namibian context). He thought that in broad terms, the principal 
beneficiaries of development intervention were the NGOs, aid agencies, government 
departments and research actors that provided or accessed funds made available for 
developmental purposes. This was, he argued, a necessary arrangement: there had to 
be sufficient incentive for their continued involvement and commitment to frequently 
difficult, stressful jobs; altruism alone could not be relied upon to provide that 
incentive. It was perhaps not the fairest system, in his view, but was one that 
‘worked’ because it was not only the development professionals that benefited from 
it, but also project beneficiaries.  
However, what Brown would not wish to endorse is the view that NGO and 
government involvement in the Alto Bermejo Project has been motivated solely by 
financial gain. One of the goals Brown has pursued since the 1980s is to ensure that 
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the public profile of the Yungas continues to increase and to have them widely 
designated as a resource worthy of conserving. He can legitimately claim to have 
made a very significant contribution to the much-increased notoriety which the 
Yungas these days enjoy. This he has done through his own writings, his tenure as 
director of the Laboratory for Ecological Research into the Yungas, advocacy in the 
construction of the gas pipe through the Yungas, his involvement in the establishment 
of the Yungas Biosphere Reserve, the establishment of the Pro Yungas Foundation 
and, of course, through securing the funding for the Alto Bermejo Project. Doing all 
of this has not generated vast personal wealth for him. Wealth does not explain why 
he believes it vital to ensure the future survival of the Yungas, or why he has strived 
to become well-placed to make a significant contribution to this goal. His strategy has 
rendered him and his organisation indispensable to matters relating to the Yungas. He 
has succeeded in persuading a large variety of actors that the conservation of the 
Yungas matters on many different levels, and also that conservation objectives need 
not necessarily conflict with development efforts with resource users living in or near 
the Yungas. In doing so, he has been instrumental in extending the cognitive authority 
which underpins the validity of the designation of the Yungas as an area worthy of 
conservation. This has become a generalised concern, no longer limited to a small 
number of individuals with specialist knowledge of montane forest biodiversity. 
Being part of this process, a ‘player’, gaining access to resources through which to 
expand conservation and sustainable use activities further, better explains what drives 
Brown’s efforts to consolidate the status of the Pro Yungas Foundation as a key actor 
in conservation and development in the Yungas. 
Indeed, it is quite remarkable just how indispensable the Foundation has become 
within the context of the conservation of the Yungas, even given that this context is 
partly of its own making. Remarkable because the Foundation, and particularly 
Alejandro Brown himself, has become a very controversial figure, as reviled in some 
quarters as he is admired in others. He has made enemies along the way; not least 
among these is the Secretariat of Natural Resources and Sustainable Development 
(Provincial Government of Salta). During the design stages of the Alto Bermejo 
Project in 2001 and 2002, the lead organisation, was yet to be chosen by the French 
Global Environment Fund. At one point, the Secretariat of Natural Resources and 
Sustainable Development was, apparently, a clear contender for this position. 
However, as noted previously, it was the Pro Yungas Foundation that was ultimately 
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chosen instead. The wrangling that occurred over this change contributed to a year of 
delay to the initiation of the Alto Bermejo Project, and made a large hole in the Pro 
Yungas Foundation budget. It has been suggested that the French Global 
Environment Fund became so concerned about the perceived potential for corruption 
if the funds were released to an arm of provincial government that it chose instead to 
entrust them to an NGO. It may have been thought easier to hold an NGO to account 
over any abuse or misallocation than it would the Provincial Government of Salta, or 
indeed the Federal Government of Argentina. Due care must be taken with such 
suggestions: it proved beyond the scope of this research to establish in depth what 
prompted the Pro Yungas Foundation to be designated lead organisation in preference 
to the Secretariat of Natural Resources and Sustainable Development.  
The consequences were, though, clear: one set of actors saw its strong hopes of 
securing control over funds totalling €1.3m dashed, provoking a lasting resentment of 
the Pro Yungas Foundation. This resentment manifested itself, amongst other ways, 
in a decision to exclude the Foundation, along with other NGO counterparts, the 
Argentine Wildlife Foundation and Greenpeace Argentina, from the meetings of the 
Yungas Biosphere Reserve Management Committee, on which also sat the Salta 
Secretariat of Natural Resources and Sustainable Development. Pro Yungas 
Foundation staff complained in private that a deal had been cut with other 
stakeholders, and one which would suggest that it was not only the Salta 
Development Secretariat which was hostile to the Foundation and its NGO ‘allies’. 
Interestingly, however, even this exclusionary attempt was to have comparatively 
little effect on the involvement of the Pro Yungas Foundation in the Biosphere 
Reserve, for two reasons. First, they continued to be involved in the meetings of the 
local committees for the different zones of the Biosphere Reserve. Second, they 
continued to be the principal source of funding for any initiatives to be conducted 
within the framework of the Biosphere Reserve. 
 
Indispensable in Los Toldos…  
There are a number of reasons to expect the continued presence of the Pro Yungas 
Foundation in Los Toldos, as opposed to a strategy which favours as rapid a 
withdrawal as possible, once toldeños have the necessary knowledge and skills to 
carry out the agroforestry initiatives without external assistance. For a start, the 
Foundation does not anticipate an imminent end to its presence in Los Toldos. During 
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interview, Alejandro Brown argued that the involvement of his Foundation and other 
support organisations in agroforestry initiatives in Los Toldos was likely to be on a 
long-term basis44. He disagreed with the notion that it would be possible for the 
municipality’s inhabitants to become independent of current modes of assistance over 
a short timeframe. It is not difficult to see why: Los Toldos remains geographically 
isolated; it is one of the poorest parts of a poor Argentine province; its basic 
infrastructure is rudimentary; in 2002, 38.2% of people between the age of 15 and 64 
had not completed primary school education (Salta 2002:23). Even despite job 
creation from the increased presence of state services, formal employment 
opportunities are slim and people ill-equipped to take advantage. There have, of 
course, been gains in health care, schooling and other services as a result of increased 
state presence in Los Toldos. But the commensurate increase in the numbers of 
people receiving state pensions and unemployment subsidies – not to mention the 
prevalence of machine politics – has fostered a culture of dependency on state 
resources. There are compelling reasons to think that the chances of a rapid 
transformation of structural poverty, which for centuries has shaped livelihoods in 
Los Toldos, are minimal. Intervention of any kind takes place against this wider 
backdrop. It is understandable that actors involved in such intervention may formulate 
their timeframes accordingly. 
All of these factors, then, militate against the toldeños becoming the sort of 
protagonists envisaged by ‘bottom-up’ participatory rhetoric, even if they do make 
decisions about group work jointly with extension workers. The consequences of the 
culture of dependency are particularly worthy of consideration as they constitute an 
important determinant of what people believe they can or are prepared to do for 
themselves and, therein, the extent to which they will embrace the role of 
‘protagonist’ prescribed by the logic of empowerment. It should be noted that they 
may not perceive it to be in their interests to do so. The assistance offered by groups 
such as the Pro Yungas Foundation constitutes an important supplement to household 
income, may perhaps be seen as a livelihood strategy in itself. Why would people 
want such assistance to be withdrawn? In the previous description of the process of 
setting up a micro irrigation facility, the extension worker, as well as the resources 
s/he can access, are preconditions of realising the dual objectives of strengthening 
                                                 
44 Interview conducted 22.8.2004 
 264
local livelihood options whilst reducing pressure on the environment. It is far from 
clear that toldeños feel the need to assume all the responsibility required for the 
achievement of these objectives. Assuming that micro irrigation improved crop yields 
by a quantity sufficient to produce a surplus that could be sold in regional markets, 
the producers would soon run into the practicalities of transporting produce to market. 
How to address this without free access to the Pro Yungas Foundation pickup truck? 
They could hire space in the local supermarket lorry, which does weekly trips to 
Orán, but that would incur extra (and currently avoidable) costs. How would 
producers pay for micro irrigation system maintenance or seed purchase? Again, it is 
perfectly possible and feasible for toldeños to find solutions to all such difficulties; 
but whether they would want to is another matter. We should remember that these 
resources – seeds, fertilisers, tubing, water pumps, use of a vehicle, extension workers 
with valued knowledge and a desire to make it locally available – are offered with no 
political strings attached. The recipients are not required to pledge an oath of political 
fealty in return for access to resources; nor is access threatened by the defeat of a 
political ally in municipal elections. Therefore, the long-term presence of the actors 
who can guarantee such access may well be looked upon favourably by toldeños.  
Now, focus group and interview data do not unequivocally support the notion that 
all toldeños involved in the agroforestry initiatives felt a sense of dependency 
regarding the Pro Yungas Foundation. Some groups reported that either they thought 
they already could operate independently of the Foundation or were moving in that 
direction. Others, such as the Mothers’ Club of La Misión, which had initiated 
activities with the Pro Yungas Foundation more recently, did not feel they could 
dispense with assistance received. Some activities were more established than others, 
too: i.e. grafting and fertilising were better understood and more widely adopted than 
bee-keeping.  
Even if some toldeños think they are or should be less dependent on the Pro 
Yungas Foundation, it is telling that most of these initiatives are not new. In the early 
1990s, they were started through funding from GTZ, which collaborated with the 
Laboratory for Ecological Research in the Yungas (LIEY), the forerunner to the Pro 
Yungas Foundation. By 2004, such initiatives had been underway for more than a 
decade; yet during fieldwork, very few people continued the activities independently 
of the support they received. This does not appear to constitute a strategy for 
becoming dispensable.  
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Why, then, have the agroforestry initiatives continued over this comparatively 
long timeframe? Part of the answer is related to the management and uneven 
provision of funding over substantial periods. Both in fieldwork conducted in 2002 
and 2004, a situation had arisen in which money was not available for some or all of 
the activities in Los Toldos. As a consequence, the salary of the extension worker 
(then) responsible for the agroforestry initiatives, was paid only intermittently 
through 2002 and, apparently, was not paid for the greater part of 2003. Indeed, in 
that year, Pro Yungas Foundation staff told me, so little funding was available that the 
organisation almost ground to a halt. There was a period of four consecutive months 
in which extension workers were not remunerated, and in which there was not even 
money to pay for petrol for most of the vehicles. With the onset of the Alto Bermejo 
Project in September 2004, monthly salary payments for one of the extension workers 
responsible for agroforestry initiatives in Los Toldos resumed. The French Global 
Environment Fund (FFEM) had agreed to cover the cost of the extension worker 
responsible for all of the agroforestry activities, and was strictly and frequently 
monitoring the expenditure of its funds, leaving little room for discretion over their 
disbursement. However, the salary of the extension worker (then) responsible for the 
livestock activities, was not being paid: these activities, although classified as part of 
the Alto Bermejo Project, were not covered by the FFEM. Other sources of funding 
for the Pro Yungas Foundation have not, it appears, proved so reliable. Therefore, 
scheduled activities have sometimes either not been carried out or have been delayed. 
The extension staff most affected have, of course, been in a very difficult position. 
There are the obvious problems that stem from being paid infrequently, i.e. paying 
rent, buying food etc. But the extension workers were also angered by an ethical 
dilemma to which they felt subjected. They were still requested to write or assist in 
the writing of funding proposals for continued work in Los Toldos or other places in 
which the Pro Yungas Foundation also works, such as Los Naranjos or San Andrés, 
but were unsure that the funding gained would ever reach the projects. One extension 
worker characterised this as an abuse of the people in whose name the funds had been 
requested, and eventually refused to be involved in writing funding proposals unless 
given guarantees that the funds would not be spent on anything else. Considerable 
resentment was expressed, by more than employee and on more than one occasion, 
over the perception that funds had instead been spent on propping up what was 
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viewed as an unnecessarily large amount of staff – 15 employees in total – as opposed 
to on the project activities themselves. 
With all due respect to the holders of these views, mitigating factors may be cited 
here. Further, it should be clarified that I do not have a complete account of the 
complex reasons for this funding shortfall. It has been argued that it was not within 
the power of the Foundation to control the unforeseen events connected to the 
development of this chronic shortfall in available revenue. It has also been argued that 
it is difficult to apportion blame to any one actor. One staff member at the Foundation 
told me that the reason why the organisation had been expanded to number 15 people 
was related to the negotiations over who would be lead organisation for the Alto 
Bermejo Project. Apparently, the Foundation had been told that it had insufficient 
capacity to take up the mantle of lead organisation. Therefore, it hired staff to cover 
perceived gaps, especially in terms of social development. As a strategy to convince 
the FFEM that the Pro Yungas Foundation had improved its capacity sufficiently, this 
was very successful. However, as noted, financial difficulties arose when the funding 
arrived to the Pro Yungas Foundation one year later than expected. The delay left the 
Pro Yungas Foundation in the position of having large salary costs but without 
sufficient funds to cover them. The priority became institutional survival, leading to a 
situation in which funds that were intended for project activities were diverted for 
other purposes. There were also, apparently, interruptions to existing sources of 
funding separate from that secured from the French Global Environment Fund. This 
led the Foundation to use up all its existing funding, until it became impossible, for a 
brief period, to pay any salary. Indeed, it was apparently the conviction held, 
especially by the Foundation’s president, Alejandro Brown, that its survival was 
essential to the future conservation of the Yungas, that justified taking a course of 
action that led to an inability to pay employees. The vision of conserving the Yungas, 
to which the Pro Yungas Foundation had already made a significant contribution, 
would, on this view, otherwise be impossible to realise. It might also be noted that as 
the delays occurred after institutional expansion, the Foundation has little choice but 
to make do as best it could.  
Whatever conclusion one arrives at about the strategy through which the Pro 
Yungas Foundation became lead organisation in the Alto Bermejo Project, it serves as 
an illustration of one of the limits to participation of the toldeños in the decision-
making processes regarding agroforestry initiatives in Los Toldos. The people in 
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whose name funding was solicited took no part in some of the most crucial decisions 
determining how that funding was spent. This situation also illuminates an important 
question: at what stage should the participation of the toldeños begin?  
Moreover, not disbursing the funds in accordance with the proposals through 
which they were secured has not yet stopped the Pro Yungas Foundation from 
accessing further funding to continue their activities. Indeed, using money for the 
purposes of institutional survival has served so far to assist the Foundation in gaining 
access to even greater sources of funding, not to be disqualified from it.    
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The Alto Bermejo Project’s agroforestry initiatives are formulated in terms of 
knowledge about sustainability. Consensus between PAB implementers and their 
funders on the need to transfer of knowledge about sustainability to the people whose 
resource usage will determine the viability of the resource base justifies intervention. 
Credible knowledge about how to achieve conservation and development objectives 
is concentrated within the NGO, government and private sector actors, all of whom 
are seminal in the design and implementation of these projects in the first place. The 
cognitive authority of these actors is crucial to maintaining the credibility of this 
knowledge: their designation of certain things and processes as sustainable or 
otherwise is one of the fundamental reasons why those things or processes are more 
widely designated sustainable or otherwise. It is this circular dynamic which renders 
their participation indispensable. Having knowledge about sustainability, if the results 
of what they do are judged favourably by those who provide the resources deemed 
necessary for the running of the project, guarantees their participation and allows 
them to continue to be seminal in defining the agenda. In this regard, broad parallels 
can be drawn with the conservancy programme: examining the link between knowing 
and deciding reveals not just the privileged character of the concept of sustainability 
in both initiatives, but also that it has comparable consequences for participation in 
two markedly distinct contexts.  
The indispensability of governmental, non-governmental and private sector actors 
in the agroforestry initiatives is to some extent at odds with the rhetoric of ‘bottom-
up’ participation which would at first glance seem to apply to the ‘direct 
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participation’ encountered in the agroforestry initiatives. As noted throughout the 
chapter, one privileged belief in Alto Bermejo Project – and conservancy programme 
– policy is that what local people know has to be incorporated or has to influence the 
shape of the project and the type of participation that characterises the project. But 
neither is or can be based solely on what local people think or believe, precisely 
because they do not have the ‘project-specific’ knowledge that NGOs or government 
actors or specific private sector actors have. Indeed, such actors in both Argentina and 
Namibia are much more equipped with the necessary knowledge, skills and resources 
successfully to implement the initiatives they have designed in the first place than are 
the local people who are within such initiatives elevated to the status of principal 
protagonists.  
However, this circularity in intervention does not necessarily constitute grounds 
on which to issue an outright condemnation of the Alto Bermejo Project. The long 
term assistance provided in a resource-poor area, which is at such a structural 
disadvantage when it comes to any attempts to reduce poverty, is welcome. When 
resources do find their way down to the agroforestry initiatives, they are put at the 
disposal of recipients with no political strings attached. In focus groups and 
interviews, time and again toldeños highly valued the knowledge and skills Pro 
Yungas Foundation extension workers provided. Moreover, in the context of 
increasing dependency on subsidy as a viable livelihood strategy, toldeños might have 
good reason to conclude that they did not want the Foundation to become 
indispensable any time soon. As Mosse has argued with regard to research on the 
Indo-British Rainfed Farming Project (2001), there may well be a case for the 
continued presence of support actors like the Pro Yungas Foundation over the longer 
term. It is as well to leave space for this argument to be made, as opposed to 
explaining the presence of the Pro Yungas Foundation merely in terms of self-interest 
and judging their efforts according to the extent to which toldeños could be left to 
pursue project objectives without assistance.  
When the people in whose name resources are claimed and accessed do not 
benefit from them because they have been used for other purposes, then questions 
emerge about accountability. The stage at which the toldeños should start to 
participate in decision-making processes is another important issue. However, it 
might also be noted in this regard that the accountability strictures put in place by the 
French Global Environment Fund (FFEM) have been both stricter than those of other 
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organisations from which the Pro Yungas Foundation has secured funding and, on 
their own terms, more successful. For the period of research period for which the Alto 
Bermejo Project was up and running, extension workers whose salaries were covered 
by the FFEM were paid regularly, and resources were consistently available for the 
agroforestry initiatives. Whatever conclusions are arrived at about the consequences 
of circularity in intervention, I hope to have illustrated the utility of insights from the 
sociology of knowledge – especially cognitive authority, self-referential knowledge 
and goals and interests – in rendering visible the circularity in the first place, as much 
in Argentina as in Namibia. 
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Chapter XI:  Conclusion 
 
1. In summary… 
 
This thesis has attempted to chart the effects on local participation, in two initiatives 
in very distinct contexts, of the link between knowing and deciding. What people 
know or do not know about how to define and achieve sustainability objectives is a 
central factor in deciding who participates and on what basis in both the conservancy 
programme and the Alto Bermejo Project. This is especially so to the extent that the 
simultaneously privileged and specialised character of knowledge about sustainability 
renders the participation of some actors indispensable. This is the essence of 
circularity in intervention, and it is a dynamic which remains invisible without a 
thorough investigation of the link between knowing and deciding. It will be 
overlooked, I contend, if we view either of these initiatives in terms of ‘grass-roots’ 
participation. That idea, of local people being the source of the initiatives deflects 
attention away from the global influence of the concept of sustainability which, in my 
view, is the ‘real’ source of both initiatives. Nor does this idea help us to remember 
that above all both of these initiatives are exercises in knowledge transfer. In order to 
reorient attention back towards this defining characteristic, I have employed and, I 
hope, demonstrated the utility of insights from the sociology of knowledge which 
help us to understand the consequences – especially for local participation – of 
processes of knowledge transfer.  
Another goal from the outset has been to be clear that circularity in intervention 
may be good or bad according to context or perspective, but it is as well to reiterate 
my own perspective on the matter. Within the specific contexts of Tsiseb conservancy 
and the Alto Bermejo Project’s agroforestry initiatives in Los Toldos, there are 
grounds for concern about some of the consequences for local participation of 
circularity in intervention. In Tsiseb, for instance, during the research period some 
conservancy residents knew so little about the conservancy that it was not possible for 
them to participate in the conservancy’s central decision-making processes. The 
knowledge deemed necessary for running the conservancy and which had been 
transferred was concentrated in the conservancy executive committee and even more 
in the conservancy manager. Even with this transfer, the continued participation of 
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NGOs such as the Rural Institute for Social Development and Empowerment (RISE) 
and the Namibian Community-based Tourism Association (NACOBTA) continued to 
be indispensable; not least owing to the funding and other resources to which they 
helped the conservancy secure access. In Los Toldos, despite the ‘direct’ model of 
participation which characterises the agroforestry initiatives, NGOs or government 
actors or specific private sector actors remained, after ten years of intervention, better 
equipped with the necessary knowledge, skills and resources, successfully to 
implement the initiatives they have designed than are the local people who are 
ostensibly the principal protagonists. There are also questions about claiming funds in 
the name of local people and not spending those funds on those people: this is a direct 
consequence of the circular character of participation in these agroforestry initiatives.  
However, there is a danger of failing to appreciate the benefits that are offered by 
both the conservancy programme and the Alto Bermejo Project, especially if we 
interpret the continuing centrality of having knowledge about sustainability purely in 
terms of the self-interest of government, non-government, research or private sector 
actors. In the case of Tsiseb conservancy, representative structures derive 
considerable legitimacy from the very struggle for Namibia’s independence. There is 
a consensus within Namibian society on the legitimacy of representative democracy, 
even if there are growing concerns about the extent to which the manner in which 
Namibia is governed is democratic (cf. Melber 2003). Moreover, having 
representatives standing in for larger numbers of people in Tsiseb is a response, albeit 
an imperfect one, to the classic dilemmas of collective action that surface in the 
context of having to consult hundreds of people dispersed over an extensive 
geographical area. It has required specialist knowledge to devise and implement the 
representative system, both in its original version and in the version that was being 
introduced towards the end of the field research.  
Representative decision-making gets a bad name, understandably, to the extent 
that it facilitates elite capture of benefits and exclusion of the majority. Indeed, it has 
been argued that in a democracy, the connection between state and citizen should be 
mediated not through representation but through participation and inclusion (i.e. 
Gaventa 2004). I think the evidence from Tsiseb points to the difficulties in 
maintaining such an argument. First of all representation is a form of participation, 
not something to be contrasted participation. Second, the work of Olson (1965) has 
demonstrated that there is a balance to be struck between the efficiency and the 
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inclusivity of making decisions about what collective action to take. Gaventa’s call 
for states to include their citizens in more decisions is a promising basis for 
generating widespread consensus; but if, as he claims, it is necessary to link up local, 
national and global levels in making decisions, the increasing numbers of potential 
decision-makers entailed in a link-up to the global level are likely to make some form 
of representation, be it by politicians or civil society organisations, inevitable. Tsiseb 
conservancy demonstrates that even at the local level it is not always possible to 
dispense with representative structures. It seems better, as has been done in the 
conservancy, to attempt to engage with it and find remedies for flaws. Given that the 
‘area representative’ structures were not fully established by the time this research 
ended, it is not possible to analyse the extent to which they addressed the issue of lack 
of information about the conservancy amongst its members. Nonetheless, it should be 
noted that there was an attempt to address the issue. The creation of these structures 
depended more on what people did not know than on what they did know, and their 
acceptance rendered indispensable the participation of the NACSO and RISE actors 
who sought to introduce them. Nonetheless, it seems to me better to evaluate whether 
they should be dismissed or encouraged not on whether they originated at the local 
level or because they are ‘representative’ as opposed to ‘direct’, but rather on what  
their consequences are and how these consequences are greeted, used, co-opted or 
otherwise negotiated at the local level.  
In the case of the Alto Bermejo Project, the agro-forestry initiatives in Los Toldos 
provided long-term assistance in a historically neglected, geographically isolated 
area, with some of the highest incidences of poverty in Argentina. When resources do 
get to recipients, they are not offered on the condition of political allegiance, which is 
another pattern of resource distribution seemingly common in Los Toldos. The 
toldeños with whom the Pro Yungas Foundation works are not made perversely 
accountable to it (cf. Stokes 2005). In focus groups and interviews, toldeños clearly 
valued both the knowledge and skills Pro Yungas Foundation extension workers 
provided and the ‘no strings attached’ basis on which they were offered. Furthermore, 
within the context of dependency on resources provided by the state or NGOs, 
subsidy becomes a viable livelihood strategy. Toldeños therefore might not welcome 
becoming responsible for decisions and processes with which they currently receive 
assistance from the Foundation. Whatever view is taken on this form of dependency, 
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it cannot be discounted when assessing local views on how much protagonism to 
ascribe to the toldeños themselves within the agroforestry initiatives.  
 
2. Where do we go from here? Directions for further 
research 
 
It seems often the case with research that what we discover serves to demonstrate just 
how much more there is to discover. What we might at the outset have seen as the end 
of an inquiry at the end seems merely the beginning of another. So it is with this 
thesis. I have said much on the importance of recognising the conservancy 
programme and the Alto Bermejo Project as exercises in knowledge transfer if we 
wish to understand who participates and on what basis. And I have repeated the point 
that the achievement of objectives in both depends more on what local people do not 
know, and less on what they do know. But I have said rather less on what might be 
called the ‘mechanics’ of knowledge transfer. That is, what and how do local people 
come to know about the conservation and development processes in which they 
participate, how do they incorporate, square or contrast it with what they already 
know (presuming they understand it or do not choose to ignore it altogether)? What 
are the factors which affect the processes of knowledge transfer and acquisition? In 
hindsight, perhaps a certain bias in my research design may be detected, which often 
proved better at establishing what local people did not know than it did at establishing 
what they did know, or how they had come to know it. These are important questions 
which have fallen largely outwith the scope of this thesis, but finding answers to them 
may prove fruitful.  
Consider the example of the first significant involvement in decision-making 
processes of the conservancy management committee (the structure comprising the 
executive committee, the area representatives and the Traditional Authority 
representatives). This took the form of a management workshop which took place in 
May 2004. It was held between conservancy management committee and an 
employee of the NACSO (Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organisations) 
Institutional Working Group to devise the conservancy’s management plan. This 
event gave the area representatives much information to report back to residents, 
although the extent to which they did so, and how they did it could not be 
 274
investigated within the timeframe of the research. Further questions could be posed 
with a view to: 
 
• establishing what notions about conservancy management representatives 
took away from the workshop 
• how they were translated and re-told in Damara (and/or Otji-Herero, or 
Oshivambo)  
• how they were re-presented to the people in their settlements and farmsteads, 
i.e. what was left in the account, what dropped out of the story and why  
• what people understood of what their representative had said at the end of this 
process  
 
This is a promising area for further research. Clarifying what information is available 
to members and residents in far-flung parts of the conservancy, and what becomes of 
that information could be very helpful for the people who design and run such 
workshops, the people whose task it is to convey conservancy-related information, 
and for residents themselves.  
There is, of course, a broad literature on which this direction of research could 
draw; indeed, it should be noted that I have already drawn implicitly on it, but have 
not exhausted its explanatory potential. The concepts of – and differences between – 
‘tacit’ and ‘codified’ knowledge have for some time been useful tools for grasping 
how we know what we know and how we might make it understood to others (cf. 
Polanyi 1966). Some of what we know is amenable to an explicit rendering – we can 
explain it verbally or write it down – thus allowing for the compilation and 
communication of the knowledge necessary for understanding how to complete a 
given task or process. Other things are known tacitly, in a fashion which is sufficient 
for understanding how to complete a given task or process, but is intuitive, not spoken 
or otherwise communicated (ibid). Such knowledge is acquired through direct 
experience, and is the essence of ‘learning by doing’. Devising methods to teach 
knowledge which does not lend itself to textbook description has received substantial 
attention (i.e. Baughn et al 1997). Another notion central to the ‘nature’ of knowledge 
is its embedded quality. Clearly, tacit or explicit knowledge is ultimately embedded in 
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people (Starbuck 1992), in the teams and networks in which they work; but it is also 
held to be embedded in tools and routines.  
Distance is a concept which manifests itself in various guises within the literature 
on knowledge transfer. One such manifestation of no little relevance to further 
research in Namibia and Argentina is that of knowledge distance. This refers to the 
gap between the respective knowledge bases of source and recipient (Cummings 
2003, citing Hamel 1991). A significant point to take from the literature on 
knowledge distance is the centrality of the relation of the knowledge of the recipient 
relative to that of the speaker (Cummings 2003). It is, further, possible to distinguish 
other types of distance. One type might be geographical distance (cf. Marshall 1920). 
I will not elaborate on this point, given how much has already been mentioned on the 
consequences for local participation of the large and isolated geographies across 
which the conservancy programme and the Alto Bermejo Project extend. It remains 
as an approach amenable to further research, nonetheless.  
Another type of distance might be called organisational or institutional. A focus 
on this type of distance might generate questions about the discrepancies between the 
institutions seeking to transfer knowledge and those seeking to receive it. It would be 
salient to point out here that in both the Namibian and Argentine contexts, the 
‘institutions’, governmental and non-governmental, are also gatekeepers of the 
conduits through which knowledge is to be transferred: those institutions are part of 
the transfer process and it is not always clear that their functions are fully understood 
locally, or to what extent they coincide with local priorities or decision-making 
processes.  
An example drawn from a part of the Alto Bermejo Project which I have not 
covered in the main body of the thesis is provided by the North Zone Committee of 
the Yungas Biosphere Reserve, that is, the local Biosphere Reserve committee that 
sits in Los Toldos. The committee does not serve its stated purpose as an arena in 
which local people can come together to debate and resolve issues related to local 
common-pool resource use (cf. Cornwall 2004). Rather, it is better seen as a contested 
political space in which different actors fight to establish the system through which 
decisions will be made and the resources available to the Biosphere Reserve through 
the Alto Bermejo Project will be controlled. Some actors saw the committee as a 
space which should at all costs be kept separate from the dominant dynamics of 
municipal politics. These same actors were very concerned that the municipal council 
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would appropriate the committee as a means through which to secure control over 
resources which could then be used to consolidate local political power bases. 
Consequently, the amount of debate around the legal implications of the committee’s 
formation – especially the perceived need to establish a constitution with a set of 
clearly-defined rules which all committee representatives would be obliged to follow 
– can be read in the light of a power struggle. One ‘side’ ostensibly wanted a 
decision-making process which would prevent available resources from being 
allocated on the basis of patronage, and charged the ‘other’ side of wanting the 
precise opposite.  
In this struggle, at least as viewed through the minutes taken for the North Zone 
Committee meetings, the same voices appear over and over, whilst other participants, 
who are listed as having attended, make little or no contribution. Why this should be 
the case may be related to what I call, as yet somewhat vaguely, as the ‘committee 
culture’. With the term, I wish to draw attention to those factors which increase the 
likelihood of some actors becoming vocal participants, whilst decreasing that 
likelihood in the case of other actors. Speculating on what these might be, I would 
include:  
 
• The level of education of the recipient – the majority of the more vocal 
participants had also finished secondary school or had attended university.  
• The level of independence from the resources of local government: the most 
vociferous critics of the local government had well-paid jobs with an 
independent source of income. There were attempts sometimes to remove 
these individuals from their jobs, but as long as the position was maintained, 
so too was the potential for critique.  
• The perceived local relevance of the matters discussed. Locally, I was given to 
understand, attending committee meetings could be seen as lazy, to be done 
by those who did not have more pressingly urgent matters (generally 
livelihood-related) requiring their attention. I was informed by some of the 
poorer committee members that their principal reason for participation was the 
pursuit of financial gain.  
• This is related to the final factor, that of understanding. Concerns were 
expressed by a number of the members with more formal education that some 
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members simply did not understand what was being spoken of at the 
meetings, which limited the extent to which they could participate. It seemed 
sometimes, when it came to voting on what decision to take, that some 
members would observe how ‘allies’ or figures of respected (cognitive) 
authority had voted, and use this to guide their own decision.  
 
These are fascinating dynamics which, with further recourse to the concept of 
knowledge distance, could be much better illuminated than I have been able to do 
here. It would be interesting to explore, for instance, local forms of decision-making 
processes regarding common-pool resource use and to compare them with the 
representative and direct types of participation that currently prevail in the Namibian 
and Argentine contexts respectively. To return to the North Zone Committee once 
more, one committee member told me that it was not widely understood why there 
had to be so much attention paid to the legalistic details of committee establishment. 
Why did the constitution have to be so clearly defined? Why was it that written 
consent for decisions taken was seen as so important? Indeed, written consent in 
particular was seen by that committee member as perhaps inappropriate in an area 
where much importance was attached to the spoken word as the binding basis for 
agreement.  
A third type is relationship distance, which refers to the ease or difficulty with 
which sources and recipients interact and share knowledge (Cumming 2003). Clearly, 
if two parties have a stormy relationship, any knowledge sharing exercise will 
become much more difficult, perhaps futile. We may wish to include here the ill-will 
consequences of bad personal chemistry, professional rivalry and an over-dependence 
on negative stereotyping which can be engendered by relationship distance. As I hope 
is by now abundantly clear, in both Namibia and Argentina, the relationship between 
government, NGO and also research actors could sometimes be fraught with 
underlying tension. Despite attempts to engage in diplomatic or constructive criticism 
on all sides, sometimes ill-disguised hostility increased the likelihood of one party 
rejecting plausible but critical (and sometimes unnecessarily personal or caustic) 
statements made by another. Tensions between NGO and local actors were also an 
issue in both contexts (see Reboratti 2003 for an Argentine example and , Sullivan 
2003b for a Namibian one).  
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Significantly, the greater the knowledge distance (in whatever sense), the more 
difficult the transfer process is rendered; in some cases it may become “almost 
impossible” (Hamel 1991 97). I do not wish to suggest that the sorts of knowledge 
transfer processes at the heart of the conservancy programme and the Alto Bermejo 
Project are characterised by such distance that the exercise is so difficult as to be 
futile. On the contrary, I am inclined to think that it is possible to transfer much of 
what is currently transferred: the more important point is to be able to grasp more 
fully what sort of knowledge is ‘recreated’ at the end of such transfer processes (cf. 
Cumming 2003). Having a better understanding of what is known, by whom and how, 
could be beneficial for intervention and for the formulation of policy. It provides a 
direction for future research only partially addressed by this thesis. The analytical 
tools offered by the literature on knowledge transfer may give us a better idea of how 
to go about extending the exercise to include more on local knowledge and the 
interaction between local knowledge and ‘external’ or ‘introduced’ knowledge.  
 
3. Wider implications for thinking on the relationship 
between policy and practice 
 
The final aim of this thesis is to make a contribution to wider thinking on the 
relationship between policy and intervention or, as David Mosse would have it, 
between policy and practice. I want to do so by drawing on Mosse’s account of this 
relationship in his compelling and controversial book, Cultivating Development 
(2005), noting where my own work is similar to his and where it differs. The 
responses to this book that I have seen concentrate principally on the ethical 
dimensions and polemics surrounding its launch (Mosse 2006, Sridhar 2005, Stirrat 
2005). Important though these are, I wish, in contrast, to make some tentative remarks 
about one of his conclusions, namely the possibility that good policy is “not 
implementable” (2005:20); though he later qualifies this and, citing Latour, argues 
instead that “policy design is ‘in contradiction’ with other ideas” (Latour 1996 92, in 
Mosse 2005:230). In either case, how does he arrive at this conclusion?  
Mosse views policy as a way to form and recruit networks of people and enlist 
support for the mobilisation of resources according to a way of doing things held to 
comply with specific criteria, be that participatory, gender-focused, poverty reduction 
etc. But these policy models may not be appropriate to the socio-historical setting to 
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which they are being applied, may fail to comprehend it or may have to address goals 
related to the maintenance of networks which get in the way of or have no impact on 
the project’s actual goals. In short, Mosse is concerned that explaining the success or 
failure of implementation in terms of good or bad policy design is to miss the vital 
point that “the operational control which bureaucracies or NGOs have over events 
and practices in development is always constrained and often quite limited” (2005:8). 
Success for Mosse has more to do with the extent to which a particular policy 
narrative used to interpret empirical phenomena continues to enlist the support of 
actors involved in a given development intervention (ibid). Success is not a matter of 
implementing a policy that will cause some specific thing to happen (i.e. the poverty 
of farmer a is reduced by a factor of x through policy p), but rather one of bringing 
together diverse and often fractious interests in conformity with a single interpretation 
of what is happening. Project managers, extension workers, consultants, community 
leaders, researchers and others all help in the translation of a vague policy goals – 
such as participation – “into practical interests; practical interests back into policy 
goals” (ibid:9).  
Because of the importance of mobilising and maintaining the relationships which 
legitimise practice, development intervention is not driven by policy, but rather by 
“the exigencies of organisations and the need to maintain relationships” (ibid:16). 
This ‘ordering of juncture and disjuncture’, as Mosse puts it, is attended by costs and 
risks. First, judging success and failure in terms of project models entails too much 
deductive generalisation on the part of donors, allowing little in the way of “inductive 
understanding of contingencies and instrumentalities, or open-ended learning” 
(ibid:232-233). Second, maintaining the legitimacy of policy models is a process 
mediated through “unequal relations of power”, and therefore “the orientation is 
always ‘upwards’ in international development. Even in ‘bottom-up’ projects, policy 
innovation comes from on top” (ibid:233). Because securing further funding requires 
projects to “reflect external agendas…rather than reflect their own organisational and 
social reality”, projects are “forever projections” (ibid, emphasis in original). Their 
actions and events have of necessity to be interpreted in terms of the policy text, their 
meaning prescribed within that context. Therefore: 
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for organisations as well as for local communities, empowerment or simply survival comes 
not through validation of their own knowledge processes or cultures, but through orientation 
to the knowledge and narratives of more powerful players (ibid:233) 
   
Because the most controversial aspect of Mosse’s work is probably the 
proposition that policy may be ‘unimplementable’, it is, in the interests of balance, as 
well to point out that he is at pains not to make the claim that policy is therefore 
irrelevant. Moreover, he identifies two ways in which the Indo British Rain-fed 
Project (IBRFP), the initiative that serves as his case study, ‘works’: “first, it 
established itself as an exemplar of policy, generating valid interpretations; and 
second, it had some positive local socio-economic effects” (ibid:231). 
This, at least, is my understanding of Mosse’s position. I now want to relate his 
work to my own. I have said that policy descriptions of local participation in both the 
conservancy programme and the Alto Bermejo Project cast it in the light of a grass-
roots experience. But this view ignores the fact that the privileged status of 
knowledge about sustainability is already established. This status determines in large 
measure what there is to participate in and renders some non-local actors 
indispensable, precisely because the achievement of policy objectives in both 
initiatives depends more on what local people do not know than it does on what they 
do know. I have ended up, then, saying something rather similar to Mosse. I am 
charting the discrepancy between ‘the policy line’ on what is said about who 
participates and on what basis on the one hand, and who I think actually participates 
and on what basis on the other.  
Where our work differs, though, is with regard to the conclusions reached about 
the cause and effect relationships between policy and practice. For Mosse, policy is 
not to be seen as a cause, but rather as “an end” (ibid; emphasis in original). Indeed, 
he comes very close to saying that practice causes policy, not the other way round. 
However, he also argues that “Policy provides the context for action and is crucial for 
a project like IBRFP to work”, in the sense of providing socio-economic benefits 
(ibid:232). This would appear to suggest some sort of fundamental causal link from 
policy to practice. Whatever form development practice assumes, it is caused partially 
by the existence of a context which calls for action and which provides resources for 
pursuing and realising such action. Action may not occur as per the policy script; but 
presumably it does not occur at all in the absence of a policy script and the resources 
connected to it. Mosse seems to me to write often about policy as wholly separate 
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from the practices it is supposed to influence. This is not at all a ridiculous 
proposition: it is analogous to differentiating a description from that which it 
describes. However, in appearing at some points to sever implicit causal links 
between policy and practice, and to reverse them at others, Mosse leaves himself 
open to the charge of not adequately specifying the causal relationship between policy 
and practice. Moreover, to the extent that Mosse does not entirely get away from the 
idea that policy does not cause practice, his grounds for claiming that policy is not 
implementable would appear to be compromised.  
In my view, cause and effect relationships between policy and practice cut both 
ways. That is, policy influences practice and vice versa, albeit in ways that are often 
difficult to predict and which do not always realise policy objectives. Endless 
contingency and conflicting interests notwithstanding, I do not think Mosse’s 
argument obliges us to abandon the idea that policy can be the cause of the 
achievement of at least some of its objectives. However, although I part company 
with Mosse in his conclusions regarding the relationship between policy and practice, 
I concur with many of the premises he draws upon and the arguments he makes. What 
Cultivating Development does so compellingly is to illustrate that the causal 
relationships between policy and practice are very complicated and seldom captured 
by present-tense policy descriptions which describe the logic according to which 
action will inevitably unfold long before that action has unfolded.  
Furthermore, it is hard to see how policy formulation could be harmed by a more 
nuanced understanding of what factors affect the practice that policy is transformed 
into. Mosse encourages us, rightly in my view, to engage more thoroughly with the 
complexity of such relationships without condemning or cutting all links with 
development intervention. It seems to me that this aim can be furthered by continuing 
to maintain that policy influences practice and vice versa, as it leaves open the 
possibility for researchers to continue to suggest ideas about what kinds of policies to 
follow, as well as ways in which those policies might contribute to bringing about 
positive change. I do not pretend to have, with my own research, a clearer account of 
the cause-effect relationships between policy and practice than Mosse, but that is a 
project to which the direction for further research I have outlined above may make a 
helpful contribution. By investigating how knowledge about sustainability changes 
and is changed by local level encounters with it, we may come to a better 
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